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Abstract
The thesis studies the dynamics of urban residential redevelopment programmes in Seoul 
and Beijing that have been effectively transforming dilapidated neighbourhoods in recent 
decades.
The policy review shows that neighbourhood renewal programmes saw difficulties in 
ensuring cost-recovery and replicability in both cities, and that this has led to the 
formation of residential redevelopment programmes that depend heavily on the 
participation of real estate developers in spite of social, economic and political differences 
between the cities of Seoul and Beijing. Based on research data collected from a series of 
area-based field research visits in Seoul and Beijing between 2002 and 2003, the thesis 
examines how developer-led partnerships in urban redevelopment take place in different 
urban settings, what contributions are made by participating actors and how 
redevelopment benefits are shared among the existing and potential residents in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods.
The main arguments in this thesis are as follows. Firstly, the emergence of profit-making 
opportunities in dilapidated neighbourhoods forms the basis of developer-led partnership 
among property-related interests that include the local government, professional 
developers and property owners. Poor owner-occupiers and tenants in both Seoul and 
Beijing assume a more passive role. Secondly, local authorities intervene to ensure that the 
partnership framework works, but this is carried out largely in favour of professional 
developers and absentee landlords whose material contributions are significant. Thirdly, 
redevelopment benefits are shared among existing residents in differentiated ways. The 
most affected in negative ways are the marginalised population whose social and 
economic status is increasingly threatened by the market risks in times of globalisation, 
urban growth and redevelopment in the 1990s.
This thesis concludes that partnerships in neighbourhood redevelopment do not have 
benign outcomes for all. Stronger government intervention is necessary in order to safe­
guard the interests of existing residents in dilapidated neighbourhoods, ensure their 
participation, and in particular, increase the protection of those increasingly marginalised 
by the process of redevelopment.
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1.1 Urban regeneration in Seoul and Beijing: 
the need  for empirical research
The Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, setting out the official position of the 
United Nations originally endorsed in December 1988, called for international efforts to 
“facilitate adequate shelter for all by the year 2000” by adopting “enabling policies, 
whereby the full potential and resources of all governmental and non-governmental 
actors in the field of human settlements are utilised” (United Nations 1988). Such efforts, 
however, seem to have been far from adequate, as a recent UN report suggested that one 
third of the world’s urban population is still living with inadequate access to housing, safe 
water or sanitation (UN-Habitat 2003a: 13-14). In developing regions, such residents 
accounted for 43% of total urban population.
The history of tackling shelter problems in developing countries since the 1950s revealed 
two contrasting approaches: slum improvement and upgrading versus clearance and 
redevelopment. The former strategy was largely popular among academics and 
practitioners, who were in favour of housing improvement set in local contexts, 
emphasising residents’ own initiatives for the mobilisation of their own skills, knowledge 
and resources (Aldrich and Sandhu 1995; Choguill 1999; Werlin 1999). Mass clearance and 
wholesale redevelopment were often denounced due to their destructive nature that 
caused irreversible damages to the delicate fabric of social networks within subjected 
neighbourhoods (Mukhija 2003).
The national and local governments in the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) and 
the People’s Republic of China (hereafter mainland China) thought otherwise. In these 
countries, slum upgrading only occupied a marginal position, and wholesale 
redevelopment has been a dominant urban renewal strategy. In the case of Seoul, an 
official survey conducted in 1979 indicated that nearly 17% of its housing stock turned 
out to be substandard and dilapidated. Most dwellings were informal and illegal as they 
were built on public lands without formal land tenure (EPBK 1982; KRIHS 1981: 961). 
From 1984, the majority of these dilapidated dwellings became subject to a revised urban 
renewal approach that was titled the Joint Redevelopment Programme (hereafter JRP). It 
aimed at wholesale redevelopment of dilapidated neighbourhoods, transforming them 
into high-rise estates. By 1995, dwellings provided through redevelopment accounted for 
17% of all the dwelling stock (or 25% of all the apartment units) in Seoul (Seoul 
Development Institute 1996: 188). The core feature that differentiated it from preceding
19
urban renewal approaches was the JRP’s project financing and management structure, 
which largely depended on real estate developers * participation in partnership with 
property owners. In the course of its application, the JRP, however, faced resistance from 
local residents, especially tenants, who were forcefully evicted without compensation. This 
was particularly true of the 1980s and early 1990s when tenants’ protests, violence, 
eviction and arrests were part of daily life, something that urbanites lived with and to 
some extent, ignored if not directly affected.
In the case of Beijing, a municipal survey of housing conditions conducted in 1990 
revealed that more than one quarter of inner city dwellings required urgent attention due 
to their structural instability and severe deterioration (Liu 1991a: 16). The mayor of 
Beijing gave a speech at the end of April 1990, which signalled a shift in the direction of 
Beijing’s urban renewal strategy towards enforced adoption of market principles (BMG 
1990). The particular programme devised thereafter was known as the Old and 
Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme (hereafter ODHRP). As in Seoul, 
Beijing’s ODHRP also aimed at wholesale redevelopment that mosdy resulted in high-rise 
commercial flats, which could be sold at market prices in the city’s expanding new housing 
market. This was to guarantee participating developers’ recovery of project costs and 
acquisition of development profits.
Since their inception, JRP and ODHRP have become the dominant urban policy for the 
renewal of dilapidated neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing, and transformed urban 
landscapes. While these programmes helped local authorities tackle housing problems in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods by resorting to the private sector’s financial resources and 
expertise, the end products (that is, new dwellings) of JRP and ODHRP projects appear 
to remain beyond the reach of most low-income residents. To the extent that poor 
residents in dilapidated neighbourhoods are excluded from entering their neighbourhoods 
transformed to accommodate more affluent groups of municipal population (Smith and 
Williams 1986b), JRP and ODHRP depict a process of gentrification as “the new urban 
colonialism” (Atkinson and Bridge 2004), having extended its reach to these East Asian 
cities.
Despite these programmes’ relatively long-standing history of implementation, their 
assessment is far from adequate. With regard to the JRP, academics and pundits began to 
interpret such renewal activities from a critical political economic perspective (fang 1998a,
20
1998b) or social justice and human rights perspective (ACHR 1989b; QIR 1988; Ha 
2001b; Kim 1998; Seo 1999). Most critiques focused on assessing urban renewal from a 
welfare perspective, criticising the lack of government attention to the provision of 
affordable housing for poor residents (e.g. Ahn 2002; Cho and Park 1995; Choi 1991; Ha 
1994,1999,2002; Kim et al 1996; J.Y. Lee 2000; Sohn 1995; Yoon 1997). Such literatures, 
however, were mostly macro-level without providing an insight into the nature of 
redevelopment and its post-redevelopment impacts on residents in local contexts.
With regard to Beijing’s ODHRP, in spite of the programme’s decade-long application, 
few international debates have taken place, which critically examine the programme. The 
news of intensifying urban renewal activities began to appear sporadically in international 
media only recently. The media attention, however, was mostly on evolving housing 
markets and the soaring prices of commercial flats in cities like Beijing and Shanghai 
which raised concern over increasing affordability gaps (e.g. The Economist 14 July 2001; 
The Economist 16 April 1998). At the outset of this research, only a handful of academic 
literature was available. This alerted us to the increasing influence of the real estate 
industry in urban renewal projects (Leaf 1995; Lu 1997), the issue of redevelopment 
compensation as a source of residents’ discontent (Abramson 1997; Zhang 1997), inner 
city residents’ relocation to suburban estates and development of informal housing 
consumption on urban peripheries (Leaf 1995), and urban renewal as part of the broader 
process of urban restructuring (Gaubatz 1999; Wu 1997). These thought-provoking 
writings, however, presented limited views on what was going on in Chinese cities at 
neighbourhood level, and how residents were affected and reacted in the process.
There is a lot more to learn regarding the renewal processes in Seoul and Beijing. 
Informed views on how different sectors (that is, the public sector, the private sector and 
local communities) partake in redevelopment neighbourhoods are limited. We are yet to 
understand why the JRP and ODHRP have become predominant renewal strategies in 
Seoul and Beijing, what contributions are made by participating developers, local 
authorities and residents, and what benefits are shared (or not shared) by partaking entities. 
In this respect, this thesis aims to present detailed empirical analyses of how the JRP and 
ODHRP operate at neighbourhood levels. The thesis aims to provide opportunities to 
gain insights into urban processes that strongly influence many families at low levels of 
income who find it increasingly difficult to settle due to the demolition and displacement 
which are part of neighbourhood transformation. The findings apply far more widely
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than the two countries studied.
1.2 Key hypothesis and research questions
The overarching objective of this research is to examine how developer-led partnerships 
in urban redevelopment came to operate in different urban settings, what roles were 
undertaken by participating actors and how redevelopment benefits are shared among the 
existing and potential residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods. Given the negative 
experiences in western cities and in other developing countries of having private sector 
participation in low-income neighbourhoods (LJN-Habitat 1993), the key hypothesis that I 
propose at the outset of this research is:
*Developer-led redevelopment does not benefit local residents.’
This key hypothesis is to be addressed in the light of the following questions that are 
considered throughout this study:
What were the living conditions in dilapidated neighbourhoods before 
redevelopment?
What opportunities were there in dilapidated neighbourhoods that enabled the 
establishment of developer-led redevelopment strategy? How were developers able 
to exploit these opportunities?
What roles were played by the private and public sectors in sustaining residential 
redevelopment?
What were the patterns of displacement and relocation of local residents upon 
redevelopment? What difficulties did local residents face upon displacement?
What were the impacts of redevelopment on local residents’ housing conditions?
Did all the residents share redevelopment benefits?
Were local residents able to contribute and participate as equal partners in 
neighbourhood transformation?
Who really benefited and lost?
1.3 Research framework and theoretical foundation
This section lays the theoretical foundation for the design of the research framework. 
Two main theoretical underpinnings are discussed: (1) the rent gap theory on urban 
renewal and gentrification and (2) the constraints perspective on residential mobility.
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Rent gap theory: a  critical perspective on urban renewal and gentrification
This research uses the theory of ‘rent gap’ as the main tool for the critical understanding 
of Seoul and Beijing’s urban renewal processes. The rent gap refers to the situation in 
which the actual rents derived from current conditions are far below the potential rents of 
newer development displacing the old. The rent gap theory allows us to understand and 
explain the main impetus behind the real estate investment in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
and developers’ participation. The theory focuses on the political economic conditions 
that lead to the production of gentrifiable properties in urban neighbourhoods, and how 
the human intervention is necessary to realise the development opportunities.
Rent gap theory, urban renewal and gentrification
Urban renewal with increased private sector participation is closely associated with the 
displacement of local residents who are too poor to afford upgraded or redeveloped 
dwellings. The phenomenon of local residents’ displacement due to housing rehabilitation 
or redevelopment at neighbourhood scale is often referred to as gentrification (Smith and 
LeFaivre 1984:50-51). Here, gentrification is defined as a process that accompanies capital 
re-investment in dilapidated neighbourhoods and subsequent replacement of poor 
households with more affluent groups that largely include growing number of 
professional/managerial class in post-industrial cities. Smith and Williams define 
gentrification as “the rehabilitation of working-class and derelict housing and the 
consequent transformation of an area into a middle-class neighbourhood” (Smith and 
Williams 1986a: 1).
The rent gap theory was first introduced by Neil Smith to emphasise the structural 
changes that drove gentrification (Smith 1979). Since its introduction, the theory has 
become a powerful analytical framework for the understanding of inner city decline, its 
renewal and residents’ displacement and gentrification (Clark 1988, 1992, 1995; Smith 
1987,1992,1996,2002; Smith and LeFaivre 1984; Smith and Williams 1986b).
The rent gap theory explains that neighbourhoods go through a devalorisation cycle 
before experiencing capital reinvestment and gentrification (Smith 1996; Smith and 
LeFaivre 1984). The devalorisation cycle includes new construction of structures and then- 
first use, disinvestment and abandonment. According to Neil Smith, there are three main 
sources that contribute to the devalorisation of properties: (1) improved labour 
productivity that makes it possible to build a similar structure at lower costs; (2) physical
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wear and tear; and (3) obsolescence of building style (Smith 1996: 63-64). The 
devalorisation cycle eventually leads to the “systematic decrease in the capitalised ground 
rent, reflected in lower house rents in an area and a relatively lower selling price for 
structures” (Smith and LeFaivre 1984: 50). Here, ground rent refers to the “claim made by 
landowners on users of their land,” and capitalised ground rent is defined as “the quantity 
of ground rent that is appropriated by the landowner, given the present land use” (Smith 
1996: 62).
As a neighbourhood goes through the devalorisation cycle, house values fall and so do the 
levels of capitalised ground rent (Smith 1996: 62-67). As the devalorisation cycle 
continues, it leads to the growth of a rent gap, which refers to the disparity “between the 
ground rent actually capitalised with a given land use at a specific location and the ground 
rent that could potentially be appropriated under a higher and better land use at that 
location [that is, potential ground rent]” (Smith and LeFaivre 1984: 50). Figure 1-1 shows 
this process of devalorisation and rent gap expansion. The rent gap expansion is further 
aided “by continued urban development and expansion... that has historically raised the 
potential ground rent level in the inner city'’ (Smith 1996: 67-68). For professional 
developers, owner occupiers and absentee landlords, the rent gap represents development 
opportunities.
Figure 1-1: The devalorisation cycle and the expansion of the rent gap 
(Adapted from Smith 1996: 65)
Dollars
House value Potential 
ground rent
Capitalised 
ground rent
Time (from construction date)
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Arguing against the consumption-side critics who focus on the production of gentrifiers 
(that is, new urban elites comprised of professional, technical and administrative workers) 
and their consumption preference (Beauregard 1986; Hamnett 1991, 1992; Ley 1980; 
Munt 1987), the proponents of the rent gap theory argue that it is not the existence of 
gentrifiers but the presence of rent gap which provides a fundamentally necessary 
material condition for urban renewal and gentrification processes. Consumer choice is still 
seen as important, but it is regarded as being ‘boostered’ by producers to create effective 
demand. For the proponents of the rent gap theory gentrification is more influenced and 
in fact produced by “builders, developers, landlords, mortgage lenders, government 
agencies and real estate agents involved on the production and supply side, and their 
actions and profit motives are essential to the process of rent gap expansion and closure” 
(Clark 1992:359).
Although the rent gap thesis was initially proposed to explain the causes of inner city 
gentrification in post-industrial cities, the rent gap expansion could also be “essential to 
the redevelopment process” (Clark 1992: 359). It is understood that gentrification 
encompasses rehabilitation and redevelopment. Gentrification through redevelopment 
occurs when demolition becomes the main method of closing the rent gap (Williams 
1984).
Presence of capital for the closure of the rent gap
As Clark noted, “Rent gap closure hinges on the active expression of demand for ‘higher 
and better uses’ of a site” (Clark 1992: 360), and the rent gap itself does not determine 
the type of end products a gentrifying area would come to possess. The closure of the 
rent gap requires a substantial presence of capital to be invested in built environment for 
higher profits (Smith and LeFaivre 1984: 53). It is argued that the capital to complete the 
closure of rent gap comes into existence through ‘capital switch,’ which refers to the 
process of capital flow redirection from the primary, production circuit to the secondary 
circuit of fixed assets and built environment (Smith 1986:29-30; Wu 1997:643).
According to the interpretation of David Harvey, capital switch takes place as a solution 
to the problem of capital over-accumulation, which is an inherent tendency in the primary 
(production) circuit of capital (Harvey 1981: 93-97). The capital flow into built 
environment presupposes two conditions: (1) the production of surplus capital and labour, 
which fosters long-term asset formation; and (2) the existence of a functioning capital
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market to enable the creation of ‘fictional capital’ (Harvey 1981: 96-97). The second 
condition is deemed necessary as the investment in built environment (or capital flow into 
built environment) is often difficult for individual capitalists. In this respect, the presence 
of “a State willing to finance and guarantee long-term, large-scale projects with respect to 
the creation of the built environment” (Harvey 1981: 97) would facilitate the capital 
switching process.
The switch of capital into the real estate sector has its own advantage and disadvantage. 
The investment in built environment in the form of infrastructure and land development 
for further expansion of production capacity is an advantage for the facilitation of the 
primary circuit of capital flow as it provides an opportunity for further accumulation and 
profit retaining. On the other hand, the investment in built environment requires a long­
term commitment, and spatially fixes capital in a locality As the new opportunities are 
found for additional investment, the tendency of over-accumulation prevails in the 
secondary circuit of capital in the form of over-investment in built environment, leading 
to potential crises of devaluation (Harvey 1981:101).
Human intervention in closing the rcnt gap
In gentrification literature, the proponents of consumption-side explanations commonly 
acknowledge that “neighbourhood decline is necessary but is not sufficient for 
gentrification to occur” (Beauregard 1986: 47). They aigue that it is important to look at 
the emergence of gentrifiers as a social group and their role as agents and consumers that 
enables and completes the process of gentrification (Beauregard 1986; Hamnett 1991; 
Munt 1987). This perspective, however, limits our understanding within the domain of 
individual consumerism and consumer behaviour with less attention paid to the socio­
economic and political contexts within which gentrifiable properties are produced.
The proponents of the rent gap theory argue that gentrification is not realised by the 
gentrifiers who merely close the circuit of production-consumption by consuming 
rehabilitated housing stock, and that the rent gap is not to be treated as a mechanistic 
determinant. Production-side critics focus on social relations and power struggles in a 
given locality that lead to human interventions.
“...the rcnt gap does not determine property development. Property development 
and rent gaps are determined by social relations and power struggles centring on the 
making and taking of values in the built environment” (Clark 1995:1490-1491)
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Contrary to consumption-side critics who treat state policies as “of secondary 
importance” (Bailey and Robertson 1997: 563), production-side critics argue that it is the 
political intervention that completes the transformation of ‘rent gap’ into actual 
development gains and, together with the conditions in a given locality, determines the 
end products of neighbourhood transformation. To the extent that the rent gap condition 
only provides material conditions for capital reinvestment, and that the profit realisation is 
achieved only by active political intervention, the public sector assumes a catalytic or an 
enabling role (Smith 1996).
The growth in the rent gap could also be influenced by “blighting effect of state and local 
government policy” (Badcock 1989: 142). For instance, school development, building 
height restrictions or land use zoning to restrict commercial development may discourage 
the full closure of the rent gap. As Smith (1987) noted, it is possible that “Not all 
neighbourhoods experiencing the rent gap may experience gentrification or 
redevelopment; some economic opportunities remain unexploited and specific local 
conditions may discourage the process” (ibid, p.464).
Constraints perspective on residents* displacement and relocation
Part of the objectives of this research is to find out the impacts of neighbourhood 
redevelopment on local residents by closely examining the changes in their housing 
experiences upon displacement. In redevelopment projects, most local residents are 
displaced involuntarily from their homes, forced to make decisions to move while facing 
various constraints that are beyond their control. In this regard, this research adopts a 
constraints perspective on residential mobility. This perspective views that institutional 
and structural constraints are more determinant for residential relocation than individual 
housing demands or preferences.
Since the seminal work on residential mobility by Peter Rossi in 1955, the existing 
literatures on residential relocation could be divided broadly into two main strands: the 
demand-oriented perspective and the constraints perspective. The demand-oriented 
perspective identifies residential mobility or relocation as a spatial adjustment process 
initiated by individual households to meet their needs arising from family life cycle, job 
relocation or personal life style preferences. This perspective focuses on the behavioural 
aspects of housing choice, placing households* “life cycle changes at the top of the list of
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sources of residential moves” (Rossi 1980: 37). The desire of households for a larger 
space, tenure change and more affordable accommodation significantly explains relocation 
behaviour (Clark and Onaka 1983). The homeownership of a high-quality, single-family 
home in a suburban setting is regarded as the stable state, suitable for child-bearing, and 
became a norm for middle-class families (Kingsley and Turner 1993:2; Michelson 1977).
In contrast to the demand-oriented perspective, the constraints perspective emphasises 
the supply-side constraints within which choices are made (see for example, Flowerdew 
1982; Moore and Rosenberg 1993; Murie 1974; Rex and Moore 1967). In this perspective, 
instead of focusing primarily on individual choices as in the behavioural approach, 
residential mobility was viewed as influenced by household expenses on the one hand, and 
the presence of institutional constraints such as households* access to existing financial 
provisions and public housing on the other (Flowerdew and Manion 1982:10-12).
These constraints might also be generated by the urban managers and ‘gatekeepers* who 
controlled and distributed scarce urban resources and facilities (Pahl 1970). Rather than 
adopting a narrow focus on local urban managers, it is important to set constraints within 
wider socio-economic processes (Gadwallader 1992:18; Flowerdew and Manion 1982:13- 
20). For example, in the United States, the exodus of middle-income families in the 1960s 
and 1970s from the inner city neighbourhoods to outer suburban areas once played as 
impetus for residential relocation, leading to the sharp increase in suburban population 
from 24% of national population in 1950 up to 70% in 1980 (Kingsley and Turner 1993: 
2). For urban poor families, however, the affordability crisis due to increasing income 
inequalities and limited availability of affordable rental units outside the central city led 
them to be trapped within inner city areas despite the situation that most new low-wage 
jobs were created in suburban cities (Apgar 1993; Kingsley and Turner 1993).
The supply-side constraints perspective acknowledges that residents also face 
information-constraints when making decisions to move. For instance, the study of 
Turner and Wienk (1993) on the residential segregation in Canadian cities reveals that 
fewer houses in minority areas or integrated neighbourhoods had been advertised in 
newspapers than those in ‘white areas.* The study also showed that real estate agents 
practiced discriminatory treatment against minority home-seekers, and steered them away 
toward minority areas, hence acting as barriers to the housing choice by minority 
households (Turner and Wienk 1993).
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From a structural viewpoint, such constraints would be shaped by the structure of 
housing provision that influenced the patterns of housing consumption and production 
through the dynamics of relationships among social agents involved (Ball 1986a, 1986b). 
The development of ‘rent gaps’ (the difference between the ground rent appropriated by 
landlords under current land use and the anticipated ground rent under a different land 
use) in inner city areas would drive gentrification, hence displacing or forcefully relocating 
low-income families (Smith 1996). Such processes could not readily be captured by the 
housing choice and demand-oriented perspective. Those supplyside constraints upon the 
decisions to move “tend to be much more place-specific” and “reflect the historical 
character of the stock ... as well as specific mixes of local regulation and development 
controls which interact with more general economic and programmatic trends” (Moore 
and Rosenberg 1993:125).
All the literatures above suggest that the decision to move by residents is not simply a 
function of housing adjustment to fulfil individual household’s housing preferences and 
needs, but is conditioned by institutional and structural constraints. The supply-side 
constraints perspective is particularly persuasive in this research that examines the 
experiences of residents subject to involuntary relocation and displacement within the 
context of neighbourhood restructuring through residential rehabilitation or 
redevelopment programmes. Such experiences are often beyond the control of residents, 
and are involuntary to the extent that their relocation is induced by external forces that 
change the existing neighbourhood structure.
1.4 Urban regeneration and partnership: evidence from the West
The research on which this thesis is based was first conceived by the realisation that the 
two cities, having experienced different urban development trajectories and distinct socio­
economic and political backgrounds, came to share a similar urban renewal strategy that 
relied heavily on developers.
Since the 1980s, urban renewal strategies in many European and North American cities 
have increasingly been shaped by partnership with the private sector (UN-Habitat 1993). 
Existing literatures on private-led development in western cities are mostly focused on the 
experiences of the UK and the US. The rise of New York, London and other of their 
post-industrial cities in the global competition for investment capital also seems to have
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made private-led, place-oriented regeneration more attractive in these cities. For these 
reasons, the background to how private sector participation in urban regeneration has 
been analysed and assessed largely draws on the experiences of the UK and the US. 
Existing literatures on East Asian experiences including South Korea and mainland China 
will be referred to throughout this thesis when necessary.
Private sector participation in urban regeneration
In the UK, with the development of the welfare state during the post-war years, local 
authorities carried out public service delivery, and when short of resources to meet 
service demands, received central government grants (Fainstein 2001: 6). In a similar vein, 
urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s was mostly implemented by local authorities, 
focusing on the provision of social housing, but it was the private sector that undertook 
the actual construction. In this respect, as Healey et al (1992) noted, public and private 
interests were in “a synergetic relationship” (Healey et al. 1992:216).
The UK experience differed from that of the US where the private sector actively 
participated in urban renewal during the post-war years. Scholars such as Squires (1996) 
point out that in the US, “the private partner dominated as the public sector’s role 
consisted principally of ‘preparing the ground for capital’” (Squires 1996: 275). Public- 
private partnership in the 1950s and 1960s largely focused on sub-urban expansion and 
slum clearance in urban ghettos near business centres and more affluent neighbourhoods 
(Fainstein 2001: 6). Public subsidies were provided to facilitate commercial development 
in downtown areas, to promote homeownership and sub-urbanisation through highway 
construction (Squires 1996: 273-276). Gregory Squires (1996) refers to the long-standing 
ideology of privatism in the USA for explaining the nation’s increasing reliance on public- 
private partnership for economic restructuring and urban redevelopment:
“The central tenet of privatism is the belief in the supremacy of the private sector 
and market forces in nurturing development, with the public sector as a junior 
partner whose principal obligation is to facilitate private capital accumulation”
(Squires 1996:267)
Since the 1980s, there has been a lot of policy interest in establishing partnerships with 
the private sector for carrying out urban regeneration. In the US, diminishing federal 
reserves for social services and urban renewal programmes led to re-visiting the concept 
of partnership, which is “widely perceived to be an innovative approach that is timely in
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an age of austerity'’ (Squires 1996: 267). In Britain, public-private partnership received 
renewed attention, this time the private sector assuming a leading role for rebuilding inner 
city areas where problems of declining industry, decaying infrastructure, poverty 
concentration and social polarisation were prevalent (Edwards 1984; Gore 1991; Healey et 
aL 1992; LJN-Habitat 1993). In the changing environment, the private sector became “a 
legitimate provider of public policy initiatives,” providing finance that used to be largely in 
the domain of local authorities (Healey et aL 1992:217).
As the public sector's direct intervention in urban renewal and housing development was 
substantially curtailed, public-private partnership was seen as a way of tapping the private 
sector’s financial resources and managerial skills (Cameron 1992). The Conservative 
government in this period considered partnership “as a means of transferring 
responsibility for urban regeneration to the private sector'’ (Bailey et al. 1995: 1). In his 
study on partnership agencies in Britain, Bailey et al (1995) identifies several factors that 
set the background for the rise of partnership in Britain. Firstly, economic recession in the 
1990s coupled with loss of jobs and declining manufacturing industry led to local 
authorities to seek for alternative strategies including “closer links with the private sector” 
(Bailey et al. 1995: 7). Secondly, local government control of major services was 
substantially transferred to the central government. For instance, local authorities were 
excluded from allocating development funds such as the Gty Grant that replaced Urban 
Development Grant in 1988. For local authorities, partnership was regarded as one of 
“new institutional arrangements at the local level in order to maximise both their 
influence and the leverage by which limited funds, or resources such as land, could be 
used to maximum advantage” (ibid, p.8). Thirdly, departmental competitions in central 
government to implement inner city initiatives led to the fragmented programme 
implementation, which called for “new alliances between local government, local 
businesses and the voluntary sector at the local level... as a partial response to the array of 
ill co-ordinated government initiatives” (ibid, p.9). Fourthly, there had been attempts by 
the central government “to give the private sector greater ownership of urban policy” 
(ibid, p.ll), also supported by business organisations such as the Confederation of British 
Industry.
Prevalence of property-based regeneration
Property-based regeneration has prevailed while pursuing public-private partnership 
approaches, and has become a governing strategy of urban regeneration in post-industrial
31
cities (Cameron 1992; Healey et al. 1992; Quilley 1999). Property-based redevelopment is 
also being preached in cities of developing countries that try hard to compete in 
globalising world, and a recent evidence of this process is witnessed in Shanghai (Wu 2000, 
2003). Place promotion and uiban re-imaging through ‘flagship’ projects have become 
dominant themes of urban regeneration (Bianchini et al. 1992), along with revitalisation 
of dilapidated or derelict urban lands in inner city areas which economic activities and 
affluent population once fled from. As Quilley (1999) noted:
There has been a pervasive homogeneity in the models of urban regeneration 
pursued by western cities since the 1980s. Common strands include flagship 
property developments and an emphasis on physical regeneration; environmental, 
and infrastructural developments aimed at increasing the quality of life (“liveability”) 
and attracting the expanding service class; waterfront and harbour developments 
typically featuring the development of marinas and the recycling of nineteenth- 
century warehouses for residential and office developments and as “heritage”; the 
expansion of the central business district; and a commitment to the twenty-four- 
hour city and cafe society”
(Quilley 1999:189)
Proponents of property-based regeneration argue that place-oriented inner city renewal is 
expected to generate further investment by enhancing commercial development 
opportunities (e.g. improved general appearances and increased funding possibilities) and 
reap economic benefits (e.g. job creation and new demand for service industry) that would 
eventually trickle down to poor neighbourhoods (Cameron 1992). Turok, for example, 
argue that property-based regeneration creates construction-related jobs, contributes to 
the expansion of indigenous companies, acts as a catalyst to attract further investment, 
revitalises run-down neighbourhoods, and initiates area-wide economic restructuring 
(Turok 1992).
Although inner city areas were experiencing multi-faceted problems including job losses, 
crime, poverty, poorly managed infrastructure and dilapidated housing, social problems in 
the worst neighbourhoods were of secondary importance, as governmental responses had 
largely taken a physical approach. In the UK, various subsidies such as the City Grants 
and Urban Development Grants were provided to support property-led regeneration and 
local economic growth. According to Jones (1996b), the UK government in the 1980s 
“sought to withdraw from the direct provision and subsidization of industrial property” 
(Jones 1996b: 801), and remove supply-side constraints to attract and win the confidence 
of private capital (Jones and Watkins 1996: 1129). The establishment of the Urban 
Development Corporations (hereafter UDCs) in the UK in the 1980s is often cited as
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representing the Conservative government’s property-led regeneration strategy. The 
UDCs were “non-elected agencies... set up with sole powers to execute policies leading to 
market-led, property-based regeneration” (Bailey et al. 1995: 15). As Parkinson (1988) 
noted, the UDCs were based on the assumption that “regeneration should be physically 
led by a single-puipose agency, free from the constraints of local democracy, which 
should establish at minimal public cost the conditions for private investment, which will 
generate wealth that will eventually flow back into the community” (Parkinson 1988 cited 
in Bailey et al. 1995:15).
In the UK, the New Labour government since the late 1990s has focused on 
implementing area-based regeneration and tackling social exclusion. In addition, 
improving urban environmental quality such as the physical and visual appearances of 
buildings and public space has been prevalent (Urban Task Force 1999). To this extent, it 
could be said that place-oriented property-led regeneration has survived under the Blair 
administration. Whereas such promotion of physical appearances was left to the private 
sector under the Conservative government, it was actively sought by the Blair 
administration (Booth 2005).
Role of the public sector in regeneration partnerships
The emphasis on private sector led to the modification of the role of the public sector, 
which increasingly became an enabler or facilitator, focusing on removing supply-side 
constraints and providing incentives and financial subsidies to attract private capital. Bailey 
et al. (1995) state that the centralisation of control in Britain in the 1980s weakened the 
autonomy of local authorities, which used to be strong and interventionist in the 
preceding decades. The central government in this process “engineered the transition of 
local government from being the primary agency to tackle inner city area problems to 
being one of many players” (Bailey et al. 1995: 18). This in turn laid the foundations for 
the formation of local growth coalition in order for local authorities to salvage what was 
left of its autonomy. Local authority initiatives that required allocation of central grants, 
however, had to be justified by involving support or participation of the private sector 
(Bailey etal. 1995:18-19).
Critical literature links the changes in urban renewal strategy closely with the change in 
urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Griffiths 1998; Harvey 
1989; Quilley 1999). The managerial form of governance, according to Griffiths (1998:
33
42), is characterised by state resource allocation and bureaucratic organisation of social 
services delivery on the basis of social welfarism. Structural changes (such as the 
economic recession, declining basis of manufacturing industry in traditional metropolitan 
areas, and changes in employment structure and relations) have led to the erosion of the 
basis of managerialism. A new form of class alliance has replaced managerialism in order 
for cities to survive and succeed in the new environment of diminishing territorial barriers 
for global capital movement and of intense inter-urban competition for jobs, resources 
and private capital investment (Harvey 1989). Local authorities have become more 
desperate “to pin down increasingly fleet-footed capital” (^ Cfeber 2002: 531). David 
Harvey (1989) notes:
“The new urban entrepreneurialism typically rests, then, on a public-private 
partnership focusing on investment and economic development with the speculative 
construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular 
territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic 
goal” (Harvey 1989: 8)
The ‘speculative construction of place* under entrepreneurialism entails risks, which are 
absorbed by the local public sector (Harvey 1989: 7). In other words, public sector 
subsidies ensure “private sector manoeuvrability... especially in areas of high risk” (Healey 
et al. 1992: 218). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, both local and central 
government initiatives to enhance private sector participation had “a remarkably 
consistent approach with the promotion of private investment and confidence by both 
financial pump priming and the removal of constraints” (fones 1996a: 205). The 
transformation from managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism in the LJK is thus 
government-led, fuelled by local authorities that strive to maintain its limited autonomy in 
times of centralisation of control by the central government. As Healey et al. (1992) 
argues:
“Not only has central government remained highly active in promoting and 
sustaining partnership, but local government, the original object of exclusion, has 
become increasingly entrepreneurial as it has fought to maintain its position in the 
public policy arena of economic development” (Healey et al. 1992: 219)
In the US, the local authorities are known to be more business-oriented, seeking economic 
growth in coalition with other private interests. This is interpreted as a growth machine, 
which is manoeuvred by a local growth coalition that combines land-based interests 
including local officials, their counter parts in the federal government, developers, real 
estate agents, mortgage lenders and so on (Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch 1976).
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Social consequences of urban renewal
Urban renewal during the last several decades has made profound changes to the 
landscape of major cities in the UK and the US. Policy makers and proponents of place- 
focused, private-led renewal processes seem to assume that urban renewal not only brings 
benefits for local economy and raise fiscal revenues for local government but also affects 
local neighbourhood positively by bringing in more affluent groups of population (Bailey 
and Robertson 1997:564-566).
On the other hand, a large number of researchers focus on analysing urban renewal and 
resulting gentrification as a negative outcome (Allen 2000; Atkinson 2000a, 2002; Goetz 
2002; LeGates and Hartman 1986; Marcuse 1986; Smith and Williams 1986b). They tend 
to focus on the scale of displacement, loss of affordable housing and to a lesser extent, 
social implications of gentrification (Atkinson 2002). In the United States, studies 
(LeGates and Hartman 1986; Marcuse 1986; Sumka 1979) showed that a substantial 
number of residents were found to be displaced due to gentrification. Marcuse (1986), for 
instance, showed that up to 60,000 households were displaced from abandonment, and 
between 10,000 and 40,000 households from displacement annually in New York. 
LeGates and Hartman (1981) also found that 2.5 million persons were displaced annually 
in the United States (LeGates and Hartman 1981 cited in LeGates and Hartman 1986: 
197). In Britain, few studies attempted to measure the scale of gentrification-induced 
displacement, but a recent longitudinal study based on 1981 -  1991 census data found that 
losses of working class, inactive and elderly groups of population from gentrified areas of 
Greater London turned out to be profound (Atkinson 2000b). The presence of social 
housing in gentrifying city centres in UK cities, however, seemed to have lessened the risk 
of displacement, though the economic opportunities resulting from urban regeneration 
were not shared by residents in deprived neighbourhoods due to labour market 
segmentation (Cameron and Doling 1994). Bianchini et al. (1992) are also sceptical of the 
redistributive effect of flagship projects in urban regeneration, arguing that they 
contribute little to local communities (in terms of the number of new jobs allocated) and 
small local business. It was also suggested that residents in deprived neighbourhoods 
would find it difficult to access new attractions often located in city centres (Bianchini et 
al. 1992:252-253).
Loss of affordable housing is also pointed out as a negative outcome of urban renewal 
and gentrification. In the United States, urban renewal in the 1960s led to the demolition
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of 404,000 dwellings by 1967, while only 41,580 replacement units were built to 
accommodate low- and middle-income families (Friedland 1983: 85 cited in Squires 1996: 
275). Redeveloped or gentrified dwellings are often beyond the financial reach of original 
poor residents. Gentrification occurs at a neighbourhood level (Smith and LeFaivre 1984), 
and this leads to the reduction of affordable housing available to original residents, 
resulting in what Marcuse (1986) termed as ‘exclusionary displacement’ (ibid, p.156). 
LeGates and Hartman (1986: 190-194) found in the review of existing studies that 
displacees tended to resettle within or close to their original neighbourhoods, and certainly 
within the same city This came however at the expense of spending more on housing.
Other research examined the consequences of gentrification upon displacees placed in 
wider social contexts. Displacement of disadvantaged residents through gentrification in 
the United States is reported to have resulted in increased racial and class conflicts 
(LeGates and Hartman 1986:194-196) and aggravated “residential polarisation of the city 
by income, by education, by household composition, and by race” (Marcuse 1986:169).
At the individual level, displacement also affected the well-being and health of the 
displacees especially when they were rid of “the opportunities to exercise an appropriate 
level of control” (Allen 2000: 459). Moreover, housing renewal and forced relocation had 
a significant impact upon people’s psychological well-being by disrupting the residents’ 
continuity in life through the demolition of one’s home that once helped construct 
his/her identity (Ekstrom 1994).
Inclusion of local communities in partnership
The focus on property-based redevelopment or physical approaches throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s overshadowed social approaches. In the UK, the evaluation of the 
operation of the UDCs conducted by the House of Commons Employment Committee 
called for the inclusion of local communities in sharing regeneration benefits (in this case, 
increased employment opportunities). The Committee argued that “UDCs cannot be 
regarded as a success if buildings and land are regenerated but the local community are 
bypassed and do not benefit from the regeneration” (House of Commons Employment 
Committee 1988: xxv para 89 cited in Jones and Watkins 1996: 1130). The stronger 
emphasis on communities and social needs was eventually reflected in the Conservative 
government’s design of a series of Challenge Funds including the Gty Challenge (initiated 
in 1991) and the Single Regeneration Budget (hereafter SRB; initiated in 1994), which at
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the outset “sought to achieve a balance between investing in people and places” (Oatley 
1998b: 14). These programmes aimed at allocating funds on the basis of opportunities 
rather than level of needs through competitive bidding processes. Each bidder was to 
form a non-hierarchical multi-sectoral partnership among various stakeholders including 
local business interests and local communities in affected areas, moderated by the local 
authority (Oatley 1998a: 148-149).
The orientation toward place-based policies for urban regeneration paid less attention to 
the betterment of local residents, as it was often believed that the development gains 
accrued would eventually trickle down to local residents by means of creating demands 
for new jobs and service industries. Findings in the late 1990s in Britain, however, 
suggested that there was no concrete evidence of redistributive effect of propertybased 
urban regeneration. In fact, it was noted that income inequality was exacerbated and social 
polarisation increased with some of the worst neighbourhoods becoming more isolated 
(Glennerster et al. 1999; Power 1996; Power and Mumford 1999; Smith 1999; Social 
Exclusion Unit 1998).
The attempts by the UK Conservative government as previously reviewed were also 
criticised as having lacked consultation with and representation of local communities in 
decision-making and evaluation processes. For instance, Baeten (2000) examines the 
regeneration process of the South Bank, London, and concludes that regeneration 
partnership and competitive bidding for funding failed to contribute to the empowerment 
of the disadvantaged population in these neighbourhoods despite the claimed objective of 
meeting social needs (Baeten 2000). Hart el al. (1996) also criticises the inclusion of 
business elites and the lack of representation of local community interests in non-elected 
agencies (in this case, the Training and Enterprise Councils or TEC) for doing little to 
prevent “the purposeful skewing of TEC boards in favour of business interests” (Hart et 
al. 1996:440) and made it difficult to reflect the needs of local communities.
Attempts to reflect community interests moved to the centre of urban policies in the late 
1990s. The impetus came from the New Labour government’s emphasis on tackling social 
exclusion and the concentration of multi-faceted problems in the worst-performing 
neighbourhoods (Glennerster et al. 1999; Wallace 2001). To some extent, New Labour’s 
area-based policies were the extension of place-oriented urban regeneration under the 
Conservative government in the 1980s and 1990s, but the main difference lay in New
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Labour’s emphasis on encouraging local communities to spearhead changes to come 
(Imrie and Raco 2003). Involving communities in planning and consultation and 
encouraging residents’ active participation in neighbourhood rebuilding were also 
regarded as a means to increase social capital (Social Exclusion Unit 1998). One of the 
latest policy interventions in area-based initiatives includes the promotion of a social mix 
through Low Demand Pathfinders programme (Cameron 2003). Stuart Cameron (2003) 
comments that this programme “reflects an explicit concern to ‘rebalance’ the population 
of disadvantaged and stigmatised neighbourhoods through ‘positive gentrification’” 
(p.2367).
Though it may be too early to evaluate New Labour’s attempts to foster community 
participation in urban regeneration, some literature provides a critical understanding of 
these. Community participation, tackling social exclusion and improving the 
environmental quality of urban space have been chosen as three main areas of action 
(Booth 2005: 262-263). The strategy to improve environmental quality leads to the 
process of gentrification disguised by the use of terms such as ‘urban renaissance’ and 
‘diversity1 without effectively addressing its potential negative consequences upon 
disadvantaged population (Lees 2003). Rob Atkinson (2003) argues that the participatory 
system of governance has provided communities with opportunities to exercise greater 
control over their lives, but failed to realise its full potential as communities lacked the 
right power, capacity and access to resources. He further speculates that a successful 
implementation of neighbourhood initiatives to transform a neighbourhood might lead to 
the displacement of many socially excluded individuals elsewhere (Atkinson 2003). 
Difficulties in accessing ‘insider5 knowledge and information along with cultural injustice 
(that is, negative portrayal of local neighbourhoods) also make it difficult to realise full 
participation of local communities (Morrison 2003). New Labour’s initiative to involve 
communities in project evaluation also seems to have failed to include local knowledge 
that could have contributed more telling stories of area improvement (Wilks-Heeg 2003). 
The importance of valuing local knowledge and listening to residents for regeneration 
policy evaluation has been also put forward by Mumford and Power (2003) in their work 
on family and community in East London.
Summary
This section has reviewed the evidence from the West regarding the increasing 
participation of the private sector in urban regeneration and its assessment. Drawing on
existing literatures largely on UK and the USA experiences, we learnt that private sector 
participation in urban regeneration has been in place for many decades. From the 1980s, it 
received renewed attention in order to supplement the public sector’s withdrawal from 
direct intervention and also to rebuild decaying inner city areas. The private sector was 
given a more leading role in pursuing property-based regeneration, which aimed at 
exploiting commercial development opportunities and economic growth. The public 
sector still played an important role and led the changes in regeneration strategies by 
removing supply-side constraints and providing incentives and financial subsidies to 
attract mobile capital. This role was that of an enabler or facilitator, interpreted in the 
context of urban entrepreneurialism. In social terms, urban regeneration led to the 
gentrification of regeneration areas, which was viewed as a negative outcome as it 
involved local residents’ displacement and loss of affordable dwellings. Although urban 
partnership promoted participation of all sectors concerned, it was far from achieving 
local residents’ empowerment, and failed to engage them in policy design, implementation 
and evaluation processes.
The review in this section has shown us that the increasing participation of developers in 
Seoul and Beijing’s urban regeneration has been a shared experience with the cities of the 
developed world, and that the study of Seoul and Beijing’s experiences would present an 
exciting opportunity to provide a platform to bridge conversations across borders. This 
review has also allowed this research to adopt a more critical approach for assessing 
developer-led partnerships with regard to the role of participating actors and impact on 
residents.
1.5 Thesis structure
The remaining part of this thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter Two reviews 
urban demographic and housing contexts to understand the production of dilapidated 
neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing. It also reviews the historic development of urban 
renewal policies in these cities, and outlines the implementation process of Seoul’s JRP 
and Beijing’s ODHRP.
Chapter Three explains the research methodology adopted in this research. It explains the 
use of a multiple case study approach applied at neighbourhood levels, the selection of 
field research neighbourhoods and interviewees, methods of data collection and analysis 
and research constraints encountered during field research visits.
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Chapters Four to Nine include research findings and discussions. Chapter Four examines 
the physical and social conditions that residents were exposed to before redevelopment. 
The findings help us set the local contexts within which public and private participation 
took place. The findings also provide us with information on local residents that could be 
used to discuss residents’ redevelopment benefits at later chapters.
Chapter Five addresses the issue of developers’ participation. It is argued in this chapter 
that the flow of capital into real estate sector and the expansion of rent gap in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods provided the economic rationale for their participation in neighbourhood 
redevelopment. This chapter also uses case studies of redevelopment projects based on 
my field research visits to understand the process of real estate capital participation at the 
neighbourhood level
Chapter Six addresses the issue of government intervention. This chapter explains that 
the growth of both JRP and ODHRP projects has been supported by the government 
intervention that provided policy incentives for participating professional developers and 
property owners. The chapter also examines the emergence of revised JRP and ODHRP 
approaches and their strengths and shortcomings by looking at case studies from my field 
research. The chapter also examines the degree of local residents’ displacement as a result 
of each redevelopment approach.
Chapters Seven to Nine document research findings about local residents’ experiences in 
redevelopment processes. Chapter Seven identifies constraints on residents’ decision to 
move upon displacement. Chapter Eight then examines residents’ post-displacement 
housing experiences by looking at dwelling space, physical conditions, tenure, housing 
costs and means of financing post-displacement housing. Chapter Eight discusses the 
limits of existing redevelopment framework regarding local residents’ participation in 
redevelopment processes, and examines their individual and collective responses to their 
neighbourhood transformation.
Chapter Ten concludes this thesis on the nature of developer-led partnerships and 
residents’ access to redevelopment benefits. It also provides a summary of beneficiaries 
and losers in Seoul and Beijing’s neighbourhood redevelopment. A reflection on the 
findings of this thesis draws lessons from this research. The chapter then outlines this 
study’s contributions to the existing body of knowledge, and identifies further research 
agenda.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has laid the foundation for this research by emphasising the need for 
empirical research to study developer-led partnership in Seoul and Beijing’s urban 
redevelopment and by outlining the key hypothesis and main research questions for the 
enquiries to follow. Two main theoretical foundations were introduced to construct the 
framework of this study’s analysis and discussion: rent gap theory to understand 
neighbourhood gentrification and urban renewal in dilapidated neighbourhoods; and the 
constraints perspective to explain residents’ moves and changes in housing experiences 
upon displacement. Evidence from the west where urban regeneration partnership has 
long been implemented was reviewed in order to gain insights into how partnership and 
property based redevelopment have developed and what impacts they have made on local 
residents. Existing relevant literature on urban growth and renewal in South Korea or 
mainland China will be used throughout this thesis. It is hoped that the comparative 
analysis of Seoul and Beijing’s redevelopment experiences will provide opportunities to 
gain greater insights into the understanding of the urban development in these East Asian 
countries.
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Chapter 2
Urbanisation, urban housing and the evolution of
renewal policies
2.1 Urbanisation and demographic changes
South Korea: from rapid population growth to stabilisation 
Mainland China: growth, stagnation, then expansion
2.2 Urban housing conditions
The case of South Korea and Seoul 
The case of mainland China and Beijing
2.3 Evolution of urban renewal approaches
Seoul: slum clearance, ad hoc settlements and renewal experiments 
Beijing: traditional settlements, over-crowding and renewal experiments
2.4 Implementation of partnership-based redevelopment
Joint redevelopment programme in Seoul
Old and dilapidated housing redevelopment programme in Beijing
2.5 Conclusion
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Urban conditions in Seoul and Beijing differed from each other, and also differed from 
those of developed countries where, as Anne Power noted, inner city problems in post- 
industrial societies originated from prolonged decay and abandonment (Power 1993; 
Power and Mumford 1999). Dilapidated neighbourhoods subject to redevelopment in 
Seoul and Beijing were exposed to lack of maintenance and originated under differing 
circumstances, but they were far from being abandoned. This chapter reviews urban 
demographic and housing contexts to understand the production of dilapidated 
neighbourhoods within each municipal context. It also reviews how Seoul and Beijing 
came to face the same problems of ensuring cost-recovery and replicability of urban 
renewal programmes before implementing the Joint Redevelopment Programme 
(hereafter JRP) and the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme 
(hereafter ODHRP).
This chapter consists of five main sections. The first section reviews urbanisation and 
demographic changes in Seoul and Beijing. The second section reviews urban housing 
conditions and identifies the extent of housing problems by the time these municipalities 
were to introduce the JRP and the ODHRP. The third section introduces the historical 
development of urban renewal policies to tackle dilapidated neighbourhoods. The fourth 
section outlines the structure of Seoul’s JRP and Beijing’s ODHRP, and the final section 
sums up this chapter with brief discussions.
2.1 Urbanisation and  dem ographic changes 
South Korea: from rapid population growth to stabilisation
Over the last five decades, South Korea has witnessed rapid urbanisation, converting itself 
from a war-torn nation into a highly urbanised, industrial society. This process was 
facilitated by the government’s industrialisation drive, supported through the 
implementation of a series of 5-year economic development programmes that started in 
1962. These programmes were aimed at creating and enhancing manufacturing and heavy 
industries in major cities around the country. The resulting employment and earning 
opportunities became major pull factors for urban in-migration. For instance, in 1966, the 
natural population growth in Seoul was estimated to be 1.92%, whereas the growth of 
municipal population due to in-migration was 7.4% (SMG 1975:253).
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The pace of urban population growth was outstanding. Whereas only about one-quarter 
of the national population resided in urban areas in 1960, the urban share of national 
population was 74.4% in 1990 (NSO Korea 2001a: 22-23). As of 1990, the level of 
urbanisation achieved between 1950 and 1990 was the second greatest increase of all 
Asian countries with 10 million or more inhabitants (UN-Habitat 1996: 75-77). The urban 
share of national population has been stable at around 80% since the mid-1990s (NSO 
Korea 2001a: 22-23).
Table 2-1 below clearly shows that until the 1990s, the growth rates of urban population 
and households were much higher than the national rates. The household size also 
decreased considerably during the urbanisation period, increasing the share of nuclear 
families (Yoon 1994: 23-25). The average size of urban households decreased from 5.12 
persons per household in 1970 to 3.76 in 1990, and then 3.18 in 2000 (EPBK 1973; NSO 
Korea 1992, 2001a).
Table 2-1: Annual growth rates of population and households in South Korea 
(EPBK 1973, 1977, 1982, 1987; NSO Korea 1992, 1997a, 2001a; Yoon 1994: 24)
National 1960 -1970 1970 -1975 1975 -1980 1980 -1985 1985 - 1990 1990 - 1995 1995 - 2000
Population 2.3% 2.0% 1.5% 1.6% 1.4% 0.5% 0.7%
Households 3.0% 2.9% 3.4% 3.7% 3.5% 2.7% 2.0%
Urban 1960 - 1970 1970 - 1975 1975 - 1980 1980 - 1985 1985 - 1990 1990 - 1995 1995 - 2000
Population 6.4% 5.3% 5.0% 4.3% 4.1% 1.6% 1.0%
Households 7.3% 6.2% 6.5% 6.3% 6.0% 3.5% 2.3%
One of the major characteristics of the urbanisation process in Korea is the expansion of 
Seoul to urban primacy. Seoul occupies only 0.6% of Korea’s total land area, but the share 
of municipal population in the national population grew from 13% in 1966 to 24.4% by 
1990 (EPBK 1968: 93; NSO Korea 2001a: 22-23). With one quarter of the national 
population living in Seoul, the city was positioned as the 11th largest urban agglomeration 
in 1990 next to Calcutta and Buenos Aires (UN-Habitat 1996:16-17).
Mainland China: growth, stagnation, then expansion
Soon after its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of China was noted for its 
rapid expansion of urban population. This 1950s’ growth was propelled by the 
industrialisation drive, set out by the new Communist government as an attempt to catch
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up with developed countries. There was a net urban inflow, supported by an increasing 
number of new recruits into expanding state enterprises, voluntary migrants in search for 
urban jobs, and involuntary migrants who were driven out in the process of rural 
collectivisation (Qian 1994: 33-48). Urban natural growth was also at high rates as a result 
of a post-war baby boom and reduced mortality rates.
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the urban share of national population remained 
stagnant, a phenomenon often referred to as ‘zero urban growth’ (Szelenyi 1981: 1-14). 
Those migrating into cities during the period of Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) were 
sent back to their places of origin. The decade-long Cultural Revolution from the mid- 
1960s also led to the massive rustication of urbanites (Chan 1994: 33-48). Extreme 
control was imposed on regional migration with the implementation of household 
registration system (commonly known as h u k o u  in Chinese). Formally implemented in 
1958, the hukou system has been 
functioning since then as a 
means to prohibit urban 
migration by associating people’s 
registration status with their 
access to social benefits and 
urban services. Since its 
implementation, only those non- 
agricultural segments of urban 
residents have been eligible for 
such benefits and services 
(Solinger 1999).
From the early 1980s, urbanisation took off again with the introduction of open-door 
reform policies. The share of urban population came to be more than 21% of national 
population in 1982, and since then increased rapidly to reach 40.5% by 2003 (see Figure 
2-1). It was recently forecast by the National Bureau of Statistics to rise at a faster rate in 
the coming years (NBS China 2004: 95).
Migrants in Beijing
Official statistics in mainland China make a distinction between permanent population 
(d o a n & h u  r e n k o u  in Chinese) and temporary population ( liu d o n g  r e n k o ii) . According to the
Figure 2-1: Increasing urban share of national population in 
China (% of national total)
(Chan 1994: 24-25; NBS China 2000, 2001a)
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hukou system, taking the example of Beijing, permanent population refers to those who 
hold permanently registered residence status within Beijing’s municipal jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, temporary population refers to those who have migrated from other 
provinces into Beijing for a limited period. In this case, their original hukou does not 
change and is kept in their place of origin. By regulation, migrants in mainland China are 
required to register for a temporary hukou if they are to stay more than three months 
away from their place of original residence (B. Li 2004). By 2002, the total number of 
Beijing population reached 15 million, and one quarter were registered temporary 
migrants (BMBS 2003a; NBS China 2004).
In official statistics, only ‘registered’ migrants have been reported, neglecting a large 
number of ‘unregistered’ temporary migrants. For instance, according to the result of a 
municipal survey in 1994, the total number of registered and unregistered temporary 
migrants in Beijing reached 3.3 million. Only one third of them turned out to be officially 
registered (BMG 1995; Zhang 1997:91). The migrants’ average stay reached 19.5 months, 
and 63.1% of them had been residing in Beijing for six months or longer (AGRI2002).
Due to complexities and burdens of acquiring official residence and employment permits, 
a large number of temporary migrants remained unregistered, facing limited accesses to 
fair employment conditions and social benefits including public housing (B. Li 2004: 21- 
24). Most migrants were of rural origin, and the majority of them were engaged in low- 
paid labour-intensive secondary or tertiary industries or in insecure temporary jobs (Gu 
and Liu 2002: 201-202). Accommodation was provided by their employers. If not, 
migrants relied heavily on private renting in the urban fringe where they could rent private 
housing from villagers, or joined existing migrant enclaves established in the suburbs (Gu 
and Shen 2003: 117-118; Jie and Taubmann 2002: 187-194). Therefore, temporary 
migrants were effectively excluded from sharing the benefits of rapidly expanding 
commercial housing market. Only a small portion of migrants who were highly skilled 
and educated enough to find well-paid jobs would have access to the private rental sector 
in inner city districts.
2.2 Urban housing conditions
This section discusses the urban housing contexts in Seoul and Beijing, and the degree of 
urban housing deterioration at the time of devising developer-led redevelopment 
programmes (JRP and ODHRP) in these municipalities. This section shows that the way
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in which housing was produced and consumed went through different trajectories since 
the 1950s, but both municipalities had a large number of dilapidated dwellings which 
posed problems to budget-constrained municipal governments.
The case of South Korea and Seoul
Post-war‘housing shortage* and production bias
The three-year-long Korean War (1950 -  1953) had deleterious influence upon urban 
infrastructure and housing provision. Sources suggested that during the war, up to 18% 
of the national housing stock was destroyed or made uninhabitable, and this rate reached 
50% in Seoul (W-J. Kim 1996: 106; Steinberg 1989: 52). Makeshift shelters and refugee 
camps were hastily erected with the help of foreign aid agencies (W-J. Kim 1996: 107). 
Illegal dwellings were built in any open space available. Such dwellings were often known 
as 'panjajibl which would be literally translated as a wooden-board framed house.*
Facing such a situation, housing debates in South Korea were dominated by a quantitative 
bias. This was strengthened by the government attitude that advocated the approach of 
‘one house per family.’ This became a government catch-phrase as early as 1971:
“Under the present condition of having 54.4% of housing supply ratio, the first 
priority is to overcome quantitative aspects of housing difficulties [shortage of 
dwellings], and hence, the first direction of municipal policies should be the 
‘orientation towards one house per family so as to endeavour at resolving the 
housing shortage phenomenon” (SMG 1971a: 117)
The outspoken concern was constantly about the rapid growth of urban population and 
small households, which were thought to have undermined the current growth of housing 
production capacity. Such a mismatch between housing supply and demand was coined as 
‘housing shortage.’ The degree of housing shortage was quantified in terms of the 
proportion of the total number of dwellings to the total number of households, and this 
ratio was known as ‘housing supply ratio.’ Increasing the housing supply ratio has been a 
major government agenda to this date, and has been a barometer to judge governments’ 
competence to achieve housing welfare for the general population. In urban areas, such 
housing supply ratio was estimated to be 55% in 1970, implying that nearly one in every 
two households had to share a dwelling unit on average (EPBK 1973:43-49).
In Seoul, the municipal administrative outline stated that the housing supply ratio for the
municipality was worse than the national average, having decreased from 50.1% in 1966 to
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45.7% in 1972 (SMG 1973: 185). An annual housing construction plan included target 
ratios to be achieved, which were often too idealistic. The Seoul municipal government set 
out an ambitious aim to achieve the housing supply ratio of 80% by 1981 (SMG 1973: 
186). However, the reality was that even a conservative measurement would yield a 
housing supply ratio of less than 60% by 1985 (Yoon 2002: 82).
Weak private sector and low investment in housing
In the 1960s, the housing supply in Korea was dominated by small-scale private builders 
who produced nearly 90% of new housing (see Table 2-2). Between 1962 and 1971, only 
12.6% were constructed by the public sector (KNHC 2001b: 232). A public housing 
agency called the Korea National Housing Corporation (hereafter KNHC) was established 
in 1962 to build homes for low-income households nation-wide, but its contribution 
remained minimal (1.4% of total housing production) (KNHC 2001b: 232).
Table 2-2: National housing production in South Korea 
(KNHC 2004; MoCT Korea 2002c)
Unit: dwellings
Period Housing Construction: Planned Output Housing Construction: Actual Output
Public % of 
planned 
total output
Private % of 
planned 
total output
Public % of 
planned 
total output
Private % of 
planned 
total output
1962 - 1966 475,340 40,266 8.5% 435,074 91.5% 325,935 39,915 12.2% 286,020 87.8%
1967 - 1971 500,000 30,000 6.0% 470,000 94.0% 540,338 69,613 12.9% 470,725 87.1%
1972 - 1976 833,000 250,400 30.1% 582,600 69.9% 760,591 228,766 30.1% 531,825 69.9%
1977 - 1981 1,260,000 477,000 37.9% 783,000 62.1% 1,116,074 495,378 44.4% 620,696 55.6%
1982 - 1987 1,731,000 798,000 46.1% 933,000 53.9% 1,399,372 716,098 51.2% 683,274 48.8%
1988 - 19921’ 2,000,000 900,000 45.0% 1,100,000 55.0% 2,717,682 905,294 33.3% 1,812,388 66.7%
1993 - 19971’ 2,850,000 1,350,000 47.4% 1,500,000 52.6% 3,125,797 1,173,018 37.5% 1,952,779 62.5%
Note: 1) The planned output figures for these years are taken from the Ministry of Construction and Transportation's Housing W hite Paper (2002: 61, 95).
The central governments attempt to increase housing production was often overly 
ambitious, and its projection under-achieved. For instance, the second five-year economic 
development programme (1967 -  1971) aimed at the construction of 800,000 dwelling 
units, which was roughly equal to one-fifth of the total number of existing dwellings in 
1965 (MoCT Korea 2002c: 27; Planning and Coordination for the Cabinet Office 1967: 
397). Once put into the implementation stage, the plan was substantially scaled down to 
aim for 500,000 units in order to save the government from humiliation (MoCT Korea 
2002c: 27).
The reality of the housing sector until the mid-1980s was that the private sector was weak, 
and the level of housing investment stayed relatively low despite policy emphasis on 
increased production. According to a report from the Korea Research Institute for
Human Settlements, the share of housing investment in GNP (gross national product) 
averaged 1.6% between 1962 and 1966, and below 3% between 1967 and 1971 (KRIHS 
1981:13-14).
When the Korean economy took off in the 1970s, the gross investment in fixed capital 
formation expanded sharply to support the nation’s industrialisation. The value of gross 
fixed capital formation (hereafter GFCF) as a share of gross domestic product (hereafter 
GDP) at 2000 constant prices increased from 14.9% in 1970 to 26.1% in 1985, and hit the 
ceiling of 39.3% in 1996 (The Bank of Korea 2004). The absolute amount of housing 
investment increased substantially in line with the expansion of investment in fixed capital, 
but the share of housing investment in real GDP hardly exceeded the 5% threshold level 
between 1970 and 1985 (see Table 2-3). In other words, the housing investment received 
less emphasis in comparison with other investments in facilities and non-residential 
construction in times of rapid economic development. Only from the late 1980s did the 
housing sector experience a substantial increase in investment when the newly elected 
government in 1987 announced a massive housing scheme to supply two million flats 
between 1988 and 1992. This period also coincided with the introduction and 
proliferation of developer-led urban redevelopment, indicating a renewed emphasis on 
strengthening the private sector.
Table 2-3: Annual rate of national housing investment in South Korea 
(The Bank of Korea 2004)
Housing investment as... 1970 1971 - 1975 1976 - 1980 1981 - 1985 1986 - 1990 1991 - 1995 1996 - 2000
% of GDP at 2000 constant prices 3.7% 3.9% 5.2% 4.5% 5.7% 7.7% 5.8%
% of GFCF11 at 2000 constant price: 24.9% 24.5% 20.9% 17.8% 18.8% 20.8% 17.3%
GFCF as % of GDP 14.9% 15.9% 24.9% 25.4% 30.4% 37.2% 33.4%
Note: 1) GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation
High-rise orientation
One interesting feature of the Korean housing market is the construction bias towards 
high-rise flats. As far back as 1969, the central government stressed apartment 
construction as one of its three main policy directions, stating that “in large cities, it is no 
longer encouraged to build individual houses, and the construction of apartment flats is 
to be facilitated” (Planning and Coordination for the Cabinet Office 1969: 366). The 
municipal administrative document also confirmed this policy shift:
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“The housing construction by the municipality has been transformed as of. 1969 to 
accord with the urban structure and to strengthen the degree of land utilisation by 
building high-rise apartments as per the [central] government policy*
(SMG 1971a; 253)
For instance, when the government made an announcement of its ten-year urban housing 
programme (1972 -  1981), the programme gave emphasis to the development of large- 
scale medium- to high-rise estates (called danji in Korean) (Planning and Coordination for 
the Cabinet Office 1972: 253-254). It was understood that such building practices would 
maximise the economy of scale and land utilisation. These estates were largely found in 
Seoul in its urban fringe where land mobilisation was relatively easier and cheaper. Each 
estate was huge in scale: for example, Mdkdang danji in southwest Seoul accommodated 
26,629 apartment flats (Yoon 1994: 86).
The increasing orientation towards flat construction can also be seen in other evidence. 
Firsdy, an increasingly large share of planning permits issued for new housing 
construction was for high-rise flats. In 1975, among the 131,850 units that received 
construction permits from the central government, high-rise flats (that is, above 5 storeys) 
constituted 21.0% (W-J. Kim 1996: 145). The share rose further to 66.8% by 1990 (W-J. 
Kim 1996: 145; KNHC 2001b: 232-233). Secondly, the public housing agency, KNHQ 
also focused mostly on medium- and high-rise flat construction. The share of apartment 
flats in the company’s annual housing production was on average 34.8% between 1962 
and 1966, but increased to 97.8% for the period between 1972 and 1981. Since 1987, the 
company has been producing apartment flats only (KNHC 2001b: 530).
Homeownership orientation
It is still the case that more than half of urban households are in the rental sector, and it is 
common for Korean families to share a sub-divided dwelling among multiple households. 
With the rapid growth of urban population and small households, accompanied by weak 
housing production capacity, the share of owner occupying households in urban areas 
decreased from 62.0% in 1960 to 41.3% in 1985 (EPBK 1987; Yoon 1994:27). The urban 
home-ownership rate has gradually increased since then, but it remained at around 40% in 
Seoul during the last two decades (see Table 2-4 below).
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Table 2-4: Changing trends of tenure structure in South Korea, 1980 - 2000 
(EPBK 1982, 1987; NSO Korea 1992, 1997a, 1997b, 2001a)
Region Tenure 1980 1 9 8 5 1995 200 0
Urban areas Owner occupation 43.0% 41.3% 46.3% 49.0%
Tenancy 55.4% 55.7% 51.9% 48.8%
Others (e.g. rent free) 1.6% 3.0% 1.9% 2.1%
Seoul Owner occupation 44.5% 40.8% 39.7% 40.9%
Tenancy 54.2% 56.5% 58.8% 57.5%
Others (e.g. rent free) 1.3% 2.7% 1.4% 1.6%
In contrast with the tenure distribution, new housing production was targeting 
prospective homebuyers, and long-term public rental housing was scarce. A vivid example 
would be the share of housing produced by the KNHC for rental and sale (see Table 2-5 
below). The KNHC produced 682,988 units in total between 1962 and 1991, and about 
one third were for sales on the market. From this, one would mistakenly conclude that the 
public agency focused on producing rental units to supplement the homeownership- 
oriented private market. However, the reality was that the majority of these rental units 
supplied were for less than 5 years’ rental period, after which they became subject to sales. 
Rental units for a longer lease period appeared only in the late 1980s.
Table 2-5: Total output of KNHC housing in South Korea, 1962 - 1991 
(KNHC 1993: 258-259; 2004: 486-487)
Period Total Outf>ut
For sales For rental
0  + (D © © Renting Period Employer- Rental
% of total 
output
% of total 
output 1 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years
provided 
rental flats1*
dwellings for 
foreigners2*
1962 - 1966 5,159 5,097 98.8% 62 1.2% 0 0 0 0 0 62
1967 - 1971 7,739 6,731 87.0% 1,008 13.0% 300 0 0 0 0 708
1972 -1976 54,420 35,770 65.7% 18,650 34.3% 18,015 0 0 0 0 635
1977-1981 154,031 106,314 69.0% 47,717 31.0% 46,632 0 0 0 0 1,085
1982-1986 186,678 151,384 81.1% 35,294 18.9% 0 29,994 5,000 0 0 300
1987-1991 274,961 86,185 31.3% 188,776 68.7% 0 76,015 0 104,955 7,806 0
Total 682,988 391,481 31.3% 291,507 68.7% 64,947 106,009 5,000 104,955 7,806 0
Note: 1) These are built by the KNHC, and sold to other companies to be rented out to their employees. The rental period was set to be 50 
years intially, but in 1994, it was reduced to 10 years, and again in 1998, to 5 years; 2) These dwellings are provided for those foreigners 
stationed in Korea.
Housing poverty and sub-standard dwellings in Seoul
By the early 1980s, housing poverty still prevailed in cities despite the government’s 
emphasis on new housing construction, providing justification for intense renewal 
activities in the years to come. Table 2-6 below presents a summary of housing conditions
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since 1980.1 By 1980, just before the introduction of the Joint Redevelopment 
Programme (JRP), nearly two thirds of existing urban dwellings turned out to have no 
access to modem kitchens and flush toilets. Close to half of all dwellings in Seoul were in 
similar conditions. The per capita floor space for urban households was estimated to be
9.3 m2.
From 1990, the census started to take the number of households as the basis for the 
estimation of housing conditions. The result of the 1990 census revealed that, although 
the per capita floor space increased to 13.0 m2, a little more than one third of all urban 
households still had no access to modem kitchen and flush toilet.
Table 2-6: Housing conditions in South Korea: Urban areas and Seoul 
(EPBK 1982, 1987; KNHC 2001b; KRIHS 1981; MoC Korea 1992; NSO Korea 1992, 1994b, 1997a, 1997b)
Urban areas 1980 1985 1990 1995
Number of ordinary households 
as reported in the census
(households) 4,669,976 6,330,798 8,462,417 10,031,978
Hrwicinn cfnrk ftinifr^ 9 dfifi 9no A CAC ~iA 4 c c c i  c n r
dwellings still reached 25.5% (163,543 units) (SMG 1973:185).
Since 1972, the Seoul municipal government took a decisive step, which somewhat 
resembled a military action, in order to prevent any further construction of illegal 
dwellings. Throughout the whole municipality, aerial photographs were taken four times a 
year while 159 ground surveillance posts were set up in informal settlements to prevent 
any new construction of illegal dwellings. Existing residents were encouraged to report 
any new illegal dwellings, and officials deployed routine patrols (ibid, 192). Such 
comprehensive measures to identify and eradicate new illegal dwellings did provoke a 
widespread feeling that illegal dwellings, if ever built, would soon be found and 
demolished by the government. The annual number of new illegal dwellings noted by the 
municipal government decreased considerably from 21,589 units in 1970 to 1,160 units in 
1973, and then to 783 units in 1976 (SMG 1977:175)
Such draconian measures were, however, far from eliminating existing informal 
settlements in Seoul. Municipal statistics still showed that the share of illegal and 
substandard dwellings in the total municipal housing stock remained as high as 15.5% in 
1980 (Ha 2001b: 387-388). Only with the implementation of laige-scale residential 
redevelopment from the mid-1980s did illegal, substandard dwellings start to be 
extensively removed.
The case of mainland China and Beiiina
Public housing provision during the pre-reform period, 1949 -  1978
In mainland China, the rapid urbanisation in the 1950s increased urban housing demand. 
Moreover, the new government initiation of large-scale capital projects in cities led to the 
demolition of many existing dwellings, offsetting any growth in the overall urban housing 
stock. The ruling of the Communist Party and the political instability discouraged housing 
production in the private sector. Urban authorities also lacked resources either to provide 
new dwellings within their jurisdiction or to carry out maintenance of rental dwellings 
under their control. Instead, major investment in housing came from the central 
government via state enterprises and institutions which were striving to provide 
accommodation for their expanding work force, as they rapidly increased their share in the 
total industrial output (Wang and Murie 1999b: 63-67).
During the pre-reform period, the state sector came to account for more than 80% of
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total national industrial output (NBS China 1999: 423). Under the planned economy, state 
enterprises had to turn over most of their profits to their supervisory government 
agencies, and in return, received central construction funds that could be invested in their 
operations. Part of these central construction funds were retained so as to provide their 
employees with welfare benefits. While the staff and workers in work units generally 
received a low salary, the consumer price was heavily subsidised, and it was the 
distribution of in-kind benefits including housing, which largely compensated the nominal 
wage. As the state sector expanded its share of industrial output, so did the public 
housing sector. According to the first national survey on housing stock in 1985, almost 
75% of total urban housing stock was provided by employers (Wu 1996:1603).
Lack o f investm ent in housing
During the pre-reform period, housing investment largely depended on the capital 
construction investment funds allocated by the state to local governments and enterprises. 
The capital construction investment funds included “the productive investment for the 
main part of a project and the non-productive investment for facilities and services 
attached to it” (Wu 1997: 649). The investment in housing fell in the non-productive 
investment category under the planned economy, receiving low priority. With the 
structural tendency for underinvestment in non-productive areas, the investment in 
housing was even suppressed in times of economic boom (Wu 1997: 649-651).
Figure 2-2: National housing investment in mainland China, 1955 - 1989 
(Compiled from Tables 2-1 and 2-2 in Hong 1999: 104-105, 110)
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According to the World Bank, housing investment as a proportion of GNP averaged only 
1.5% during the pre-reform period of 1949 to 1978 (World Bank 1992: 2). In the case of 
the share of housing investment within capital construction investment, it stayed at only 
around 5% during the same period. This, in fact, contrasted sharply with the estimates 
since the reform began (see Figure 2-2). Such lack of investment in housing during the 
pre-reform period not only discouraged new housing construction but also led to the 
poor maintenance of existing stock. It was reported in a national housing conference in 
1977 that “in all the then 187 designated municipalities {she shi) as a whole, the average 
annual repair bill (let alone management, maintenance and additions to the housing stock) 
per square metres of public housing stood at 2.1 yuan, whereas the rental income was a 
mere 1.0T (Kirkby 1990:297).
Allocation o f public rental bousing
Before the reform, the capacity of employers to provide housing for their employees 
largely depended on the allocation criteria of central construction investment funds. The 
allocation of such resources was carried out “through negotiations between the central 
and local governments, and between the government department and subordinated 
enterprises” (de Rosario 1988 cited in Wu, 1996:1607), The rank of state enterprises and 
institutions in the administrative hierarchy was, therefore, significant. Enterprises directly 
under a ministry of the central government were in a more favourable position than small 
municipal enterprises. As Bian et al. found, the housing system before the reform 
favoured enterprises and institutions “that were (1) in the state sector, (2) managed by 
central ministries, and (3) local, with a higher bureaucratic rank” (Bian et aL 1997: 234). 
Within state enterprises, larger enterprises or those engaged in large capital projects were 
more likely to receive larger shares of the capital construction funds from the central 
government. Informal contacts with the gatekeepers, known as guawci in Chinese, were 
also deterministic, distorting state policies in many cases (Wu 1996:1607-1608).
On the other hand, small/street-level enterprises were short of funds to provide welfare 
housing for their employees. They had to rely on public rental dwellings managed by the 
municipal housing bureau, which itself was under budget constraints (Wu 1996: 1606). 
Major state enterprises in cities were under the direct control of their supervisory central 
government organs, which meant that revenues generated by such enterprises were 
directly transferred to their supervisory government agencies, bypassing municipal 
governments. In such circumstances, urban authorities could only rely on the revenue
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transfer from those enterprises under their direct control. Such municipal-level enterprises 
were mostly smaller in size and weaker in terms of financial capacity than state enterprises.
Urban housing reform and increased investment
Since the 1980s, urban housing has been central to urban reform policies in order to 
improve the performance of state enterprises and the living conditions of urban residents. 
Housing reform was first introduced with an emphasis on sharing responsibilities by 
adopting a so-called ‘three-pillar system.’ This called for diversified sources of investment 
from the local government, enterprises and employees (Hbu 1999; Li 2005). A strong 
emphasis was placed on promoting homeownership and introducing market components 
in the housing sector so that housing was no longer treated as welfare goods but as a 
commodity in a market (Duda et al. 2005; Wing and Murie 1996,1999b; Zhou and Logan 
2002). Monthly rents in the public rental sector were to be substantially increased from 
1 -3% of household income to 15% to cover basic maintenance and management costs 
(World Bank 1992:28). Public rental dwellings in good conditions became open to sales to 
sitting tenants, and potential buyers were drawn towards the expanding commercial 
housing sector to become owner occupiers. To assist homeownership, the Housing 
Provident Fund was established as the backbone of China’s new housing finance system. 
It was fundamentally an employment-based system, first introduced in Shanghai in 1991, 
and received monetary contributions from both employers and employees (World Bank 
1992: 30-32).
The urban housing stock experienced a dramatic increase during the reform period. There 
was a massive boom in housing construction as well as a surge in housing investment 
throughout the whole nation. The housing investment as a proportion of GNP jumped to 
7.6% by 1988 from an average of 1.5% during the pre-reform period. The housing 
investment as a share of national gross fixed asset formation also dramatically increased 
from 7.4% in 1978 to 25.8% in 1989 (World Bank 1992: 2-5). Unlike the pre-reform 
conditions under which the major source of housing investment came from the central 
government’s capital construction investment funds, a large share of the increased 
investment in housing in the 1980s came directly from the state and collective enterprises.
This was made possible by the financial reform in the 1980s, which included the 
introduction of a ‘contract responsibility system.’ This system enabled enterprises to gain 
some degree of operational autonomy and retain self-raised funds that could be used to
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improve their performance and invest in projects outside their state budgetary constraints 
(Morris et al. 2002: 363). The growth of self-raised funds fuelled the increase in housing- 
related investment especially between mid-1980s and mid-1990s when the state enterprises 
emerged as the main buyer and financier of new commodity housing (Wang and Murie 
1996,1999a; World Bank 1992; Wu 1996,1997).
However, the poor performance of state enterprises in recent years has also created 
difficulties for the state sector to provide welfare housing as before. The World Bank 
(1996: 1-6) reports that since the end of the 1980s, the state enterprises experienced a 
radical decline of their profitability, measured as per cent of their fixed assets, from about 
15% in 1987 down to below 6% in 1994 (World Bank 1996: 1-6). Consequendy, the role 
of state sector as the main financier would be subject to a serious question.
Deteriorating urban housing conditions
By 1978, the housing conditions in cities were in need of urgent attention. Per capita 
living space in cities declined from 4.5 m2 in 1952 to 3.6 m2 in 1978 (Kirkby 1990: 295). 
Due to the under-investment in the housing sector and the lack of construction of new 
dwellings for many decades until the end of the Cultural Revolution, “densification and 
subdivision of the existing housing stock” had been the main means of accommodating 
urban growth (Wii 2004: 456). Despite the increased housing investment during the early 
years of reform implementation, the conditions of older dwellings in cities worsened. 
One of the major problems was the lack of maintenance and management funds. For 
instance, in Beijing, the maintenance and management fees in 1987 were, on average, 0.46 
and 0.10 yuan/m2 respectively The average rent of dwellings, however, was 0.11 yuan/m2 
in 1987, and the rent for one storey dwellings (known as pirigfang in Chinese) was even 
lower, causing further deterioration due to near negligence (Sun and Zhang 1989:7).
According to a nation-wide survey of urban housing conditions in 1985, more than half 
of the residents in Beijing (52.7%) did not have a private kitchen (Fan 1989). Nearly two 
thirds (62.7%) had no access to private toilets, and only half (49%) had in-house tap water 
connection. Beijing’s per capita use space turned out to be 8.77 m2, placing the capital city 
as one of the regions with the worst conditions (see Figure 2-3 below).
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Figure 2-3: Per capita use space across provinces in mainland China (for urban housing only) 
(Compiled from Table 1 in Fan 1989: 30)
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Gose to one quarter of Beijing residents (24.39%) were classified as the housing poor.2 
The incidence of ‘housing poverty7 was much more severe in inner city districts (25.58% 
of those surveyed) than in suburban districts (9.91%) (Fan 1989: 32-33). Only 43.9% of 
Beijing residents lived in self-contained dwellings (d o e n g ta o  in Qiinese). The results of a 
housing survey carried out by the Beijing Municipal Property Management Bureau in 1990 
revealed a wide scale of run-down pingfang dwellings, most of which were concentrated 
in inner city districts (see Table 2-7). Of all the pingfang dwellings in the municipality, 
more than one quarter (13.62 million m2) were classified as Grade 3, 4 or 5 dwellings3 that 
were eventually subject to urban renewal (Liu 1991b: 16).
2 ‘Housing poor’ was defined as follows: (1) those families residing in uncomfortable conditions (e.g. three 
generations living together in one room; parents and a child of 12 years old or older living together in one 
room; two or more children of different gender, aged 12 years or older, living together in one room; two 
couples living together in one room); (2) those families living in over-crowded conditions (i.e. households 
whose per capita living space is less than 2 square metres); and (3) homeless families (e.g. couples without 
their own dwelling after marriage; households residing in non-residential units; households living in make­
shift shelters or in relatives’ or friends’ dwellings) (Hong 1993).
3 The grading system refers to the classification by the Beijing Municipal Property Management Bureau,
which is applied to each dwelling: “Grade 1 is new and in good condition; Grade 2 is structurally sound and
weatherproof but in need of repair, Grade 3 is structurally sound (Le., columns, beams, and bearing walls
are intact) but suffers from leaking roof, crumbling masonry, and/or broken windows or doors; Grade 4 is
structurally unsound but not in imminent danger of collapse; Grade 5 is hazardously dilapidated” (Wu 1999: 
225).
Per Capita Use Space in 1985 (sq.m) 
National Average
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Table 2-7: Old and dilapidated housing distribution in Beijing 
(Compiled from Table 1 in Liu 1991b: 16)
District Total pingfang dwellings 
(million m2)
Old and dilapidated pingfang dwellings
Grade 3 
(million m2)
Grade 4  and 5  
(million m2)
Total 48.60 7.52
15.5%
6.10
12.6%
Inner city districts 21.92
2 s“ % 20.9%
Near suburban districts 26.68 1.92
7.2%
1.51
5.7%
2.3 Evolution of urban renewal approaches
In spite of the differences in the development of housing systems in Seoul and Beijing, 
both cities came to have a large number of dilapidated dwellings in the 1980s. Policies
------------ ^   K1»--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- T T T ii- l - ,
dwellings. For instance, right after the military coup in 1961, the owners of illegal 
dwellings subject to demolition were to be put on trial in a military court (Chosun Ilbo 
news report on 20 May 1961 cited in Kim et al. 1996:74).
The slum clearance and relocation of residents, however, faced certain limitations that 
made it difficult for the municipal government to carry it out for long. First of all, there 
was lack of public land for existing residents’ relocation (Kim et al. 1996:79). In the 1960s, 
the number of illegal and substandard dwellings was increasing rapidly despite the 
municipal efforts to contain them. The provision of public lands for residents’ relocation 
was not a sustainable option in the long term. Secondly, relocation sites were located on 
urban outskirts, and were not adequately serviced for living. Moreover, only about 20% of 
these sites were found to be fit for residential use, and displacees often had to bear land 
preparation and development costs themselves (fang 1998a: 27-28). Thirdly many 
displacees faced the loss of employment opportunities as jobs were scarce around 
relocation sites. They had to pay for the increased transportation costs to commute back 
to the city centre. Eventually they re-sold the de facto use rights of their allocated public 
lands, and returned to the city centre (Jang 1998a: 27-29).
An exemplary case was a site-and-services programme on a large site called Gwrngu danji, 
which was located south of Seoul, 20 km away from the city centre. Started in 1966, it was 
proposed as a relocation site of displacees from illegal settlements in city centre (Ha 1994: 
109; S.-H. Kim 1996: 91-92). It was planned that 550,000 residents in total were to be 
relocated, accounting for 14.5% of the municipal population in 1966 (S.-H. Kim 1996:91- 
92; SMG 1999: 82). Despite its ambitious layout, however, the scheme came to an abrupt 
halt in 1971 when large-scale protests by the relocated residents broke out. The scheme 
was doomed to failure, given that the provision of infrastructure and services was poor, 
that there was no alternative employment in the area, and that residents’ original places of 
work were beyond the reach of many households due to high transportation costs. Only 
about 20% of the original target population were relocated in the end (S.-H. Kim 1996: 
92).
Experiments in the 1960s: formalisation and self-help programme
While the Seoul municipal government carried out the demolition of illegal dwellings and 
residents’ relocation to city outskirts, it did not completely rule out more benign 
approaches. One such measure was to formalise some designated illegal settlements on
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the condition that they be upgraded to conform to urban planning regulations. This 
measure was put into practice in 1967. In total, 10,161 illegal dwellings were subject to this 
measure, about 7.4% of all illegal dwellings identified at the end of 1966 (Kim et al. 1996: 
75, 81). Designated settlements were to rid themselves of any illegal and substandard 
characteristics. All the expenses incurred, however, were to be bome by the owners of 
such dwellings. There was no other support from the government apart from its 
supervisory administration (Kim et al. 1996: 81-82). The financial pressure imposed upon 
dwelling owners made it difficult to sustain this programme in the long run.
Another programme conceived by the municipal government was a self-help programme, 
named the ‘Gtizen’s Apartment Programme.’ This programme aimed at replacing illegal 
dwellings with modem walk-up blocks. It first appeared in 1968, and lasted only about 3 
years. In this programme, the municipal government was to provide services for the land 
preparation and the construction of the basic building framework Dwelling owners were 
to complete any remaining building works at their own expenses (Kim et al 1996: 81). It 
initially aimed at constructing 2,000 blocks (90,000 flats), but only achieved to build 406 
blocks as the programme came under serious criticisms when one of the completed 
blocks collapsed in 1970 due to poor structural conditions. Criticisms included that there 
was a large-scale corruption in awarding building contracts and that the owners of illegal 
dwellings could not afford the financial burdens and sold their stake to off-site higher 
income residents (Ha 1999:277).
Experiments in the 1970s: ‘Temporary Act on the Promotion of Housing 
Improvement
In light of the difficulties in dealing with mushrooming illegal dwellings in Seoul, the 
municipal government made a proposal to the central government for the enactment of a 
special law so as to enable the municipal government to apply more systematic efforts to 
eradicate illegal dwellings and settlements. Temporary Act on the Promotion of Housing 
Improvement (hereafter Temporary Act) was thus enacted in 1973. It aimed at completing 
the ‘improvement’ of all illegal and substandard dwellings by 1981, which was the year the 
Act expired. The key to this Act was to allow the free transfer of ownership of those 
public lands occupied by squatter dwellers from the state to the municipal government. In 
this way when an illegal settlement on such public land becomes subject to renewal, land 
sales revenues could be retained by the municipality, providing it with financial resources 
to proceed with subsequent renewal of other setdements (Kim et al. 1996: 85). The ideas
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behind the enactment of this Temporary Act could be seen in the administrative 
statement by the Seoul municipal government below:
“What is urgent in reality is to tackle the illegal, substandard dwellings that exist in 
disorder in great numbers all around the city... these dwellings impoverish 
mountains and fields; cause inundation of rivers and flooding of urban districts; 
make citizens sick due to the pollution from contamination; cause low self-esteem 
that produce social problems as there are no benefits of having cultural facilities; 
and degrade the facade of Seoul. [Therefore] it is inevitable to improve these illegal 
dwellings and put them in order* (SMG 1974:331)
The Temporary Act was the first attempt by the government to legislate the renewal 
process of illegal/informal setdements in South Korea. It ultimately targeted 
approximately 121,000 dwellings in 230 project areas in Seoul, which accounted for about 
three quarters of 155,467 illegal dwellings identified in December 1973 (SMG 1974: 345- 
346). Any units excluded from this programme were subject to demolition (Kim et al 
1996: 86). The main urban renewal method adopted under the 1973 Temporary Act was 
the self-help renewal by means of either ‘in situ upgrading’ or ‘clearance and 
redevelopment’ depending on site conditions.
In situ upgrading under the 1973 Temporary Act
In the case of in situ upgrading, owner occupiers were to take the initiative, pay for the 
expenses of upgrading their dwellings to the standard prescribed by the Building Act. Any 
conflicts among residents were to be resolved by negotiation (Kim et al. 1996: 83; J.Y. Lee 
2000: 11). The municipal government was responsible for carrying out public works 
including the installation of tap water connections and the construction of at least 4 
metre wide thoroughfare (Kim et al. 1996: 83). The in situ upgrading programme was 
initially introduced in 1971, targeting 47,887 illegal dwellings in 220 project areas, and was 
later incorporated into urban renewal programmes under the 1973 Temporary Act.
The programme, however, only managed to achieve the upgrading of 9,976 units by 1973, 
and 1,203 units between 1974 and 1983 (f.Y. Lee 2000: 11). The major reason for such 
hindrance was, again, too much financial burden upon dwelling owners. They bore as 
much as 54% of all the costs incurred (J.Y. Lee 2000: 10). There were also difficulties in 
coming to a compromise among the residents for the installation of basic infrastructure 
and services, as such works involved selective demolition of dwellings in the path (Kim et 
al 1996: 84).
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Clearance and redevelopment under the 1973 Temporary Act
The focus of the 1973 Temporary Act was on implementing ‘clearance and 
redevelopment’ programmes, which consisted of two different approaches. The first 
approach was often referred to as the ‘self-help clearance and redevelopment,’ applied 
between 1973 and 1975 (Kim et al. 1996: 87). Lands were to be re-defined into larger 
housing lots (usually at least 165 m2) so that shared ownership among several households 
could make it easier to build ‘corporative housing’ of higher density. The dwelling owners 
were required to finance all the costs incurred for the purchase of public lands they 
illegally occupied; for temporary accommodation until re-housing; and for the 
reconstruction of houses after clearance.
The second approach that presented important implications for the practices in the 1980s 
was the ‘consigned redevelopment.’ It called for the organisation of a steering committee 
among owner occupiers, and consigned the clearance of dwellings as well as the 
construction of apartment flats or multi-dwelling houses to a private builder. The 
municipal government was to recommend private builders of good reputation, and 
assumed a supervisory role during the project period. Twenty to thirty households were to 
come together so as to define approximately 1,000 m2 of housing lot, and construct 
dwellings with higher density (Kim et al. 1996:96).
These two approaches were very limited in scale. The ‘self-help clearance and 
redevelopment’ programme was only applied to 1,418 illegal dwellings, far from reaching 
the municipal government’s initial target of 6,731 dwellings (Kim et al. 1996: 92). The 
total number of dwellings that were redeveloped by the ‘consigned redevelopment’ 
programme only reached 2,253 dwellings in 12 project areas (Kim et al. 1996:96).
Limits of renewal programmes in the 1970s
The renewal programmes trialled in the 1970s faced many problems. Firstly, for most 
owners who were under considerable financial constraints, it was too cosdy to meet all the 
building requirements imposed upon them, leading to a very low participation rate (Jang 
1998a: 45). These trial programmes all incurred large costs on the residents’ side in order 
to finance the construction of dwellings and temporary accommodation during a project. 
Secondly, many dwelling owners opted for in situ upgrading that required less financial 
input compared to clearance and wholesale redevelopment. Such request was, however, 
often against the municipal preference that hoped to transform the fagade of the
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municipality to establish a ‘modem’ look before the expiration of the Temporary Act in 
1981 (Kim et al. 1996: 95-101; SMG 1983: 335-336). Thirdly, conflicts among residents 
also deterred the smooth operation of redevelopment projects. When in situ upgrading 
was applied, it was difficult for them to come to an agreement regarding which dwellings 
were to be demolished in order to give way for infrastructure installation and road 
construction. Furthermore, the promotion of shared ownership to define larger housing 
lots in order to build apartment flats or multi-dwelling houses was also subject to disputes, 
as some dwelling owners considered it as a restriction upon their exercise of property 
rights (Kim et al. 1996:95-101; SMG 1983:335-336).
Despite all these problems associated with the trial measures in the 1970s, they still 
presented a set of useful experiences that fed into the establishment of the Joint 
Redevelopment Programme in mid-1980s.
Beiiina: traditional settlements, over-crowdina and renewal experiments
The tendency for under-investment in ‘non-productive’ sectors such as urban housing and 
services led to near negligence of existing dwellings’ maintenance. When opportunities of 
increased investment rose, state enterprises focused on new housing construction. In 
Beijing, the redevelopment of substandard dwellings only began to take a meaningful 
shape after the implementation of housing reform measures from the 1980s. During the 
early period of reform era in the 1980s, the focus was still on the construction of new 
dwellings by utilising unleashed investment in ‘non-productive’ sector. Facing the 
mounting problems of deterioration in inner city districts in particular, the Beijing 
municipal government began to seriously take the issue of urban renewal, acknowledging 
the absence, and hence the needs, of uniform policies for the redevelopment of 
dilapidated dwellings and neighbourhoods. In this regard, this section summarises the 
evolution of redevelopment approaches in Beijing from the planned economy period, and 
outlines the shaping of the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme 
(ODHRP) that began to appear from 1990.
Capital building, 1949 -  1966
The period from the Liberation in 1949 until the commencement of nation-wide fever of
the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s could be characterised as the period of capital
building that involved major building and infrastructure projects (e.g. administrative
buildings around the Tiananmen Square and the Beijing railway station). Dwellings that
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stood in the way were demolished, and residents were displaced to relocation dwellings 
provided by the municipality
In the Old Gty area (defined as the area within the second ring road), there was 
approximately 17 million m2 of building space at the time of the Liberation, 65% of 
which was of residential use. Most dwellings were pingfang units.4 Only about 5 -6% of 
such pingfang units could be identified as old and dilapidated, posing no immediate threat 
to the overall quality of urban housing stock at that time (Dong 1989: 11; Wu 1999: 49). 
The approaches taken towards the Old Gty area in general by the municipality could be 
identified as follows: (1) use of the Old Gty area as the centre of the national capital city 
in order to save the costs of building a new centre elsewhere; (2) redevelopment of the 
Old Gty area as soon as possible, demolishing outdated and dilapidated pingfang units; 
and finally, (3) more emphasis on redevelopment than preservation (Dong 1989: 11). In 
this regard, there was lack of attention given to such pingfang dwellings for their 
management and timely maintenance.
Replacement of pingfang dwellings with higher density flats, 1966 -  1974
This period was under the influence of the Giltural Revolution, which advocated minimal 
destruction of workers’ dwellings. If any dilapidated pingfang dwellings were to be 
demolished, they were replaced with two- or three-storey jianyi zhufang literally translated 
as simply constructed housing (Dong 1989: 12). These were of low standard, built with 
thin brick walls to accommodate one bedroom in general with residents to share kitchen 
and toilet.
In the 1970s, a more systematic approach, known as ‘rolling snowball (in Giinese, gm 
xueqiu)’ approach, appeared for housing reconstruction (ibid, 12). This was in principle to 
provide three times as many dwellings as before demolition by means of building five- or 
six-storey walk-up blocks. Original residents would be re-housed upon project completion. 
Remaining vacant units were to be reserved as relocation dwellings for other residents 
subject to similar projects. In this way, it was envisaged that the overall number of new 
dwellings would expand rapidly as such renewal projects took place. In reality this
4 According to the 1985 Housing Survey these one-storey pingfang was found to be the major housing 
form, accommodating 45% of the surveyed urban residents in Beijing. The next most common built form 
was medium-rise residential blocks, home to about one third of the residents surveyed (Hong 1993).
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ambition was never fully realised. Although this approach survived until the late 1980s, 
each project took a long time to complete, and such long project cycles made the 
approach unpopular (Dong 1989: 12). Furthermore, the densification of residential space 
placed more constraints upon under-invested infrastructure and utility services within the 
municipality (Wu 1999:50).
Infilling instead of renewal, 1974 -  mid-1980s
From 1974, employers were given the right to develop housing units for their employees 
on their own premises. This led to a phenomenon of 'jiarfeng doalrnmeaning that any 
available spaces were filled in with buildings. At the same time, existing pingfang dwellings 
(traditional courtyard houses in particular) underwent a massive infilling process to 
provide temporary shelters to accommodate refugees from the Tangshan earthquake in 
1976 (Dong 1989:12; Wu 1999: 51). About 2 million m2 of such temporary shelters were 
built. A documentation of an infilling process in a courtyard house showed that a typical 
courtyard house experienced “55 per cent increase in built area within the confines of the 
lot and a loss of ... about 75 per cent of the 1950s courtyard area” between 1950s and late 
1980s (Gaubatz 1999: 1516). These measures led to a dramatic increase in the total 
amount of housing construction. During the period from 1974 to 1986, the total amount 
of new housing construction recorded about 7 million m2, which represented 70% of 
total housing construction since the Liberation.
Renewal experiments in the late 1980s
Prior to the ODHRP announcement, the Beijing municipal government implemented a 
few pilot projects in 1987 to test the feasibility of different approaches towards urban 
renewal These included projects in Ju’er Hutong, Xiaohoucang, Dongnanyuan and Debao. 
Based on the outline by Liangyong Wu who took the lead for Ju’er Hutong project (Wu 
1999:52-54), these approaches are summarised below.
The first approach was concerning the ownership. The original residents residing as public 
rental tenants in pilot project areas were presented with an opportunity to buy 
redeveloped dwellings at a preferential price that only covered basic costs, and become 
homeowners. If they were to pay in one lump sum, they were given 20% discount. They 
could also pay in instalment over the period of 10 years or less. Loans were provided by 
approved banks at low rates, and some were able to get financial support from their 
employers. If households were too poor to buy a completed dwelling, they could rent a
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redeveloped unit on site at low rents with a deposit of 50 —80 yuan per m2. The low rents, 
however, re-created the municipal-wide problems of poor maintenance and management, 
as the rents could not cover necessary costs.
The second approach was to propose residents’ relocation to suburban districts by 
offering favourable terms. “Because of the rent differential in the city core and the 
suburbs” (ibid, 53), the residents who could not afford to pay for a redeveloped unit were 
presented with an option to be re-housed in the suburbs. Such dwellings were usually 
provided by the developer in charge of the redevelopment project. If a family did not 
prefer any of these options, they could also “exchange their right to a unit in the 
redeveloped neighbourhood directly with another household in the Old Gty” (ibid, 53).
The third approach was regarding the recovery of the costs by developers. Commercial 
spaces or any units which were not taken up by original residents could be sold or leased 
by developers on the commercial housing market. In Xiaohoucang project, the revenues 
generated in this way could finance 63% of the total investment. In Debao project, it was 
85%. “There is an incentive, therefore, from both the developer’s and the government’s 
point of view, to limit the number of original residents who may return: the more units 
sold as commodity housing, the more funds can be raised for profit and further 
redevelopment” (ibid, 54).
Finally, the fourth approach was regarding the regulatory support framework by the 
government to provide incentives for developers. These included interest-free loans to 
developers, tax incentives and reduced charges to developers for the provision of 
infrastructure services in redevelopment neighbourhoods.
2.4 Implementation of partnership-based redevelopment
Having experimented with various renewal approaches, the municipal governments of 
Seoul and Beijing came up with partnership-based wholesale redevelopment programmes 
that relied heavily on professional developers to solve the problems of cost recovery and 
replicability and ensure financial feasibility of redevelopment projects. This section 
examines the establishment of the JRP and ODHRP, their progress since inception and 
the outline of their key principles and implementation processes.
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Joint redevelopment programme in Seoul
Establishment of the JRP: key principles and its progress
The emergence of the Joint Redevelopment Programme (sometimes known as 
‘cooperative’ or ‘partnership’ redevelopment programme) was based on the reflection of 
the municipality’s trial programmes up until the early 1980s. Redevelopment financing was 
defined as the most important pre-requisite for the successful transformation of 
dilapidated neighbourhoods which experienced heavy concentrations of substandard 
dwellings and low-income households.
The key to the JRP approach was to build high-rise flats to the maximum density 
permitted by the planning regulation so that any remaining units after allocation to 
participating property owners could be sold on the market to recover development costs. 
In this way, it was expected that financial contributions from property owners could be 
reduced as much as possible, hence encouraging greater participation. The Seoul 
municipal government announced a detailed guideline on 24 January 1984, titled ^Detailed 
Implementation Guideline for the Joint Redevelopment Programme.’ Its main contents 
were as follows (fang 1998a: 57; 1998b: 270; Kim et al. 1996: 106): (1) property owners 
(owner occupiers and absentee landlords) would form a redevelopment association, which 
becomes the main organisational body for redevelopment implementation; (2) the 
redevelopment association would select a professional developer (or a consortium of 
developers) as its partner to carry out the redevelopment; (3) professional developers 
would pay for up-front costs and provide subsidies to assist residents’ temporary 
relocation; (4) upon completion of relocation, illegal dwellings would be demolished 
without compensation whereas legal dwellings would be entitled to a certain amount of 
compensation subject to an independent appraisal; and finally, (5) the developer would 
construct up to twice as many dwellings as the demolished units so that remaining units 
after allocation to the property owners could be sold on the open market to recover their 
investment and retain profits. Although there have been changes to the guideline over the 
years, the principle of establishing partnership between property owners and developers, 
and of participating developers as the main financier remains unchanged to this date.
Table 2-8 below shows the summary of redevelopment projects that received ‘project 
implementation permission’ (Stage 2 in Figure 2-4 on p.71) between 1972 and 2004. ‘Self- 
help upgrading’ in the table refers to all those programmes that tried to mobilise the
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dwelling owners as the main financier of upgrading programmes. As shown in the table, 
the JRP has been the dominant renewal strategy since the mid-1980s, and continued to 
flourish throughout the 1990s. Of 129,867 dwelling units subject to redevelopment since 
the early 1970s, 80% became subject to the JRP. Since there were in total 160,686 
dilapidated dwellings in Seoul (about 17% of total municipal housing stock) identified by 
an official survey conducted between March and April 1979 (EPBK 1982; KRIHS 1981: 
961), the majority of these dilapidated dwellings could be said to have been subject to the
JRP.
Table 2-8: The status of neighbourhood redevelopment implementation in Seoul 
(Housing Bureau of SMG 2005)
Classification
1972 - 1976
_  .....................
1977 - 1981
.................. ...
1982 - 1986 1987 - 1991 1992 - 1996 1997 - 2001 2002 - Present
Sub-total
Sub-total Project areas
1 anH aroa frrA
17 44 48 47 79 55 32 347
5.3% 12.9% 10.3% 12.0% 34.9% 15.1% 6.0% 100.0%
JRP Project areas 0 0 38 47 79 55 32 276
Land area (m2) 0 0 1,317,495 1,858,238 5,022,021 2,036,825 800,273 11,720,764
Dwellings demolished 0 0 11,769 15,557 45,289 19,608 7,760 104,677
Self-help Project areas 17 44 10 0 0 0 0 71
upgrading Land area (m2) 815,647 2,420,507 186,737 0 0 0 0 3,422,891
Dwellings demolished 6,821 16,713 1,656 0 0 0 0 25,190
Note: The summary is based on the approval year of the project implementation plan by the government.
Outline of the JRP implementation process
The JRP was designed to redevelop old and dilapidated urban neighbourhoods by 
implementing projects on a partnership basis (Choi 2002). Local authorities, developers 
and property owners assume a different role and contribute their financial and/or 
organisational resources to transform such neighbourhoods into modem high-rise estates.
At the core of this approach lies the partnership agreement between the redevelopment
property owners transfer all the rights to the developers to clear occupied land and 
dwellings. Such an arrangement effectively reduces the large amount of initial investment 
in land acquisition (Yoon 1997: 108). The sales of redeveloped flats enable cost recovery 
and profit maximisation. In return, a portion of redeveloped flats is set aside for sales to 
property owners (that is, redevelopment association members) at discounted price.
As for the property owners, their partnership with professional developers provides, in 
principle, an opportunity to trade their existing dilapidated dwellings with new units at 
discounted price. They are given an opportunity to redevelop their dwellings and 
neighbourhood by relying on the financial and technical contribution from developers of 
their choice (Ha 2001b). They are released from the burden of financing, and managing to 
some extent, the whole project as this is taken care of by participating developers. If their 
dwellings stand on public lands, they are entitled to purchase the land to formalise their 
land tenure.
Because JRP’s financing is achieved by the involvement of developers, the obvious 
advantage for the municipal government is the transformation of dilapidated 
neighbourhoods with low budget contribution. The JRP has also become a good source 
of revenue for the central and local governments through the sales of public lands in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods (Bae 1997: 197). On the average, nearly half of the lands 
in JRP project areas turned out to be owned by either the central or municipal 
governments (Ha 2001a). Furthermore, the construction of public facilities such as 
administrative office buildings and road networks within a redevelopment neighbourhood 
are built at the expense of project finance (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2000). The 
municipal government also makes financial contributions in the form of paying for the 
public rental flats provided for re-housing tenants who are eligible for redevelopment 
compensation (Ministry of Construction and Transportation. 2000).
Figure 2-4 below shows the implementation process of a JRP project, and the responsible 
parties at each stage. The process can be broadly divided into five stages: (1) project 
preparation that includes the designation of a neighbourhood as a redevelopment district; 
(2) acquisition of project implementation permission, which is the process of obtaining a 
formal approval of the project implementation plan prepared by a redevelopment 
association; (3) finalisation of management disposal plan to determine the sales price of 
redevelopment flats; (4) project implementation that involves residents’ displacement,
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relocation and actual construction works; and (5) project liquidation to settle the bills 
among participating property owners and developers.
Figure 2-4: Redevelopment process of a JRP project 
(MoCT Korea 2000)
Major stage of redevelopment Breakdown of each stage Responsible parties
Stage 1
Project preparation Selection of a neighbourhood and preparation of a project outline District mayor
i
Designation of a neighbourhood as a 
redevelopment district
City mayor
1
Stage 2 Project implementation 
permission
Establishment of 'redevelopment 
association'
Property owners
1
Selection of a developer, which then 
joins the association as a co-member
Redevelopment association 
(property owners)
1
Preparation and submission of a 
'project implementation plan'
Redevelopment association 
(property owners + developer)
1
Review and approval of the project 
implementation plan
District mayor
1
(Tenants' displacement begins)
Stage 3
Management disposal plan Application for a redevelopment flat
Members of redevelopment 
association (property owners)
1
Preparation of a 'management 
disposal plan'
Redevelopment association 
(property owners + developer)
1
Approval of the management disposal 
plan
District mayor
I
Stage 4
Project implementation Completion of residents' relocation and demolition of dwellings
Redevelopment association
I
Construction Redevelopment association (developer)
1
Stage 5
Liquidation Final estimation of each member's financial contribution
Redevelopment association 
(property owners + developer)
I
Liquidation of redevelopment 
association
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As shown in the figure, each stage of a JRP project is mostly initiated by a redevelopment 
association. Property owners and professional developers who constitute a redevelopment 
association are in principle to consult each other and work together in partnership to 
produce plans such as the project implementation plan and management disposal plan. 
Since the expertise and financial contributions from participating developers are crucial 
for the successful implementation of a JRP project, it can be assumed that professional 
developers take the lead.
Old and dilapidated housing redevelopment programme in Beiiina 
Establishment of the ODHRP: key principles and progress
Having experimented with various renewal approaches, the Beijing municipal government 
launched the ODHRP in 1991 to demolish and redevelop 2.5 million m2 of old and 
dilapidated dwellings by 1995 (BMG 1991). The core idea behind the ODHRP was to 
bring in real estate developers as the main financier and project implementer, while local 
authorities provided administrative support. This was seen as an inevitable solution to the 
severity of dilapidated housing problems and the limits of public finance. According to 
Sun and Zhang (1989: 7), the total investment necessary to redevelop old and dilapidated 
dwellings in the Old Gty of Beijing (that is, areas within the second ring road) in 1989 
would be “more than 200% of total urban housing investment in the Old Gty since the 
Liberation.”
The turning point was the speech by the mayor of Beijing on 30 April 1990, which 
emphasised the ripening opportunity for the redevelopment of inner city districts (BMG 
1990). It was stressed that a series of new estate developments in suburban districts 
provided new dwellings that could be used for the relocation of inner city residents. To 
facilitate the implementation of ODHRP projects, an ODHRP office was opened at the 
municipal government to supervise and support the overall process. Furthermore, the 
municipal government set aside 200 million yuan to lend to those four inner city districts 
(namely Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chongwen and Xuanwu), which received particular 
attention due to the severity of their housing problems (BMG 1990). Figure 2-5 below 
shows the locations of dilapidated housing areas as of 1990.
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Figure 2-5: Location of dilapidated residential areas in and around the Old City of Beijing
0 1 2 3 4 km
1 i i i i
Source: Adapted from the map in Tan (1998)
Legend
Built-up areas by 1996
Built-up areas by 1949
Dilapidated housing areas as 
defined in 1990
Upon promulgation of the ODHRP in April 1990, 37 areas were initially assigned as 
redevelopment project areas. 22 of them were located in inner city districts, 11 in near 
suburban districts and 4 in outer suburban districts of Beijing (Lu 1991). The number of
High-rise flats and commercial buildings were favoured as the end products, and very few 
original residents were able to be re-housed (Lee 1999: 23; Wen 1998: 39). To carry out 
the redevelopment in a financially feasible way, it was thought inevitable to sell as many 
redeveloped flats as possible (UCMCBMPPCC and JSSBC1992:21):
“At present, apart from the limited funding sources such as 200 million yuan of 
state funding and little resources from those homebuyers, the main method is to rely 
on housing management, that is, selling many housing units so as to acquire 
funding* (UCMCBMPPOC and JSSBC 1992:21)
The characteristics of the second phase basically continued to dominate throughout the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. A major change took place in 1998 regarding the way residents 
were to be compensated. Through this change, a stronger emphasis has been placed upon 
monetarised (cash-based) compensation, and this was expected to strengthen the market- 
oriented characteristics of redevelopment.
By 1999, the number of ODHRP projects reached 279 (Fang and Zhang 2003). Between 
2001 and 2005, it was reported that Beijing anticipated another 340,000 households to be 
displaced as part of urban redevelopment projects (People’s Daily 1 April 2002). The 
preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing would facilitate the progress. 
Considering the number of inner city residents, the scale of displacement indicated that 
approximately 14% of inner city residents would be subject to the redevelopment (BMBS 
2003a).
Outline of the ODHRP implementation process
Unlike Seoul’s JRP project in which local residents and developers team up together, 
residents in Beijing do not enjoy the same status when ODHRP projects are implemented. 
It is the partnership with local authorities and developers that plays a crucial role in 
completing the transformation of dilapidated neighbourhoods. This is shown in Figure 
2-6 that summarises the process of an ODHRP project. This is based on the government 
notice in June 1994, which gave greater power and autonomy to inner city district 
governments for authorising ODHRP projects within their jurisdiction (BMG 1994a; 
Fang and Zhang 2003:155).
Local authorities hold the right to designate a project area, but it’s common for developers 
to choose an area and make an application to initiate redevelopment. Once the local 
district government receives an application, it reviews and approves the application based
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on its planning criteria. One important criterion is the proportion of dilapidated dwellings 
within a proposed neighbourhood. In order to be designated, more than 70% of the 
dwellings in a neighbourhood must be Grade 3, 4 or 5 dwellings (see footnote 3 on page 
58 for the explanation on the grading classification). Furthermore, at least 30% of the 
neighbourhood dwellings should be either Grade 4 or Grade 5 dwellings (Fang 1999: 61).
Figure 2-6: Redevelopment process of an ODHRP project 
(BMG 1994a; Fang 1999: 69-70)
Major state of redevelopment Breakdown of each stage
Project designation
Project design
Project implementation 
(demolition and construction)
District ODHRP office examines and 
approves the project
Signing an agreement between 
developer and district ODHRP office
Developer's preparation of project 
design plan that includes local 
residents' displacement and
Residents' displacement and 
relocation begins
Construction
District ODHRP office examines and 
approves the project design plan
District ODHRP office reports the 
project approval to municipal ODHRP 
office
(if no work is carried out within 2 years)
IZ Z I___
Cancellation of the project by 
district ODHRP office
The process of authorising and implementing an ODHRP project as shown above 
indicates that there is little room for residents’ participation until a project reaches the
Nevertheless, local residents are still considered to be important contributors since their 
cooperation is one of the key factors in the success of ODHRP projects. The land use 
rights, enjoyed by the local residents, are taken away in exchange for redevelopment 
compensation (Fang and Zhang 2003: 157). If residents are offered re-housing, they are 
required to purchase redeveloped flats, and this is the moment they make financial 
contributions.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed urban demographic and housing conditions embedded within the 
national contexts, and examined the development of urban renewal policies for the 
transformation of dilapidated dwellings and neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing.
The review showed that the origins of dilapidated neighbourhoods in these cities differed 
considerably. In Seoul, dilapidated dwellings which became subject to the JRP were largely 
an outcome of informal and illegal building practices, carried out by urban residents 
including in-migrants who had to find a foothold in cities when there were simply not 
enough dwellings during the post-war period of rapid urbanisation. Forced eviction and 
clearance actions were taken by the municipal government especially in inner city districts, 
but a large number of such setdements managed to survive through the 1970s.
In Beijing, the origin of old and dilapidated dwellings that were subject to the ODFIRP 
was not illegal in character. Their eventual deterioration was the result of long-time under­
investment in housing by the state sector that considered such input as ‘unproductive’ 
during the pre-reform period of the planned economy A large proportion of dilapidated 
dwellings were traditional one-storey courtyard houses called pingfang, which lost their 
character over the years due to inadequate management and maintenance. Major infill 
processes in the 1970s also exacerbated the problem of over-crowdedness.
The review of urban housing conditions showed that Seoul and Beijing were both facing 
severe housing problems by the time they were to introduce the JRP and ODHRP. In 
Seoul, the policy orientation towards new housing construction and homeownership did 
not succeed in eradicating housing poverty. By the early 1980s, about a half of urban 
residents still had no access to modem in-house facilities. About 16% of existing 
dwellings in Seoul were illegal and informal in character. In Beijing, by the mid-1980s, the 
majority of dwellings lacked in-house facilities, and close to one quarter of Beijing
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residents were housing poor. The problem was more acute in inner city districts.
In the case of renewal experiences, both cities experimented with several approaches 
before implementing the JRP and ODHRP. In Seoul, the experiences in the 1960s and 
1970s suggested that neither the government nor the residents could finance 
redevelopment on its own. With no heavy financial input coming from the government to 
subsidise the lack of funding on the residents’ side, the prospect of redeveloping a 
dilapidated neighbourhood seemed near impossible. In Beijing, the Communist 
government’s supposedly egalitarian nature did little to avoid decades-long neglect of old 
dwellings. State enterprises and institutions began to make use of their newly-found 
capacity to make additional investment in employees’ housing provision in the 1980s, but 
the Beijing municipal government found it near impossible to implement urban renewal 
due to its constrained budget and weak tax base. It was the housing market, and hence the 
real estate capital and potential homebuyers’ savings, which were considered to be the 
solution.
Seoul’s JRP and Beijing’s ODHRP were, in this regard, a means to resolve persisting 
problems of project financing by attracting professional developers to urban renewal 
projects. These programmes signified responsibility sharing among the state, the market 
and local communities. The structure of the programmes, however, differed. In both cities, 
professional developers took the leading role in that they were to provide project 
management skills and financial resources. Local authorities provided regulatory support 
and took planning control. As for the residents, the JRP in Seoul was based on a formal 
contractual relationship between property owners (that is, dwelling owners and absentee 
landlords in a redevelopment neighbourhood) and participating developers. In Beijing’s 
ODHRP, professional developers had no formal contract with residents for project 
initiation. Instead, it was the agreement between developers and local authority that 
started the project implementation process. More details of how the interaction among 
developers, local authorities and residents unfolded will be discussed in subsequent 
analysis in this thesis.
Having reviewed urban housing contexts and the development of renewal policies, the 
next chapter explains the research methodology of this thesis.
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3.1 Case study approach
This thesis set out to understand how Seoul and Beijing came to implement a common 
strategy of developer-led redevelopment programmes despite their different urban 
contexts, what contributions were made by various sectors and what impacts these 
programmes had on local residents. It aimed to gain a contextual understanding of how 
developer-led partnerships unfold within local contexts in order to find out how the 
public sector, the private sector and local residents interact with each other, and how local 
residents cope with the transformation of their neighbourhoods. In this way, it is hoped 
that this research provides an insight into the process of neighbourhood transformation 
at a local level, which has been understudied despite these programmes’ relatively long­
term operation.
To examine the impacts of redevelopment on local residents, I aimed to find out the 
degree of displacement due to redevelopment, to identify constraints that would have 
influenced residents’ decision to move, and to examine the changes in housing conditions 
upon their displacement. As Bailey and Robertson (1997) noted, studies of urban 
regeneration and residents’ displacement have been largely concerned with the scale of 
displacement. This focus was strengthened by the trend for existing studies to infer the 
scale of displacement by using census data rather than taking a direct measurement due to 
difficulties in tracking displacees (Atkinson 2002:9). This research hoped to overcome the 
narrow focus, expand the scope of study to include post-displacement experiences of 
local residents and hence deliver the views and voices of local residents.
To accomplish these objectives, this research adopts a case study approach, which allows 
social science researchers to focus on the contextual effects upon social phenomena (Yin 
1993). The approach has the advantage of examining “the specific institutional, historical 
and political features of each country covered, instead of imposing a standardising 
framework whereby only pre-selected items of data are accepted for incorporation into 
the analysis” (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999). A case study approach employed in a 
international comparative study also enables researchers to obtain findings that can “shed 
light on shared processes at work in disparate circumstances” (Cheek and Lindau 1998: 5). 
In this study, the benefits of comparing Seoul and Beijing’s redevelopment experiences 
include the shedding light on the shared processes of developer-led partnership 
approaches, local authorities’ mounting task of tackling urban dilapidation in fast growing 
societies, lack of public resources to enable direct government intervention, strong
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government leadership and emphasis on economic growth which absorbs available 
resources. By employing a case study approach and detailed preparation as outlined in this 
chapter, this research overcomes the difficulties of international comparative research, and 
provides a rich understanding of the shared experiences through comparable findings.
The case studies in this research were conducted at neighbourhood level, and took a 
multiple case study approach within each municipality, which entailed the selection of a 
case within a wider case (Stake 2000: 446-447; Weitzman 2000: 812). In other words, if the 
primary case was a residential neighbourhood, the neighbourhood was n e s te d  within a local 
administrative district, which was subsequently n e s te d  in a municipality, which in turn was 
identified as to be n e s te d  in a city and country. Figure 3-1 below demonstrates such a 
nested approach.
Figure 3-1: Selection of a case within a wider case: a nested approach
Various actors 
within a 
neighbourhood
Neighbourhood
Local District
I I
City
i i  m - i
Country
This approach made it possible to understand the local contexts of a case study 
neighbourhood in relation to wider geographic and socio-economic contexts at a larger 
scale. Furthermore, by identifying major actors and gatekeepers at different scales, the 
nested approach provided this researcher with an opportunity to look at the interaction 
between actors, gatekeepers and institutions, and how central government policies were 
transmitted down to neighbourhood level, constrained by the local environment.
3.2 Field research visits
A series of field research visits were carried out between December 2001 and September 
2003. The field research took the form of area-based studies. In order to understand 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, I attempted to identify a physical pattern (that is, what
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the physical condition of the area was like, and how they were internally organised and 
externally related to the rest of the city) as well as institutional (that is, what institutions 
were involved in transforming the area, and how they were related to each other) and 
social portrait (that is, what the life conditions were like in subjected neighbourhoods, and 
how the residents therein adjusted to the changes and attempted to overcome any 
difficulties that were confronted).
This section explains how field research neighbourhoods were selected, what data 
collection methods were used and how residents were recruited for interviews. It also 
discusses the barriers that I encountered and overcame during my field research. Unlike in 
Seoul where I, as a South Korean, possessed natural advantages (e.g. no barriers with 
language, understanding social and cultural contexts, social network), Beijing presented 
institutional and cultural obstacles that required more detailed preparation and adaptation 
to local circumstances to conduct field research.
Field research neighbourhood selection
The selection of neighbourhoods for this research was conditioned by several factors. 
Firstly, there was the policy factor. My baseline research on municipal renewal policies in 
Seoul and Beijing showed that both municipal governments revised their existing 
redevelopment programmes (Joint Redevelopment Programme or JRP in Seoul and Old 
and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme or ODHRP in Beijing). In Seoul, 
the revision was enacted at the end of 1995, and was known as the ‘rolling 
redevelopment.’ Its details are discussed in Chapter 6, and it would suffice here to 
mention that this rolling redevelopment was aimed at enhancing the range of work of the 
public housing agency in order to promote the housing security of tenants eligible for 
redevelopment compensation. In Beijing, the revision was made in March 2000, and its 
main feature was to increase the re-housing rate of existing residents by providing 
subsidised redevelopment flats. Therefore, at the time of selecting field research 
neighbourhoods, I hoped to include those neighbourhoods where these revised 
approaches were applied in order to see their nature and impact upon residents.
The second factor was the time factor. As a redevelopment project usually takes several 
years from the planning stage to the final delivery of end products, the resource 
constraints of PhD research mean that it is near-impossible for a PhD researcher to carry 
out longitudinal research to cover the whole progress of neighbourhood redevelopment.
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It was, therefore, necessary to conduct field research visits by taking a cross-section of 
redevelopment projects. In this respect, I tried to look for a neighbourhood where its 
redevelopment or residents’ displacement and relocation were phased so that residents’ 
pre- and post-displacement conditions could be examined.
Bearing these two factors in mind, I established neighbourhood typologies to help me 
search for field research neighbourhoods. This is shown below in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2: Selection typologies of field research neighbourhoods
Neighbourhood Type A Neighbourhood Type B Neighbourhood Type C
A dilapidated neighbourhood that 
has become subject to 
redevelopment In near 
future
A dilapidated neighbourhood where 
redevelopment work is being 
phased in 
(preferred over 
Neighbourhood Type A)
A dilapidated neighbourhood where 
the revised JRP or ODHRP policy 
was applied.
Finally, the third factor to consider was the is s u e  o f  a c c e s s . Redevelopment often gives rise 
to tensions between residents and developers, between residents and local authorities, and 
among residents themselves. A researcher who is alien to the neighbourhoods would find 
it difficult and time-consuming to penetrate existing social networks and win the trust of 
local residents. My access to the field research neighbourhood in Seoul was helped by a 
local NGO leader who was highly respected in the neighbourhood. In Beijing, because 
independent access to neighbourhoods as an individual researcher was impossible, I 
received administrative support from a local research centre that I was attached to during 
my stay in Beijing (see later in this chapter for fuller explanation).
Neighbourhood selection in Seoul
The field research in Seoul was carried out in one neighbourhood called Nangok. It is 
located about 15 kilometres away from the city centre and on the south-western edge of 
Gwanak district (see Figure 3-3). Gwanak district is one of the twenty five administrative 
districts that make up Seoul.
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Figure 3-3: Location of Gwanak district and Nangok in Seoul
River Han
Gwanak
District
Nangok neighbourhood
The selection of Nangok neighbourhood was on the basis of a number of careful 
considerations. Firstly, it was one of the only two neighbourhoods in Seoul where 
aforementioned ‘rolling redevelopment’ was implemented. Therefore, it belonged to 
Neighbourhood Type C in Figure 3-2. The other neighbourhood, known as Sillim 2-1 
redevelopment district, was also in Gwanak district, and its redevelopment was completed
Secondly, Nangok neighbourhood was selected as it was subject to the JRP in the mid- 
1990s before its renewal was switched into the rolling redevelopment programme in 2000. 
My baseline research indicated that in the mid-1990s, property owners signed an 
agreement with a private developer for the neighbourhood redevelopment. The Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, however, endangered the financial liability of the participating 
developer, which had to subsequently withdraw from the project. Such events provided a 
unique opportunity to examine both advantages and disadvantages of the JRP and of the 
‘rolling redevelopment.’
Neighbourhood selection in Beijing
The field research in Beijing was carried out in 2002 and 2003 in two different phases. 
Most interviews with local residents and key actors took place in the summer of 2003. 
The researcher spent half a year in 2002 in Beijing to review the national and municipal 
urban policies, and be immersed within the local environment as part of the 
familiarisation process.
The selection of field research neighbourhoods was carried out by this researcher 
presenting the selection criteria to the local authority (via a local research institution), who 
subsequently pinpointed several neighbourhoods that met such criteria. The reasons for 
such an arrangement are explained later in this section when the access problems are 
discussed. The main reason was the practical difficulty in conducting independent field 
research as a foreign researcher in mainland China. This was especially so when the 
research topic was as sensitive as the neighbourhood redevelopment and its compensation. 
The neighbourhoods selected were Xinzhongjie (marked ‘A’ in Figure 3-4 below) and 
Haiyuncang (marked ‘B’). They were all located within one of the four inner city districts 
called Dongcheng district. Xinzhongjie neighbourhoods belonged to Dongzhimen Street 
Office,5 while Haiyuncang neighbourhood was part of Beixinqiao Street Office. Their 
neighbourhood contexts are further explained in the following chapter.
These neighbourhoods turned out to fit my research design. Haiyuncang neighbourhood 
was one of the four pilot project areas in Beijing for the implementation of the revised
5 In Beijing, the administrative hierarchy is as follows: Municipal (shi) Government -  Local District (qu) or 
County (xian) Government -  Street (jiedaS) Office. Each jiedao consists of neighbourhood committees 
(jumhd), and neighbourhood committee leaders (zburen), appointed by the district government, undertake 
daily administrative tasks.
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ODHRP approach (therefore, Neighbourhood Type C in Figure 3-2). Its redevelopment 
was completed at the end of 2002, and the re-housing took place throughout the first half 
of 2003.
Figure 3-4: Location of field research neighbourhoods in Dongcheng district, Beijing 
(Original administrative map from DDG 1998)
Chongwen
District
Inner city districts o f Beijing
Legend:
Field research  neighbourhoods 
A: Xinzhongjie B: Haiyuncang
1-km radius circle
redevelopment policies.
Haiyuncang
Beijing
By revised ODHRP
Figure 3-5: Selected field research neighbourhoods and their redevelopment progress in relation to
renewal policies and field interview timing
Timeline (Year) 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
JRP in Seoul 
South Korea
Nangok, Seoul
Initially by JRP; then 
revised approach 
(rolling redevelopment)
Xinzhongjie
JR?  ^first 
inception 
Jan. 1984
Revision to the JRP 
(rolling redevelopment) 
Dec. 1995
Interviews with residents 
in Seoul 
Jan.-Jun. 2002
ODHRP in Beijing 
Mainland China
A
Apr. 1990 
ODHRP's first 
inception
KNHC's pa rticipa
Feb. 2000
A A  
Nov. 1997 May 1998
Agreement between a Withdrawa
a private developer and of the private
property owners developer
. 2000
placem
reloca
A
May 2003 
Displacement 
and relocation 
completed
:nt and aDistrict. 
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>gta collection methods
bcusing on the neighbourhood contexts and redevelopment processes meant that the 
^search required multiple data collection methods (Yin 1993). Three main data collection 
lethods were used, which were: (1) collection of local documents and archival records 
dated to the fields study areas; (2) on-site observation; and (3) semi-structured interviews 
r ith residents and key actors. The research was also supplemented by the acquisition of a 
arvey data set on former Nangok residents, provided by a local welfare centre in Seoul.
x)llection of local documents and archival records
lie first methodological step was to carry out a literature search through local policy
redevelopment policies were implemented. The range of documents and archival records 
included: (a) policy announcements and amendments to existing housing and urban 
renewal laws and regulations; (b) minutes and proceedings from South Korea’s National 
Assembly or local district assembly, and their equivalents in mainland China if available; 
(c) performance reports from public agencies if accessible; (c) local media coverage; (d) 
official statistics and yearbooks from local district governments. Once the field research 
neighbourhoods were selected, efforts were also made to gather materials related to these 
neighbourhoods. These included local authorities’ reports and statistics on these 
neighbourhoods; media coverage on the housing redevelopment in the field study sites; 
and reports, if any, from non-governmental or not-for-profit organisations on the field 
research neighbourhoods.
On-site observation
The second methodological step was on-site observation. On-site observation was used
actors and local residents. Interviews with local residents, in particular, were carried out in 
order to collect individual case histories. Collection of individual case histories is one of 
the data collection methods that “provide an enormously detailed and substantiated 
account of one person’s ‘history7 with reference to some specific personal characteristic or 
series of events they have experienced” (Hakim 2000: 63). The collection of individual 
case histories focuses on particular aspects of a person’s life. In this research, this 
particular aspect was individual household’s housing and redevelopment experiences, 
narrated through a member (usually household head) or members (household head and 
spouse) of each family.
I devised an interview schedule to conduct semi-structured interviews in Seoul (see 
Appendix Al). This was also used in Beijing, but the interviews in Beijing were further 
assisted with a questionnaire that I produced on the basis of the interview schedule (see 
Appendix A2 for the questionnaire sample in Chinese). This was to make sure the basic 
household details and housing conditions were recorded correcdy at the beginning of an 
interview in order to minimise the possibility of misinterpretation due to language barriers. 
In total, 40 residents were interviewed: 20 in Seoul and 20 in Beijing (see Appendix B1 for 
the list of residents interviewed). The selection of residents for interviewing is explained 
later in this chapter.
Semi-structured interviews with key actors included local officials, neighbourhood 
committee leaders and managers working for developers engaged in neighbourhood 
redevelopment. These interviews were to collect their comments and views in relation to 
the contemporary urban housing and renewal policies in each municipality as well as their 
views on residential redevelopment projects taking place in field research neighbourhoods. 
In Seoul, 18 interviews were conducted with key actors. In Beijing, 15 interviews were 
carried out, and a formal meeting with six officials from Dongzhimen Street Office and 
Dongcheng district government was held to listen to their views on neighbourhood 
redevelopment (see Appendix B2 for the list of interviewees).
Raw survey data from a local welfare centre in Seoul
In addition to my field research data, the research was further aided by the acquisition of a 
set of raw survey data from a local welfare centre (that is, Sillim Welfare Centre). The 
survey was conducted in Seoul in June 2002 to gather information on former Nangok 
residents who were displaced as part of its neighbourhood redevelopment. Thanks to a
senior research fellow at the Korea Centre for City and Environment Research, I was 
introduced to the local welfare centre and had a chance to take part in the survey activity 
collecting responses from 11% of total sample population (156 households). When the 
survey was taking place, I was nearing the completion of semi-structured interviews with 
local residents. There was little chance, therefore, that my research design was influenced 
by the welfare centre’s survey Nevertheless, the survey data turned out to be very 
beneficial for this research, as it supplemented quantitative interpretation of the changes 
in Nangok residents’ housing conditions due to redevelopment. The survey responses 
were coded by the welfare centre, and the data set was available in SPSS for Windows 
format.
Selection of residents for interviews 
Interviewees in Seoul
Selecting residents in Seoul to interview for this research was done using a snowball 
sampling technique, which is a non-probability sampling method often employed when 
the acquisition of sampling characteristics is difficult.
“[Snowball sampling] involves contacting a member of the population to be studied 
and asking him or her whether they know anyone else with the required 
characteristics... The nominated individuals are interviewed in turn and asked to 
identify further sample members. This continues until no further sample members 
are obtained. Then another member of the population of interest is identified, 
preferably from a different area or social class, and the process of asking for 
contacts with the required characteristics begins again” (Arber 2001: 63).
In this respect, the most important criteria for selecting interviewees were their diversity 
and range of experiences (Stroh 2000: 203). For this research, four main categories were 
considered when selecting residents: (1) income status; (2) employment status; (3) 
displacement and relocation status; and (4) eligibility for redevelopment compensation.
The use of this technique was deemed appropriate in this research for three main reasons. 
The first was the fact that it was difficult for an individual researcher to obtain a set of 
household registration records that would assist probability sampling. This problem was 
even more acute in Beijing where the degree of social control was tighter. An uninformed 
random door-to-door visit by a foreign researcher would have provoked suspicion in 
Beijing’s social and political environment.
89
The second reason was the resource constraints in individual research. Conducting a 
survey of a meaningful sample population required a lot of financial resources and a 
considerable amount of time when implemented on one’s own. The fact that this research 
was to be conducted in two municipalities in different countries exacerbated such 
constraints.
The third reason was the potential hostility among local residents towards visitors 
including researchers. This is particularly problematic in redevelopment neighbourhoods 
where tensions build up as work progresses. Residents might feel offended by the way 
‘outsiders* were treating them. They would also feel reluctant to meet outsiders due to 
their residence in dilapidated neighbourhoods that might have led to the sense of being 
disadvantaged or excluded. Such feeling was confirmed in Seoul while having a discussion 
with a local NGO leader in Nangok neighbourhood (interviewee KSS7-INW01). He said 
that some of the local residents actively working for tenants’ housing rights were hostile 
towards the so-called ‘intellectuals’ who used to come to the neighbourhood for the sake 
of their own research projects without adequate consultation. In addition, many people 
including some journalists were visiting the neighbourhood to take photographs for 
various reasons before the commencement of its demolition. For these reasons, it was 
more sensible to conduct interviews through a snowballing (that is, referral) method so 
that I could win the trust of local residents and overcome the obstacle of being treated as 
one of such ‘outsiders.’
Interviewees in Beijing
In Beijing, I initially tried to apply the same snowball sampling strategy. Initially, this 
seemed even more appropriate as I feared it was near impossible to obtain the 
cooperation of Beijing’s local authorities if any survey was proposed. The snowball 
sampling, however, turned out to be problematic in Beijing, as it faced additional 
constraints originating from access problems. Arranging interviews with local residents 
was only possible through the coordination of neighbourhood committee leaders, who 
could have acted as ‘gatekeepers.’ Neighbourhood committee leaders were themselves 
residents, but they also served the government as the lowest branch of local 
administrative organs. Being aware of this potential problem, I proposed four main 
categories as above (that is, income status; employment status; relocation status; and 
eligibility for redevelopment compensation) to the local street office and neighbourhood 
committee leaders in order to avoid the situation in which only those relatively better off
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were recruited.
In the end, the number of interviews conducted with residents in coordination with 
neighbourhood committee leaders was somewhat fewer than I had originally envisaged. 
The number of recruited households decreased on two occasions. First, the local 
authority (that is, Dongzhimen Street Office) scaled down the number of interviewees at 
the time of initial negotiation. Second, in the course of conducting interviews, the 
neighbourhood committee leaders grew weary of accompanying researchers while 
carrying on with their daily administrative tasks. I eventually agreed to stop recruiting 
more households when I felt I had learnt as much as practical under the constrained 
research circumstances in Beijing.
Summary of residents interviewed in Seoul and Beijing
Table 3-2 shows the distribution of resident interviewees according to their former 
residence and their household move status at the time of interviewing. Appendix B1 
shows all the residents interviewed in Seoul and Beijing (Box 3-1 on p.98 explains how the 
coding for interviewees’ identification was constructed by this researcher). In Seoul, 20 
residents were interviewed in total Eleven of them were already displaced and relocated 
at the time of interviewing, and nine were yet to be displaced. In Beijing, 20 residents 
were interviewed in total. Three of them were displaced from Xiangheyuan 
neighbourhood (also under the administrative control of Dongzhimen Street Office), 
located adjacent to Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. Because Xinzhongjie and Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood committee leaders found it difficult to contact those displaced to outer 
suburban districts, these former Xiangheyuan residents were recruited in order to 
guarantee the diversity of interviewees. These three households were displaced from their 
former residence in Xiangheyuan neighbourhood as part of its redevelopment6 in April 
and May 2001 (Haiyuncang residents were also displaced in this period). One of the 
twenty households was recruited through my personal acquaintance as neighbourhood 
committee leaders were not able to come up with any households who were temporarily 
re-housed upon displacement.
6 According to a Xiangheyuan neighbourhood committee leader, part of Xiangheyuan neighbourhood went 
through redevelopment in the summer of 2001, displacing 866 households (44% of its registered 
households). She stated that re-housing was considered unnecessary as the redevelopment was to construct 
high-rise modem flats called Wanguxheng, which were beyond the reach of displaced residents. Three 
households interviewed were all displaced from Xiangheyuan neighbourhood in 2001 and moved to an 
outer suburban estate called Yinghuayuan in Shunyi district.
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Table 3*2: Distribution of resident interviewees as per their former and current place of residence
In Seoul
Status o f household m ove
Moved to relocation rental flats 
(in Sillim 2-1 District)
Moved to other neighbourhoods 
adjacent to Nangok
Subject to displacement
4 7 9
In Beijing
Current residence (after redevelopment) Redevelopmentapproach
Subject to Re-housed Moved t0 h®31" Moved to outer Temporarily 
displacement suburban district suburban district housed
Xinzhongjie
Phase I 
area 2 3
ODHRP
(completed)
Former
residence
(before
displacement/
relocation)
Phase II 
area 9
ODHRP 
(yet to start)
Haiyuncang 2 Revised ODHRP (completed)
Xiangheyuan 
(adjacent to Xinzhongjie) 3
ODHRP
(completed)
pif Dongsi
(adjacent to Haiyuncang) 1
ODHRP
(completed)
Field encounters
Gaining access
In this research, gaining access to field research neighbourhoods and recruiting 
interviewees required particular attention. Researchers working in a foreign country often 
become subject to suspicion. As Razavi (1992) noted retrospectively about her research in 
Iran where she came from, she struggled to win the trust of local people in part because 
she was attached to a Western academic institution as a female researcher.
“Relationships are not created in a vacuum. Upon entering any community as an 
outsider, various suspicions have to be dispelled, depending on the particular 
circumstances of the community and the individual researcher’’ (Razavi 1992:154)
In her case, the suspicion ranged from the fear of espionage to the possibility of future 
taxation based on the information interviewees were requested to provide (Razavi 1992). 
Razavis recommendation was to choose a safe channel to conduct field research, and this 
principle also applied to the field research in Seoul and Beijing.
In the case of field research in Nangok neighbourhood in Seoul, the access to the 
neighbourhood was made through a church minister who was well-connected with and 
trusted by Nangok residents. He understood the purpose of the research, and was eager 
to share the residents’ experiences with regard to the neighbourhood redevelopment with
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anyone who was sympathetic with the residents’ fate. I was introduced by him to the initial 
batch of local residents to conduct interviews, and this allowed me to win their trust at 
the early stage of field research. For instance, an interviewee who was blacklisted by 
financial institutions due to her husband’s credit delinquency record agreed to do an 
interview only because the minister introduced me to her:
“When the redevelopment of this neighbourhood began, there were a few 
journalists who came here to do interviews, and I never accepted any request. I 
didn’t want to risk revealing my identity as my family was kind of hiding away from 
the creditors... I am only doing this interviewee as a favour because the minister 
asked me personally” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01)
The field research in Beijing was more problematic than what was encountered in Seoul 
The access problems experienced in Beijing were two fold. On the one hand, there was 
the usual issue of winning the trust of local residents. On the other hand, there was a 
serious administrative issue, which could have jeopardised the whole research. As a 
foreign researcher, it turned out that it was near impossible to conduct an independent, 
individual research in Beijing, since this required a legal approval from the government 
statistical bureau. The Interim Measures for Administration of Foreign-related Social 
Survey Activities, which became effective as of 15 August 1999, stated that:
Article 3 Organisations and individuals from outside the territory subsidiaries of 
foreign enterprises and resident representative offices of foreign enterprises within 
the territory and resident institutions in China of other foreign organisations shall 
not, by their own, conduct such survey activities within the territory of China.
Where there is a need to conduct such surveys, they shall be conducted by domestic 
institutions with the qualification of conducting foreign-related social survey 
Institutions without such qualification shall not be commissioned for any survey
Article 12 The conduct of foreign-related social survey activities must be submitted 
to the statistical institution’s of the people’s governments at or above the provincial 
level for review and approvaL (NBS China 2001b)
In order to get around this obstacle, this researcher was based at a government-run 
research institution called the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (hereinafter CASS) 
during the field research period. The CASS worked as an umbrella institution for this 
researcher’s field research, and coordinated meetings with local officials and interviews 
with local residents. For the selection of neighbourhoods and interviewees, the researcher 
made it clear to ensure that all the researcher’s criteria were met while negotiating with the 
local officials. This researcher prepared a guideline for neighbourhood selection, which 
was shared with the CASS before presenting it to the local officials.
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Influence of public authority on the research
In Seoul, there was hardly any influence of public authority upon this research as there 
was no restriction on carrying out individual research. In Beijing, however, this was not 
the case. As explained above, due to the administrative constraints, the local officials at the 
Dongzhimen Street Office had to be informed, and the interviews with local officials and 
residents were coordinated by the CASS. The arrangement of actual interviews with local 
residents was further assisted by neighbourhood committee leaders. This process raised 
some concern on two accounts.
Firstly, the recruitment of residents through neighbourhood committee leaders left room 
for potential screening. As mentioned earlier, the snowball sampling for recruiting 
interviewees was not feasible in Beijing. Although I made every attempt to make it clear to 
the neighbourhood committee leaders in order to identify and recruit those displacees 
who remained as tenants either in private or public sector after displacement, those 
interviewees who moved to suburban districts turned out to be all owner occupiers. The 
committee leaders said that they could not track back those 'who remained as tenants in 
private rental sector after displacement. "While the difficulty of tracing all the displaced 
households should be fully acknowledged, their responses were not fully convincing since 
those committee leaders also admitted that most households kept their household 
registration in their former place of residence. This remained as the limitation of this 
study, and should be noted when interpreting the interview results.
In order to supplement this shortfall, I managed to recruit, with difficulties, a couple 
through a personal acquaintance. The couple was displaced from a dilapidated 
neighbourhood close to Haiyuncang neighbourhood in Dongcheng district, and the 
couple was residing temporarily in their father’s residence while searching for the right 
opportunity to buy a house within the district.
Secondly, there was the possibility that Beijing interviewees were concealing their true 
feelings towards the redevelopment processes and their relationship with the local 
authority. Nine out of twenty interviews with local residents were conducted in the 
presence of a neighbourhood committee leader. In this circumstance, there was the 
possibility that the presence of a neighbourhood committee leader would have ‘toned 
down’ their negative voices towards local officials or government policies. Furthermore, at 
each time of interviewing, a researcher from the CASS was also present to accompany
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this researcher. It was possible therefore that the status of the CASS as the government- 
run research institution could have influenced the responsiveness of interviewees. All in 
all, those interviewees who completed their relocation to suburban districts were less 
enthusiastic to express their views towards the redevelopment. In the case of those 
interviewees who were subject to imminent redevelopment, they were more ready to voice 
their frustration regardless of the presence of neighbourhood committee leaders. 'When 
the neighbourhood committee leader was present, however, interviewees were tactful 
enough to make comments to ‘save the face’ of the committee leader as shown below:
“If this neighbourhood is to be demolished, I don’t know which compensation 
policy is going to be applied... .1 ask the committee leader about how much 
[compensation] is to be given out, and she says she doesn't know... She also lives in 
this area, and she must be worried as well... Premier Zhu also explained that the 
redevelopment was to improve residents' living condition. Has it been improved in 
Beijing? According to our current policies, it’s impossible to improve, isn’t it? This 
demolition and displacement method is problematic” (Interviewee CBX-INT-03)
Coping with unexpected interruption of research schedule
In Beijing, the actual interviews with local residents and government officials in field 
research neighbourhoods were originally planned to take place between April and June 
2003. This plan, however, had to be postponed by several months due to the SARS 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic that swept the whole country in the first 
half of 2003. When the outbreak in Beijing was dramatically disclosed in early April, the 
local authority (Dongzhimen Street Office) was reluctant to invite any outsiders to enter 
their neighbourhoods while they were coping with the epidemic. It was only in late July of 
the same year that the epidemic came under control, and the local authority agreed to 
resume the research work.
Research ethics and raised expectations
As Elizabeth Francis noted, “(L)ocal-level research... places the researcher and the 
researched in a social relationship” which raise difficulties in carrying out research since 
the researcher and the researched “bring expectations that are unlikely to coincide” 
(Francis 1992: 86-87). This is particularly the case when carrying out field research and 
interviews in redevelopment neighbourhoods. When the researcher was introduced to the 
local community in Beijing by the local government as mentioned above, it was possible 
that the researcher could be regarded as a government representative, and treated as such 
to express the residents’ on-going concern in relation to the redevelopment.
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In fact, instead of under-reporting their concern towards the neighbourhood 
redevelopment, some interviewees were expressive of their needs and expectations in a 
hope that their voices could be delivered to the local authority via the researcher. Two of 
the interviewees in Beijing were very eager to do the interview as they thought we were 
government representatives. They became much less enthusiastic when it became clear 
that we were not related to the local authority. These interviewees initially thought that 
they could take the opportunity to explain their frustration towards the developer and the 
estate management company. Another interviewee initially refused to do the interview as 
she mistook us for having come from the developer. All these suggested that the research 
visits to a redevelopment neighbourhood could have influenced residents* views.
In Seoul, it was also evident that residents in the field research neighbourhood hoped to 
use the interview as a chance to express concern regarding their neighbourhood 
redevelopment. The tone, however, was different from Beijing. Most interviewees were 
aware that the researcher’s field research would not make any difference to their situation. 
Instead, they were making suggestions and recommendations from their own perspectives 
so that these could be summarised by someone like the researcher to be written and 
publicised for future reference.
At the beginning of every interview, the researcher made it clear that we were not from 
the government, that the interview was only part of research activities, and that their 
views and identity would remain anonymous and confidential. A form was prepared for 
each interviewee to sign in order to gain their consent for the use of interview material 
for this research. These processes helped them understand the purpose of the research 
and interviews.
Overcoming language barriers in Beijing
Another problem of conducting field research in a foreign environment was the linguistic 
barrier. By the time of conducting interviews with local residents and officials, the 
researcher was well aware of local customs and code of conducts by being exposed to the 
culture for a number of months prior to these interviews. The researcher was also 
relatively fluent in standard Mandarin Chinese. Nevertheless, the use of strong local 
dialectics by the local residents raised concern for potential misunderstanding. In order to 
minimise this, two provisions were made. Firsdy, a questionnaire was prepared to collect 
the basic information regarding the interviewees’ household details and housing
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conditions. The questionnaire was based on the interview schedule employed in Seoul 
Secondly, all the interviews were tape-recorded for future retrieval. The recording was all 
performed with each interviewee’s consent.
3.3 Data analysis
This research is based on the data collected from local documents and archival records, 
on-site observation and semi-structured interviews with local residents and key actors. 
Due to the nature of comparative case study approach that this research adopted, such 
data were diverse and rich in quality. From the early stage of research design, data 
collected and compiled were cross-checked against each other by means of triangulation 
to ensure the rigour of this research. “Triangulation means gathering and analysing data 
from more than one source to gain a fuller perspective on the situation you are 
investigating” (Lacey and Luff 2001:23). This method proved to be particularly useful and 
effective in this research as one type of data was far from adequate to establish a full 
picture of redevelopment projects. The analysis of field data involved transcribing the 
interviews, classifying the collected data, preliminary coding and developing a framework 
for further comparison and thematic classification.
Transcription
As Pfaffenberger notes, the act of writing up is “an important form of data analysis and 
theoretical discover/’ since researchers reconstruct the snapshots from the field 
encounter to establish internal coherence (Pfaffenberger 1988: 26). The interviews with 
local residents and key actors constituted an important part of the data collection in this 
research. Most interviews were tape-recorded with the consent from interviewees, and 
were transcribed verbatim. When interviews were not tape-recorded, the researcher made 
hand-written notes in as much detail as possible, and these notes were written up right 
after each interview not to lose any details while still vivid in the memory. When the 
researcher encountered casual contacts or engaged in casual conversation with local 
residents, the researcher tried to produce verbatim transcriptions of such activities. For 
these activities, the researcher kept field research journals and took photographs to ensure 
the loss of detail was minimised.
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Classifying the data
The field data collected were organised by assigning document identification numbers. 
One example would be the classification of interview transcripts according to each 
resident interviewee’s identification number coded by the system explained in Box 3-1 
below. The coding was devised to identify a resident interviewee according to his/her 
place of residence (area), method of recording (date type) and sequence of interviewing 
(sequence). This method was used to ensure easy retrieval when analysing as well as to 
protea interviewees’ anonymity.
Box 3-1: Identification of residents interviewed
The researcher created the following assignment system to identify each interviewee.
The identification is composed of three parts: Area — Data type -  Sequence
Area: Country - City -  Administrative District
Country C for mainland China K for South Korea
City B for Beijing S for Seoul
Admin, district where interviewees were living at the time of interviewing
S7 for Sillim 7-dong in Seoul, where Nangok neighbourhood is located 
S6 for Sillim 6-dong and S10 for Sillim 10-dong in Seoul, where Nangok residents 
moved to upon displacement 
X for Xinzhongjie neighbourhood in Beijing
K for Kangjiagou neighbourhood in near suburban Beijing, where some of 
Xinzhongjie residents moved to upon displacement 
H for Haiyuncang neighbourhood in Beijing
X. for Yingheyuan neighbourhood in outer suburban Beijing, where some of 
Xiangheyuan residents moved to upon displacement 
11 for Haiyuncang neighbourhood in Beijing 
D6 for Dongsi 6-tiao in Beijing
Data type: INT for tape recording
INW for note-taking without tape recording
Sequence: 01, 02, 03...
An example of interviewee identification:
Interviewee CBX-INT-01 would refer to an interviewee living in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood in Beijing. The interview was tape-recorded.
Following a similar approach, all electronic and non-electronic field research data 
including photographs were also organised thematically for ease of retrieval at the stage of 
analysis and writing-up (see Appendix C for the details).
Coding and developing a  framework for interview analysis
The transcripts of interviews with local residents were analysed by means of the 
framework analysis, which is increasingly used in the analysis of qualitative research (Lacey 
and Luff 2001: 9-13; Spencer et al. 2003). According to Lacey and Luff (2001:9-10), there 
are five main stages to develop to conduct a framework analysis: (1) familiarisation; (2) 
identification of a thematic framework; (3) indexing; (4) charting; and (5) mapping and 
interpretation.
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For this research, themes were produced on the basis of the interview schedule, and then 
were arranged in a case chart produced in a spreadsheet format. That is, themes are 
arranged in columns, and cases in rows. In this research, each case would refer to each 
interviewee. Once this chart was established, this researcher went through each interview 
transcript carefully to index those verbatim accounts by the interviewees and chart them 
in the corresponding cell. Once these were completed, the contents under each theme 
were compared across cases to identify “patterns, associations, concepts, and 
explanations” (Lacey and Luff 2001:11). Figure 3-6 below shows the themes used for the 
indexing and charting.
Figure 3-6: Themes for indexing and charting residents' interviews
A. Household circumstances and conditions
A-l Household circumstances 
A-2 Household constraints
B. Housing experience and history
C  (In Beijing) Housing reform measures and their influences upon interviewing households
D. Description of current residence and the method of its acquisition
D-l Housing conditions of current residence (inc. in-house utilities and services)
D-2 Method of acquisition of current residence
E. Views on living in current house
F. Views on life in the neighbourhood
G. Reasons for choosing current place of residence
H. Attempts to solve housing problems
I. Commuting method to work or school
J. Social Network and participation
J-l Local environment /  Amenities
J-2 Participation in neighbourhood activities
J-3 Support Network
K. Description of previous residence and the method of its acquisition 
K-l Housing conditions of previous residence 
K-2 Method of acquisition of previous residence
L. Finding an alternative house to live after displacement
L-l Expectation level for relocation dwellings
L-2 Opportunities for housing mortgage (or bank loan)
L-3 Concerns for living in new flats after relocation 
L-4 Difficulties in finding an alternative residence to live
M. Displacement and relocation
M-l Negative experiences regarding displacement and relocation
M-2 Access to information on redevelopment schedule (including displacement)
M-3 Attitudes toward neighbourhood redevelopment
N. Views on urban renewal policies
0 . Views on local authorities
P. Expectation of re-housing after redevelopment
Q. Redevelopment compensation
Q-l Expectation for the type of compensation 
Q-2 Alternative way of using cash compensation
Analysis and tabulation
"Wherever possible, residents’ responses were quantified or precisely coded. Such
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responses included their household characteristics (e.g. number of co-habiting households, 
gender, age, education attainment), employment status (e.g. regular, temporary, 
unemployed), and housing conditions (e.g. tenure status, dwelling size). These were coded 
into the SPSS for Windows software for the ease of producing descriptive statistics if 
necessary.
Access to other raw data
As mentioned earlier, the field research data from Seoul was further aided by a set of raw 
survey data from a local welfare centre whose service area covered Nangok 
neighbourhood. The data were supplied with a code book produced by the Centre. They 
were used to support part of the arguments in Chapter 8 of this thesis which discuss the 
changes in housing experiences of Nangok residents after their displacement. In most 
cases, the researcher carried out descriptive statistical analysis, but in some cases such as 
the comparison of rent levels before and after house-moving, a paired-samples T-test was 
performed. These were all conducted using the SPSS for Windows software.
3.4 Conclusion
Emphases on redevelopment processes and local contexts led this research to adopt a 
multiple case study approach that involved nesting a neighbourhood within a wider 
context. Such an approach enabled me to examine how a developer-led partnership in a 
neighbourhood redevelopment unfolded within local contexts against the backdrop of 
wider socio-economic processes. International comparative research on cities which 
developed in different urban contexts is a challenge, which requires strenuous efforts but 
provides a rich understanding of their shared experiences. In conducting research in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, I came up against numerous constraints including access 
problems, data collection, and research ethics and raised expectations. The research 
methodology covering neighbourhood selection, data collection and analysis was carefully 
chosen and designed to overcome such constraints while ensuring consistency and rigour. 
The research methodology itself adds competency and strength to this research in 
comparison with other previous research on urban redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing, as 
this research established a direct dialogue with key actors and, most of all, residents in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods. The following chapters present findings of this research, 
and begin with the examination of residents’ living conditions before redevelopment.
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Chapter 4 
Living conditions in neighbourhoods 
targeted for redevelopment
Living conditions in Seoul
Seoul, Gwanak district and Urban Redevelopment
Formation and growth of Nangok neighbourhood
Physical conditions
Social conditions
Housing tenure
Summary
Living conditions in Beijing
Beijing, Dongcheng district and urban redevelopment
Different phases of housing construction
Physical conditions
Social conditions
Housing tenure
Summary
Conclusion
This chapter addresses my first research question: to find out what kind of physical and 
social conditions residents were exposed to before redevelopment. These findings were 
expected to serve two purposes. Firsdy, to help us better understand the operation of 
developers and local authority intervention in neighbourhood redevelopment, which is 
embedded within local contexts. Secondly, to provide information on local residents that 
could be used to determine the benefits of neighbourhood redevelopment from residents’ 
perspective.
The data for this chapter largely come from my own observations during the field 
research visits to redevelopment neighbourhoods in 2002 and 2003, and also from my 
interviews with local residents. In the case of Seoul, this research also benefited from the 
raw survey data provided by a local welfare centre (that is, Sillim Welfare Centre), which 
carried out a questionnaire survey of 156 households displaced from the neighbourhood 
where I also conducted my field research. Physical and social conditions discussed herein 
are largely taken from Nangok neighbourhood in Seoul, and Xinzhongjie neighbourhood 
(second phase redevelopment area) in Beijing, which were yet to face demolition at the 
time of my field research.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first two sections are devoted to 
Seoul and Beijing respectively. For each city four main topics are discussed: (1) 
demographic and geographic conditions of field research neighbourhoods placed in wider 
urban contexts; (2) formation and growth of field research neighbourhoods; (3) 
neighbourhoods’ physical conditions with emphasis on housing form and in-house 
facilities; and (4) residents’ social conditions, covering their occupational structure, poverty 
and housing tenure. The last section sums up the findings of this chapter.
4.1 Living conditions in Seoul 
Seoul. Gwanak district and Urban Redevelopment
Gwanak district in Seoul, where Nangok neighbourhood was located, first became part of 
Seoul in 1961 when the municipality was pursuing a rapid expansion of its administrative 
jurisdiction. At the time of incorporation, the district was largely rural. It had just over ten 
thousand residents in 1965, but grew very rapidly to become a densely populated district. 
By 1975, the total population reached 326,393 with a population density of 12,612 people
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per km2 (SMG 1976: 30). By 1980, the population density reached 18,227 people per km2 
and since then, it has been stable (GDG 1986: 28-29).
According to the district governments own account, such demographic expansion in the 
1970s was largely due to the mass relocation of evictees from more centrally located 
districts in Seoul. This was said to be experienced similarly by other newly incorporated 
municipal districts in the periphery (GDG 1997: 280-281). Indeed, the provision of 
relocation sites to accommodate those evictees was extensively practiced in Gwanak 
district until the early 1970s. For instance, during the five year period between 1964 and 
1968, 11,660 households in total were relocated in Gwanak district after their eviction 
from central Seoul (GDG 1997: 283). Considering that the average number of household 
members in Seoul in 1970 was five persons (SMG 1971b), this would equate to about
60,000 people, which meant that half of the district population increase between 1965
density of Gwanak district surged from 18,087 to 44,102 people/km2, becoming the most 
densely populated in Seoul.7
The progress of urban redevelopment in Gwanak district was slow in the 1970s. In 
December 1973, when the municipal government announced the designation of 196 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, 12 were from Gwanak district (GDG 1997: 291). 
However, for the next ten years, as was the case for the whole municipality, redevelopment 
was hardly initiated in these designated neighbourhoods due to the problems with project 
financing. It was only with the commencement of the Joint Redevelopment Programme 
(hereafter JRP) in Seoul that the neighbourhood redevelopment was actively promoted. 
Table 4-1 below shows the details of JRP projects completed in Gwanak district by 
December 2004. In total, 13 projects were completed, subjecting 94.6 hectare of surface 
area and demolishing 10,605 units of dilapidated dwellings. This accounted for about 17% 
of total dwelling stock available in the district by 1985 (GDG 2000: 86). Upon project 
completion, 23,008 flats were provided, a 117% increase in terms of the number of 
dwellings.
Table 4-1: Details of JRP project completion in Gwanak district (as of December 2004) 
(Housing Bureau of GDG 2005: 198-199; Housing Bureau of SMG 2005)
Year Number o f projects 
completed
Surface
area
(m 2)
Number of dwellings 
dem olished  
(units)
Number of  
new  flats supplied 
(units)
1988 1 15,391 215 251
1992 2 108,381 596 2,266
1993 3 112,292 1,520 2,856
2000 4 325,789 4,281 9,265
2003 1 264,225 1,954 5,387
2004 2 119,521 2,039 2,983
Total 13 945 ,599 10,605 23,008
Formation and growth of Nanaok neighbourhood
In terms of administration, Nangok neighbourhood belonged to Sillim 7-dong, which was
7 By the end of 1997, about 59% of the district’s administrative land was designated as forestry area (SMG 
1998b: 70). In Seoul, a substantial share (26%) of municipal land was taken up by forestry areas, which were 
largely consisted of mountains and hills along the periphery (SMG 2001b: 72). As of the end of December 
2000, 70% of these forestry areas were protected from development in accordance with the Urban Planning 
Act (SMG 2002c).
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one of the sub-districts of Gwanak district. Sillim 7-dong consisted of three main
neighbourhoods as shown in Figure 4-2 below.
Figure 4-2: Sillim 7-dong in Gwanak district and Nangok 
(Original map from Lee 1989)
0 50 100 150m
Legend
Sillim Redevelopment 
District 1 (Nangok 
redevelopment district)
Sillim Redevelopment 
District 7
(Government permit in 
September 2002 to 
authorise project 
implementation)
Remaining area of 
Sillim 7-dong (dwellings 
from the 1980s)
Nangok was formed along a hillside whose slope could be as steep as 45 degrees. Nangok 
redevelopment neighbourhood adjoined Sillim Redevelopment District 7. The latter 
redevelopment district had about 200 dwelling units, and obtained government 
authorisation in September 2002 to implement its redevelopment. Whereas 92.6% of 
Nangok redevelopment neighbourhood was public land with the majority of dwelling 
owners having no formal land tenure, the land within Sillim Redevelopment District 7 was 
largely privately owned. This explains why Nangok redevelopment area in the cadastral 
map above largely remained empty with no signs of dwellings. The remaining area of 
Sillim 7-dong included formal dwellings built in the 1980s, and was not subject to
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redevelopment. Figure 4-3 in the next page shows some of the views of Sillim 7-dong.
In the 1960s, when evictees from central Seoul were relocated to Gwanak district, 
dwellings prepared by the municipal government were hastily done. Their standard was far 
from adequate. For instance, in 1963, 45 one-storey buildings were prepared to 
accommodate 450 displaced households. Each household was allocated to a floor space 
of 13 m2, having only one bedroom and a kitchen (GDG 1997:281). Not all the displaced 
households were given a completed dwelling. Many were only allocated to a barren site 
where land preparation was performed to the minimum. Evictees were left to build their 
own dwellings at their own expense.
Nangok was designated in 1968 as a relocation site for about 2,700 households, evicted 
from various inner city districts of Seoul (GDG 1997: 649). When the evicted families 
arrived at Nangok, each family was allocated to a piece of land along the hillside. Each lot 
measured about 25 m2. The intention was that evicted families could start building a 
dwelling at their own expense. Interviewees who had been living in Nangok since its first 
establishment reported similar experiences of eviction and relocation. For instance:
“I was in my second year of primary school when we were evicted and built a new 
house here. It’s been more than 30 years since then, since 1968... I came home after 
school, and my house was gone. I looked for my mom, and on a main road, there 
were my mom and dad, on a vehicle that resembled one of those garbage trucks.
That night, we came here, and the life in Nangok began.”
(Interviewee KSS7-INT-02)
“I first came to Nangok in 1968 with my wife and children. At that time, it was all 
mountainous... We evictees were allocated to a parcel of land that was roughly a 5- 
metre square. The boundary was marked by lime powder and each parcel was 
numbered so that it was allocated to a family by drawing a number. There was no 
other thing apart from the barren land, so we had to erect a tent as a makeshift.”
(Interviewee KSS10-INT-03)
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Figure 4 -3 :  Various view s of Sillim 7-dong including Nangok neighbourhood  
(Photos taken by th e author in 2002)
Point A.
Formal housing outside Nangok neighbourhood
PHOTO
LAYOUT
Figure 4-3: Various views of Sillim 7-dong including Nangok neighbourhood (continued)
Point E. View to the north. The area below white line is Nangok redevelopment
neighbourhood
Point F. View to the east
Nangok neighbourhood expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, absorbing many poor families 
and new migrants from rural areas. According to a municipal report in 1991 on Nangok, 
there were in total 4,416 households in the neighbourhood, accommodated in 2,732 illegal 
dwellings (SMG 1991: 186). The total resident population reached 16/34 people, which 
was about two thirds of the total population of Sillim 7-dong (GDG 1996: 28). Nangok 
itself occupied less than 20% of Sillim 7-dong area, which indicated that the resulting 
population density of Nangok could have been as high as 107/53 people per km2 (SMG 
1991: 186). This suggested excessively crowded conditions, and was far higher than 
Gwanak district’s average of 19,381 people per km2 (GDG 1996:28).
Nangok was originally designated as a redevelopment neighbourhood in 1973, but the 
designation was lifted in 1982 as no further government action was carried out to initiate 
renewal work in the neighbourhood. With the commencement of the JRP in the mid- 
1980s, rumours were spread around the neighbourhood that a JRP project would take 
place soon in the neighbourhood. It was only in 1995, however, that Nangok was 
designated as a JRP district, and that a redevelopment steering committee was approved 
by the district government as the first step of project implementation. The lack of formal 
land tenure for most dwellings in the neighbourhood and rumours about potential 
redevelopment in the 1980s and early 1990s created unfavourable conditions for 
neighbourhood expansion, limiting any further growth or physical improvement. 
Nevertheless, Nangok remained a large community By 1996, a year before the formal 
approval of redevelopment comprehensive plan, the total number of residents in the 
neighbourhood still reached 14,640, with a population density of 85,364 people per km2 
(GDA 1996). The number of dwelling turned out to be 2,609 units. All but nine units 
were without formal land tenure (GDA 1996).
Physical conditions
Dwelling form and housing space
As was mentioned earlier, the evictees who settled down in Nangok in 1968 were first 
allocated to a piece of land whose size was only about 8 pyeong (an indigenous term often 
quoted by local residents; 1 pyeong is 3.3058 m2in metric terms). Families mobilised their 
own resources to self-build homes. As the neighbourhood population increased, 
transactions also took place among the residents, which sometimes led to the merging of 
two dwellings into one to allow more residential space (SMG 1991: 188). The original
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dwelling space of 8 pyeong (26 m2), however, came to be the dominant feature of physical 
housing standard. Close to two thirds of all dwellings in Nangok turned out to have a 
dwelling space of 8 pyeong or less. Sharing a dwelling with a multiple number of 
households was common due to frequent sub-letting. A dwelling was occupied on the 
average by 1.6 households, thus each household enjoyed 17 m2 of floor space on average 
(SMG 1991: 181). Another study found that there were 1.8 households per dwelling, each 
household occupying about 22 m2 of floor space (Lee 1989: 13). Both findings suggested 
that the dwelling space enjoyed by Nangok residents was far from reaching the urban 
average of 48.3 m2 per household in 1990 (NSO Korea 2001d: 333). Figure 4-4 shows 
some examples of existing dwelling layout.
Figure 4-4: Some examples of existing dwelling layout in Nangok 
(Lee 1989: 29)
An example of a 
backhouse next to 
the entrance door
The 2nd and 3rd rows 
of houses are drawn 
with floor plans to 
show various ways of 
utilising internal space
A former owner occupier, whose dwelling space used to be less than 8 p y eo n g  during their 
residence in Nangok neighbourhood, recollected that she used to sub-let one of her two 
bedrooms to receive rent income. With four sons and her husband, they were cramped 
into one bedroom:
“I wish we were to use two bedrooms [at that time]. One [of the two bedrooms] 
________ — i ^  — j  :-------------------------  c_L- 1
I nuke any money didnt have any capacity tor living, 
iidn’t let me find a job. Not even once. He was saying women should stay at 
>o, there was no room for children to study In that small room, with one 
i sub-let, it was difficult even to sleep... Then, after my husband passed 
years ago], I started to work, saved some money, and turned the tenants 
le house. Afterwards, it was so comfortable. Children slept together in the
puui... 1
But, he c 
home... J 
bedroon 
away [16 
out of tl
other bedroom, and I slept alone, or sometimes with one or two children...”
(Interviewee KSS10-INT-01)
The analysis of Sillim Welfare Centre’s survey data indicates that the average housing 
space of 113 respondents before their displacement from Nangok neighbourhood turned 
out to be 37.8 m2 (see Table 4-2 below). This was still lower than the urban average of 
61.3 m2 in 2000, but much higher than the 1991 estimate. This could be explained by the 
decrease in the total number of on-site residents throughout the 1990s. Households came 
to occupy a whole dwelling on their own rather than co-habiting with another household.
“I started my family in 1986.1 have two children, a 15-year-old son and a 13-year- 
old daughter. Both are in junior high school in the vicinity... When we were living in 
Nangok before relocation, the house [with a construction space of less than 26m2] 
originally had one bedroom, and we subdivided it into two. We used one room as a 
storage space, and four of us all lived in one bedroom... The condition of the 
previous house was so appalling, and it was very small. It didn’t even have a toilet, so 
we had to use our neighbours. . . ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-18)
“The house [rented by the interviewee in Nangok at the time of interviewing] has
two bedrooms... The rent was cheaper here in this upper hill-side than down there.
if the house had no warmth... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-03)
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Dwelling conditions and facilities
Nangok neighbourhood was connected bv a web of narrow alleys, whit 
more than two or three metres wide at the most (see previous Figure 4
Figure 4 -5 : Various views of Nangok’s physical conditions before demolition
(a) View of an alley. The letters on the 
wall say "do not dump rubbish here"
(b) View of an alley. LPG cylinders are 
stacked against the wall, and electric and 
telephone cables are hanging above roof
Figure 4 -6 :  An exam ple of a dwelling's physical conditions in Nangok 
(Photos taken by th e author in 2002)
Point A. Exterior view. Exhausted briquettes are 
stacked against the wall. The number '2419' is a 
dwelling identification number attributed by the 
developer.
Point B. Entry area, also used for washing-up, 
with a kitchen sink in the middle. The vertical 
pipe in the foreground is from a briquette stove
Point C. Bedroom #1, used by the interviewee's daughter Point D. View of kitchen
Note: This is a floor plan of the interviewee, KSS7-INT-05’s  dwelling. 
Original drawing by the author.
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Within the neighbourhood, the most frequently found dwelling type was a one-storey 
dwelling whose floor space was not more than what was originally assigned at the time of 
initial setdement in the late 1960s. Each dwelling consisted of one or two bedrooms and a 
kitchen area. Indoor flush toilets were rarely found. The pictures and floor plan in Figure 
4-6 above show a typical example of what such a dwelling would look like. Wherever 
possible, residents built a backhouse to have a private access to toilet, but the odour was 
hard to endure. Over the years, the local authority provided public toilets, and where 
permanent structure was hard to be built, installed temporary ones. An interviewee made 
a comment seasoned with humour that “public toilets are the finest” in Nangok 
(Interviewee KSS7-INT-05). These public toilets were more commonly found as one 
walked further uphill:
“People living further up there used public toilets. There, 1 out of 4 houses had a 
toilet of its own...We are located in the middle, and usually toilets are outside the 
main entrance [of each house]. In our case, our toilet seemed to have been originally 
outside the house, next to the gate, but the previous occupants must have pushed 
the front door further outward so that the toilet came inside the walls 
” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01)
At an individual household level, dwelling upgrading was carried out over the years in 
various ways. Coal-fired heating and cooking system was replaced with oil-fired heating 
system and/or LPG-connected (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) cooking facility. When LPG 
was used, gas cylinders were placed against the wall outside each house. This was a 
dangerous, but inevitable, setting, because electric cookers were hardly used in South 
Korea. It was difficult to carry out underground piping work to install feed pipes for 
conventional LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) supply system around the neighbourhood due 
to the steep slope and high building density
When a dwelling was wholly rented out, tenants had to carry out maintenance and 
adjustment works in order to fix equipment and facilities that were abandoned or out of 
order. Especially in the 1990s, landlords were anticipating a redevelopment project to take 
place in Nangok in the immediate future. Housing maintenance was carried out just 
enough to prevent a dwelling from collapsing, in which case the concerned landlord 
would not be able to fully claim his/her rights in a redevelopment project. This was 
because, as mentioned earlier, the dwellings in the neighbourhood were largely absent of 
formal land tenure. Under such circumstances, maintenance and repair works had become 
largely a burden for tenants to bear. A typical situation for tenants who signed a new 
tenancy contract was described by interviewees as follows:
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“This house [in Nangok] was vacant at the time of our moving-in [in October 1997], 
and was like in ruins. We had to fix the house and repair the boiler 
ourselves... There was nothing in this house. The boiler was out of order, and the 
roof was near collapsing...” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01)
“Our house has two rooms and about 33 m2 of floor space. It has a small yard in 
front. The landlord said it used to be an empty plot, and he built a wall around it for 
his own use... There was no toilet at the time of our house moving-in [in 1995]. My 
husband was in construction business, so he built one himself. Of course it was just 
like a backhouse, a simple brick structure with a roof, and no tiling... Kitchen was 
like a semi-basement due to the slope. It’s awfully small and very inconvenient... We 
installed the boiler ourselves. Originally the heating was by coal, but it smelled a lot. 
Because we were raising children, we spent a lot of money as there was no other 
choice. The landlords in this neighbourhood [Nangok] don’t do such things even if 
you ask them. So, we squeezed our money and it was worthwhile as we have lived 
here for several years... Any repair work for the piping or electricity all had to be 
taken care of by us. The landlords never show up. They simply trade the property 
between themselves, and you never know who the landlord is... ”
(Interviewee KSS7-INT-02)
Social conditions
Residents in urban renewal areas and also in Nangok neighbourhood showed a high 
incidence of non-regular jobs and unemployment. This is well demonstrated in Table 4-3 
below, which summarised three studies.8 Between 40% and 55% of residents were either 
unemployed or engaged in jobs that could be regarded as precarious and unstable in terms 
of job security (see the shaded rows in the table). The proportion of office or factory 
workers (top three job categories in the table) reached 23% in the 1991 study, and much 
lower in the case of Nangok residents.
To some extent, this reflected the characteristics of South Korea’s labour market, which 
was noted for its low share of employees in regular/permanent jobs (OECD 2000: 33-39). 
Even then, the rate of unemployment as shown in Table 4-3 turned out to be far higher 
than the national average. The national unemployment rate was effectively kept under 3% 
since 1988 until the national economy was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (NSO 
Korea 2001d: 196). The unemployment rate of 6.8% in 1998, which was the highest
8 In Table 4-3, three studies are introduced: the 1991 study published by the Seoul Municipal Government 
was to examine the housing situation of low-income residents residing in low-income neighbourhoods 
including urban renewal districts through the selection of several case study sites (SMG 1991). The other 
two studies were conducted by Sillim Welfare Centre, once in April 2000 and again in June 2002. The study 
in April 2000 was to look at the living conditions and find out the needs of the residents in Nangok 
neighbourhood (Sillim Welfare Centre 2000). Because the study was conducted before the large-scale 
displacement took place, it provided a latest insight into the profile of the residents before displacement
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during the last three decades, was still much lower than what was experienced in urban 
renewal neighbourhoods including Nangok
Table 4-3: Occupational structure of residents in urban renewal areas including Nangok
Job category 19911)
(All household members) 
Residents in urban 
renewal areas
April 2000Z) 
(Household head only)
Residents in Nangok 
neigbhourhood 
before displacement
June 20023)
(All household members)
Displacees from Nangok 
neighbourhood
Administrative work 190 12.7% 12 4.5% 22 5.5%
Factory work 95 6.4% 23 8.7% 10 2.5%
Managerial/supervisory 57 3.8% 9 3.4% 4 1.0%
Service and sales 109 7.3% 50 18.9% 34 8.5%
Self-employed 67 4.5% n.a. n.a. 10 2.5%
Peddlers/handicraftsmen 21 1.4% n.a. n.a. 2 0.5%
Manual labour (casual/construction) 154 10.3% 68 25.8% 54 13.5%
Unemployed4’ 420 28.1% 54 20.5% 78 19.5%
Unpaid family work n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 70 17.5%
Public work (NBLS-based) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16 4.0%
Students 320 21.4% n.a. n.a. 72 18.0%
Others 62 4.1% 48 18.2% 29 7.2%
Total 1495 100.0% 264 100.0% 401 100.0%
Note: 1) SMG (1991); 2) Sillim Welfare Centre (2000); 3) Sillim Welfare Centre (2002); 4) The number of unemployed workers may 
also include unpaid family workers in the case of the studies by Sillim Welfare Centre in 2000, and by Seoul Metropolitan 
Government in 1991, as unpaid family workers do not appear as an independent category.
The 2002 survey on displaced households by the Sillim Welfare Centre provided another 
interesting piece of information on the job status of Nangok residents. It was found that 
only 39.2% of all the employed household members had full-time permanent positions, 
and 19.0% were working full-time but temporarily employed. The proportion of those 
working on hourly or daily basis among all those household members employed was 
estimated to be 39.2% (Sillim Welfare Centre 2002).
In South Korea, the major means-tested social assistance programme is called the 
National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) system. It was put into operation in October 
2000, replacing the Livelihood Protection Programme that was in practice since 1961. The 
NBLS system was an attempt by the central government to re-align its existing social 
assistance programmes in line with the principle of ‘productive welfare’ (for more 
information, see Lee et al. 2001: 59-81; OECD 2000: 127-143). By the end of 2000, the 
total number of NBLS beneficiaries in Gwanak district reached 4,570 households, or 
2.4% of all the households in the district. The proportion of NBLS beneficiaries was 
much higher in Sillim 7-dong, where Nangok was located, having reached 14.1% (GDG 
2001a: 38-39, 138). The second highest figure, experienced in Bongcheon 5-dong, reached 
only 6.7% (ibid). This suggests that poverty was more likely to be prevalent among the
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residents in Sillim 7-dong than in any other sub-district within Gwanak district. The high 
proportion of NBLS beneficiaries was also witnessed among the displacees from Nangok 
Among 2,067 households displaced from the neighbourhood between September 2000 
and March 2002,12% were NBLS beneficiaries (Sillim Welfare Centre 2002: 10-11).
Housing tenure
According to the data provided by the Housing Bureau of the Gwanak district 
government, there were in total 2,450 households in Nangok neighbourhood by the end 
of 2000. Of these, 421 households were owner-occupiers, suggesting a very high 
proportion of absentee landlords (83.1%) (GDG 2001b). Such low proportion of owner 
occupation was in contrast with the general tenure distribution in Seoul where about 40% 
of all the municipal households were owner-occupiers (NSO Korea 2001a). The dominant 
form of rental tenure in Seoul was called C h o n se i in Korean which I explain below, 
accounting for two thirds of tenant households in the city (41% of total municipal 
households). The remaining tenants were mostly in deposit-based monthly rental tenure. 
The popularity of Chonsei tenure in Seoul is also witnessed in Nangok neighbourhood, as 
Table 4-4 below indicated.
Table 4-4: Nangok residents’ pre-displacement tenure status
Pre-relocation tenure status
Owner occupation Chonsei Deposit-based monthly rent
(Valid responses N = 134) 22.4% 69.4% 8.2%
Source: Data from Sillim Welfare Centre study in summer 2002
Chonsei in Korea requires a substantial amount of up-front costs as key money or deposit 
upon signing a contract, and does not require monthly rent payment. This key money is 
returned to tenants in full at the end of their contract, and could be used in part or in full 
as key money for the tenants’ subsequent Chonsei contract or housing contract (Renaud 
1989: 12).9 As for the deposit-based monthly rental tenure, it occurs usually when tenants
9 This key money is usually invested by landlords in formal and informal financial market, and their 
“interest earning represents an imputed rent” (Ha 2002: 197). The real value of the key money may be 
depreciated in line with price inflation, and the tenants are to give up the opportunity to gain interest 
income. For the landlords, Chonsei tenure works as “a source of funds,” and “exemplifies the inherent 
qualities of residential real estate as collateral Instead of borrowing from a bank against this collateral, the 
owner of the dwelling is receiving a loan from his tenant (or tenants)” (Renaud 1989: 13). Landlords often 
use “the deposit to pay for real estate or business activities” and if not, deposit the money “with an informal 
dealer on the curb market” that may yield high interests (Renaud 1989: 13).
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are in shortage of imposed Chonsei key money If agreed with their landlords, some of 
the key money is turned into monthly rents. Because there is no regular monthly rent 
payment involved with Chonsei, it provides relatively stable tenure security during the 
contract period even if they do not have regular income. The amount of Chonsei deposit 
is often increased upon renewal of its contract. If tenants are able to meet this renewed 
demand from their landlords, the increased Chonsei deposit would be equated to an 
increase in the tenants’ accumulated savings. In this way it works as “a contractual savings 
scheme” by functioning as “a vehicle for self-imposed savings and asset accumulation” 
(Renaud 1989:12).
When residents were residing in Nangok neighbourhood before displacement, two major 
advantages were their low spending on housing costs, and the relatively secure and 
affordable housing provided by Chonsei tenure. The average amount of Chonsei deposit 
was estimated to be KRW 7,834,000 during their residence in Nangok neighbourhood 
(Sillim Welfare Centre 2002). This was about 73% of average annual disposable income 
for the bottom 20% of income decile for salary and wage earners’ households in 2001 
(NSO Korea 2002a).
Summary
This section has examined the neighbourhood formation and growth, living conditions of 
the residents in Nangok neighbourhood before its full-scale redevelopment. It was shown 
that Nangok was initially established as a relocation site for evictees from central Seoul, 
and had grown in the 1970s and 1980s to become an over-crowded informal settlement. 
Like in other redevelopment neighbourhoods, informal jobs and unemployment were 
prevalent among the residents. The majority of dwellings had no formal land tenure. 
Residents’ living space was far smaller than the municipal average, and the majority of 
dwellings lacked basic facilities. Nangok provided residents with affordable dwellings, and 
the dominant tenure form was Chonsei tenure that involved up-front deposit payment 
without monthly rents.
4.2 Living conditions in Beijing 
Beiiina. Donachena district and urban redevelopment
Beijing consists of 16 districts and 2 counties within its jurisdiction, which are usually
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grouped into three categories: inner city districts (sometimes referred to as ‘city proper’), 
near suburban districts and outer suburban districts and counties. Figure 4-7 below shows 
the administrative boundaries in Beijing. Inner city districts, positioned at the centre of the 
map, had been the urban core during the imperial period, and remain so now. They consist 
of four districts, namely Dongcheng, Xicheng, Xuanwu and Chongwen.
Figure 4-7: Beijing’s administrative boundaries
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In terms of land size, the inner city districts occupy only 0.5% of Beijing’s total surface 
area, but their population accounts for more than two fifths of total municipal permanent 
population (BMBS 2003a). As such, inner city districts have been the most densely 
populated in Beijing with the highest population density of 34,027 people per km2 in 
Xuanwu district by the end of 2002. Dongcheng district, where my field research was 
conducted, had a population density of 25,847 people per km2, which was more than 6 to 
7 times denser than neighbouring near suburban districts.
Over the years in the 1990s, in spite of the implementation of the Old and Dilapidated
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Housing Redevelopment Programme (hereafter ODHRP), the population density of 
inner city districts did not experience much reduction. This was the same for Dongcheng 
district. Between 1992 and 2002, the population density of Dongcheng district only 
decreased by 1% (BMBS 2003a; BMG 1995). This was far less than the 10% reduction, 
which was set out by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning.10
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When the ODHRP was first introduced in Beijing in 1990, 37 neighbourhoods in total 
were designated to carry out the programme. Five of them were located within 
Dongcheng district. In 1992, Dongcheng district assigned another 19 neighbourhoods to 
its list of redevelopment districts. By 1995, another 17 neighbourhoods were added, 
bringing the total number of ODHR neighbourhoods to 41. The total land area subjected 
to the ODHRP reached 6.22 km2, which accounted for approximately one quarter of 
Dongcheng district’s total surface area. The total number of households subjected would 
reach 65,300 households. By 1997, ODHRP projects in 5 neighbourhoods were
10 Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning set out an aim to gradually disperse municipal 
population so that the number of urban permanent residents within the second ring road would be reduced 
from 1.75 million in 1990 to 1.6 million by 2000. By 2010, it was hoped to reach below 1.5 million (BMG 
1993).
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Figure 4-8: Population density of Beijing districts by the end of 2002
(BMBS 2003a)
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completed, 14 still in progress, and work was yet to start in 22 neighbourhoods (Wei 1997: 
49). The redevelopment of these remaining 22 neighbourhoods started in 1999 (DDG 
2000: 280).
Residents’ composition in Dongzhimen Street Office
Administratively, Dongcheng district is subdivided into 10 Street Offices (known as jie d a o  
b a m h k h u  in Chinese). Xinzhongjie neighbourhood, the field research neighbourhood, was 
part of Dongzhimen Street Office. As of the end of 1999, the permanent residents in 
Dongzhimen Street Office were organised into 39 neighbourhood committees (in Chinese, 
jm m b u i) . The population density in the area under Dongzhimen Street Office’s jurisdiction 
reached 23,471 people per km2 in 1999, which was slightly lower than the district average 
of 24,770 people per km2 (DDG 2000: 331, 353). The residents’ composition in 
Dongzhimen Street Office area in Table 4-5 below shows a glimpse of its social 
conditions.1
Table 4-5: Household registration and employment status in Dongzhimen Street, Beijing
lotai nurriDer or 
registered  
households
no . or nousenoia  m em oers Persons p e r household
Male Female
19,711 53,144 26,194 26,950 2.70
Employment status
Total num ber of 
reg istered
R esidents excluding s tu d en ts  and children under schooling age S tuden ts Under 
schooling ag e
residen ts Employed Retired Laid off or 
unemployed
Beneficiaries of 
social assistance
53,144 44,163 28,531
64.6%
9,823
22.2%
4,414
10.0%
1,395
3.2%
7,845 1,136
Source: Dongzhimen Street Office
Different phases of housing construction
According to the director of Dongzhimen Street Office, the housing construction in 
Dongzhimen Street area could be broadly divided into four phases since the 1949 
Liberation. The first phase referred to the period of the 1950s when the municipality was 
swept with capital construction to provide major facilities and landmark buildings such as 
The People’s Congress Hall, Beijing Railway Station, Worker’s Stadium and Worker’s 
Gymnasium. During this period, one-storey pingfang dwellings were erected in
Dongzhimen area and in its precincts (including Xinzhongjie neighbourhood) as 
residential quarters for those workers put into large-scale post-war capital construction 
projects (see Figure 4-9a and Figure 4-9b).
“The first phase was right after the Liberation, in the late 195s. Workers Stadium 
and Gymnasium were also built at that time. In addition, when the Ten Major 
Construction Projects [commonly referred to as shida jianshe in Chinese] took place, 
residential compounds were also built to accommodate those workers put into the 
construction projects. This covers all the areas around here, and also includes 
Xinzhongjie” (Director of Dongzhimen Street Office)
Figure 4-9: Built forms from the 1950s and 1980s in Dongzhimen Street 
(Photos taken by the author in August 2003)
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. The projects sometimes accompanied residential flats, which 
re-housed some of the original residents, but in most cases, original residents were 
relocated to other districts in the east or northeast Beijing outside Dongcheng district. 
The fourth phase referred to the recent years of carrying out the ODHRP projects in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods.
Physical conditions
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Xinzhongjie neighbourhood lies across the Workers’ Stadium outside the eastern section 
of Beijing’s second ring road. The redevelopment of Xinzhongjie neighbourhood was 
phased in two separate phases. The first phase was already completed by the time my field 
research was carried out, covering about one quarter of the neighbourhood into a high-
rise commercial estate called the Sun Gty estate. The dwellings subjected to the
redevelopment in Xinzhongjie depicted 
typical characteristics of old and 
dilapidated dwellings found in other 
redevelopment neighbourhoods in 
Beijing. The juxtaposition of modem 
high-rise flats and dilapidated dwellings 
in the second phase redevelopment area 
in Xinzhongjie presented a strikingly 
contrasting picture (see Figure 4-10).
Figure 4-10: Old and new in Xinzhongjie - 
juxtaposition of a pingfang dwelling and 
the Sun City estate
In the case of the second phase 
redevelopment area in Xinzhongjie, there 
were two distinguishable dwelling forms.
On the one hand, there were one-storey 
pingfang dwellings. Unlike those former 
imperial courtyard houses largely found 
within the second ring road, pingfang dwellings in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood were 
mostly built in the 1950s, arranged in rows along hutong alleys. Most pingfang dwellings 
were not self-contained, unequipped with facilities such as private toilet or kitchen.
On the other hand, there were five-storey walk-up blocks, which were also built in the 
1950s with the financial and technical assistance from the former Soviet Union. These 
walk-up blocks consisted of one- or two-bedroom flats, most of which were not self­
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contained either. Two flats often shared a kitchen, and each floor had one public toilet 
installed. Indoor heating depended on individual coal-fired heating system.
The physical conditions of the dwellings in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood were subject to 
residents’ discontent and complaints, as some of the quotes below implied:
“In winter, it gets pretty cold in this small room, especially near the south wall, 
which gets freezing and damp... ” (Interviewee CBX-INT-01)
“I always longed for relocation. Look at this house, look at lower part of those walls.
I did some maintenance of the house in 1995 when I retired, pulling [all the 
wallpaper] off the wall, but the lower part of those walls is covered with mould... ”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-03)
“At the moment, I just wish to have a place to wash and also a private toilet. Because 
my mom requires to have someone to look after [because she is ill and is in a 
wheelchair]. It is inconvenient when she goes to [public] toilet... If you go other 
place to take a bath, you have to pay the fees. The house is always in the shadow due 
to the tree in front of the house. There’s no way to dry clothes here. See the leak in 
the house?” (Interviewee CBX-INT-06)
In terms of dwelling space, a Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader commented 
that a flat in a walk-up block would usually have a floor space of approximately 35 -40 m2, 
whereas the floor space of a pingfang unit would only reach 14 m2 at the most. This was 
only taking the formal dwelling space into account. Old and dilapidated neighbourhoods 
in Beijing were often characterised by the high incidence of informal extension (known as 
zijiarfang in Chinese) to existing formal dwelling space to meet household needs. This was 
also commonly found in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. Such space constituted about one- 
third of their total floor space, but was not subject to any rent payment, nor was it subject 
to compensation at the time of demolition and redevelopment. Unlike pingfang dwellings, 
the structural rigidity of the walk-up blocks did not allow informal extension, and their 
original design feature appeared to have remained largely untouched.
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Figure 4 -1 1 : Various views o f neighbourhood conditions in 
Xinzhongjie second phase redevelopm ent area
(Photos taken by th e  author in August 2003)
(e) View of an alley. About 1.2m wide
(b) View of a cul-de-sac. 1980s' walk-up 
flats lie in the background behind 
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(a) View of an alley used for small vehicle
(c) Front fagade of pingfang dwellings
Figure 4-12: Physical conditions of a pingfang unit in Xinzhongjie 
(Pictures taken by the author in August 2003)
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Figure 4-13: Physical conditions of a walk-up flat in Xinzh 
(Pictures taken by the author in August 2003)
Point A. View of Bedroom 1
Table 4-6 below summarises the extent to which the housing space of interviewees 
depended on the self-built portion of their residence. It clearly indicates the important 
role the informal extension had played for the residents who were allocated only a small 
portion of formal dwelling space by their employers or the municipal housing bureau. 
Self-built space constituted approximately one-third of their total floor space.
Table 4-6: Extent of residents’ use of informal self-built space in Beijing
Category
Floor space per household
Formal space Self-built space Total
20.2 9.0 29.2
19.4 7.7 27.1
* ' 21.5 11.0 32.5
Total
Current dwellings
Pre-relocation dwellings of households displaced and relocated
“[Before the children got married and left this house], my son and husband slept on  
this wooden plank bed, bending over to fit in, and my daughter and I slept on this 
double bed [all in this one bedroom]. When the summer came, it’s impossible to  
sleep like that in here with my son and daughter, so m y son and husband just slept 
on the ground outside. Life was just like that. It was so difficult... ”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-03)
Social conditions
Neighbourhood committees in Chinese cities maintained a detailed record of permanent 
residents within their jurisdiction as part of household registration system (known as 
h u k o u  in Chinese). A neighbourhood committee leader in Xinzhongjie explained that 
many residents displaced in December 1999 as part of the neighbourhood’s first phase 
redevelopment still kept their registration record within Xinzhongjie neighbourhood.
“People were displaced and went away but their household registration didn’t 
change, and is kept here. So, if their children enrol into the army or if they apply 
and be recipients of minimum living security allowances, they would still have to  
make applications here [that is, Xinzhongjie neighbourhood]”
(Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader)
According to the summary record of Xinzhongjie residents, there were 1,539 officially 
registered households (see Table 4-7 below). The number of actually residing residents 
reached 1,237 or 80% of the total registered residents. The average size of a household 
turned out to be 2.7 persons, but the record did not show how many households co­
habited a dwelling.
Table 4-7: Household registration status in Xinzhongjie
Registered in the neighbourhood Currently residing (as of March 2002)
No. of 
households
No. of household members Persons per 
household
No. of 
households
No. of household members Persons per 
household
1,539 4,151 2.70 1,237 3,403 2.75
Male
2,068
Female
2,083
Male
1,702
Female
1,701
Source: Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee
Table 4-8 below shows the occupational structure of all the registered Xinzhongjie 
residents. Among the residents excluding students and children under school age, 48.5% 
turned out to be in employment, but the record itself did not indicate the proportion of 
residents in part-time or temporary employment. Twenty nine percent turned out to have 
retired, and ten percent lost their jobs by being laid-off or unemployed. This shows that
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Xinzhongjie neighbourhood had a high incidence of unemployment in municipal or 
national standard. The number of people registered as unemployed in Beijing reached 
51,900 by the end of 2001, resulting in an unemployment rate of only 1.18% (BMG 2002: 
216). Such a rate of unemployment was even lower than the national average for urban 
areas, which was 3.6% (NBS China 2002: Table 5-1).
Table 4-8: Occupational structure of Xinzhongjie residents
___________________________________ (as of March 2002)
Total number of 
registered residents
Under
schooling
age
4,151 3,283 Employed Retired Laid off or Others 795
unemployed
1,593 942 319 429 
48.5% 28.7% 9.7% 13.1%
73
Source: Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee
Part of the reason for such a hieh inrirlenre o f  lin em n lnvm en r in Xin7hnn<nie
those urban households whose per capita income falls below the income threshold 
announced each year by local governments (Zhu 2002). In 2002, those households eligible 
for such benefits in Beijing were to have per capita income less than 290 yuan, which was 
28% of per capita disposable income of average Beijing residents in the same year, or 
51% of per capita disposable income of the bottom 20% of income decile (Beijing 
Qingnianbao 26 June 2002; BMBS 2003a: 180).
Housing tenure
According to the director of Dongzhimen Street Office, most dwellings found in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods were public rental housing. The privatisation of existing 
public housing units was part of the reform agenda, and helped public housing tenants 
become owner-occupiers. This was not the case for Xinzhongjie residents whose 
dwellings were too dilapidated to be considered for such transfer of ownership.
All the interviewees but two were tenants in public rental units during their residence in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods. One household was residing in a completely rent-free self- 
built unit with no formal contract with the municipal housing bureau, thus not paying any 
rent. The other interviewee owned her place, because her family used to be registered as 
agricultural households until 1978, and her house was allowed to remain in her family's 
possession when the area of her residence was incorporated into urban built-up space.
Those interviewed households, subject to displacement due to the second phase 
Xinzhongjie redevelopment, reported that their monthly rents averaged less than 2% of 
their monthly household income. This was much lower than reform policies had 
anticipated. While the reform measures aimed at increasing the level of rent to reach 15% 
of household income, the rent level in Beijing had not risen to meet this target. The 
standard rent in the public housing sector at the beginning of the reform policies in the 
late 1980s was 0.11 yuan/m2 (c.0.81% of household monthly income). It was increased to 
1.3 yuan in 1999, and was further increased to 3.05 yuan/ m2 as of 1 April 2000, but this 
still constituted only about 6.3% of household income (BMG 2000a; China Daily 22 June 
2000,22 March 2000).
Summary
This section has examined pre- redevelopment neighbourhood conditions in Beijing,
i
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including dwellings’ physical status and residents’ social conditions. In Beijing’s 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, those dwellings subject to redevelopment were not illegal 
in character when they were first built, but came to have informal self-built space over the 
time in order to accommodate residents’ housing needs. Dwelling space was far too small 
even if self-built space was included, and in-house facilities were poor. Public rental tenure 
was dominant, as most dwellings belonged to the municipal housing bureau. Residents 
experienced a high incidence of out-of-job conditions (e.g. retired or unemployed), 
suggesting unstable or weak income activities.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the physical and social conditions residents were exposed to 
before redevelopment. Redevelopment neighbourhoods and residents in Seoul and Beijing 
shared some common features. As expected, dilapidated dwellings were prevalent, lacking 
basic facilities such as private kitchen or toilet. Most dwellings were built decades ago, and 
apparently experienced lack of investment for upgrading or maintenance. Although 
residents tried sub-division or external extension to meet their housing needs, per capita 
dwelling space was much lower than die municipal average. A large number of existing 
residents were either unemployed or engaged in precarious jobs, having difficulties in 
securing stable income.
On the other hand, redevelopment neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing also displayed 
some differences. In Seoul, dwellings were mostly privately owned with no formal land 
tenure, as they were originally built on public land without conforming to municipal 
building codes. Private rental tenure known as Chonsei was the dominant tenure form. In 
Beijing, dwellings were not illegal in its origin, and in fact, they constituted Beijing’s public 
housing stock External extension was commonly practiced to increase dwelling space, 
adding informal characteristics. Public rental tenure was the dominant tenure form in 
Beijing.
Such differences in housing ownership, tenure structure and dwellings’ origin imply that 
the relationship between the local authority, developers and residents may not be the same 
across municipalities in the process of neighbourhood redevelopment. To some extent, 
this explains partly why the initiating parties for redevelopment projects are property- 
owners/developers in Seoul’s JRP, and developers/local authorities in Beijing’s ODHRP
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(see Chapter 2 on JRP and ODHRP structure). As far as the ownership is concerned, JRP 
projects in Seoul involves public/private lands (mostly public land in the case of Nangok 
neighbourhood), and dwellings in individuals’ possession. Beijing’s ODHRP is largely 
concerned about public housing on state-owned land, making it simpler for project design 
and execution. In the case of residents, such situations may bring about differing 
opportunities for their participation, and influence the way in which residents in different 
tenures would respond to their neighbourhood redevelopment.
JRP and ODHRP projects have proliferated in Seoul and Beijing for nearly two decades, 
attracting developers. Dilapidated dwellings and neighbourhoods might be unpleasant for 
local authorities and inconvenient for residents’ living, but over time, they came to be 
attractive for profit-seeking developers. The next chapter explains what opportunities 
there were in such neighbourhoods for developers, and examines how they exploited such 
opportunities by taking one project from each city.
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Chapter 5 
Real estate capital and its profiteering in 
neighbourhood redevelopment processes
JRP and Real Estate Capital in Seoul
Production of surplus capital and its switch into the built environment
Dilapidated neighbourhoods and rent gap
Real estate capital and Nangok redevelopment, 1973 -  1998
Summary
ODHRP and Real Estate Capital in Beijing
Economic growth and capital switch into the built environment 
Dilapidated neighbourhoods and rent gap 
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood and real estate capital 
Summary
Conclusion
This chapter addresses the issue of developers’ participation in neighbourhood 
redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. Earlier reviews of the evolution of redevelopment 
policies revealed that the initial aim of Seoul’s Joint Redevelopment Programme (hereafter 
JRP) and Beijing’s Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme (hereafter 
ODHRP) was to overcome the financial burden of local authorities and property-owners. 
By involving developers as the main financier and project managers, it was believed that 
replicable and cost-effective redevelopment at city-wide scale could be achieved.
The track record of implementing JRP and ODHRP projects indicates that developers’ 
participation was indeed a break-through for these programmes’ sustainability. The key 
question in this respect is what propelled the developers’ participation in redeveloping 
dilapidated neighbourhoods. More precisely, what opportunities were presented to 
participating developers in redevelopment projects, and how did they exploit such 
opportunities?
This chapter uses rent gap theory to explain that the development opportunities arising 
from the expansion of rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods provided the main impetus 
behind developers’ participation. The way in which rent gap expansion has occurred in 
Seoul’s dilapidated neighbourhoods differs from that in Beijing. The expansion was 
possible with the presence of surplus capital produced in the main production circuit, 
which made its switch into the secondary circuit of fixed asset and built environment. A 
case study supplements discussions on each city to closely examine the way in which 
developers made their participation at neighbourhood scale.
5.1 JRP and Real Estate Capital in Seoul
Between 1970 and 1985, the share of housing investment in real GDP (at 2000 constant 
prices) remained more or less lower than 5%. It increased, however, to 5.7% between 
1986 and 1990 (The Bank of Korea 2004), and then 7.7% between 1991 and 1995 (see 
also Table 2-3 in Chapter 2). This indicates that the commencement and intensification of 
the JRP in Seoul since the mid-1980s coincided with the expansion of housing investment 
in both relative and absolute terms. The question is: where did the investment come from? 
What propelled such increase in capital input into the real estate sector? In particular, 
what opportunities were there in Seoul’s dilapidated neighbourhoods that attracted 
developers, and how were these opportunities exploited?
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Production of surplus capital and its switch into the built environment
Economic growth and capital accumulation
For the last three decades from the commencement of industrialisation in the mid-1960s,
the Korean economy had been noted for its exceptionally rapid economic development,
sustained by government-led export-oriented macro-economic strategies and heavy
investment in key industries to build up fixed assets (Kim and Leipziger 1993). The
average annual growth rate of real GDP (at 2000 constant prices) between 1970 and 1996
was a stupendous 7.9% (The Bank of Korea 2004). Per capita gross national income
(hereafter GNI) increased at a higher rate of 16.1% per annum during the same period
(ibid). There was also a phenomenal growth in exports, increasing “from 2 per cent of
GDP in the early 1960s to around 35 per cent in the late 1980s” (OECD 2000: 25). Such
growth was achieved in spite of an economic set-back at the time of 1970s’ international 
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The relationship between gross saving and domestic investment as well as between gross 
saving and gross domestic capital formation noticeably changed between 1970 and 2002, 
and this is shown in Figure 5-2. The figure indicates a few noteworthy aspects as follows. 
Firstly, the gross saving ratio had been on the increase in the 1970s and 1980s until it hit a 
ceiling of 40.4% in 1988. In the 1990s, it remained largely stable at a high rate of more 
than 35% with a slight downturn after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
Figure 5-2: Gross saving and gross domestic investment in South Korea 
(The Bank of Korea 2004)
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Thirdly the ratio of gross savings to gross domestic capital formation was relatively low in 
the 1970s. During the boom period of the 1980s, however, the ratio of gross savings to 
gross domestic capital formation exceeded 100%, and even recorded as high as 129.3% in 
1988. The total amount of gross domestic investment was lower than the gross savings 
during the same period. This suggests that a considerable amount of money capital was 
formed and couldn’t find investment areas to be engaged in capital formation. Such 
money capital represents the manifestation of surplus capital that is “lacking 
opportunities for profitable employment” (Harvey 1981:94).
Such surplus capital would be a good resource of investment in real estate and built 
environment if it was no longer profitably employed in direct production circuit. Three 
factors in combination could be identified as having facilitated this channelling process. 
The first factor was the falling rate of profit of manufacturing industry in South Korea 
(Shin 1998) that pushed away surplus capital from the primary production circuit to the 
secondary circuit of fixed asset and built environment (Harvey 1981). It was found that 
since the commencement of industrialisation, the average rate of net profit of 
manufacturing industry fell from 39.7% (1963-1971) to 27.7% (1972-1980), and then 
further to 16.9% (1981-1990) (Jang 1995 cited in Shin 1998). The second factor was the 
announcement by the central government in 1987 to build 2 million dwelling units as part 
of the ‘Five-year Housing Plan (1988 -  1992)’ and to develop new towns around Seoul 
(MoCT Korea 2002c). The third factor could be identified as the speculative environment 
in real estate sector that accompanied significant increases in land and housing prices in 
the 1980s. This is explained in further detail below.
Speculation and the real estate sector
Given the situation that about 70% of the land in South Korea is uninhabitable (KIHASA 
and UNDP 1998: 11), the urbanisation process and the rapid industrialisation in times of 
economic take-off and maturation created a surge of real estate demand for industrial, 
commercial and residential uses. Since the mid-1970s, land prices have occasionally 
witnessed precipitous increases, as displayed in Figure 5-3 below. The figure strongly 
suggests a highly speculative environment regarding land transaction.
the whole period of economic take-off and maturation from the 1960s until the mid-1990s, the total 
amount of FDI hardly exceeded 0.5% of national GDP (MoQE Korea 2001; NSO Korea 1994a, 2002c). 
Of these, the share of FDI invested in construction and/or real estate sector was minimal
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Figure 5-3: Rate of changes in land prices in South Korea
(Compiled from Table 3-1 in Park et al. 2000: 34)
160.00%
Country as a whole 
Urban areas 
Seoul
140.00%
120.00%
100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
- 20 .00%
-40.00%
From the figure above, it appears that opportunities to make capital gains from 
investment have been superior in urban areas, especially in large cities, as the land 
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Figure 5-4: Rate of changes in land and housing sales prices in Seoul
(Table 3-1 in Kookmin Bank 2005: 34; Park et al. 2000)
60.00% I 80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
20.00% ■  ■  H i  ■ ....... ................ ,.| 30 0
20.0 
10.0 
0.0 
- 10.0
- 20 .00%    - 20.0
50.00% 
40.00% 
g, 30.00%
c
ro
-5
o
QJ
S. 10.00% 
0 .00% 
- 10 .00%
1986
I Rate of change in land prices in Seoul 
i Rate of change in housing sales price in Seoul 
-Housing sales price index for Seoul (Sep 2003
1991 19*92 W 3  1994 1995 1996 1997
Two main factors could be pointed out as having supported the profit acquisition in the 
real estate sector. Firstly, the highly speculative environment in the sector and the frequent 
transaction of lands prevented capital entrapment. For instance, it was reported that 10 ~  
20% of urban land changed hands each year during the 1980s (KRIHS 1989 cited in Jung, 
1998: 141). This was much more than, for example, Japan where only 2.2% of residential 
land was traded in 1987 (Noguchi 1990 cited in Jung 1998: 141). Such a high frequency of 
land transaction in times of price inflation provided opportunities for the landed capital 
to realise its profits, guarantee its mobility, and be ready to seek further investment 
opportunities.
Secondly, major real estate and construction companies that had been investing heavily in 
built environment were also subsidiaries of large conglomerates (commonly known as 
C h a e b o ls  in Korean). The investment in real estate enabled these Chaebols to use acquired 
lands as collateral for more financial loans, and at the same time, safeguard their assets 
against business risks. Furthermore, as Meredith Woo-Cumings pointed out, the Korean 
Chaebols had been operating to increase their market share and follow the logic of 
diversification that would provide them with opportunities to gain from economies of 
scope, building their managerial skills, albeit with low profitability (Woo-Cumings 2001). 
Many of these Chaebols operated construction companies, one reason being that it was 
easy to forge construction companies’ accounting books in order to produce ‘black 
money for bribery, and another reason being that the investment in the rapidly expanding 
real estate market would guarantee profits that supplemented low profitability in their 
business operation.
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Dilapidated neighbourhoods and rent gap
In the late 1980s, the production of surplus capital and the speculative property markets 
in South Korea channelled increased investment into the real estate sector. In particular, 
development gains were anticipated in dilapidated neighbourhoods in Seoul where the 
pressure to secure lands for commercial and residential development was particularly high. 
The JRP, initiated in Seoul since 1983, has been based on the partnership between the 
property-owners and developers, who have taken advantage of the development potential 
in dilapidated neighbourhoods that experienced low capitalised ground rents.
Rent gap in informal/illegal settlements
The rent gap theory has evolved in market economies, and explains that a neighbourhood 
goes through a devalorisation cycle that reduces the amount of capitalised ground rent 
that property-owners could claim on users (Smith 1996). Three sources are identified as 
having contributed to the devalorisation of properties: (1) improved labour productivity 
that makes it possible to build a similar structure at lower costs; (2) physical wear and tear; 
and (3) obsolescence of building style (Smith 1996: 63-64). As the surrounding conditions 
change and new economic needs arise to transform the land into “highest and best use,” 
the rent gap expands, eventually providing the economic basis of neighbourhood 
rehabilitation/ redevelopment.
In the case of informal/illegal settlements often found in major cities of developing 
countries, land invasion by squatters in prime locations, for example, may take away the 
opportunity for the land to be mobilised for “highest and best use.” Informal/illegal 
settlements in less prime locations may initially grow to accommodate migrants as they lie 
outside the real estate capital’s immediate interest, but would eventually come into conflict 
as the city expands and new demand for land rises for economic and residential uses. For 
owner-occupiers in informal/illegal dwellings, they may carry out maintenance or 
upgrading, but are likely to be deterred from making full investment due to restrictions 
imposed by planning regulations. As for real estate developers, informality and illegality of 
such neighbourhoods often make it difficult for them to make a formal entry to exploit 
the rent gap. Real estate investment in the neighbourhoods, if any, would be speculative in 
nature unless uncertainties are removed (e.g. formalisation of land tenure, slum clearance 
and land preparation).
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Rent gap in redevelopment neighbourhoods in Seoul
A large proportion of land in neighbourhoods subject to the JRP was in state ownership, 
and most dwelling owners did not enjoy the full recognition of de jure property rights. 
According to the Master Plan for Housing Redevelopment in Seoul, finalised in 1998, the 
proportion of public land in 106 JRP districts turned out to be around 43% on average. 
The proportion of illegal dwellings (that is, dwellings in violation of planning regulations) 
was found to be much higher in these districts, reaching on average 57% of all dwellings 
(SMG 1998a: 20-21). The absence of de jure property rights may not hinder usual 
maintenance and repair works by landlords or owner-occupiers to offset physical 
deterioration, but poses serious risks to those who plan to make any long-term investment 
in such neighbourhoods. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely for a neighbourhood to 
experience positive ‘neighbourhood effects/ that is, the arrival of higher-income individual 
‘gentrifiers’ who would purchase dwellings, make significant renovation and contribute to 
the revalorisation of the neighbourhood. The rent gap expansion would be greatest just 
before redevelopment. If the prospect of neighbourhood redevelopment prevails, 
speculative interests would prevail, leading to an increase in the amount of capitalised 
ground rent. As Eric Clark noted, “[capitalized land rent rises rapidly, and the rent gap 
narrows rapidly, towards the end of the cycle when the property becomes an object of 
speculation with a view towards redevelopment” (Clark 1988:252).
Furthermore, if a neighbourhood is designated as a redevelopment district, any further 
structural extension, addition or modification of the dwellings are restricted in accordance 
with the Urban Planning Act until the demolition of such dwellings takes place (MoCT 
Korea 2000: 40-41).16 Together with the absence of de jure property rights, the legal 
restriction to prevent dwelling’s improvement leads to a condition similar to ‘redlining’ in 
western cities that effectively curtails inward investment (Smith 1996: 66-67). This would 
force property-owners to “keep the building appropriate to its site, or, withhold 
investment, minimize maintenance and variable costs, and milk it as it stands, resulting in 
a broadening of the rent gap” (Clark 1988:252).
One of the major problems associated with many redevelopment districts is that it not 
only takes years for an area to be designated as a redevelopment district, but it also wastes
16 The Urban Planning Act has been absorbed into the Act on Planning and Use of National Territory 
from 1 January 2003.
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(largely from the developer’s point of view) another several years to prepare detailed plans 
(that is, project implementation plan and management disposal plan; see Figure 2-4 in 
Chapter 2) and acquire government approval.17 My own estimation on the basis of 
municipal data on 167 JRP districts indicates that it took 39 months on average to acquire 
formal approval of project implementation plans from the date of district designation. 
The longest duration was 215 months (see Figure 5-5 below).18 Such lengthy preparation 
results in disinvestment by property-owners, contributing to the further expansion of rent 
gap in redevelopment neighbourhoods.
Figure 5-5: Duration between district designation and formal approval of project implementation plan 
(167 Joint Redevelopment Districts - each point denotes a district)
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While those dilapidated neighbourhoods, subject to redevelopment, experience low 
capitalised ground rent, the continued urban densification and real estate boom in Seoul 
as explained earlier increases the capitalised ground rent of the surrounding
17 The government approval of project implementation plan is important for anyone who is interested in 
obtaining redevelopment gains, as the approval leads to the next stage of preparing a management disposal 
plan that includes the evaluation of property values in redevelopment districts.
18 The period entails the formation of redevelopment association among property-owners, the selection of 
a developer (or developers) to form a partnership, and the finalisation of detailed project implementation 
plans including those for the relocation and compensation.
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neighbourhoods that enjoy d e  ju r e  property rights. This, in turn, places development 
pressure on dilapidated neighbourhoods, and increases their potential ground rent in 
anticipation that such neighbourhoods could be put into their ‘highest and best use’ with 
full property rights. Such processes increase the disparity between capitalised ground rent 
in redevelopment districts and their potential ground rent.
Closure of rent gap to exploit development gains in JRP neighbourhoods
The JRP designed and implemented by Seoul municipal government has allowed the 
conversion of land use in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
into a ‘higher and better’ use, if not the ‘highest and 
best,’ in the most financially viable way. The transfer 
of ownership of public land in a redevelopment 
neighbourhood demonstrates a vivid example of how
Figure 5-6: Bird's Eye Views of 
Shindang 3 district 
(Seoul Jung-gu Office 2005)
increase in land price during the life cycle of a redevelopment project. One example from 
the 1990s is the redevelopment of Shindang 3 district, located in one of the inner city 
districts in Seoul (see Figure 5-6). This redevelopment project started in the mid-1990s, 
and was completed in 2002, covering 22 hectares of surface area. Approximately 60% of 
the project area were public lands (Kim et al. 1996: 123; Seoul Jung-gu Office 2005; SMG 
2000a: 509-520). The evaluation of the value of public land was made in 1997, and the 
average sale price of public lands turned out to be KRW 1,196,012 per m2.
Table 5-1 below shows another interesting set of data on official land prices between 1991 
and 2002 in Shindang 3 district together with the year-on-year changes in average land 
price in Seoul.20 The official land prices are estimated annually for tax purposes. Although 
acknowledging the limitation that “[assessed [land] values for tax purposes are much too 
rough and arbitrary to be useful” (Smith 1987: 464) for the estimation of rent gap, it is
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insights. Firstly, the data set suggests that the redevelopment of Shindang 3 district led to 
the considerable increase in land value, which was much higher than the municipal land 
price changing rates. This would suggest a wide rent gap at the outset, and its closure 
towards the end of the redevelopment project. The nominal land price in Shindang 3 
district had increased by nearly two fold between 1991 and 2002. Secondly, the data set 
also shows that the anticipated profits helped to limit price fluctuation in Shindang 3 
district when the municipal real estate market in general was experiencing a downturn in 
the 1990s. For instance, the rate of land price increase in Shindang district since 1997 was 
much higher than the municipal average.
Table 5-1: Changes in official land price in Shindang 3 district in Seoul, 1990 - 2002
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ (Unit: KRW 1,000)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Shindang 3 District 
(Land plot no. 373-3006)
756 907 907 900 920 950 980 1,000 1,350 1,300 1,500 1,600 1,700
Year-on-year rate - 20.0% 0.0% -0.8% 2.2% 3.3% 3.2% 2.0% 35.0% -3.7% 15.4% 6.7% 6.3%
Average year-on-year 
rate in Seoul 31.2% 11.2% -2.8% -8.7% -1.4% 0.2% 0.9% 0.3% -16.3% 2.7% 0.1% 1.9%
Source: Ministry of Construction (1991 to 1994) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha Bogoseo);
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1995 to 2002) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha Bogoseo) -, 
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1999 to 2002) Official Land Prices: Seoul Vol.II-1; Seoul Land Information Service web site 
(http://lmis.seoul.go.kr/sis/index.html)
20 The land price refers to the official land price compiled by the government for tax purposes, and doesn’t 
include the value of built structure. They do not fully reflect the capitalised ground rent, however, as tax-
Real estate capital and Nanaok redevelopment. 1973 - 1998
As was pointed out in the previous section, the rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
was prominent in redevelopment neighbourhoods, presenting development opportunities 
to be exploited by real estate capital through neighbourhood transformation. Rent gap 
expansion, however, doesn’t lead to an automated process of gentrification or 
redevelopment. Local conditions count, and the social and political interactions among 
the residents and institutional actors influence the way in which rent gap closure occurs.
The redevelopment progress discussed in this section covers the first phase of Nangok 
neighbourhood redevelopment until 1998, which includes the period of private 
developer’s participation and withdrawal before subsequent public sector intervention. 
The discussion will show that the presence of rent gap in Nangok provided the economic 
basis of redevelopment, but it was the action of the local authority and property-owners 
as well as the participation of real estate developer within the JRP framework that made 
the redevelopment possible.
Rent gap and development opportunities in Nangok neighbourhood
As was the case for Shindang 3 district earlier, the official land price data between 1990 
and 1998 was taken to infer the presence of a rent gap in Nangok. Two plots of public 
land from Nangok and a plot of private land located close to Nangok were chosen to 
compare the degree of the rent gap. The results are presented in Table 5-2 below. The 
table shows that in 1991, the official land price for public lands in Nangok was less than 
one third of the official price of private lands close to Nangok This indicates that the 
potential ground rent in Nangok would be much higher, and that its transformation to put 
the urban space into a higher and better use would yield higher rents. In 1998, the 
transformation was yet to take place, but the official land price for public lands in Nangok 
was updated and increased in order to partially reflect the rising expectation of yielding 
higher rents after transformation. The rising expectation was represented by highly 
speculative transactions that took place in the mid-1990s.
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Table 5-2: Changes in official land price for public land in Nangok and private land outside
(Unit: KRW 1,000 per m2)
Location Landownership Land register 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Nangok 
neighoburhood 
(Sillim 1 District)
Public Land plot San97-9 
Year-on-year rate -
260 260
0.0%
240
-7.7%
220
-8.3%
223
1.4%
226
1.3%
300
32.7%
470
56.7%
Public Land plot Sanl04-6 
Year-on-year rate .
260 260
0.0%
240
-7.7%
220
-8.3%
220
0.0%
237
7.7%
400
68.8%
500
25.0%
Neighbouring land 
outside
Private Land plot 673-18 
Year-on-year rate
690 906
31.3%
906
0.0%
880
-2.9%
869
-1.3%
860
-1.0%
860
0.0%
860
0.0%
860
0.0%
Source: Ministry of Construction (1991 to 1994) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha Bogoseo); 
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1995 to 2002) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha 
Bogoseo); Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1999 to 2002) Official Land Prices: Seoul Vol.II-1; Seoul Land Information Service web site 
(http://lmis.seoul.go.kr/sis/index.html)
Initial progress
Nangok was originally designated as an urban redevelopment district in 1973 in 
accordance with the ‘Temporary Act on the Promotion of Housing Improvement’ 
introduced in the same year. Like many other dilapidated districts, however, 
redevelopment didn’t take place during the 1970s, and the designation was lifted in 1982. 
When the JRP was implemented in the early 1980s, rumour was spread throughout the 
second half of the 1980s and early 1990s that a redevelopment project was soon to take 
place in Nangok There were at least four failed attempts by the local district government 
(that is, Gwanak district government) between 1985 and 1988 to apply for the designation 
of the neighbourhood as a redevelopment district. The district government made an 
attempt once again in 1992, this time to include the neighbourhood redevelopment as part 
of the Municipal Master Plan for Redevelopment.21 The maior cause of such failed
to-area ratio22 (hereafter FAR) didn’t exceed 300%. This could be considered as a good 
outcome, given the fact that an average FAR in the early 1990s was about 300% and that 
the neighbourhood developed along a steep hillside.
When this conditional designation was made, neighbourhood property-owners organised 
a redevelopment steering committee (formally approved by the Gwanak district 
government on 30 August 1995), and selected a developer (Daewoo Engineering and 
Construction Co.) in a general assembly on 20 April 1996. A consulting firm was also 
chosen and signed a contract with the steering committee to help them prepare a project 
implementation plan.23
Figure 5-7: Initial process of Nangok redevelopment, 1994 - 1997
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
26 May 1994 11 May 1995 11 Nov 1996 12 Nov 1997
Application for the designation 
of Nangok neighbourhood as a 
redevelopment district
Conditional designation of 
Nangok neighbourhood as a 
redevelopment district
Application for the approval 
of Nangok neighbourhood 
redevelopment 
comprehensive plan
Approval of Nangok 
neighbourhood 
redevelopment 
comprehensive plan
and to clear the conditions regarding the FAR imposed at the time of area designation 
(Stage 3 in Figure 5-7). In the application, the redevelopment of Nangok neighbourhood 
was proposed to construct 4,980 flats replacing 2,609 units of existing dwellings. 3,520 
units were to be sold to property-owners and prospective buyers, and had an average use 
space of 85 m2. The remaining 1,470 units were proposed to be public rental units for re­
housing tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation. These rental units had an 
average use space of 32.95 m2.
The approval of Nangok’s redevelopment comprehensive plan by the municipal 
government was, however, contrary to the expectation of the district government and the 
redevelopment steering committee (Stage 4 in Figure 5-7). The FAR was reduced to 250% 
from what was proposed as 292.69% in the original application. The maximum building 
height was also restricted to 55 metres. Furthermore, the number of rental units for 
eligible tenants was to be increased from 1,470 units up to 1,580 units. The result was a 
26% reduction in the total number of flats to be sold in the new housing market. 
Nevertheless, a formal agreement was signed between the developers and the steering 
committee soon after the municipal approval was made.
Changing environment towards low density
The reasons behind the reduced building density (that is, the FAR reduction) in the 
municipal approval were the concerns over crowded residential conditions and potential 
damage to the urban landscape due to building high-rise flats along the hill. When the 
municipal government’s Urban Planning Committee (consisting of planning officials and 
experts) reviewed applications from the district government in February 1997 along with a 
few other similar applications, there was a heated debate regarding the problems of 
unmanaged, high-density redevelopment of dilapidated neighbourhoods.24 The Urban 
Master Plan for Seoul was under thorough revision at the time, and one of the principles 
was to emphasise low-rise, low-density land uses on hillsides. This was indeed contrary to 
what was envisaged by the property-owners in Nangok. In fact, the revised version of the 
municipal master plan for housing redevelopment published in 1998, indicated that the 
FAR in the administrative district that encompassed Nangok should be kept below 180% 
(SMG 1998a: 124). In this respect, Nangok was fortunate to have 250% of FAR by
24 Session meeting minute of the Urban Maintenance Committee during the 92nd Session (Extraordinary) 
of the Seoul Metropolitan Council held on 19 February 1997.
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obtaining this approval before this revised guideline was officially produced.
Such an approval was a major step towards Nangok redevelopment. As a member of 
Nangok’s redevelopment steering committee enthusiastically commented, it was envisaged 
that “the project implementation plan would receive government approval by June 1998, 
and once the construction starts, the whole project could be completed by the end of 
2002” (Yoo 1997). The future prospect was bright as the media coverage below displayed:
“Compared to the situation prior to the approval of the redevelopment 
comprehensive plan, the price of [on site] properties are strong, and there are 
queries streaming in. There is a strong expectation that the price [of the on site 
properties] would go through a further increase before the acquisition of the formal 
approval for project implementation...The purchase of a 43-pyeong flat [that is, 115 
m2 of use space] would require KRW 230 million. Upon moving in, the price of the 
flat is expected to be at least KRW 300 million when compared with those units in 
the neighbourhood, and hence, even after deducting financial costs, it is expected to 
raise around KRW 50 million of investment return... ”
(Seoul Gyeongje, 27 November 1997)
Such a rosy picture, however, couldn’t be drawn by most owner-occupiers who would find 
such revised built density as a severe blow to their original expectation. The tougher 
restriction on built density meant a significant reduction of those flats subject to sales. 
Because there were 2,489 propertyowners who were entitled to make a claim for a 
completed flat, the final approval of Nangok’s redevelopment comprehensive plan (see 
Stage 4 in Figure 5-7) suggested that there were only 99 units remaining for sales to 
prospective buyers in new housing market. This could be considered too few to raise any 
substantial revenue to lessen property-owners’ financial contribution. This would in turn 
increase the likelihood of owner-occupiers selling their rights (to a redeveloped flat) to 
those speculators who could withstand the increased financial burden.
“As for these people [on-site property owners], suppose that a person has a plot of 
10 pyeong [that is, 33 m2], and say an additional amount of KRW 100 million needs 
to be paid for a completed flat of 30 pyeong [that is, 99 m2], it is too much of a 
burden... Then, there is this land price. When redevelopment takes place, the land 
price rises, and they can sell their lands, take the money and find an old flat 
somewhere. This would eventually suit part of their purposes.”
(Head of a redevelopment section in a private developer)
As the redevelopment prospect became more concrete, speculators began to invade the 
neighbourhood more vigorously. The dwelling prices in Nangok rose sharply luring many 
owner-occupiers to the sales of their properties when the prices were good According to 
the recollections of an interviewee who was a former owner occupier, the price of a 26m2
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dwelling25 reached as high as KRW 65,000,000 by the time the neighbourhood was 
designated as a redevelopment district and a developer joined in. This was two to three 
times more expensive than the usual transaction price.
As for the developer, the reduction in the number of sales units could have been 
discouraging news, but for them, the bottom line is to carry out the construction works, 
from which a certain amount of profits could be secured. When a developer initially signs 
a contract, they make a rough estimate of the total project costs by considering the local 
conditions as well as similar projects in other areas. The developer makes room for profits 
at this initial stage, commonly referred to as ‘normal profits.’ Once this initial contract 
amount is decided, its escalation depends on the normal price inflation rate, and on 
whether or not the project is significantly delayed due to unforeseen circumstances such 
as the disputes and/or conflicts regarding the relocation of on-site tenants and owner- 
occupiers.
Asian Financial Crisis and the withdrawal of the developers
The situation was overturned completely with the arrival of Asian Financial Crisis that 
engulfed South Korean economy at the end of 1997. The real estate sector was hit badly 
The total number of dwellings authorised for construction in 1998 was just over 300,000 
units, which was only about 50% of the 1997 level (NSO Korea 2001c). The prospect of 
Nangok redevelopment was seriously threatened as the participating developer was part 
of the conglomerate, which came close to bankruptcy at the time of the Crisis. The 
developer’s capacity to mobilise capital to carry out the project was severely undermined. 
As it couldn’t finance the large amount of up-front costs,26 it had to withdraw from the 
redevelopment of Nangok early May 1998. From then on, the project went astray, and 
there was no prospect of finding another private developer who could step in to salvage 
the project. Nangok propertyowners contacted a public agency, Korea National Housing 
Corporation, which had begun to engage in neighbourhood redevelopment projects since 
the mid-1990s, to no avail. A letter from the company to the property-owners dated 19 
January 1999 showed that the gloomy prospect of project financing was the single most
25 This was the most commonly found dwelling size in the neighbourhood. See Section 4.1 in Chapter 4 for 
more descriptions on the neighbourhood dwelling conditions.
26 Handout prepared by the Sillim 1 District (Nangok) Redevelopment Steering Committee and presented 
at the Propertyowners* General Assembly on 20 May 2000. Source: KNHC web site 
http://www.jugong.co.kr/ gisa/ seoul/ sinliml/chujin/ chu/ chul3.htm (accessed on 05 June 2002).
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important factor that made it hesitant.27
With the reduced built density, the merit of redeveloping such a crowded neighbourhood 
with a large number of property-owners was not present any more. The high share of 
public lands on site also further worsened the situation. The quote below shows the 
typical attitude of a developer regarding the Nangok redevelopment:
“That place, Nangok area, we also thought of doing a business there in the past.
About three years ago [in 1999], we carried out an appraisal ourselves. I think every 
other company must have considered the area as well But, that area, more than 90% 
of the lands in that area are public lands. For a private company it was very difficult 
due to the burden of leasing the funds for them [on-site property-owners] to 
purchase those public lands. Usually when carrying out a redevelopment project, we 
lend the relocation money to the propertyowners by taking their lands as collateral.
But, here, there was no property to be used as collateral. This was the same for 
banks. Existing dwellings couldn’t be collaterals, since they get demolished. This 
aspect was the biggest obstacle. This made it difficult for us to get involved in the 
project.” (Head of a redevelopment section in a private developer)
Eventually, the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHQ, a public agency 
established with an aim to provide homes for low-income residents, took over the project. 
How the KNHC decided to participate will be examined more in detail when the role of 
the public sector is discussed in the following chapter. Here, it would suffice to mention 
that the total number of rental units allocated for the re-housing of on-site qualified 
tenants was reduced by mobilising the company's existing stocks elsewhere, and as a result, 
the number of units for sales was increased. The position of KNHC as a public agency 
also placed a pressure upon the company as there were numerous requests from the 
propertyowners via local and municipal governments.
Summary
This section has examined the production of surplus capital in South Korean economy 
and the production of rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods that provided the 
economic basis for neighbourhood redevelopment. The discussion showed that a 
substantial amount of money capital was formed that could flow into the real estate sector, 
which was experiencing a highly speculative environment in the 1980s and 1990s. As 
exemplified by the early experiences of Nangok redevelopment, the JRP provided a policy
27 The official letter, Document Reference No. Dojeong 1620-670, was dated 19 January 1999.
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framework to direct the capital switching into built environment to transform dilapidated 
neighbourhoods into a higher and better use. Property-owners and private developers 
seized opportunities to take advantage of the rent gap within the JRP framework and 
enjoy development gains. As shown from the withdrawal of developers from Nangok 
redevelopment project, the participation of real estate developers could be considered as 
being more critical than that of property-owners and the local authority.
5.2 ODHRP and Real Estate Capital in Beijing
Having examined the participation of real estate capital in Seoul’s JRP, this section seeks 
to explain that a similar environment of increased real estate investment and rent gap has 
appeared in Beijing as well, attracting developers to engage in neighbourhood 
redevelopment. The economic conditions that led to such an environment, however, were 
different from those of Seoul, reflecting the transitional nature of the economy in the 
midst of pursuing reform policies.
Economic growth and capital switch into the built environment
The economic growth of the Chinese economy since the implementation of reform 
policies has been phenomenal from an international perspective and has accompanied a 
huge amount of investment in fixed assets. A large portion of this investment went into 
the real estate sector, providing the conditions for extensive restructuring of urban space 
that includes redevelopment of dilapidated neighbourhoods.
Economic growth and capital accumulation
The average growth rate of real GDP (at 1990 constant prices) between 1980 and 2000 
was 9.7%, outpacing that of the South Korean economy (7.6%) (IMF Web Database 
2004; The Bank of Korea 2004). The national GDP per capita increased by more than 15 
times during this period, reaching RMB 7625 by 2001. In Beijing, the municipal economy 
expanded at a comparably fast rate, its real GDP (at 1990 constant prices) between 1980 
and 2000 having increased by an annual average rate of 9.1% (All-China Marketing 
Research 2004). By 2001, the per capita GDP of Beijing reached RMB 25,523, which was 
more than three times the national level. Figure 5-8 below shows the overall growth trend 
of real GDP and per capita GDP in mainland China and Beijing since 1980.
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Figure 5-8: Per capita GDP and year-on-year change of real GDP in Beijing and mainland China,
1980-2001
(All-China Marketing Research 2004; IMF Web Database 2004World Economic Outlook Database)
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inflation rate of 18.8% in 1988 as well as the political turmoil which peaked at the 
Tiananmen Square incident. The latter event led to a temporary set-back of reform 
initiatives, which was only overcome when Dene Xiaooine made his historical southern
(hereafter GFCF) in regional GDP of Beijing recorded 45.5% in 1990. The share 
decreased significantly in times of political turmoil in the early 1990s, but increased 
rapidly to record 63.7% in 1995. Throughout the second half of the 1990s, the share of 
GFCF remained at around 55 -58%. All these were much higher than the national level.
Table 5-3: Gross fixed capital formation and investment in real estate as a share of GDP in China
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
National GFCF (% of GDP) 25.5% 27.5% 31.2% 37.5% 36.0% 34.7%
Investment in Real Estate (% of GDP] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.5% 5.4%
Beijing GFCF (% of GDP) 45.5% 30.8% 28.3% 37.8% 47.9% 63.7%
Investment in Real Estate (% of GDP 4.5% 4.0% 4.8% 6.8% 9.2% 25.3%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
National GFCF (% of GDP) 34.4% 33.8% 35.3% 35.9% 36.5% 37.8%
Investment in Real Estate (% of GDP; 4.7% 4.3% 4.6% 5.0% 5.6% 6.5%
Beijing GFCF (% of GDP) 57.1% 55.3% 58.3% 56.7% 55.6% 57.3%
Investment in Real Estate (% of GDP; 20.3% 18.2% 18.8% 19.4% 21.1% 27.5%
Source: All-China Marketing Research (2004); NBS China (various years) China S ta tistica l Yearbook
The examination of the investment structure shows that capital flow into real estate 
played a significant role in this explosive capital formation in Beijing. While the table 
above exhibits an incremental increase in the share of real estate investment28 in national 
GDP, the real estate investment in Beijing skyrocketed from 4.0% of its regional GDP in 
1991, to 9.2% in 1994, and then further up to 25.3% in 1995. The year-on-year changes in 
real estate investment, as compared to other investment components of fixed assets, are 
illustrated in Figure 5-9. The figure also indicates an explosive growth of real estate 
investment in the mid-1990s. The annual growth rate in 1994 was recorded to be 70.5%, 
and in 1995, a record high level of 254.4% (see also Figure 5-10 that shows the 
investment in real estate sector as a share of total investment in fixed assets). This 
reflected the real estate boom in this period, and the trend had been more or less similar 
in other major competing cities such as Shanghai (Wu 2002b: 155-159).
28 The investment in real estate constitutes part of total investment in fixed assets in Chinese statistics. The 
real estate investment has been reported in the statistics as a separate item since 1990, and “refers to 
investment in the development of properties that can be sold in markets (commonly housing and offices)” 
(Wu 2002b: 157). Other major components of the total investment in fixed assets include: (1) investment in 
capital construction (that is, new construction); (2) investment in innovation (that is, addition to the existing 
assets); (3) other investment by state-owned enterprises and collectives (ibid).
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Figure 5-9: Year-on-year changes of the total investment in fixed assets and its components in Beijing 
(All-China Marketing Research 2004; NBS China 2002)
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Figure 5-10: Investment in real estate sector as a share of total investment in fixed assets in Beijing 
(All-China Marketing Research 2004; NBS China 2002)
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Since 1998, contrary to the earlier experiences of high inflation, signs of deflation were 
evident when neighbouring countries including South Korea had been badly hit by the 
Asian Financial Crisis. The central government measures to tackle the deflation were 
active fiscal policies to achieve the target growth rate of 8%. Those policies include 
increased investment in fixed assets such as infrastructure provision, and housing has been 
one of the key areas. Accordingly, the increase in real estate investment in Beijing gained
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momentum, and the recent estimate indicated that the annual growth rate in 2001 reached 
50.1%, more than double the rate achieved in 2000 (see Figure 5-9 above). The revised 
housing reform in 1998 (designed to stop the allocation of welfare housing and to 
promote full-scale housing commodification) was envisaged to work together with the 
economic policy so as to attract domestic savings and have spill-over effects on other 
related industries (Lin 2000; Wu 2001:283).
Reform measures, capital switch and real estate sector
The previous discussion on economic growth and capital accumulation in mainland China 
as a whole and in Beijing showed a definite trend towards an increased input into real 
estate sector during the reform period. Then, what made it possible for such capital switch 
into the real estate sector during the reform period? The following discussion considers a 
number of factors concerning housing production and consumption.
First of all, the reform measures have facilitated gradual expansion of commodity 
housing market. "When the World Bank was analysing China’s housing reform progress in 
1992, it raised concerns over the “absence of market signals providing information, and a 
dearth of market-motivated agents able and willing to act on such signals” (World Bank 
1992: xv). Only about one-quarter of total housing floor space completed in 1991 in 
mainland China was commodity housing. The production and distribution of housing in 
market ways, however, has had a slow but definite progress throughout the 1990s. In 1994, 
the share of commodity housing had increased to 37.3% (Data from the Real Estate 
Management Department of the Ministry of Construction cited in Wang and Murie 
1999a: 1480). The implementation of the 1998 housing reform aimed at stopping all types 
of in-kind housing allocation, and thereafter, the majority of new houses were put on to 
the market. In Beijing, 83% of total residential floor space completed in 2002 was sold on 
the open market (BMBS 2003a).
From the demand side, the expansion of the commodity housing sector led to the rise of 
individuals as one of the main actors. In mainland China as a whole, individuals purchased 
more than one quarter (28.7% in floor space terms) of commodity housing sold on the 
open market in 1990. Within two years, the rate had increased to 38.2% (Wu 1996: 1614). 
In Beijing, the progress was somewhat slower, largely due to the heavy concentration of 
state enterprises and government institutions that were more resilient to the adoption of 
market-oriented practices of housing consumption. In 1990, less than 1% of commercial
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housing sold in Beijing was taken up by individuals (ibid). Seven years later, however, the 
rate had reached 38.4% (Beijing Municipal Housing System Reform Office cited in YJP. 
Wing 2001: 627). The prohibition of in-kind housing allocation since 1998 has changed 
the situation radically, and any prospective homebuyers have to purchase a unit on the 
open market rather than relying on their work units. By 2002, individuals have purchased 
almost 97% of those commercially-sold housing space in Beijing (BMBS 2003a).
Furthermore, the land use reform since the late 1980s has produced a favourable 
environment for long-term real estate investment. The most important piece of legislation 
was the 1988 Amendment to the Constitution that officially ratified the transaction of 
land use rights. The Land Administration Law was also subsequently revised, thus laying 
the foundation of the land market that used to be virtually non-existent before the reform 
(Fang and Zhang 2003:150). This legislation dictated that land ownership still lay with the 
state, but the right to use would be detached from the bundle of property rights, and 
become subject to transaction through tender, auction or negotiation. The leasehold of 
land secured in this way could last up to 70 years for residential use, 40 years for 
commercial use, and 50 years for comprehensive use (Xie et al. 2002:1378-1379).
Finally, until the late 1990s, the role of state enterprises and institutions was critical in 
sustaining and expanding commodity housing market, compensating for the lack of 
individuals’ purchase power. They made significant contributions into the real estate 
sector both as main consumers and investors. As much as 46% of total investment put 
into housing in Beijing between 1992 and 1997 was reportedly coming from state 
enterprises and institutions, while the rest was from commercial developers (Data from 
Beijing Municipal Housing System Reform Office cited in YR Wang 2001: 626). 
Investment from the state enterprises and institutions was put into “their house-building 
programme” or purchasing “new housing from the commercial sector at full market 
prices for distribution to employees who had reached the housing allocation standards” 
(ibid, 627). In Beijing or Shanghai for example, most dwellings developed commercially 
between the 1980s and mid-1990s were purchased by state enterprises and institutions, 
which were then rented out to their employees at nominal rents. Such practice effectively 
re-capturing those commercially developed units within the traditional welfare housing 
system (Wang and Murie 1999a: 1487; Wu 1996: 1612-1618). The low rate of direct sales 
of commodity housing to individuals, as explained earlier, was the direct result of such 
institutional consumption of commodity housing.
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Dilapidated neighbourhoods and rent gap
Given the amount of investment in built environment and the rise of real estate sector 
during the reform period, the question is how the urban rent gap was created in Beijing, 
especially in inner city districts. What changes were made in the process of municipal- 
wide urban spatial restructuring that contributed to the rise of inner city districts as 
attractive loci of real estate investment? Did these changes present a similar opportunity 
for the ‘market-motivated agents’ to enjoy development gains from the rent gap?
Rent gap and urban (re-)development in mainland China
Because of the late formation of marketised housing production and consumption in 
urban China, the application of the rent gap theory requires a brief explanation. In short, 
China’s reform initiatives during the last two decades including the development of 
housing market, redistribution of property rights to individuals and the transaction of 
land use rights have made it possible to perceive the process of redeveloping dilapidated 
neighbourhoods from the perspective of rent gap thesis. As Fulong Wu has argued, state 
socialism in mainland China displayed a structural tendency to disinvest in built 
environment including housing for residents, but this “engendered a rent gap, which laid 
down the foundation for the phase of redevelopment when the constraint on land 
transactions was lifted through land reform” (Wu 1997:659).
Most dilapidated neighbourhoods subject to redevelopment through demolition consist 
of state-owned rental dwellings whose rent level is fixed low, subsidised heavily by the 
state or work units. This suggests that the amount of capitalised ground rent is also fixed 
and could be determined by the state: “In the pre-reform era, underinvestment through 
the administrative allocation of land and the fixity of the built environment inherent in 
project-specific development pushed down the rent that could be capitalised” (Wu 1997: 
646). Housing and land market formation in the process of urban restructuring in 
mainland China enabled the transaction of land (in the form of land lease premium) and 
the sales of dwellings, thus eliminating, albeit gradually, such ‘artificial’ oppression of 
potential ground rent. This has created basic conditions for the creation and expansion of 
rent gap, subsequently providing opportunities for urban redevelopment.
In market economies, individual gentrifiers (or occupier developers, to use Neil Smith’s 
terminology) constitute one of the three major gentrifying agents (the other two being 
professional developers and landlords) (Smith 1979; 1992: 112). In its earlier period of
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implementing housing reform, as discussed earlier in this chapter, consumers of new 
dwellings had been state enterprises and institutions, and their employees. This process 
has been well-documented by Fulong Wu in his 1996 paper on the structure of housing 
provision in reform China (Wu 1996).
Expansion of rent gap in Chinese cities in their transition to market economies
The capitalised ground rent in Chinese cities in the midst of implementing reform 
measures could be assumed as being represented by the rent level imposed upon public 
rental dwellings. As urban expansion and spatial restructuring take place in Beijing, 
disparities occur between ‘potential ground rent’ and ‘capitalised ground rent/ To carry 
out a detailed analysis, time series data such as land rents and building sale prices in 
redevelopment sites are crucial (Clark 1988). Due to the absence of such data in Beijing, 
the discussion herein on rent gap would be inevitably reduced to examine the factors that 
contributed to the expansion of such rent gap in Beijing’s urban (re-)development 
contexts. Such discussion, however, would still be beneficial to enhance our understanding 
about the underlying force behind intense urban redevelopment in Beijing.
Firstly, the introduction of the market mechanism in the real estate sector through the 
implementation of housing and land use reform measures presented opportunities to 
extract market rents from urban land and dwellings (Wu 1997). Under the planned 
economy, rents were collected by the state, and hence there was less chance of forming 
rent gradient within urban built-up areas. The development of employees’ residential 
compounds in Beijing followed the socialist principle of communal living (French and 
Hamilton 1979b). As Gaubatz (1999) noted, “most urban residents would rarely have any 
need to travel beyond the walls of their work-and-living unit” (Gaubatz 1999: 1497). The 
reform initiatives changed such a way of living. Many residents now face commuting long 
distances to their work place in central Beijing from their suburban residence, and 
companies are increasingly interested in locating their offices in strategic locations, mostly 
within and around inner city districts. The study of 1463 cases of land lease transaction 
that took place between 1993 and 2000 in Beijing showed that the land lease unit price 
showed a clear locational hierarchy in favour of those lands closer to the centre (Ding
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2004).29
Secondly, the rent level in public rental units was much lower than market rents. Housing 
in state socialism was one of the major collective consumption goods, and rents were 
heavily subsidised by residents* employers to assist their nominal wage. Long-term under­
investment in housing maintenance and management also contributed to the decline of 
housing value and ground rents that could be capitalised. One of the earlier housing 
reform measures in mainland China was to increase monthly rents to reach 15% of 
household income so that usual maintenance and management activities could be financed. 
This itself was not an easy task, given the condition that the housing rent in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods accounted for “only about 15 to 20% of the maintenance and 
management fees’* (Sun and Zhang 1989: 7). The official monthly rent for public tenants 
was planned for a gradual increase from 0.55 yuan/m2 in 1994 to reach 3.86 yuan/m2 in 
2000 (YP. Wing 2001:625). In Beijing, the monthly rent in the public rental sector was 1.3 
yuan/m2 only by 1999, and then experienced a sharp increase to 3.05 yuan/m2 as of 1 
April 2000. The increased monthly rent constituted about 6.3% of household disposable 
income in Beijing (BMG 2000a; China Daily 22 June 2000,22 March 2000).
On the contrary to much subsidised public renting, private renting would yield much 
higher rents. The disparity between state subsidised rents and actual market rents was also 
reported to be prominent in the early 1990s (Wii 1997: 652-653). A clear example of this 
is the rent level in the Sun City estate in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood where I conducted 
field research. The completion of the Sun City estate as part of the neighbourhood’s first 
phase redevelopment led to a sharp contrast in the rent level between commercial flats in 
the Sun City estate and public rental dwellings located in the area subject to the second 
phase redevelopment. While the public rental tenants were paying nominal rents set by the 
municipal regulations, the market rent for a two-bedroom Sun City flat with a 
construction space of around 110 m2, for example, was envisaged by residents to be at 
least 4,000 yuan per month at the time of field research visits. A talk with an on-site sales 
representative by the author in July 2004 came back with an even higher rent level of
29 The predominance of price negotiation as a land lease method over tender or auction has led to the 
arbitrary determination of land value, increasing the risk of land transaction through corruption and 
informal relationship. Only in June 2002 did the Beijing Municipal Government issued a policy to terminate 
the lease of state land for business through negotiation, and the first state land auction too place on 19 July 
2002 Qinghua Ribao 20 July 2002; Ye and Shan 26 July 2002).
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7,500 yuan for a two-bedroom flat, the sales representative claiming that the estate’s high 
standard and central location in Beijing attracted many buyers and tenants. Such disparity 
between state subsidised rents and actual market rents provide ample opportunities for 
the acquisition of development gains.
Finally, as for entrepreneurs, inner city districts present additional incentives to be located 
therein. Major central and regional government offices are concentrated in inner city 
districts. Embassies and foreign representative offices are also largely concentrated in and 
around the eastern section of the second ring road, which also makes it attractive for 
overseas capital to look for office spaces in the vicinity Industries formerly located in and 
around the inner city districts are moving outward to give way to other more commercial 
development (Gaubatz 1999: 1503-1504). Development zones are forming at various 
locations in near and outer suburban districts, but the delayed provision of ground 
transportation network means that a mono-centric urban development with the inner city 
districts at its focal point is more favoured over polycentric development (Deng and 
Huang 2004). In an attempt to promote Beijing to be on a par with other global cities, 
Beijing municipal government has been investing a lot to develop a central business 
district (CBD) as well as a financial centre at each end of the horizontal main avenue 
(Jianguorrm Dajie) where it meets with the second ring road (Beijing Today 18 May 2001; 
Cheng 11 May 2001). These measures in turn increase the level of potential ground rents 
in those old and dilapidated neighbourhoods, subjecting them to development pressure 
and spatial transformation.
Xinzhonaiie neighbourhood and real estate capital
In the previous section, it was noted that market-oriented reform measures created 
conditions for the rise of real estate sector and the rent gap expansion, providing ample 
opportunities for real estate capital to gain profits by exploiting the rent gap in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods.
In the following section, the first phase redevelopment in Xinzhongjie in Dongcheng 
district is discussed to show how real estate capital operates within local contexts in order 
to realise development opportunities presented by the expansion of rent gap. The 
discussion also shows that unlike the situation in Seoul where property-owners were 
actively promoting neighbourhood redevelopment as ‘occupier developer’ (Smith 1992: 
112), the dominance of public rental dwellings in Xinzhongjie meant that it was the real
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estate developer that actively promoted neighbourhood redevelopment in close 
partnership with the local authority
Dongcheng district and real estate investment
When examining fixed asset investment in Dongcheng district, the investment in real 
estate has been overwhelming. Between 1996 and 2000, the total amount of fixed asset 
investment in the district reached 18.74 billion yuan, of which 87% went into the real 
estate sector (SBDD 2001a). Such a share of real estate investment is far higher than the 
municipal average (37%) during the same period (All-China Marketing Research 2004). 
The district’s heavy investment in the real estate sector could be understood as being in 
line with the municipal government’s effort to transform its urban landscape to be 
‘modem* and ‘global.’ The district’s locational advantage of being at the heart of Beijing 
also made it attractive for real estate investment (Gaubatz 1999,2005).
As the District Mayor mentioned in January 2004, the total number of households 
relocated during this period reached 44,800 households, which were twice as many as 
those relocated during the preceding ten years (Lu 2004). This means that roughly one- 
fifth of all the households in the Dongcheng district were directly affected by the 
redevelopment process. The redevelopment of Xinzhongjie was initiated during this 
heightened period of pursuing real estate development and residents’ displacement.
A summary of the redevelopment progress
The redevelopment of Xinzhongjie was proposed to take place in two phases. The whole 
project was expected to last eight years, aimed at transforming the existing neighbourhood 
into “a new type of community where housing, retails and offices come together” (SBDD 
2000). The neighbourhood was divided into six districts (Districts A to F). The first phase 
(Phase I) was to build four high-rise blocks of commercial flats in Districts A and D 
whose combined surface area reached 2.3 hectare. Phase I took three years to complete.30
Regarding the land lease process, the case of Xinzhongjie redevelopment exemplified
30 Unless otherwise mentioned, the source of information on the status and progress of Xinzhongjie 
neighbourhood redevelopment in this sub-section is from the Dongcheng district government news web 
site, http://wwwbjdch.gov.cn/ (last accessed on 15 October 2005), and also from the author’s interview 
with a former manager affiliated with China Homes Limited (Interviewee CB99-INT-12) who wished to 
remain anonymous.
162
what Fang and Zhang (2003) described as ‘allocation first, bid later.’ For the first phase 
Xinzhongjie redevelopment, the demolition notice was delivered to the neighbourhood on 
19 December 1999, which gave 20 days for the residents to move out (Interview with 
CBK-INT-001). In total, 550 households were displaced from the neighbourhood. For 
District A, the contract for the payment of land lease premium in return for its use rights 
was concluded in the first half of 2000 with the total contract amount of RMB 54.67 
million. This was equal to the land lease unit price of RMB 5,015 per m2, which was about 
one third more expensive than the average unit price of seven other land lease contracts 
for residential projects made in Dongcheng District in the same period (BLRHMB 2000). 
The contract amount for the land lease of District D couldn’t be found. The total 
construction space for Phase I amounted to 140,000 m2. The sales process began in 
November 2000 with an expected moving-in date of one year later. In January 2002, the 
residents began to move into those two blocks in District A, which were completed one 
year earlier than the other two blocks in District D.
The letter of intent for Phase II redevelopment was signed on 26 May 2002 between the 
District Government and a Hong Kong-based investment company. A formal contract 
followed on 11 February 2003 in the presence of the District Mayor. An initial survey of 
the households regarding their housing conditions, in order to determine compensation, 
was carried out by the end of May 2003. As of September 2003, the actual date for the 
commencement of area demolition and relocation was yet to be announced.
Investment and project financing
The Xinzhongjie redevelopment was carried out through a joint cooperation between 
foreign investors, local developers and the local authority. Here, the local authority refers 
to Dongzhimen Street Office within Dongcheng District. The Director of Dongzhimen 
Street Office states:
“On the one hand, in the case of the national government, particularly close 
attention was paid in these years to the reform issues of redeveloping dilapidated 
areas. On the other hand, I feel this is the benefit of the reform and open door 
policy, this is my personal viewpoint, this policy should be said to have driven the 
government towards construction. I feel nowadays there’s still no financial capacity.
Like this Phase I development here [Xinzhongjie]. There was a Malaysian 
businessman, who had many friends. The businessman looked around some of his 
friends, and among them was the American Prudential insurance. Americans don’t 
invest in the real estate projects in China. Those countries such as Germany do not 
invest in the real estate sector in China. They feel the policies in China change too 
fast. However, I feel these countries have gained confidence with their investment
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in our country by means of this joint cooperation.”
(Director of Dongzhimen Street Office3)
The local representative of the foreign investment was China Homes Limited (hereafter 
China Homes). The foreign investment itself originated from two overseas investors, one 
of which was a US-based insurance company, Prudential Financial, which held 100% 
share of a Bermuda-based company, PRICOA China (Residential) Ltd. China Homes was 
a subsidiary of PRICOA China (Residential). The other overseas investor was Tan & Tan 
Developments Berhad, a Malaysian investor mentioned earlier. A joint venture was 
established between China Homes Limited and a local private developer (Beijing 
Zhonghong Real Estate Company Ltd.; hereinafter Beijing Zhonghong) in order to carry 
out the Xinzhongjie redevelopment, and was named as Beijing Huaju Workers’ 
Gymnasium Real Estate Development Company Ltd. (hereinafter Beijing Huaju) The 
total amount of investment that went into the Xinzhongjie redevelopment amounted to 
US$ 33.7 million (China Securities Journal 16 October 2004). Figure 5-11 below shows the 
organisational structure of the project.
Figure 5-11: Organisational Structure of the Sun City Project in Xinzhongjie
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China Homes held 95% share of the newly established Beijing Huaju in order to take full 
operational control of the company, and Beijing Zhonghong held the remaining 5%. The 
total investment of US$ 3,372 million was made by the joint venture as per related 
government regulations that required minimum capital investment of one third of total 
project costs. The rest of the project costs were financed through the sales of Sun Gty
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flats. Figure 5-12 shows some of the marketing posters that emphasise the international 
nature of the completed estate in terms of design and investment. The former manager at 
China Homes commented:
“30% of the total project costs were required to be invested as minimum capital by 
us investors. This was used for the payment of land premium after the project lands 
were granted, and also for some upfront construction costs. Two thirds of the total 
project costs were then financed by the bank mortgages and down payment by the 
homebuyers.” (Former manager at China Homes Limited)
Densification
8.5 hectare or 85,000 m2 of land was subject to redevelopment, which was to transform 
the pingfang-dominated low-rise neighbourhood into a modem district dominated by 
commercial flats of high-rise (Editorial Committee of Beijing Dongcheng District 2000: 
330). The total construction space, as envisaged at the project outset by the District 
Government was 255,000 m2, leading to the FAR of 300%. This was an average FAR 
estimated for the whole project by the local authority
The final building density of the Sun Gty estate, however, was much higher (see Figure 
5-12 at the end of this section for the view of the estate). Upon the completion of Phase 
I redevelopment, the total construction space built on the land parcel of 23,000 m2 
reached nearly 140,000 m2, resulting in the FAR of about 600%. Considering the fact that 
Phase II redevelopment would focus on commercial and office-oriented development that 
normally entailed high density, the average density for the whole project site would be 
bound to be much higher than the local authority envisaged initially. The orientation of 
the district government towards the real estate development and its strong emphasis on 
the sector for its economic development would explain such preference of high building 
density.
The use of foreign investment and the densification have led to the changing landscape 
from a low-rise dilapidated neighbourhood to a high-rise modem estate. For the 
developers, the increased built density would be equal to higher returns to their 
investment. As for the local authority, the transformation of the neighbourhood provides 
the basis of increased tax revenue, and proves the competitiveness of its administrative 
capacity. In terms of re-housing the original residents, however, the neighbourhood 
redevelopment has been an effective process of gentrification. This will be dealt with in
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the following chapter.
Summary
This section has examined the substantially increased investment in the real estate sector 
in the process of economic growth and capital accumulation in mainland China and 
Beijing. The growing emphasis on real estate sector and the expanding rent gap in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods in times of urban spatial restructuring under reform policies 
led to the creation of ample development opportunities. The experiences of Xinzhongjie 
redevelopment showed that the ODHRP provided a policy framework to invite real estate 
capital (in this case, both local and foreign) to transform dilapidated neighbourhoods into 
a commercial high-rise estate of much higher density than initially envisaged. Real estate 
developers and local government made a contractual relationship for the land lease and 
redevelopment of Xinzhongjie neighbourhood.
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SUNCfTY
Figure 5-12  : Samples of marketing posters for Sun City estate and its view upon completion
SUNClTY
©
©
Pictures ©  and (?) are marketing posters that emphasise the global look of 
the Sun City (© ) and its competitiveness of having attracted a Fortune 500 
company (Prudential Financial) as the major investor (© ).
Picture (3) shows the model of the estate, displaying four high-rise blocks on 
site.
Picture @ is the view of completed Sun City estate.
Sources:
Pictures © , (2) and (D are from a marketing web site, 
http://house.vnet.com/moe/viewad.isp?hrid=27105 (accessed on 20 June 
2004).
Picture ®  was taken by the author on 15 August 2003.
5.3 Conclusion
One of the questions of this thesis was why developers participated in the redevelopment 
of dilapidated neighbourhood within the JRP and ODHRP framework. As the UN- 
Habitat report pointed out, private sector puts profits at the centre of its operation, which 
traditionally “limited its involvement in low-income shelter in the cities of developing 
countries because the commercial private sector has normally been unable to provide 
housing at a profit, at a price the poor can afford” (UN-Habitat 1993: Chapter 2A). From 
the discussions presented in this chapter, we were able to understand that the flow of 
capital into real estate sector and the expansion of rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
provided the economic rationale for developers’ participation in neighbourhood 
redevelopment. Case studies of redevelopment projects based on my field research visits 
also allowed us to understand the process of real estate capital participation at the 
neighbourhood level.
In Seoul, the creation of surplus capital coincided with the expansion of a speculative 
property market, and the under-development of old and dilapidated neighbourhoods has 
led to an expanding rent gap. The absence of de jure property rights and subsequent 
restrictions on property maintenance and development contributed to the rent gap 
expansion. In Beijing, reform measures encouraging the transaction of state land and 
dwellings in newly developed property market gave rise to the importance of locational 
advantages of inner city districts, and eventually to the creation of a rent gap that was 
foreign in the planned economy. This provided developers in the property market with 
opportunities to extract profits. The exclusion of those dilapidated public rental dwellings 
from the process of privatisation facilitated the process of rent gap expansion.
Seoul and Beijing municipal governments both experienced lack of financial resources to 
carry out redevelopment in dilapidated neighbourhoods, and the participation of real 
estate developers certainly proved to be effective in neighbourhood transformation within 
the urban policy framework of JRP and ODHRP. Developers’ skills to manage projects 
and their capacity to mobilise capital to finance upfront development costs surpassed 
those of local residents and local authorities. The case of Nangok redevelopment showed 
that the success of a redevelopment project relied heavily on the capacity of participating 
developers. In such an arrangement, developers’ stake was the least to be threatened, as 
the bottom line for them was to secure their ‘normal profits’ through building practices.
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Opportunities to secure development gains were enormous, but could only be 
materialised when real estate capital intervened as financiers. The case of the Nangok 
redevelopment, however, showed that such heavy reliance on developers also carried risks 
of jeopardising a project when participating developers dropped out of the project.
In the case of Xinzhongjie neighbourhood, the Sun Gty project was a success from the 
local authority perspective that opted for the transformation of its built environment into 
a modem cityscape. The local authority’s inadequate financial resources and expertise to 
manage such a large-scale development in the locality were compensated by the 
participation of foreign investment through the establishment of a joint venture with a 
local private developer. The Sun Gty project had favourable conditions such as high 
density, high sales price, good location and wide rent gap, which were attractive for the 
developers to participate. It exemplifies developer-led redevelopment that has increasingly 
become a common practice in urban Giina in transforming old neighbourhoods in good 
locations with a high land value, where high returns to capital investment are promising 
(YP. Wang 2003: 258). The case of Xinzhongjie redevelopment also showed that the 
presence of overseas developer was crucial in salvaging the project when local developers 
were short of capacity to carry it out on their own, again suggesting the risks inherent in 
developers’ participation.
This chapter showed an interesting contrast between Seoul and Beijing in terms of 
developers’ participation in redevelopment projects. In Seoul, developers were in a 
contractual relationship with property-owners to carry out neighbourhood redevelopment, 
while the local authority provided regulatory framework and was not in direct business 
relationship with either propertyowners or developers. In Beijing, developers entered into 
a legal contract with the local authority for the land lease and redevelopment of 
neighbourhood, indicating that a stronger alliance between the state and capital could be 
formed in Beijing. Such differing role of local authorities leads us to the next chapter that 
examines the way in which the public sector makes its intervention in neighbourhood 
redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing.
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Chapter 6 
Government intervention in redevelopment: 
driving neighbourhood changes
Government intervention: the case of Seoul
Policy incentives
JRP in Seoul and gentrification
Direct intervention: Nangok and the rolling redevelopment 
Summary
Government intervention: the case of Beijing 
Policy incentives
ODHRP in Beijing and gentrification
Government’s search for an alternative approach: the Haiyuncang
model
Summary
Conclusion
The presence of rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods as examined in the previous 
chapter only provides material conditions for capital investment, and does not serve as a 
mechanistic determinant of profit realisation. The closure of rent gap requires active 
human intervention, and in this respect the public sector performs a catalytic role (Smith 
1996). The recent UK experiences in urban renewal showed that property-based urban 
renewal would not have been possible without the sponsorship of local authorities, which 
used a range of powers at their disposal (e.g. planning, building control, infrastructure and 
compulsory purchase powers) to remove supply-side constraints and facilitate private 
sector participation Qones 1996a; Jones and Watkins 1996).
In Seoul and Beijing, the design and implementation of the Joint Redevelopment 
Programme (JRP) and the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment (ODHRP) were 
part of such human interventions. These programmes provided the redevelopment 
framework within which participating stakeholders from the public and private sectors 
could interact in order to close the rent gap and acquire development gains. In this 
context, this chapter examines the public sector intervention that was made to ensure the 
successful implementation of JRP and ODHRP projects, and hence, the closure of the 
rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods.
Discussions of each are divided into three main sections. The first section examines the 
policy incentives to facilitate the operation of the JRP and ODHRP. This section will 
show that these incentives have been largely provided in order to lessen the financial 
burdens on participating developers. The second section examines the degree of 
residents’ displacement and gentrification, which shows that the JRP and ODHRP 
resulted in mass displacement of original residents and neighbourhood gentrification. The 
third section discusses the effect and implications of the public sector’s direct intervention 
in neighbourhood redevelopment by closely examining a case study in each city.
6.1 Government intervention: the case  of Seoul 
Policy incentives
Having initiated the JRP framework in which developers and property-owners took the 
lead, the central and local governments provided policy incentives to encourage 
developers’ participation in JRP projects and ensure that the framework worked.
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Project finance
Financial input from the government into neighbourhood redevelopment is usually made 
by marking government revenues for targeted use in redevelopment projects, or by 
providing direct or indirect subsidies to developers and/or residents. In Seoul, in 
accordance with the Urban Redevelopment Act and the Municipal Ordinance on Urban 
Redevelopment, a certain proportion of urban planning tax income (5% until 1982, and 
10% thereafter) was earmarked to be channelled into a special municipal account for 
urban redevelopment. The fund accumulated in this way was called the ‘redevelopment 
project fund.’
The redevelopment project fund became one of the major means for the municipal 
government to make financial contributions to the JRP as the municipal government had 
to purchase public rental units provided in redevelopment neighbourhoods for eligible 
tenants’ re-housing. Since 1989, JRP projects have been required to construct public rental 
flats within project areas for the tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation if they 
chose to return for re-housing upon project completion (Kim et al. 1996: 110). Public 
rental flats provided in this way were to be purchased and managed by the municipal 
government. The redevelopment project fund was to finance such purchases (Kim et al 
1995). The sales revenue of public land in redevelopment districts was also earmarked for 
the purchase of these rental units. In particular, the central government transferred state- 
owned public land in redevelopment districts to the hands of local government free of 
charge so that local government could use the revenues from land sales.
The financing of JRP projects has also been supported by the National Housing Fund 
(NHF), which was established in July 1981 and operates to provide financial support for 
homebuyers and builders in the public and private sectors (Ha 1987: 107-109). Its main 
sources have been the central government budgetary contribution and the National 
Housing Bonds (MoCT Korea 2002c: 232). Below-market rate interest loans from the 
NHF are provided to developers when constructing flats with a floor space of less than 
85 m2 (MoCT Korea 2002c: 272). The NHF was also the major source for supplementing 
funding shortages when the redevelopment project fund and land sale revenue were 
insufficient to finance the purchase of public rental flats in JRP projects (Kim et al. 1995). 
The Seoul municipal government had to resort to loans from the National Housing Fund, 
which provided low-interest (3%) long-term loans to be repaid in instalments over 20 
years after a 10-year grace period (MoCT Korea 2002c: 227).
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The JRP or real estate sector in South Korea in general was not much influenced by 
foreign capital. Foreign loans and foreign direct investment focused on the economic 
development, concentrating on the growth of key industries (W-J. Kim 1996: 25-26). The 
share of FDI invested in construction and/or the real estate sector was minimal until the 
late 1990s (MoQE Korea 2001; NSO Korea 1994a, 2002c). The FDI in real estate sector 
only became noticeable in the late 1990s when overseas capital began to take interest in 
the Korean market to take advantage of the devaluation of Korean currency after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The interest focused largely on purchasing buildings at 
prestigious locations rather than getting involved directly in property development.
Land transaction
In Seoul, the history of implementing JRP projects in the 1990s showed that 50% of the 
land in redevelopment neighbourhoods turned out to be publicly owned, and that nearly 
60% of dwellings were without possession of formal land tide (SMG 1998a: 20-21). The 
owners of these dwellings are required to purchase the land when the redevelopment 
project is authorised for implementation. In this regard, the conditions of purchase 
including the terms of redemption become an important factor for the facilitation of 
redevelopment projects.
Until April 1994, the State Properties Act and its enforcement decree stipulated that 
dwelling owners on state-owned lands had to pay for the land in instalments at a 5% 
annual interest rate with a 5-year redemption period. In April 1994, in order to reduce the 
financial burden on dwelling owners, the terms of payment were relaxed so that 
instalments could be paid over 10 years at 8% interest rate. From July 2000, the 
redemption period was further extended to 15 years, and the interest rate reduced to 5% 
(MoCT Korea 2000:98).
Housing transaction
In South Korea, as part of government attempts to control housing speculation, the 
central government implemented a ‘resale control policy* in the new housing market. The 
resale control policy was first put into practice in April 1981, and prohibited the resale of 
new dwellings for two years from the date of purchase (MoCT Korea 2002c: 305-308). In 
May 1982, this period was reduced to six months, and the policy was completely abolished 
in February 1999 in an attempt to revive the real estate market since its collapse in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. During the two decades of its operation, the
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resale control was never applied to homebuyers of redeveloped flats. Despite the 
prevalence of housing speculation in JRP projects, speculators entering redevelopment 
neighbourhoods faced no restrictions on their property transaction.
Qff-plan purchase: buyers’ contribution to project financing
In line with the rapid expansion of new housing construction since the 1980s, off-plan 
purchase had been widely practiced. The system was first introduced by the enactment of 
the Ordinance on Housing Supply in 1977 in order to encourage housing construction in 
general, and also became a powerful tool for the implementation of the JRP. Under this 
system, developers were permitted to sell their flats at an early stage of a project, usually 
when a project reached 10% or 20% of project schedule. The down payment and period 
instalment from homebuyers assisted developers with the remaining work The final 
instalment is made upon their moving-in (Yoon 1994: 70-72). For a JRP project, it was 
found that about one third of the total project costs were spent by developers before they 
began to receive down payment through the off-plan purchase system (Korea Housing 
Institute 2001:56-57; Lee and Bae 1998:277-279).
Planning control and densification
According to the Housing Bureau of Seoul Metropolitan Government, there were 134 
completed redevelopment projects, which received implementation permits after 1990. Of 
these, 97 provided public rental flats for tenants’ re-housing. By the end of December 
2004, the total number of rental flats reached 43,453 units, accounting for about 30% of 
redeveloped flats (Housing Bureau of SMG 2005). Under such circumstances, an effective 
means of encouraging property-owners and developers to proceed with residential 
redevelopment was to allow higher density development. The prevailing rhetoric in JRP 
projects was to build as many flats as possible to the maximum density permitted by the 
planning regulations in order to maximise development profits.
One way to judge the degree of densification is to look at the floor-area ratio (hereafter 
FAR), which is the ratio of a building’s gross floor space to the net area on which the 
building is constructed. FAR has been an effective planning tool for the government in 
controlling real estate development. In Seoul, until the late 1990s, the planning regulations 
on building density control were relaxed on several occasions to allow high density 
development (Lee and Bae 1998: 268). Between 1983 and 1990, the maximum FAR in 
general residential areas was 250% for north Seoul and 300% for south Seoul (Seoul
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Building Ordinance No.1766 issued on 4 May 1983). From November 1990, it was 
increased to 400% (Seoul Building Ordinance No.2660 issued on 9 November 1990) 
before decreasing to 300% in 1998 (Seoul Building Ordinance No.3499 issued on 30 April 
1998).
The high density redevelopment led to significant increases in both dwellings and 
residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods. According to the Housing Redevelopment 
Bureau of Seoul municipal government, 65 redevelopment districts completed between 
1990 and 1996 experienced an increase in households of 32% on average, and in the 
number of dwellings by 303% (SMG 1998a: 32). Indeed, the average FAR for 
redevelopment districts as shown in Figure 6-1 below indicates that the building density 
of redevelopment districts increased substantially throughout the 1980s, and stayed at 
around 300% in the 1990s.
Figure 6-1: Increase in the floor-to-area ratio in JRP projects, 1983 - 1996
(SMG 1998a: 28)
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for project implementation
JRP in Seoul and qentrification
The previous section examined policy incentives from the government aimed at 
facilitating dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment. Then the question is: does this 
intervention help existing residents to ‘stay fixed’ in their original neighbourhood? In this 
section, I will examine the scale of existing residents’ permanent displacement and 
gentrification in accordance with conventional and revised redevelopment strategies.
In Seoul, owner-occupiers, in principle, work in partnership with developers and
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implement the redevelopment of their neighbourhood. In practice, however, a large 
number of them are being replaced by off-site investors (or ‘speculators’ as they were 
commonly referred to). In a JRP project, as soon as professional developers are selected 
and the project enters into the stage of preparing a project implementation plan (see 
Figure 2-4 in Chapter 2 for the JRP’s implementation process), project uncertainties are 
lifted and speculation becomes rampant. With low re-housing prospect due to the high 
prices of redeveloped flats, the speculation encourages low-income owner-occupiers to 
sell their properties and withdraw from the redevelopment association (the issue is 
discussed in more details in Chapter 9). The result is the displacement of poor owner- 
occupiers by higher-income residents who can afford redeveloped flats. This process is 
considered to be unavoidable by the local authority under the JRP framework:
“The owner-occupiers just possess dwellings built with a licence on public 
lands... and don’t have enough money even to pay for their Chonsei deposit 
elsewhere, nor do they have capacity to pay for construction costs... In general, the 
proportion of owner-occupiers being re-housed is known to be less than 20%, but 
this is exaggerated... In my view; it’s less than 5%, because many properties change 
hands even before the project implementation plan is approved or before a project 
is concretised... When these neighbourhoods are redeveloped, it’s an inevitable 
consequence” (Head of Housing Bureau at Gwanak District Government)
In a report published by Seongdong District Office in east Seoul that closely examined 
three redevelopment projects (Hawang 1-2 District, Ogsu 9 District and Geumho 1-6 
District), the proportion of absentee landlords among property-owners reached 54%, 
49% and 59% respectively by the time their project implementation plans were approved 
by the government. Furthermore, less than one third of these owner-occupiers were able 
to be re-housed upon project completion (Seongdong-gu Office 2001: 132). Another 
example of the low re-housing rate of owner-occupiers could be taken from the data 
compiled by the Housing Bureau of the Seoul municipal government in 1996. The data, 
which were gathered from 28 JRP districts completed between January 1993 and June 
1996, revealed that only 30.5% of owner-occupiers were re-housed upon project 
completion (Kim et al. 1996: 221-222). These statistics indicate that despite the initial aim 
of the JRP to encourage owner-occupiers to implement neighbourhood redevelopment, 
the JRP has been actually driven by absentee landlords, and that the majority of owner- 
occupiers have been displaced.
In a JRP project, the redevelopment association carried out a survey on tenants in order 
to find out the number of tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation and who wish
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to choose in-kind compensation. Here, in-kind compensation refers to the access to 
public rental flats provided on site as part of neighbourhood redevelopment. By law, the 
redevelopment association has to incorporate the required number of public rental flats in 
their preparation of the project implementation plan. This requirement prevents complete 
gentrification of a redevelopment neighbourhood as a certain proportion of redeveloped 
flats are built as public rental flats for low-income tenants.
Nevertheless, most tenants in redevelopment neighbourhoods were found to be displaced. 
A recent study that included a survey on tenants in two JRP projects in Seoul showed that 
public rental flats were provided to accommodate 62% and 46% of original tenants in 
each neighbourhood, but, upon project completion, the re-housing rate of the original 
tenants reached only 6.2% and 34.5% respectively (Ahn 2002: 41-42 cited in Lee et aL 
2003: 2228). This indicates that a large number of eligible tenants refrained from moving 
to these rental flats upon project completion. This issue will be addressed in the following 
chapters on redevelopment impacts on residents.
Direct intervention: Nanaok and the rolling redevelopment
The previous discussions on the JRP and its impact on residents* displacement and 
gentrification have shown that the majority of existing residents are excluded from 
enjoying the direct benefits of redeveloped neighbourhoods where they have lived for 
years (and possibly decades for some). The second argument to consider is to examine if 
the public sector makes any direct intervention to overcome the shortcomings of the JRP.
The direct intervention by the public sector in Seoul came in the form of implementing a 
revised JRP approach called the ‘rolling redevelopment* in which public agencies such as 
the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHQ were to participate as professional 
developers. This provision was made possible by revising the Urban Redevelopment Act 
at the end of December 1995. The overall process of rolling redevelopment was not 
much different from what was followed under the conventional JRP framework except 
that, in a rolling redevelopment project, the tenants eligible for redevelopment 
compensation were to be provided with public rental units for their relocation at the 
beginning of a redevelopment project rather than upon project completion (Bae 1997; 
Yoon 1997). The rolling redevelopment also made the public agency the sole implementer 
of a redevelopment project instead of establishing a redevelopment association with 
property-owners. The approach was thought to increase the housing security of eligible
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tenants who have chosen in-kind relocation compensation as an option. Since the 
stipulation of the rolling redevelopment approach in the Urban Redevelopment Act in 
1995, two projects took place, both by the KNHG One of them was the redevelopment 
of Nangok neighbourhood.
KNHC and its participation in Nangok redevelopment
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the redevelopment of Nangok took a severe blow due 
to the withdrawal of the participating developers early 1998. No other private developers 
came forward to take over the project. Densely populated neighbourhood conditions, high 
concentration of dwelling owners without <k jure property rights and reduced density 
requirement all discouraged developers from participation. It was the Article Nine of the 
Urban Redevelopment Act that redirected property owners’ attention towards the KNHC, 
which was a public housing agency with 73.2% of its equity capital in 2000 coming from 
the central government.31
The Article Nine of the Urban Redevelopment Act states that under certain stipulated 
conditions, local authorities are permitted to intervene and take control of a 
redevelopment project from the hands of property-owners and implement it on their own, 
or assign a public agency such as the KNHC as a professional developer to continue the 
project on their behalf. Some of these conditions were, for example: (1) the 
implementation of rolling redevelopment; (2) the proportion of public lands within a 
redevelopment neighbourhood being more than 50% of total land area; or (3) request by 
more than 50% of property-owners. The participation of the KNHC in Nangok 
neighbourhood redevelopment met all these conditions. The following discussions on the 
company’s participation in Nangok were largely based on the documents produced by the 
property-owners, the KNHC and the local authority acquired during my field research.
Negotiations for KNHC’s participation
Having been informed of the imminent withdrawal of the private developers, the 
redevelopment steering committee, which was a representative body for property owners 
in Nangok, sent out its first letter to the KNHC in order to request the company’s 
participation. The letter was delivered via the Gwanak district government on 21 March
31 This is from the Public Finance Database web site (http://fsg.mpb.go.kr/db/db_04_01.jsp), run by the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget.
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1998 (District Government Document No. Jutaeg 58531-777). Having received the 
company's negative response four months later, the property-owners in Nangok organised 
a general assembly meeting, and collected consenting votes from 73% of property-owners, 
providing the legal justification for the public sector’s direct intervention. Requests were 
sent out by the redevelopment steering committee again in September 1998, this time to 
the KNHC, the Seoul Metropolitan Development Corporation and other major private 
developers. All other companies rejected the request, but the KNHCs response carried a 
more sympathetic tone:
"... for every project, it’s important to secure resources. At present, however, the 
downturn of the construction business due to the Asian Financial Crisis makes it 
difficult for our company to find a way to sell [the company’s] 33,000 unsold flats.
Our company is also experiencing management difficulties due to the delay of the 
cost recovery from the redevelopment project in neighbouring Sillim 2-1 District, as 
the settlement of the management disposal plan is delayed. Therefore, it is difficult 
for us to participate in a project as large as yours, and we will only be able to 
reconsider your request when the business environment improves and the project in 
Sillim 2-1 District progresses well... ”
KNHC Letter dated 19 January 1999 (Document No: Dojeong 1620-670)
As of February 1999, the redevelopment steering committee came up with a revised set 
of propositions to attract the KNHCs participation (Sillim 1 District (Nangok) 
Redevelopment Steering Committee February 1999). All four propositions were to lighten 
the financial burden of participating developers by means of minimising the up-front 
costs they usually had to bear in JRP projects.
Firstly, absentee landlords agreed not to cling to interest-free loans which were usually 
arranged by developers during a project period. A JRP project usually required developers 
to provide property-owners with interest-free loans at the outset of each project in order 
to help them finance any temporary relocation. Because these loans were interest free, 
absentee landlords also took advantage and used to demand these loans despite the fact 
that they would not need temporary relocation.
Secondly, property owners promised that they would endeavour to displace existing 
tenants so that dwellings could be vacant and become ready for demolition as soon as 
possible. They estimated that there were around 1,500 tenant households in total and 
promised that they would reduce this number to at least 1,000 households before the 
project implementation.
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Thirdly property-owners also proposed that by the time they were to purchase public 
lands in their neighbourhood, they would pay the initial down payment (10% of the total 
land price) out of their pocket. In a JRP project, such payment was usually made by 
participating developers, increasing the up-front costs they had to bear.
Fourthly, with regard to property-owners’ off-plan purchase of redeveloped flats, they 
proposed that they would start the instalment payment even before the commencement 
of construction works, reducing the amount of financial resources that the developers 
had to mobilise to proceed with a redevelopment project.
These propositions were delivered to the KNHC by the Housing Redevelopment Bureau 
of the Seoul municipal government on 8 March 1999 (SMG Document No. Jujae 58531- 
518). Having received no response within three months, the Housing Redevelopment 
Bureau sent out another letter to the KNHC (SMG Document No. Jujae 58531-1506) on 
10 June 1999 to urge its quick decision.
KNHCs participation and the rolling redevelopment: work progress
To these requests, the KNHC kept on emphasising its practical difficulties as quoted 
previously but left room for further negotiation by mentioning that the use of 818 public 
rental units provided by the company as part of redeveloping Sillim 2-1 District could be 
a way of improving the financial prospect of Nangok redevelopment. Sillim 2-1 District 
was the first redevelopment project in Seoul to carry what was termed as ‘rolling 
redevelopment’ (sometimes called ‘circular redevelopment’).32
The idea was picked up by the property-owners, and was delivered to the Gwanak District 
Assembly members who prepared a written petition to the KNHC This was made 
possible because one of the property-owners was serving as a member of the District 
Assembly, and this person also initiated the petition process. The petition included a 
proposition that the implementation of rolling redevelopment would also lead to the 
reduction of the number of public rental units to be built in Nangok from 1,580 flats to 
only about 600 flats. This was thought to allow more space for building commercial flats
32 ‘Rolling redevelopment’ first appeared as an experimental project in 1983, and was applied to the 
redevelopment of four neighbourhoods (SMG 1983). It failed to survive at that time, and gave way to the 
JRP.
180
for sale in new housing market, and therefore, increase developers’ profitability (Members 
of GDA October 1999).
One more letter was sent out by Gwanak District Government on 29 October 1999 
(Document No. Jutaeg 58531-3621) to urge the KNHCs participation, and the KNHC 
finally gave consent to its participation in November 1999. An agreement was signed on 
29 February 2000 between the redevelopment steering committee and the KNHC to 
make official the company's take-over of the project as the sole implementer. In 
accordance with the Urban Redevelopment Act, the redevelopment steering committee 
was to be dissolved, and a body named the Council for Residents’ Representatives was 
formed instead for the KNHC to consult.
On 20 May 2000, a general assembly was held to secure property-owners’ majority 
consent to the agreement signed between the redevelopment steering committee and the 
KNHC More than 50% of property-owners were present, unanimously approving the 
agreement. It was also decided that the redevelopment steering committee would select a 
demolition company to proceed with the demolition of vacant dwellings until the 
KNHCs participation was formally approved by the local authority. The KNHC was to 
take over the demolition work thereafter (Sillim 1 District (Nangok) Redevelopment 
Steering Committee May 2000). Based on the general assembly resolution, the formal 
designation of the KNHC as the project developer was made by the Gwanak district 
government on 15 June 2000 (Document No. Jutaeg 58531-1949). Fifteen months later, 
the Gwanak district government approved the project implementation plan submitted by 
the KNHG Figure 6-2 below shows the KNHCs blueprint of the redeveloped Nangok 
neighbourhood, and includes overall project information specified in the project 
implementation plan (GDG 2001b).
The KNHC carried out a survey in July and August 2000 to find out the actual number of 
existing residents, and establish a relocation and displacement plan. The survey revealed 
that there were a lot more tenant households in the neighbourhood than the property- 
owners disclosed back in February 1999 (Sillim 1 District (Nangok) Redevelopment 
Steering Committee February 1999). The total number of tenant households turned out 
to be close to 2,100 households instead of 1,500. The discrepancy was largely due to the 
underestimation of those households ineligible for legal compensation. There was no 
information that revealed whether or not the redevelopment steering committee
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deliberately made such under-reporting. The underestimation contributed to the project’s 
delay by one year, as it took longer than the initial prediction to complete residents’ 
displacement. The last remaining tenants were displaced completely only in early April 
2003, almost three years after the KNHC’s participation was endorsed by the local 
authority (Korea Economic Daily 1 May 2003). As soon as the displacement was 
completed, the site preparation began, and all construction works were scheduled to finish 
within three years.
Figure 6-2: KNHC’s blueprint of redeveloped Nangok in bird’s eye view format
(Source: KNHC web site)
When the KNHC began the formal displacement and relocation of residents in Nangok 
in October 2000, there were around 10,000 residents or 2,450 households including 421 
owner-occupiers. The number of actually displaced residents, however, was much higher. 
In October 1996, six months after the selection of private developers’ consortium, 14,640 
residents used to live in Nangok (see Table 6-1 below). Between 1996 and 2000, around 
4,600 residents left the neighbourhood. Because the series of redevelopment-induced 
events during these years encouraged owner-occupiers to sell their properties and 
destabilised secure tenure environment for tenants, the departure of 4,600 residents 
during these years could be considered as redevelopment-induced displacement.
Table 6-1: Changes in the number of residents in Nangok, 1989 - 2000 
(GDA 1996; SMG 1991: 186)
December 1989............ October 1996X) October 20002)
No. of Households No. of residents No. of households No. of residents No. of households No. of residents
4,416 16,734 n.a. 14,640 2,450 c. 10,000
Note.
1) Six months after the selection of developers' consortium. One year before the full designation of Nangok neighbourhood as a JRP 
redevelopment district
)up ol residents to be re-housed 
eir dwellings without selling to 
nber of owner-occupiers at the 
421 households. This accounted 
i the neighbourhood, indicating 
red on a large scale.
rental tiats provided by the KNHC elsewhere, the only gr< 
in Nangok was the owner-occupiers who held onto th 
speculators. As shown in Table 6-2 below, the total nui 
time of commencing relocation in October 2000 reached 
for only 16.9% of the total dwelling owners registered ii 
that the displacement of poor owner-occupiers had occur
In fact, the actual number of owner-occupiers who were expected to be re-housed upon 
project completion would be much smaller as they continued to sell their property rights 
as the project progressed. According to the interview with an owner-occupier who had 
been working in property^owners’ association as a delegate (interviewee KSS10-INW01), 
one fifth of the owner-occupiers who moved to the KNHGprovided public rental flats 
sold their property rights within 18 months of temporary relocation to the KNHG 
provided public rental flats (the issue of affordability problems for owner-occupiers in 
Nangok is explained in more detail in Section 7.1 of Chapter 7).
To illustrate the frequent changes in property ownership, I obtained a copy of land 
registration certificates for one of the land plots (Land plot number Sanl04-6) in Nangok. 
This was acquired at the end of October 2005 from the online services run by the Seoul 
Central District Court. The original landlord was the central government. The owners of 
dwellings on this land bought the land title on 7 June 2002. In total, 3,066 m2 of land was 
sold to 66 people, each person owning 46.5 m2 of land parcel on average. It was not 
possible to find out the proportion of absentee landlords as the land registration records 
did not distinguish them. Between June 2002 and October 2005, 48 owners sold their land 
title at least once during this period. There was a case (registration no. 48568) where the 
land title changed hands four times between June 2002 and November 2004
As for the destination of the displaced households, Table 6-3 below indicates that only 
about one quarter of the displaced residents moved out of Gwanak district. This table is 
based on the household registration records from the local administrative office for those 
Nangok residents who moved their house between September 2000 and March 2002 
(Sillim Welfare Centre 2002: 10-11). Two fifths of the displaced residents moved to the 
KNHGprovided public rental flats located within Gwanak district.
in total, which included 512 public rental flats (15.4%). These rental units were to be used 
for accommodating any tenants who were to be displaced from other KNHGled 
neighbourhood redevelopment projects, if any Like other JRP projects, the presence of 
these rental flats prevented complete gentrification of the neighbourhood.
A trade-off in whose favour?
For the property-owners of Nangok neighbourhood, the KNHCs participation came as a 
salvation. The efforts by the property-owners’ redevelopment steering committee paid off 
eventually, and the local authorities and district assembly members played a very 
important enabling role. Local authorities could also be relieved for having prevented 
further dilapidation of Nangok neighbourhood due to project postponement. By 
February 2000, about 8% of all dwellings on site were empty and faced the risk of 
collapsing due to negligence.33
As for tenants eligible for legal compensation, they were able to be relocated to public 
rental units upon displacement. This allowed them to avoid temporary relocation during 
the project period, minimising the uncertainty of having to find a temporary relocation 
unit at their own expense. This arrangement made them permanently leave the 
neighbourhood, and settle down elsewhere. For Nangok tenants, it was lucky that the 
developer, KNHC, was a public development corporation and the main provider and 
manager of pubic rental flats in the country. It was also lucky that the company was 
coincidently about to complete a redevelopment project in the neighbouring district, and 
had 818 rental units ready for receiving tenants.
When it comes to the replicability of the rolling redevelopment approach, however, it is 
difficult to remain fully positive. This approach applied by the KNHC was first tried 
experimentally in the early 1980s, and was abandoned for more than a decade before it 
was reinstated upon amending the Urban Redevelopment Act in 1995. Since then, only 
one project was carried out in this way, and this was the redevelopment of Sillim 2-1 
District, which was located close to Nangok. No other private developers sought out such 
an approach, as this would have incurred heavy costs upon property-owners and 
developers.
33 The figure was taken from the official letter from the Housing Bureau of Gwanak District Government 
dated on 21 February 2000 (Document No. Jutaeg 58531-549).
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“Rolling redevelopment doesn’t go well with private companies like us... As rolling 
redevelopment is to be carried out by the Korea National Housing Corporation or 
the SH Corporation [a municipal government invested housing development 
corporation], we don’t study that much about it, and haven’t done any research 
either... ” (Redevelopment section manager, a private development compan^
“Private sector wouldn’t do [rolling redevelopment]. They would lose money if they 
do, so why should they? In the case of our company [KNHC], we try to continue 
with this kind of project, but as for private companies, they do business on a district 
basis. Whether or not they make profits or losses, it’s all limited to one 
redevelopment district, and doesn’t affect other districts... ”
(KNHC manager in charge of Nangok redevelopment)
The municipal government was also pessimistic about the approach, as the head of the 
municipal housing redevelopment bureau stated:
“The rolling redevelopment in South Korea is impossible. It exists only in theory 
The pilot project already implemented could not be said to have applied the 
approach because it was simply to make use of existing empty rental stock as 
relocation dwellings for tenants and property-owners... ”
(Head of the Housing redevelopment bureau, Seoul municipal government)
Summary
This section has examined the policy incentives exercised by the central and local 
governments, which helped sustain the successful implementation of JRP projects in 
Seoul. These incentives were largely to release professional and individual developers from 
financial burdens and guarantee profit maximisation. This section also showed that the 
JRP accompanied large-scale displacement of not only tenants in redevelopment 
neighbourhoods but also owner-occupiers who were in principle part of the legal 
implementers of JRP projects. This section also showed that the direct intervention by the 
public sector was carried out for dual purposes: (1) to salvage endangered projects and 
complete the closure of rent gap on behalf of property-related interests; (2) and to 
provide permanent relocation rental dwellings, increasing the housing security of the 
tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation. The replicability of the revised JRP 
approach (that is, rolling redevelopment) was, however, doubtful.
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6.2 Government intervention: the case  of Beijing
Policy incentives
In the following subsection, I will examine what major incentives were put into practice by 
the central and local governments in order to ensure the successful implementation of the 
ODHRP. These incentives were largely in favour of professional developers’ interests that 
were exogenous to redevelopment neighbourhoods.
Project finance
In Beijing, the ODHRP projects were noted for being heavily levied of development taxes, 
which contributed to high sale prices of redeveloped flats, exacerbating homebuyers’ 
affordability problems. The Planning and Construction Committee of Dongcheng 
District Government acknowledged that the cost structure of ODHRP projects was not 
rationale, stating that one third of the total project cost was due to development-related 
taxes, while another third was incurred by residents’ displacement and relocation 
(Planning and Construction Committee of Dongcheng District Government 1998:17).
Given the scale of neighbourhood redevelopment in inner city districts, the accumulation 
of such revenues could be substantial. There was, however, a lack of data to help identify 
if any part of locally raised revenues were earmarked to be channelled back into the 
dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment. It is possible that these were diverted to other 
urban projects within the city, as the local government was striving to upgrade its lagging 
urban services and infrastructure provision.
Given the need for investment to carryout the ODHRP, the state funds allocated to assist 
the programme reached only 200 million yuan in 1990 (UCMCBMPPCC and JSSBC 
1992), which was far less than what was needed. It was estimated that the total amount of 
6 billion yuan would be needed in order to complete whole projects envisaged at the time 
(Sun and Zhang 1989:7). Local authorities in Beijing had to find their own way to finance 
the programme, and the solution was to encourage the use of foreign investment in 
ODHRP projects. Between 1990 and 1997, 68.1% of total investment in ODHRP in 
inner city districts of Beijing came from foreign investment. In Dongcheng District, the 
share was even higher, reaching 84.3% (Luo and Zhou 1998: 5). The District Statistical 
Office also reported in April 1997 that 90.4% of total investment in fixed assets in 1996 
went into the real estate sector, and of these, 61.2% were funded by the joint venture
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companies between Chinese and foreign partners (Statistics Bureau of Dongcheng 
District 1997). The case of Sun City project in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood introduced in 
the previous chapter would be a typical example of how foreign investment was invited to 
take part in an ODHRP project.
Off-plan purchase: homebuyers’ contribution to project financing
In urban China, developers came to rely increasingly on the purchasing power of 
homebuyers to finance their construction costs by means of adopting off-plan purchase 
schemes. A sales office was usually open when a project was still at its early stage. Between 
January and September 2001, the analysis of 16 real estate companies carrying out 
development works within Dongcheng District indicated that 55.2% of the development 
costs were funded by deposits and advance payment by prospective homebuyers (SBDD 
2001b).
Land transaction
In Beijing, the land lease administered by local authorities has been mostly through 
negotiation instead of market competition. This significandy undermined the 
transparency of land transaction practices, increasing the likelihood of arbitrary decision­
making (Wu 2001: 276-277), but helped developers acquire lands for development at a 
price cheaper than the price of land supplied otherwise (Zhu 2005:1372). For example, in 
1996, only 3.7% of newly developed lands were leased out through tender or auction, 
while the rest were transacted via negotiation. In major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai 
and Tianjin, there was no case of tender or auction (ibid, p.277). A report from the China 
Real Estate News also suggested that, of those 0.3 million hectares of land leased out 
nationwide between 1987 and 2000, only 5% was through auction or tender (cited in Zhu 
2005:1380).
Furthermore, the predominance of negotiation regarding land transaction allowed the 
Beijing municipal government to deflect the state regulation to introduce what Fang and 
Zhang (2003) described as ‘allocation first, bid later.’ According to state guidelines, land 
use rights were to be taken back from residents before they could be sold to developers. 
The relocation of residents was to take place once the developers make payment to the 
local government. When implementing ODHR projects, however, the Beijing Municipal 
Government made it possible to allocate lands for development first, and then allow the 
negotiation (or bidding) of land use rights to take place even after residents’ relocation
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and construction (Fang and Zhang 2003). This was proclaimed to be in the interest of 
residents and the general public as it quickened the completion of projects, but in fact it 
helped developers to initiate redevelopment projects with much lower financial costs by 
postponing the payment of land use fees.
Planning control and densification
As far back as in the early 1950s, there were heated debates regarding the issue of 
preserving imperial architectural heritages in the process of socialist capital construction Q. 
Wang 2003; Wu 1999). Those in favour of preservation criticised high-rise building 
construction and large-scale redevelopment of the Old Gty (the area within the second 
ring road), represented by the imperial palace and traditional courtyard houses. They were 
in favour of locating administrative functions out of the Old Gty, while the socialist 
modernists were against the idea. The socialist modernist planners eventually won the 
debate, and a large part of the Old Gty became subject to redevelopment in order to 
accommodate major government buildings and monumental landmark buildings to 
celebrate the birth of the new republic. The idea of the Old Gty preservation was not 
washed away completely, and remained in the form of height restrictions imposed in the 
inner city districts of Beijing. A 1987 version of the height control is shown in Figure 6-3 
below. Those areas with maximum heights allowed in the figure are what came to be part 
of the Central Business District (on the eastern edge of the horizontal axis) and the 
Financial Street (on the western edge).
Figure 6-3: Height restrictions in Beijing's inner city districts in 1987 
(Zhang 1993 cited in Leaf, 1995: 152)
Financial Street
Central Business 
District site
At first sight, this control on building heights could be regarded as being against 
developers’ interests as higher density construction would lead to larger profits. A closer 
look, however, shows that the height restrictions around the Forbidden Gty within the 
second ring road led to much more relaxed height control outside the second ring road. 
With the rise of real estate investment, “building height became a key marker of identity, 
success and competition in the built urban environment” (Gaubatz 1999:1510), eventually 
changing the cityscape of Beijing into a “bowl-shaped skyline” (ibid, p.1511).
In addition, local district governments often made concessions to developers regarding 
building heights in order to accommodate high profile, flagship projects. To nullify the 
municipal planners’ height restrictions, developers often negotiated with the local district 
authorities over building heights, and higher profile projects were more likely to receive 
concessions. For instance, a redevelopment project in Financial Street on the western edge 
of the second ring road ended up with the maximum building height of 116 metres 
despite the zoning control that restricted building heights to 45 metres (Fang and Zhang 
2003: 152, Table 2). Such practices have led, for instance, to the revision of the Beijing 
Master Plan in 1993 to “legitimate existing structures” that violated existing height 
restrictions (Gaubatz 1999:1514).
ODHRP in Beiiina and gentrification
The previous section examined policy incentives exercised by the public sector to facilitate 
dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment. Then, the question is, does such intervention 
help existing residents to ‘stay fixed’ in their original neighbourhood? In this section, I will 
examine the scale of existing residents’ permanent displacement and gentrification in 
ODHRP projects. The case of Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment would also be 
examined in detail.
Displacement and suburbanisation
In mainland China, the process of building socialist China since 1949 led to the
construction of residential compounds that emphasised communal living (French and
Hamilton 1979a: 9-11). The principle was expanded to the extent that “most urban
residents would rarely have any need to travel beyond the walls of their work-and-living
unit” (Gaubatz 1999: 1497). In this respect, residential relocation was strictly controlled
through the enforcement mechanisms such as the household registration system (or hukou
in Chinese) that tied welfare benefits and employment to one’s original place of residence
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(Qian 1994; Solinger 1999).
Residents’ intra-urban relocation came to be witnessed more frequently with the 
implementation of ODHRP projects. Residents were often subject to in-kind 
compensation, which meant that they were presented with re-housing or relocation rental 
dwellings (Fang and Zhang 2003: 158). The official line was, however, to encourage off- 
site relocation by means of combining suburban new estate development with inner city 
redevelopment (BMG 1994a). As shown in Figure 6-4, inner city residents were largely 
offered relocation dwellings located in suburban estates (marked 1 to 27 in the figure).
Figure 6-4: Location of 27 major suburban relocation estates for Beijing’s ODHRP projects 
(Adopted from the map in Fang and Zhang 2003: 154)
Legend
Urban built-up areas 
Main roads
Note:
Dotted lines indicate those incomplete sections of ring roads at the time of original authors' survey of relocation settlements. They are all 
completed.
For this reason, the rate of re-housing tended to be low from the early period of the 
ODHRP implementation. The Ju’er Hutong redevelopment project, which was one of the 
pilot ODFIRP projects in the early 1990s, also had a low re-housing rate despite the 
provision of employer subsidies for residents’ purchase of redeveloped flats. Its first 
phase between 1988 and 1990 resulted in re-housing 29.5% of the original 44 households. 
Its second phase between 1991 and 1992 also managed to re-house only 23.5% of the 
original 204 households (Zhang and Fang 2003: 77-78). The majority of ODHRP projects 
implemented in the 1990s were reported to have less than 30% of re-housing rates. In the
! > « « « «
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case of those projects such as Taoyuan and Guanyuan redevelopment where 54% and 
67% of total floor space provided were non-residential, the re-housing rate of original 
residents were even lower, less than 10% (Fang 1999:68-69).
Xinzhongjie Phase One redevelopment: Sun City estate and gentrification
"With the enhancement of housing reform measures and the expansion of the commercial 
housing sector, the ODHRP implementation has become increasingly commercial in its 
approach. A close look at the status of residents’ re-housing for Xinzhongjie’s first phase 
redevelopment (that is, the Sun City estate project) showed a typical ‘market-oriented’ 
inner city redevelopment in Beijing. Very few residents were able to be re-housed due to 
the affordability problems.
There were no official statistics or registration data available that revealed the residents’ 
destination upon their displacement at the time of the first phase redevelopment in 
Xinzhongjie. The interviews with the neighbourhood committee leaders all suggested that 
most residents took cash compensation and moved to near suburban or outer suburban 
districts outside the fourth ring road:
“At the time of displacement and relocation, after real estate developers heard about 
the news, they all came, each of them with a coach, pulling us into the car to take us 
to view their houses. So, for a while, because it was free of charge, all the residents 
got on the car everyday taking a view of those houses, checking out each area’s 
public transportation links, the sales price and so on. All those houses were fine- 
looking and pretty... [At that time] so many companies came. They came from 
Tongxian [c.20 kilometres to the east, outside the fifth ring road], from the airport 
area, also from Kangjiagou [between the fourth and fifth ring roads], Wangjing area 
[outside the fourth ring road to the northeast]. Also came from the west, 
Shijingshan district [around the western section of the fifth ring road]. From all over 
the city but mostly from the northeast, because we are geographically located at the 
north-eastern comer. Less people bought houses in the southwest... ”
(Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader)
When the first phase redevelopment took place in Xinzhongjie, the plan to provide rental 
dwellings in the neighbourhood for residents’ re-housing was scrapped at the early stage. 
Any residents who chose to return to the site upon project completion had to buy a 
redeveloped flat at a subsidised sales price.
The full market price of redeveloped flats in Sun Gty estate averaged 8,200 yuan/m2. In 
terms of the construction space, the Sun Gty flats ranged from 69 m2 one-bedroom flats 
to 256 m2 four-bedroom flats. In order for a three-person household with a child to
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purchase a 107m2 two-bedroom flat, it would cost 880,000 yuan, indicating that an average 
Beijing household would require paying 25 times their annual household disposable 
income.34 For Xinzhongjie residents, the price-to-income ratio (hereafter PIR) would be 
much higher, reaching 39 to l.35
The residents who were subject to the first phase redevelopment in Xinzhongjie were 
offered a subsidised price of 5,500 yuan/m2 if they chose to return for re-housing. This 
price, however, appeared to be still too high for most Xinzhongjie residents. Even at this 
subsidised price, a two-bedroom flat would still yield a PIR of 17 to 1 for an average 
Beijing household, and 26 to 1 for the Xinzhongjie residents.
It is, therefore, not surprising at all that few residents returned to the neighbourhood 
upon project completion. When the first phase redevelopment was completed, only about 
20 households were reportedly re-housed by the end of February 2002. This meant a very 
low re-housing rate of less than 5%. The Director of Dongzhimen Street Office 
recollected:
“While carrying out the first phase of redevelopment [in Xinzhongjie], our original 
estimate was that about 10 to 20% [of the existing residents] would be re-housed, 
but the final result was that the number [of re-housed residents] was not as many as 
expected. At the time of initiating [this project], it was to demolish and carryout in- 
kind compensation. Afterwards, it was based on cash-compensation. In between, the 
policies have changed many times. I feel the policies change a bit too rapidly 
Anyway this project was not in accordance with the welfare housing allocation 
policy It was on the basis of housing purchase if choosing to return to the 
neighbourhood. So, we don’t call it ‘re-housing’ (haqian) but ‘return and buy* 
(birigou).” (Director of Dongzhimen Street Office)
Moreover, the majority of the re-housed residents left the Sun Gty estate within the next 
18 months. By August 2003 when I was carrying out field research, only 6 families 
remained in the estate, and they were also said to be considering moving out in the near 
future. They didn’t mean to sell their properties, but keep them to receive monthly rents 
to pay for their mortgage.
34 The annual household disposable income for a three-person Beijing household reached RMB 34733 in 
2001 (BMBS 2002; NBS China 2002)
35 The average annual household disposable income of the six interviewee households who were subject to 
the second phase of Xinzhongjie neighbourhood redevelopment was found to be 22,392 yuan.
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Government’s search for an alternative approach: the Haivuncana model
So far, this section has shown that the government has been implementing policies to 
provide incentives for developers participating in the ODHRP. This came at the expense 
of displacing existing residents to accommodate higher-income people. As in Seoul, it is 
interesting to find that the Beijing municipal government has also made changes to its 
conventional redevelopment approach and came up with a revised ODHRP approach in 
2000 that aimed at increasing the likelihood of original residents’ re-housing (BMG 
2000b). Four neighbourhoods were chosen as exemplary cases, and Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood which was one of my field research neighbourhoods was one of them. 
The other three neighbourhoods were Jiaodong Dongi and Min-an. Redevelopment of 
these neighbourhoods all began in 2001. In this section, I will interchangeably use the 
term, Haiyuncang model, to refer to the revised ODHRP approach.
Revised approach towards ODHRP and pilot projects
The major improvement introduced in the revised ODHRP approach (or Haiyuncang 
model) was to build affordable housing instead of commercial housing. The affordable 
housing (known as jingi shiyongfang in Chinese) programme was originally proposed by the 
government to make homeownership more affordable for low- and middle-income 
households, and had its roots in the ‘comfort housing’ (known as arijufang in Chinese) 
programme in the mid-1990s. The affordable housing programme commenced in 1999 
with an aim of building flats on government-allocated lands. The price was regulated by 
local authorities, and the sales price of an affordable housing unit in Dongcheng District 
was set to be 5,000 yuan per m2in 2002 (DDG). This would be only about 60% of what 
an average commercial flat in the Sun City estate would have cost.
The revised approach was to call for a more pro-active organisational role of local 
authorities. The four exemplary neighbourhoods chosen for the implementation of this 
revised ODHRP approach were all in central locations in inner city districts, and could be 
said to be attractive places for profit-oriented real estate developers. In this respect, the 
revised ODHRP approach could be regarded as a case of the municipal government 
implementing a social approach by promoting a higher incidence of residents’ re-housing 
and safeguarding these neighbourhoods from the exploitation of real estate developers.
In order to carry out the experimental projects, the Dongcheng district government
established Dongcheng Housing Development Corporation (hereafter Dongcheng HDQ,
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and it was this public agency that acted as the principal developer for Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood redevelopment. Demolition and construction works were contracted out. 
Local officials estimated that 1.5 billion yuan was spent in total for the project (CCHS 30 
September 2004). The project finance was to come from the local government and 
residents’ contribution (that is, payment for their re-housing flats). The exemption of land 
use charges, which applied to the construction of affordable housing, also provided the 
reason for price deduction compared to other commercial housing sales.
Haiyuncang neighbourhood redevelopment: work progress
The redevelopment of Haiyuncang neighbourhood was to demolish existing dwellings, of 
which the total construction space reached 117,000 m2 (this information was from the 
neighbourhood committee office). The neighbourhood was divided into two areas, 
District A and District D, and the total construction space of new dwellings reached 
440,000 m2 (Qianlong News Network 23 November 2002). Twenty nine buildings were 
provided: 11 were six-storey high medium walk-up blocks, which were surrounded by the 
other 18 high-rise blocks on four sides. The average living space of residents was planned 
to increase from 20 m2 to 70 m2 (Qianlong News Network 23 November 2002).
The official notice for residents’ displacement and demolition was disseminated on 18 
May 2001 (DDG 2001b). Displacement and demolition works took place within less than 
50 days (Qianlong News Network 23 November 2002), and was praised by the then 
deputy mayor of Beijing for being swift. In total, 5,319 households were displaced. To 
minimise the displacement and demolition schedule, more than 300 demolition units were 
put into Haiyuncang and Jiaodong (one of the four exemplary neighbourhoods 
aforementioned) neighbourhoods, each demolition unit being in charge of roughly 20 
households on the average (DDG 2001c). The building work officially began on 18 
September 2001, and was completed at the end of 2002 (Qianlong News Network 23 
November 2002). The re-housing began on 23 November 2002, and took place over 
almost ten months. It took longer than expected due to the outbreak of the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome epidemic that swept the nation and the municipality in spring 2003 
(DDG 2003a).36
36 The re-housing work in redeveloped Haiyuncang neighbourhood came to a halt on 20 April 2003 due to 
the epidemic, and resumed again on 05 June 2003 (DDG 2003a).
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Figure 6-5: Haiyuncang neighbourhood upon redevelopment
© Hyun Shin, 2003
Bird's eye view (model) from Dongcheng district
government web site Ground view
Disputes over density
Beijing’s urban planning aimed to reduce overall population density in inner city districts 
by approximately 15% by 2010 (Beijing Today 7 December 2001). The completion status 
of Haiyuncang neighbourhood, however, indicated that the displacement of existing 
residents did not necessarily accompany the reduction in population density of the 
neighbourhood. According to the summary of Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee, 
the number of total residents displaced from Haiyuncang neighbourhood reached 12,252 
(5,319 households). Given the surface area of the original neighbourhood (c.50 hectare), 
this was equal to about 24,500 people/km2, which was 10% less than the average 
population density of Beijing’s inner city districts (27,332 people/km2) in 2000 (BMG 
2001a). Upon completion of the neighbourhood redevelopment, the residential density 
increased substantially. In the case of Haiyuncang District D, the surface area of the 
district was 22 hectare, accommodating 2,600 re-housed households (7,800 residents). 
This would result in the population density of 35,500 people/km2, which was 45% higher 
than the pre-redevelopment density.
The residents’ complaints regarding the substantially increased density were heightened in 
a recent court hearing that took place on 13 March 2005. According to a local newspaper 
report, the Beijing Gty Planning Committee was accused of having tacitly increased the 
density of four high-rise blocks (Block Nos. 1, 4, 6 and 9) by adding one storey without 
raising the building height (Jinghua Shibao 11 March 2005). 167 households filed a 
collective law suit against the municipal government, claiming that such design changes 
were not explained to them, and were contrary to what was presented at the time of 
signing the re-housing contract before displacement. The officials at the Gty Planning
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Committee claimed that the change was inevitably made to re-house more residents, but 
the residents were demanding explanations as to why 87 households from other 
redevelopment neighbourhoods were accommodated in their neighbourhood if there 
were shortage of flats. Whether such a design change involved any illicit activities was yet 
to be determined.
Local state as a developer?
Haiyuncang redevelopment was one of the four redevelopment projects that were 
promoted in accordance with a revised municipal approach that favoured higher re­
housing rates by subsidising the construction by the local government. It turned out 
however that as much as one third of the original neighbourhood space was allocated for 
commercial development. This would largely explain the high density upon 
redevelopment as discussed earlier.
It was explained by a municipal government official that the commercial development was 
to supplement the shortage of neighbourhood redevelopment funds (GCH5 30 
September 2004). Upon completion of residential redevelopment, Dongcheng Housing 
Development Corporation signed a series of contracts. For instance, a contract with 
Beijing Mobile Communications was signed on 22 November 2002 to provide its office 
building, total construction space of 63,000 m2, on a plot of 1.2 hectare (DDG 2002a). 
The lease contract for the land use right took place a year later on 12 December 2003, and 
the land use charge for this parcel reached 89.4 million yuan (BMBLRHM 2004), which 
was equivalent to about 6% of total project costs of Haiyuncang neighbourhood 
redevelopment. Another contract was signed on 18 June 2003 with Guohua Energy 
Investment Corporation to provide office spaces for the company and its subsidiaries 
(DDG 2003b).
As there was no financial statement for the redevelopment of Haiyuncang, it was not 
possible to find out to what extent such commercial development activities supplemented 
the funding shortage experienced in Haiyuncang neighbourhood redevelopment. If the 
commercial development was a necessary condition for the financially feasible 
implementation of the Haiyuncang model, it meant that the success of the Haiyuncang 
model would largely be influenced by private interests. Those neighbourhoods in less 
strategic locations for profit generation and business activities would experience 
difficulties in replicating the Haiyuncang model in their neighbourhoods. This would
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endanger the future of the revised ODHRP approach.
On the other hand, if such commercial development was not a necessary condition, then, 
this simply indicated that the Dongcheng Housing Development Corporation had been 
performing in the same manner as private developers and was making development gains 
under the disguise of carrying out social goals of re-housing residents. As the Dongcheng 
Housing Development Corporation was established and influenced directly by the 
Dongcheng district government, this suggested that the local authority itself turned into a 
profit-oriented entity with less attention paid to the housing welfare of residents within its 
jurisdiction. Perhaps, such a conversion was not completely alien from the perspective of 
local authorities, as local state-owned enterprises acting as real estate developers were 
widely practiced until recently (Fang and Zhang 2003).
Haiyuncang model and residents’ re-housing
When the Beijing municipal government began to experiment with the revised ODHRP 
approach such as the Haiyuncang model, the positive feature was the re-orientation of 
municipal urban policies towards original residents’ re-housing. As low-cost affordable 
housing was to be provided on site for the re-housing of existing residents instead of 
highly priced commercial housing, the sales price of a re-housing flat was more affordable 
for residents. Only the Beijing households who were registered within redevelopment 
neighbourhoods could be subject to re-housing or cash compensation. Re-housing flats 
were for sales only, and their renting was not permitted. According to an official at the 
Housing Management Department at the Dongzhimen sub-district office, the sales price 
of a self-contained flat for Haiyuncang redevelopment project was set at a ceiling of 5,000 
yuan/m2. The full price of a completed three bedroom re-housing flat with a construction 
space of 75 m2 would cost about 375,000 yuan, equivalent to about 11 years’ accumulation 
of the average Beijing household’s annual disposable income. The original residents in 
Haiyuncang, however, could enjoy discounts by taking into account their working years 
and the construction space of their original dwellings. Long-term housing loans were 
arranged by the local government in accordance with the regulations (BMG 2000b).
In order to see how much a household would have to pay to be re-housed and how much 
the same household would have received if it chose cash compensation, I took the 
example of a Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee leader whose family was also re­
housed upon project completion. Her family was a four-person household, which used to
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live in a non self-contained dwelling with a construction space of 32 m2, and was re­
housed in a three-bedroom flat with a construction space of around 75 m2. The total 
amount her family had to pay reached 130,000 yuan.37 This was only about one third of 
the full price of an affordable housing flat of the same size in Dongcheng district. If her 
family had chosen cash compensation instead of re-housing, she would have received only 
about 190,040 yuan, which was far inadequate to buy even a one-bedroom affordable 
housing flat whose minimum space was about 45 m2.
The Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee specified that, among the 5,319 households 
displaced from the neighbourhood, 3,716 households were re-housed in the 
neighbourhood upon project completion. This led to the re-housing rate of 70%, which 
was very high compared to the re-housing rates in other ODHRP projects such as the one 
in Xinzhongjie. Those residents who did not choose the re-housing option received cash 
compensation, and were to find a dwelling on their own, which included the purchase of 
affordable housing in a suburban estate outside the north-eastern section of the fifth ring 
road. The arrangement was made by the Dongcheng district government:
“Our district government has an affordable housing estate at Tiantongyuan area in 
Changping district... Here, we issue a certificate, and the residents take it to go and 
relocate in that area. The sales price is 2,650 yuan/m2, with a management fee of 0.5 
yuan/m2. That’s relatively cheap. If you are not satisfied with the place, you can go 
to other places on your own and choose a house, somewhere in Chaoyang or 
Daxing. For example, if you are particularly worse off and cannot come back for re­
housing, you can relocate to these areas, as the houses there are cheap, but nobody 
went there. It was too far away” (Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee leader)
For those who preferred to be re-housed in Haiyuncang, long-term loans from the 
housing provident fund were arranged for qualified residents. Just before re-housing 
started, 1,894 applications (that is, about half the re-housed households) from Haiyuncang 
were approved, the total loan amount reaching 245 million yuan (DDG 200Id). It was not 
known, however, how many applicants failed to receive the housing loans. For low-income 
residents, resorting to housing loans involved commitment to monthly loan payment that 
might be beyond one’s household income capacity For instance, in an interview with one
37 The detailed methods for estimating the re-housing prices and cash compensation could be found on the 
district government’s web site that showed information on the guideline for carrying out the revised 
ODHRP in Jiaodaokou neighbourhood (DDG 2001a). Because this neighbourhood was based in 
Dongcheng district and its redevelopment commenced at the same time as the work in Haiyuncang, the 
guideline could be safely assumed to have applied to Haiyuncang redevelopment as well.
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of the neighbourhood committee leaders at Haiyuncang whose family was also re-housed, 
her family paid 130,000 yuan for the re-housing flat after discount, and borrowed 60,000 
yuan through the housing loan scheme. Spreading the repayment over ten years in 
instalment, her family was paying back 600 yuan each month. For a family in Beijing 
whose income level belonged to the bottom 20% of the income decile distribution, this 
would constitute about one third (37%) of monthly household disposable income (BMBS 
2003a).
It would be possible that the other re-housed residents who did not receive housing loans 
either failed to receive housing loans or resorted to personal savings and informal 
borrowing only due to their ineligibility for formal loan application or incapacity to afford 
monthly repayment. This aspect of constraints will be further discussed in the following 
chapter.
Summary
This section has examined the policy incentives put into practice by the central and local 
governments in order to pursue ODHRP projects in Beijing. As in Seoul, these incentives 
helped professional developers avoid financial constraints, recover their investment and 
maximise profits. The implementation of ODHRP projects led to the suburbanisation of 
original residents, as these projects led to the gentrification of inner city ODHRP 
neighbourhoods. The first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment was a clear example of this 
gentrification. This section also showed that the municipal government began to make a 
direct intervention since 2000 by establishing public development corporations to cany 
out redevelopment. This was aimed at providing affordable dwellings and therefore, 
increasing re-housing rates. The case of Haiyuncang redevelopment indicated that this 
was to some extent a success, as more than two thirds of the original residents were re­
housed. A closer examination showed, however, that the direct intervention was profit- 
motivated, as the neighbourhood redevelopment involved higher density redevelopment 
of a section of the original neighbourhood area in order to release remaining lands for 
leasing to business and commercial interests.
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6.3 Conclusion
The growth of both JRP and ODHRP projects has been supported by the government 
intervention that provided policy incentives for participating professional and/or 
individual developers so that the JRP and ODHRP projects could remain attractive for 
developers and property-owners despite these projects’ heavy upfront costs. These 
incentives included help with project financing, property transaction, housing purchase 
and planning control. The most direct arrangement to help ease developers’ financial 
pressure could be the off-plan purchase system. Once a project started, the off-plan 
purchase allowed developers to rely on homebuyers’ instalment payments to proceed with 
the rest of the construction schedule. The implementation of the off-plan purchase 
system suggested that developers’ participation as the main financier would only be 
sustained by utilising prospective homebuyers’ purchasing power, and that the 
development risk was effectively shared between developers and homebuyers. Another 
interesting aspect in Seoul, which was not found in Beijing, was that public rental flats for 
eligible tenants were first constructed by developers, and then sold to the municipal 
government. In the case of Beijing, the municipal government executed an ‘allocation first, 
bid later’ policy for developers so that land premium payment could be postponed to suit 
the developers’ financing schedule. Foreign investment in real estate and ODHRP projects 
was also significant in Beijing, while it was hardly noticeable in the case of Seoul’s JRP.
This chapter has shown that the implementation of the JRP and ODHRP led to the 
gentrification of redevelopment neighbourhoods. In Seoul, the JRP accompanied the 
displacement of not only tenants but also owner-occupiers despite the policy emphasis 
that their participation was to be key to its successful implementation. In Seoul, the 
provision of public rental flats for eligible tenants, however, could be a platform to 
prevent the complete transformation of a neighbourhood into middle- or higher-income 
residential area. The provision of public rental flats in redevelopment neighbourhoods 
was not exercised in Beijing. The ODHRP in Beijing also led to the gentrification of 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, and the distinct feature was that the gentrification 
accompanied original residents’ suburbanisation.
The municipal governments in Seoul and Beijing have tried to address the shortfall of JRP 
and ODHRP projects by coming up with revised approaches. The implementation of the 
rolling redevelopment in Nangok took place as the public sector’s attempt to fill the gap 
where the private sector had failed. In this way, the neighbourhood redevelopment was
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completed, and the closure of the rent gap in Nangok redevelopment could be achieved. 
From the residents’ perspective, the rolling redevelopment guaranteed secure relocation 
rental dwellings for eligible tenants upon project commencement. In this way, tenants did 
not have to finance their temporary re-housing during the project period. The rolling 
redevelopment, however, appeared to have two significant shortfalls. Firstly, from the 
residents’ perspective, eligible tenants were permanently displaced from their original 
neighbourhood. Secondly and perhaps more importandy, the rolling redevelopment 
turned out to be only applicable when public development corporations such as the 
KNHC were to conduct redevelopment projects. Private developers were unlikely to 
implement such an approach due to heavy upfront costs, and this questioned the 
replicability of the rolling redevelopment approach in the long run.
In Beijing, the Haiyuncang redevelopment seemed to have achieved a higher social goal of 
re-housing the majority of original residents in the neighbourhood compared to other 
conventional ODFIRP projects such as the Sun Gty project in Xinzhongjie. The 
Haiyuncang model, however, invites criticisms on three accounts. Firstly, it was a heavily 
subsidised, government-led project. The district government itself admitted that there was 
lack of government funding to fully finance the project even though the land use 
premium was exempted for the district-owned housing development corporation. The 
project had to rely on commercial development on part of the original neighbourhood in 
order to supplement its losses.
The first criticism leads to the second: to what extent would the district-owned housing 
development corporation behave as a profit-oriented developer? Would it be free of any 
bureaucracy and corruption? The Flaiyuncang residents’ appeal against planning 
misconduct regarding density and building height control raises concern regarding the way 
in which the local authority intervenes. The greatly increased population density in the 
completed estate also suggests that the district-owned housing development corporation 
may have been oriented too much towards making profits. Considering the position of the 
municipal planning bureau that overall resident population density should be reduced in 
inner city districts in the long term, the densification of Haiyuncang neighbourhood 
suggests that the government is simply re-shuffling the population in such a way that 
residents are cornered in a smaller neighbourhood, making room for commercial 
development while the ‘average’ density did not get raised.
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The third point to consider is the government’s proposed way of financing their re­
housing costs. Housing mortgage was introduced, utilising the accumulated housing 
provident fund in Dongcheng District. In order to be eligible for the mortgage, however, 
residents must have contributed for a certain period, which means that at least a member 
of a family needed to be a formal employer in a work place that operates the Housing 
Provident Fund (HPF). As the system is employer-based, this bears a serious equity issue. 
Residents with no secure job or workers working in under-performing firms which do not 
have the capacity to make the employer portion of the HPF contributions would be 
denied access to this form of mortgage scheme. For such families, there is only one 
remaining option, which is to take the cash compensation and be permanendy displaced 
from their neighbourhood. About 30% of existing residents went along this path.
Having examined the direct and indirect government intervention in neighbourhood 
redevelopment and its consequence upon residents’ displacement and gentrification, the 
thesis will move on to the discussion of redevelopment impacts upon residents, starting 
with the constraints upon residents’ decision-to-move.
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Chapter 7 
Redevelopment and residents: 
Constraints upon ‘decision-to-move’
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Redevelopment compensation for tenants
Limits with formal financial opportunities
Summary
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Unaffordable ‘affordable housing’
Under-development of private renting 
Limits with formal financial opportunities 
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This chapter forms the first of three chapters on residents. It employs the supply-side 
constraints perspective on residents’ displacement and relocation to discuss institutional 
and structural constraints that influence residents’ decision-to-move when they become 
subject to neighbourhood redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. These constraints were 
identified from my field research in redevelopment neighbourhoods, and then analysed 
and interpreted against the backdrop of wider socio-economic processes.
Each section is devoted to the discussion of constraints in one city. The major constraints 
examined in this chapter are largely related to the housing production and tenure system, 
redevelopment compensation regulations, housing affordability problems, and existing 
housing finance system for low-income residents. These constraints are discussed in 
relation to place-specific contexts, taking into account the historical and contemporary 
development of the housing provision system in each city. The final section pulls together 
the findings from both cities.
7.1 Constraints upon residents’ decision-to-m ove: the c a s e  of Seoul
Housing market: a mismatch between supply and dem and
In Seoul, the proportion of owner occupying households is substantially lower than the 
national urban average (NSO Korea 2001a). In fact, as shown in Table 7-1, nearly 60% of 
municipal households in Seoul were in some form of rental contract in 2000, and the 
dominant form was Chonsei tenure that did not require monthly rent payment as long as 
key money was paid to the landlord upon signing a contract.
Table 7-1: Distribution of households according to tenure in South Korea, 2000
(NSO Korea 2001a)
Owner
occupation
Tenancy
Regions
Chonsei Deposit-based | monthly rental
Monthly rental 
with no deposit Others
Tenancy
sub-total
Unknown Sub-total
Urban as a whole 6,222,07350.2%
3,885,239
31.4%
1,452,319
11.7%
244,393
2.0%
585,361
4.7%
6,167,312 423
0.0%
12,389,808
100.0%
Seoul 1,263,35740.9%
1,271,330
41.2%
445,236
14.4%
36,370
1.2%
69,636
2.3%
1,822,572 7
0.0%
3,085,936
100.0%
As the Chonsei key money is returned to tenants in full when their rental contracts expire, 
Chonsei is much more favoured by tenants over other rental tenure systems. Monthly rent 
payment is likely to be chosen when tenants are financially incapable of paying the full
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Chonsei key money. Tenants also equate monthly rent payment with the reduction in their 
monthly household disposable income, and thus consider it as an irrecoverable ‘waste’ of 
their financial assets, as one of the displacees from Nangok neighbourhood stated:
“Paying monthly rents, well, in my view, is a crary thing to do. Paying several 
hundred thousand [Korean] Won is such a waste with no returns, isn’t it? I’d rather 
live on streets, save some money and find Chonsei... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-13)
Another interviewee living in an adjacent neighbourhood was in deposit-based monthly 
rental tenure, but stated that Chonsei was more preferable if circumstances permitted:
“My situation doesn’t allow me to choose Chonsei. M y children are in junior high 
and primary schools, and no matter how  much I earn, I can’t save enough to pay for 
Chonsei deposit... What I ’m saying is that it’s not whether one favours it [Chonsei] 
or not. Everyone wants to live on Chonsei tenure. If you are a tenant in someone 
else’s house, no matter what other conditions you face, Chonsei is still better... ”
(Interviewee KSS7-INT-15)
In terms of dwelling types, the majority of tenant households in Seoul lived in individual 
houses (or d a n d c g  ju ta e g  in Korean; see Figure 7-1 for the description of individual and 
multi-dwelling houses). As shown in Table 7-2 below, the Population and Housing Census 
in 2000 found 64% of tenant households living in individual houses, and 22% in 
apartment flats. According to the table, it was also more likely for those tenants in 
individual houses to double up with other households within a dwelling. On average, each 
individual house was home to 2.38 tenant households, and each apartment flat only 0.41 
tenant households. Such figures indicate that apartment flats in Seoul were clearly oriented 
towards single-household and owner occupation.
Table 7-2: Distribution of households in accordance with dwelling forms in Seoul 
(NSO Korea 2001a: 484, 645)
Total number of existing dwellings © 974,910 489,662
50.9% 25.5%
177,275
9.2%
215,319
11.2%
59,371
3.1%
1,916,537
100.0%
(1.02) (2.43) (1.61)(Households per dwelling unit) © /  © ( 1.00) (3.17) (1.08)
(Tenant households per dwelling unit) © /  © (0.41) (2.38) (0.37) (0.37) 0-79) (0.95)
Total number o f tenant 
households
403,788 1,166,992
22.2% 64.0%
66,260
3.6%
79,038 106,494
4.3% 5.8%
1,822,572
100.0%
Total number of residing househol 977,832 1,551,382
31.7% 50.3%
180,451
5.8%
232,121 144,150
7.5% 4.7%
3,085,936
100.0%
Category ______________________ Dwelling forms_________
Apartment Individual Multi-dwelling Terrace
flats houses0 houses: dasedae houses
jutaeg only0
Others
Sub-total
Tenancy
Deposit-based monthly rental 
Monthly rental with no rent deposit 
Others
Chonsei 290,754
98,433
1,622
12,979
804,834
297,073
26,376
38,709
57,384
5,902
654
2,320
61,654
11,406
1,625
4,353
56,704
32,422
6,093
11,275
1,271,330
445,236
36,370
69,636
Note: 1) See Figure 7-1 for the explanation of the difference between dasedae ju taeg  and individual houses.
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Figure 7-1: Explaining individual dwelling types in South Korea
Individual dwellings in South Korea would be broadly grouped in two categories.
(1) Dandog jutaeg (loosely translated as 'individual house')
Dandog ju ta e g  is in general for single family occupancy. It's usually one or two-storey high, and has a small yard. It could be 
sub-divided for renting, in which case tenants usually live together with owner occupying household. There is no separate main 
entrance for tenants, and it is common for tenants to share cooking and bathroom facilities with their landlords.
(2) Multi-dwelling house (see pictures below)
A multi-dwelling house is for multiple household occupancy, and is usually three- or four-storey high. It is sub-divided with an 
independent entrance, cooking and bathroom facilities for each household.
A multi-dwelling house is further divided into two sub-categories by law: dasedae ju ta e g  and dagagu ju taeg . The former refers to 
a multi-dwelling house whose sub-divided units can be subject to ownership transfer. The latter refers to a multi-dwelling house 
whose sub-divided units cannot be subject to ownership transfer. In Korean statistics, dasedae jutaeg is treated as a separate 
category for collecting household and housing data, while dagagu jutaeg is included in the individual house category.
The picture below shows examples of multi-dwelling houses
near Nangok neighbourhood,
one of which has a roof-top extension.
The picture above shows a lateral facade o f ; 
house. Each door in the  picture leads to a se\ 
Note: Both pictures taken by the author divided accommodation. The door in the low*
in June 2002 a semi-basement dwelling.
Figure 7-2: Urban housing sales price and Chonsei deposit index in South Korea, 1986-2001
(Kookmin Bank 2005; NSO Korea 2001 d: 327)
Housing Sale Price Index Housing Chonse Deposit Index
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While tenants were largely concentrated in the detached housing sector, the housing 
production, however, was largely in favour of apartment construction, and in particular, 
high-rise flat construction. As shown in Figure 7-3 below, individual houses lost popularity 
among builders, and apartment construction became the norm in the construction 
industry. In the 1990s, around 80% of new dwellings constructed were high-rise flats 
(KNHC 2004; NSO Korea 2002b). The implementation of JRP in dilapidated
without exception.
lational housing construction by dwelling types in South Korea
SO Korea (various years) Korea Statistical Yearbook; Kookmin Bank web site
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upon tenants and low-income owner-occupiers when they have to move out of 
dilapidated neighbourhoods due to redevelopment. Upon displacement, they have limited 
housing choice, looking for dwellings in neighbourhoods where individual houses for 
affordable renting are more likely to be found. Furthermore, as those tenants from 
redevelopment neighbourhoods used to pay as little as one-quarter of what other tenants 
paid in adjacent neighbourhoods as Chonsei key money, their displacement would likely 
place greater pressure on their financial situation, and increase hardship in the context of 
the housing price increase that has been prevalent since the late 1990s (see Figure 7-2 
above).
Limited supply of public rental housing
The limited supply of public rental housing could be identified as the other major 
constraint upon residents’ decision to move, which presents little option but to find a 
private rental dwelling. In South Korea, the public rental sector has received relatively less 
attention, and just over 5% of the national population are housed in public rental housing 
(MoCT Korea 2002b: 322). Approximately 15% of all new housing units that were built 
between 1982 and 2000 could be classified as public rental dwellings, but the majority of 
them were for 3 to 5-year short-term leases (KNHC 2001a: 79). These were available to 
those low-income tenants who had subscribed to and maintained a Housing Subscription 
Savings account for a certain period, and were subject to sales to sitting tenants at the end 
of their lease period. For this reason, these rental units could not be regarded as ‘public’ in 
real terms, and were often seen as a route to home-ownership. As shown in Table 7-3 
below, by the end of 2000 more than half of the available national public rental housing 
stock was for 5-year short-term lease.38
38 Yeonggu, as shown in Table 7-3, means ‘permanent’ in Korean, and refers to a certain type of public 
rental housing built for the low-income households from the late 1980s until mid-1990s. It was first of its 
kind in South Korea that had a 50-year lease period. Tenants were initially given a 2-year rental contract, 
renewable upon meeting the eligibility criteria under relevant regulations. The central government budget 
funded 85% of the construction costs. The programme came to an end due to the shortage of funding 
when the central government stopped its budgetary contribution in 1993 (SMG 2002b). Nowadays, these 
units mostly accommodate those recipients of NBLS benefits, and those who meet the criteria stipulated in 
Article 19 of Ordinance on Housing Supply
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Table 7-3: Public rental housing stock in South Korea
(KNHC 2001a)
Year end of 2000
Regions Yeong-gu  
rental housing
50-year  
rental housing
Urban 
redevelopm ent 
rental housing
5-year rental 
housing11
Total
National total 190,077 4 5 ,0 1 8 34,021 3 66 ,747 635 ,863
(Supplied by) KNHC 140,078 24,028 0 56,439 220,545
Local governments 49,999 20,990 34,021 7,613 112,623
Private companies 0 0 0 302,695 302,695
Seoul total 45 ,828 18 ,164 33 ,010 547 97 ,549
% of national total 24.1% 40.3% 97.0% 0.1% 15.3%
Note: 1) These units are subject to sales after 5 years of rental operation. These are built by both public sector (KNHC and local 
governments) and private companies, and their construction is heavily subsidised by the National Housing Fund (Ha, 2002: 200).
In Seoul, the provision of public rental dwellings had been even lower. The Population
j i j  j . i -
calculated when the whole project is completed. In its actual implementation of a JRP 
project, a rough estimate of the sale price is often shared among property-owners as 
rumours are spread around even before developers officially put forward their price 
estimation. The existing owner-occupiers in redevelopment neighbourhoods are 
discouraged, if their income and savings are not sufficient enough to afford those new 
flats, from the prospect of remaining as homeowners in their original neighbourhood 
upon project completion. This eventually leads to the sales of their property rights to off- 
site buyers, as an interviewee from Nangok neighbourhood expressed below:
“I hear the sales price will be at least KRW 5,000,000 per pyeong [that is, KRW 
1,511,600 per m2], but the actual price is to be decided once they estimate all the 
costs. The demolition is not complete yet, so they don’t know how much the price is 
going to be, but say it’ll at least be KRW 5,000,000. That means, for a 44-pyeong 
[145.5 m2] flat, the price will be more than KRW 200 million41... I don’t have such
The affordability problem was worsened by the fact that those redevelopment flats were 
relatively spacious. As Ha (2001:392) noted, “the average floor space per household in the 
redeveloped area is higher than that of Seoul Gty as a whole.” In Nangok, the average 
construction space of all the flats to be supplied was estimated to be 100.8 m2. If we 
exclude public rental units which were much smaller than flats for sales, the average floor 
space turned out to be 108.9 m2.
Redevelopment compensation for tenants
If on-site owner-occupiers are experiencing affordability problems regarding the newly 
built flats in the neighbourhood, the obvious constraint upon tenants would be their 
eligibility for legal compensation. As far as redevelopment compensation is concerned, 
tenants would be divided into two groups according to their eligibility for redevelopment 
compensation: (1) those entitled to in-kind (access to a public rental flat buik on site) or 
cash compensation; and (2) those not entitled to any kind of compensation but a token 
fee to help with their house-moving expenses.
In Seoul, at the time of the inception of JRP, there was no compensation for tenants in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods. This provoked protests and appeals, often violent and 
fierce, by tenants against forceful eviction in the 1980s, calling for international attention 
(ACHR 1989a; Q IR 1988). It was only towards the end of the 1980s that the central 
government introduced a legal basis for tenants’ relocation compensation. The 
compensation measures put into practice in 1989 have remained unchanged since then 
(SMG 2000b). The eligibility for any legal compensation is based on residence status: in 
order to qualify, tenants must have lived in the redevelopment neighbourhood for at least 
three months by the time their neighbourhood is designated as a redevelopment district 
and its final blueprint -  called ‘comprehensive redevelopment plan’ -  is officially approved. 
The provision of redevelopment compensation for eligible tenants didn’t completely 
prevent tenants’ protests, but the protestors came to be constituted largely by ineligible 
tenants. This meant that property-owners and developers didn’t have to run into 
confrontation with the entire tenant population in redevelopment neighbourhoods.
In the case of eligible tenants in redevelopment neighbourhoods, the redevelopment 
compensation consists of in-kind and cash compensation. In-kind compensation refers to 
a public rental housing unit built on site. If this option is chosen, tenants are to return to 
their redeveloped neighbourhood upon project completion, but they would have to
212
finance their temporary relocation costs themselves. Public rental units built on site to re­
house eligible tenants are purchased by the municipal government, hence bearing no costs 
on developers and property-owners (Kim et al. 1996: 109-110). If cash compensation is 
chosen instead of a public rental flat, they receive an amount equivalent to three months 
of average monthly expenditure for wage- and salary-earning urban households. It 
increases incrementally to take into account the household size (Kim et al. 1996:109-110). 
Table 7-5 below shows the amount of cash compensation for those eligible tenants in 
Nangok at the time of commencing formal relocation in 2000. The cash compensation 
turned out to be 16% to 49% of average annual household disposable income for salary 
and wage earning households in cities. For the bottom 20% of income decile distribution, 
it was 36% to 110%.
Table 7-5: Cash compensation for eligible tenants in Nangok 
(NSO Korea 2001b)
Number of household 
members
Total cash com pensation  
(Unit: KRW)
Cash com pensation as a 
proportion of average annual 
household disposable incom e1*
Cash com pensation as a 
proportion of annual household  
disposable income for bottom
jno/n n f  i n r n m p  H i d - r i h n t i t t n l L -
5 7,137,900 19.9% 44.3%
6 7,762,500 18.1% 40.2%
7 8,606,700 17.2% 38.2%
8 9,450,900 36.7%
encouraging for those who wished to stay nearby, as some interviewees ineligible for 
redevelopment compensation remarked:
“If a public rental flat is provided, it would not be in this area, but somewhere else, 
so I will have to move out if that happens. If not, then I will stay in this area, 
moving to somewhere down the hill, not very far. My children have been students 
of the primary school from Year 1, so I want to see them graduate. I also don’t 
know when my work here would come to an end, but I still have a job here, and I 
don’t know how I would manage to make friends with new neighbours if I 
move... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01)
“...I sent in a petition to everywhere, to the President, to the Mayor, to the District 
Government, KNHC, and to the local district assembly member from this 
neighbourhood, to everywhere... Then, personally I got a call, saying there is a [50- 
year public rental] flat at Seodaemun- dong [this area is located in central Seoul and 
takes about one and a half hour to get there from Nangok by public transport]. It is 
about 11 or 12 pyeong in size [36 or 40 m2]. But, my daughter’s workplace is on this 
side of the river, and too far from that flat. And, the flat is too small as well, so I 
declined the offer... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-05)
Limits with formal financial opportunities
If residents from redevelopment neighbourhoods were to find a private rental dwelling, 
the degree of their access to financial arrangements at formal institutions would be 
important. The prospect, however, was not bright. In South Korea, personal savings and 
financial support from relatives have played a significant role in financing one’s housing 
costs. For instance, a social statistics survey conducted by the government in 2001 (NSO 
Korea 2002d: 102) revealed that personal savings and financial support from parents or 
relatives were the top two major sources of funding for the purchase of one’s own house 
in Seoul. Loans from banks were only the third major source for home buyers.
A housing finance programme was established by the government to assist low-income 
tenants in 1990. Its full name is called ‘National Housing Fund (hereafter NHF) Housing 
Loan Programme to Subsidise Chonsei Deposits for Low-income Households.’ The 
programme taps resources from the NHF, which was established in 1981 and pools
resources to finance affordable housing construction nation-wide. An application for
NHF housing loans is made to the local district government by tenants who have to meet 
two conditions: (1) they should have a valid rental contract with a private landlord before 
making the application; and (2) they should have paid 10% of their Chonsei deposit in 
advance. The local district government then reviews the eligibility of the applicants, and 
recommends those successful applicants to the local branch of Kookmin Bank that
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administers the distribution of NHF housing loans. The bank then reviews the credit 
standing of applicants before depositing the loan into the successful applicants’ account 
(MoCT Korea 2002d, 2002e; SMG 2002b: 95-96). The main eligibility criteria and 
conditions of exclusion are listed in Table 7-6 below:
Table 7-6: Main eligibility criteria and conditions of exclusion 
regarding NHF housing loans for low-income households in South Korea
(MoCT Korea 2002d; SMG 2002b: 95-96)
Category
Eligibility criteria
Contents
The applicant should have made a tenancy contract, and have pre-paid 10% of the C honsei deposit to 
the landlord before making the application. The applicant must meet the following requirements:
The total amount of C honsei deposit should not exceed the upper limit specified by the local government 
in each region. In Seoul, as of July 2002, the upper limit is KRW 50,000,000;
The net floor space of a rented accommodation should be 85 m2 or smaller.
The application should be made in the name of the head of a household, who is at least 20 years old and 
has dependent family members, or by a person recognised as a household head by the local government. 
Single-person households are, in principle, excluded unless the person is 35 years or older and has no
Table 7-7: Expansion of NHF housing loan programme to subsidise Chonsei deposits 
for low-income tenants in Seoul 
(MoCT Korea 2002a; SMG 2000a: 2.689; 2001a: 11.1014; 2002a: 11.60)
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 July 2002
Number of beneficiaries 
(unit: households)
© 5,302 6,438 12,004 9,756 16,292 12,934
Total amount of loans 
(unit: million, C54KRW)
© 33,400 42,200 83,500 | 83,700 165,900 197,210
Average amount of loan per
household
(unit: million, KRW)
® /© 6.30 6.55 6.96 8.58 10.18 15.25
Maximum amount of loan 
a household could claim 
(unit: KRW)
n.a.
......
7,500,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
_________________________ ____________ _______________
15,000,000 
from 16 March; 
70% of C honsei 
deposit from 27 
August
70% of C honsei 
deposit
Maximum amount of Chonsei 
deposit for applicants to be 
eligible to apply (unit: KRW)
n.a. 30,000,000 30,000,000 35,000,000 
(26 June 
onward)
35,000,000 50,000,000
This housing loan programme for low-income households can be considered a 
meaningful measure to ease their housing difficulties to some extent, but it has limitations. 
Firstly, the programme still has limited funds despite the expansion since 1997, and 
benefits only a fraction of tenant households in South Korea. For example, the total 
number of households who are yet to redeem the loan has reached 81,396 households in 
2003 (Kim et al. 2004: 51), but this only accounts for just over 1% of all the tenant 
households in South Korea. In Seoul, the number of borrowers in 2000 was estimated to 
be 9,756 households (see Table 7-7 above), but this accounts for only 0.5% of all the 
tenant households in Seoul.
Secondly, the terms of redemption, that is lump sum repayment after 2 years of grace 
period (or 6 years if renewed twice), are often considered to be too short for many low- 
income households whose insecure and irregular income status makes it difficult for them 
to save enough money before the grace period expires. In fact, one of the requests from 
the tenants’ association in Nangok was a long-term, low-interest loan, repayable in 
instalment over 10 to 20 years after several years of grace period:
“What we ask for is a long-term, low-interest housing loan. Personally, I wish to  
obtain housing loan, and pay back in instalment during 10, 20 years or so. If that’s 
not possible, there’s no way I can cope with this situation... Some people here 
request an increase in cash compensation, but I fundamentally disagree. We should 
ask for money that we can pay back som ehow Asking for money given gratis is like 
the mind of a thief. But, even if I work, I have no way to pay back within 2 or 3 
years... so, we ask for a long-term, low-interest loan, but the state says it’s not 
possible, saying there has been no precedent... but without such loan, I have no 
other way to rely on. My relatives are not well-off, and are no way in situation to  
lend me such money Even if I borrow [through other informal sources], I can’t
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afford high interest, then my debt will increase... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02)
The average annual disposable income of the bottom 20% of the income decile 
distribution for salary and wage earning urban households turned out to be KRW
9,854,400 in 2000 (NSO Korea 2001b). This level of disposable income is only about one- 
quarter of the maximum amount of loan permitted under the revised loan programme in 
March 2002. Therefore, for those irregular workers and unemployed residents as well as 
those on means-tested social security benefits, the terms of redemption of the NHF 
housing loan require being more flexible if they are to be benefited by this programme.
In order to minimise the default on loan redemption, the maximum amount of NHF 
housing loan permitted to each applicant had been kept to be only about one-third of the 
maximum amount of Chonsei deposit until 2000. It was only from March 2001 that the 
central government revised the programme to allow as much as 70% of the total Chonsei 
deposit to be taken out as housing loans by low-income applicants. This indicates that the 
housing loan could be used only on part-financing the low-income tenants’ full housing 
costs, and further suggests that only relatively better-off tenants would be able to fully 
utilise the increased allowance.
Thirdly, as mentioned in Table 7-6, the NHF housing loan is not accessible to those 
moving into public rental housing units whose rental deposit is more than tenants used to 
pay while living in redevelopment neighbourhoods. The logic behind this restriction is that 
these units have already received subsidies from the National Housing Fund, which are 
paid out to the builders for the construction of these units. This restriction places 
significant constraints upon those low-income households (including the displacees from 
Nangok) who don’t have sufficient financial means at their disposal, and makes it difficult 
for them to take public rental flats as an alternative relocation option. Therefore, even if 
an eligible displacee from Nangok opts for a KNHC rental flat instead of cash 
compensation, they would have to finance the increased deposit without relying on the 
NHF housing loans. The likely situation is that the displacees are driven towards private 
rental accommodation so that they can at least consider applying for a NHF housing loan.
Summary
This section has discussed the major constraints that faced residents upon their 
displacement from redevelopment neighbourhoods in Seoul. The main constraints
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identified were: (1) housing provision that places more emphasis on apartment flat 
construction rather than individual houses favoured by tenants; (2) limited supply of 
public rental dwellings, which limits the housing choice of low-income residents; (3) the 
affordability problems with the newly built flats, preventing low-income owner-occupiers 
in redevelopment neighbourhoods from being re-housed in their original 
neighbourhoods; (4) redevelopment compensation criteria; and (5) the limits with formal 
financial opportunities that benefit only a fraction of tenants.
7.2 Constraints upon residents’ decision-to-move: the case  of Beijing
Since their inception in the early 1980s, mainland China’s housing reform policies 
specifically aimed at enhancing urban housing investment and breaking ties with the 
decades-long in-kind welfare provision of housing. The spatial and social changes in 
urban China during the reform era seemed to have brought significant changes to 
formerly restricted residential moves. In comparison with the pre-reform practices, urban 
residents were increasingly expected to behave under market conditions as active 
consumers of commercial housing and meet their individual housing needs with their own 
financial means. As the reform measures were put into practice and strengthened, a 
substantial proportion of urban households were assumed to be exposed to different 
tenure types with opportunities to move according to their personal preferences, thus 
increasing the incidence of intra-urban residential relocation and residents’ exercise of 
tenure preferences (Huang and Clark 2002; Li 2000; Wang and Li 2004).
With the persistence of institutional intervention in producing and executing urban and 
housing policies and developing housing markets, institutional and structural constraints 
are understood to play a more important and determining role with regard to the housing 
behaviour of urban residents and their intra-urban relocation during the reform period 
(see for example, Huang 2004; Li 2000; S.-M. Li 2004; Li and Siu 2001; Wu 2004). It is in 
this context that this section tries to address those constraints that would influence 
residents’ displacement and their post-displacement housing consumption in times of 
redevelopment.
Housing reform and homeownership orientation
Housing reform was first introduced with an emphasis on sharing responsibilities by
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adopting a so-called ‘three-pillar system’ that called for diversified sources of investment 
from the local government, enterprises and employees (Hou 1999: 221-22; Li 2005). A 
strong emphasis was placed on introducing market principles in the housing sector so that 
housing was no longer treated as welfare goods but as a commodity (Wang and Murie 
1996,1999b; Zhou and Logan 2002).
The promotion of individual homeownership was at the centre of these reform policies, 
converting public housing as welfare benefit to capitalised asset (Davis 2003). 
Homeownership was thought to release the state and under-performing state enterprises 
from their over-stretched burden of welfare provision, and transfer the responsibility to 
the individuals. It largely progressed on dual tracks: (1) supply of commercial and 
affordable housing; and (2) sales of existing public rental units to sitting tenants.
Supply of commercial and affordable housing
Relatively better-off households were directed toward the commercial and affordable 
housing sectors. The latter (known as jingi shiyongfang in Chinese) was supplied at a lower 
price than commercial housing, made possible through various government subsidies to 
developers (e.g. tax redemption) (J. Lee 2000; Shi 2001; State Council of China 1998). In 
general, households whose income fell in the top 20% of income decile distribution were 
expected to buy commercial housing at full market price. Those households whose 
income was above the lowest 20% income were considered as potential buyers of both 
commercial and affordable housing. Over the years, the sales volume of new residential 
units to individuals in urban China has increased substantially According to the National 
Bureau of Statistics, 88% of uiban housing sold in 2000 went to individuals instead of 
institutions, and the sales volume reached 295.4 billion yuan (People’s Daily 19 March 
2001). In 2002, Beijing also witnessed a high rate of market participation by individuals in 
housing purchase: 97% of 16 million m2 of residential dwelling space sold in the market 
were bought by individuals (BMBS 2003b). This was a big change compared to the 
dominant role of institutional actors in the housing market in the 1990s.43
43 Throughout the 1990s, it was often pointed out that one of the drawbacks of the 1990s reform measures 
was the unleashed purchasing power of the state enterprises, who turned out to be the major buyers of 
commercial housing on the market, much less constrained under the Enterprise Reform regarding the use 
of their budgets. Only a fraction of commercial housing was sold directly to individuals. Those houses 
purchased by the state enterprises and institutions were then rented out at nominal rents or sold out at 
heavily subsidised price to their employees (Wang and Murie 1996; Wii 1996). The practice came to an end
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Privatisation of public rental housing
The homeownership rate has also increased through the sales of existing public housing 
stock to sitting tenants at a discounted price based on employees’ work history and ranks. 
As early as 1988, the stock transfer of public rental units was emphasised by the State 
Council as an essential component of housing reform policies (Song and Hu 2001). In 
Beijing, the municipal guidance on the privatisation first appeared in 1992 (BMG 1992). 
The earlier years of privatisation did not see a significant increase in homeownership rate: 
by 1993, about 13.7% of the sitting tenants in the public housing sector nationwide had 
bought their rented dwellings (Lin 2001). Throughout the 1990s, the sales volume had 
been rising steadily, and a big push came in 1998 when all kinds of welfare housing 
allocation were to be terminated (State Council of China 1998). Huang (2004) found in 
his sample survey that nearly half of the homeowners achieved their ownership in 1998. 
Many urban residents seemed to have rushed into the queue of securing welfare housing 
and subsidised sales to ‘catch the last train’ (Huang 2004: 62-63). In August 2002, the then 
Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Construction was proud to announce in an 
international conference that “Since the mid-1990s, 80 percent of China's public housing 
has been sold to local residents” (Xinhua News Agency 12 August 2002).
Homeownership in Beijing
In Beijing, the concentration of government institutions stymied the rise of 
homeownership during the early years of housing reform, but homeownership has been 
on the increase noticeably since 1998. Surveys by the municipal statistical bureau indicated 
that the proportion of owner-occupiers was just over 20% in 1998, but it reached 54.1% 
by 2001 (see Table 7-8 below).
in 1998. Nevertheless, even the employers’ subsidised sale of commercial housing to their employees was a 
contribution to the rise of homeownership.
Table 7-8: Changes in Beijing’s tenure structure, 1998 - 2001 
(BMBS 2002)
Year Owner occupiers Tenants Others Total
Full property Partial property 
rights rights
Public housing Private housing
2001 31.8% 22.3% 44.5% 1.1% 0.3% 100.0%
2000 21.6% 23.4% 53.2% 1.6% 0.2% 100.0%
1999 12.1% 22.1% 63.9% 1.7% 0.2% 100.0%
1998 12.8% 7.4% 76.6% 2.0% 1.2% 100.0%
Note: Partial property rights refer to the property rights that only grant right to occupy and use, and do not provide residents' right to 
dispose at one's own discretion.
It appears that the pre-reform dominance of public rental tenure has shifted towards a 
polarised system of owner occupation and public rental tenure. Private rental tenure was 
marginal and constituted less than 2% of the sample population. Although the 
strengthening of reform measures in the housing sector hoped to create diversity in the 
existing tenure structure, the much hoped-for diversity seemed to have occurred only 
within the owner occupation sector which was divided into homeownership with full and 
partial property rights.
The public rental sector in Beijing occupies an important position in the tenure structure, 
but its long-term prospect is not promising due to the increasing incidence of urban 
redevelopment replacing public rental units with commercial flats. The inner city districts 
were attracting more and more highly priced commercial flats and offices and, to make 
way for them, a large amount of public rental units were becoming subject to demolition. 
Therefore, the possibility of remaining as public housing tenants within the inner city 
districts was expected to be minimal.
Redevelopment compensation: from re-housinq to full monetarisation
The method of redevelopment compensation went through a number of changes since 
the implementation of the ODHRP. Between 1991 and 1998, residents displaced from 
redevelopment neighbourhoods were compensated in accordance with the State Council’s 
Ordinance on the Management of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation in 1991 
(hereafter 1991 State Council Ordinance). It called for in-kind compensation, combined 
with cash compensation if necessary, when residents were to become subject to 
demolition and relocation (State Council of China 1991). This meant that developers in 
charge were to provide re-housing or relocation dwellings elsewhere, guaranteeing the
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continuation of residents’ existing tenure in a relocation dwelling.
“Namely it was in-kind relocation in consideration of the number of household 
members and their housing space. For example, let’s say there is a couple who lives 
with a son, daughter-in-law; and a grandchild. This constitutes three generations.
The displacement and relocation regulation [at that time in the 1990s] was closely 
linked with household structure. That is, if a household structure was complex, the 
number of dwellings allocated would also increase... [In the previous case], the 
household structure would lead to the allocation of two dwellings. If there is a 
daughter within a family who is not married at the age of 22 years old, or a son at 
the age of 24 years old, then the family would be allocated another room. That is, a 
one-bedroom flat would become a two-bedroom flat... ”
(Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department,
Dongcheng district government)
Until the early 1990s, when the inner city redevelopment was still in its embryonic stage, it 
was not uncommon to find a redevelopment project that re-housed all local residents 
(Dowall 1994; Leaf 1995). ODHRP, however, favoured the provision of sub-urban 
relocation. A substantial number of inner city residents were relocated to newly developed 
sub-urban estates that served as relocation sites for displacees from inner city districts 
(Fang and Zhang 2003; Tan 1997). By the end of 1999, Beijing’s ODHRP projects 
resulted in the displacement of 160,900 households, of which 43.8% (70,500 households) 
were relocated elsewhere, and 29.8% (48,000 households) re-housed (UCCBMPPCC et al. 
2003).
Such practices, however, took place at the expense of high project costs and low 
profitability, eventually becoming a hindrance to the rapid expansion of redevelopment 
programmes (Dowall 1994; Leaf 1995). A major revision took place in 1998. While the 
1991 State Council Ordinance was still in its place, Beijing municipal government 
produced a revised compensation policy by announcing the implementation of the 
Measure for the Management of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation in 1998 
(hereinafter BJ-1998 Compensation Measure). It became effective as of 1 December 1998 
(BMG 1998a). The key to this revision was the monetarisation of redevelopment 
compensation by taking two factors into consideration: the number of registered 
household members; and formal dwelling space. The BJ-1998 Compensation Measure did 
not rule out off-site relocation or on-site re-housing, but in its actual implementation, 
cash-based compensation was accepted as the norm under the new regulation, as an 
official explained below:
“The biggest difference was that it [that is, redevelopment compensation] was not
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based on the allocation o f relocation dwelling. All was monetarised. The idea came 
from the experiences o f Tianjin. It also took the household element into 
consideration, but it mainly considered dwelling space... ”
(Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department,
Dongcheng district government)
Under the BJ-1998 Compensation Measure, households were more likely to receive a 
larger amount of compensation if their household size was larger, and if they occupied a 
bigger dwelling space. If a household lived in a non self-contained unit with no in-door 
kitchen or toilet facilities, the household was entitled to the receipt of an additional space 
subsidy of 25 m2 (BMG 1998b). Only those residents who were formally registered as 
Beijing residents (that is, holders of Beijing h u k o u ) were eligible for compensation. 
Informal self-built space was in principle not subject to compensation. Table 7-9 below 
shows the amount of cash compensation estimated when the BJ-1998 Compensation 
Measure was applied to three-person households in non self-contained dwellings of
12,188.2 
in per sq.m
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14.0 : 1
ith 80 m2 of 
iy the author.
more than
0 m2 self- 
ge housing
1 suburban 
age Beijing 
d ring road. 
;hey would 
ere to stay
centre of business and financial activities attracted many developers to focus on the 
construction of spacious commercial housing and office buildings. Most commercial 
houses completed were affordable only to the high-income groups of urban residents 
(Wang and Murie 1996, 1999a, 1999b; Wu 2002b), thus making it difficult for the existing 
residents to stay within the immediate surrounding area in central Beijing.
Table 7-10 below is a summary of average commercial housing costs and annual 
household income to examine the affordability crisis in Beijing. The average housing price 
in Beijing was taken from the housing price data produced by the National Statistical 
Bureau of China (Xia 2002).
Table 7-10: Housing costs and household income in Beijing 
(Household interviews by the author in 2003, BMBS 2003a; NBS China 2003; Xia 2002)
Housing cost and income
Residents
interviewed Beijing (in 2002)
..............................................................
Urban China (in 2002)
Average 
(N = 13)
Average Bottom 20% of 
income decile
Average Bottom 20% of 
income decile
Annual household disposable income (RMB) 21,003.7 37,391.7 19,384.0 23,416.5
Average commercial housing price as of July 2001 
Housing price of a self-contained flat (in RMB)11
4,771 yuan per sq.m 
381,680
2,137 yui 
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price-to-income ratio (PIR) 18.2 : 1 10.2 : 1 19.7 : 1 7.3 : 1
Within 2nd ring road 620,240
price-to-income ratio 29.5 : 1 16.6 : 1 32.0 : 1
Between 2nd and 3rd
Average commercial road
561,600
housing price in Beijing price-to-income ratio 26.7 : 1 15.0 : 1 29.0 : 1
in 20001’ Between 3rd and 4th 
(in RMB) ring road 414,480
price-to-income ratio 19.7 : 1 11.1:1 21.4:1
Outside 4th ring road 288,000
price-to-income ratio 13.7 : 1 7.7 : 1 14.9 : 1
Note: 1) The calculation of the average commercial housing price in Beijing and phce-to-income ratio is based on a unit v\ 
construction space, which was the average construction space of those relocated and re-housed households interviewed I
According to the table above, an average Beijing household would have to pay 
16 years’ accumulation of their household disposable income to buy a £ 
contained commercial flat within the second ring road. In particular, the avera 
price was the highest within the second ring road, and faltered away towarc 
areas. The price-to-income ratio (PIR) outside the fourth ring road for an aver 
household turned out to be 7.7 to 1, less than half what it was within the secon 
As for the interviewed displacees who retained much lower income status, ' 
have to pay nearly 30 years of their household disposable income if they v
i . 1 - 1 ___   : j _______ _________________________ • j   j
subsidies were to be provided, it looked evident that they would have to move out to 
suburban districts if they were to find a flat in the commercial housing sector. One of the 
interviewees made a shrewd comment regarding this situation:
“Nowadays, people say ‘high-level cadres live around the second ring road, while
paupers live around the fifth or sixth ring road’” (Interviewee CBX-INT-07)
Unaffordable ‘affordable housing*
The discussion so far has focused only on the affordability problem in the commercial 
housing sector. The affordability problem, however, also engulfs affordable housing (jingi 
shiyongfang in Chinese). A set of preferential policies such as tax reduction were 
implemented to set the sales price of affordable housing flats within the range of between
2,400 and 4,450 yuan/m2. In general, the price of an affordable housing unit was set to be 
600 yuan lower than the price of other commercial flats nearby (China Daily 23 January 
2001). The sales price of affordable housing was regulated by local governments, and 
differed from one district to another. In the case of Dongcheng district, according to a 
local housing official interviewed, the price of an affordable housing flat in 2003 was 
5,000 yuan/m2. For an affordable housing unit with a construction space of 70 m2, the 
sales price would reach 350,000 yuan, which was equivalent to about ten years’ average 
household disposable income in Beijing.
A unit of affordable housing was also much cheaper in locations further away from 
central Beijing. For instance, the economic housing estate designated by the Dongcheng 
district government as a relocation site for the displacees from Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood, was situated just outside the northern section of the fifth ring road. A 
residents’ committee leader in the neighbourhood informed me in an interview that a unit 
of economic housing offered to the displacees at the time of redevelopment was sold at 
the price of 2,650 yuan/m2. This was nearly half the price of an economic housing unit 
sold in Dongcheng district.
Major affordable housing sites were mostly located in outer suburban districts, while their 
availability within and around the second ring road was limited (People's Daily 4 June 
2000). Moreover, although the total number of affordable housing units completed 
between 1999 and 2002 in Beijing reached 71,731 units, this could only benefit less than 
3% of 2,472,000 households registered within inner and near sub-urban districts (BMBS
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2002,2003a). Such limited supply of affordable housing stock spurred severe competition 
among Beijing residents. For instance, in order to get a place in Huilongguan, one of the 
major affordable housing project sites located outside the fifth ring road in northwest 
Beijing, 15,000 families rushed to put their names in the waiting list even before the 
blueprint for its second phase was yet to be announced (People’s Daily 19 March 2001).
Furthermore, the affordability problem in the affordable housing sector was fuelled by the 
developers’ practice of building more spacious flats. The amount of profits a developer 
could retain from affordable housing development was set at a fixed rate of 3% of total 
housing costs by the central government regulation (People's Daily 4 June 2000). Because 
of this, developers were lured into supplying more spacious flats in order to increase the 
transaction volume. For instance, the average construction space of an affordable housing 
unit turned out to be 95.3 m2 in 1999, but it increased up to 110.9 m2 by 2002 (BMBS 
2002; 2003a: 133).44
Under-development of private renting
Given the high prices in both commercial and affordable housing sector, one alternative 
for those displacees from public rental sector could be to look for a private rental unit. 
This option, however, was also very much restricted due to the under-development of the 
private rental market.
One of the major reasons for the under-development was the prohibition of re-sales or 
sub-letting for a certain period in the case of those properties with partial property rights. 
For instance, affordable housing was in principle for sales only It was not subject to re­
sales or letting to a third party within five years until homeowners gained full possession 
of property rights (MoC China 1995, 1999). The same rule applied to those privatised 
former public housing units. The Ministry of Construction also prohibited sub-letting or 
leasing of state allocated public rental housing and any of those old and dilapidated 
housing units subject to redevelopment. With restricted supply of affordable rental units, 
private renting in inner city districts was often beyond the reach of most residents. As one
44 This was based on the figures from the statistical yearbook In 1999, it was reported that the total floor 
space of affordable housing completed in 1999 reached 1.23 million m2, while the number of flats 
completed was 12,901 units. In 2002, the total floor space of affordable housing was 2.28 million m2, and 
the total number of units, 20,593 units.
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of the interviewees noted:
“Renting a house is too expensive. I am not capable of renting a place. Our family 
makes altogether about 900 yuan a month [and is receiving means-tested social 
security benefits]... [If to find a place to move in] I can only take care of temporary 
matters. We can live with my mom, my son's grandmother, at her place, which is 
also fine. But, in the end, you should allow us to have a practical place to live in, a 
house that belongs to myself. It must be not too far away If it is, I am not 
interested.. ” (Interviewee CBX-INT- 05)
My quick search for a two-bedroom rental unit in a low-rise walk-up place resulted in a 
rental flat with a range of monthly rent between 1,000 and 2,000 yuan/month. This would 
usually be equivalent to a low-income household’s monthly disposable income (see Table 
7-11 below).45 As a result, private renting was the least preferred option among the 
displacees, and if at all considered, it was to serve as a short-term alternative until they 
found a permanent dwelling of their own.
Table 7-11: Private rental units in Beijing and their rents
Location District O rientation Neighbourhood Construction 
space (m2)
Monthly ren t 
(RMB)
Within 2nd ring road Dongcheng East Beijing Qingshuiyuan 65 2,600
Dongcheng East Beijing Beixincang 65 2,800
Outside 2nd ring road Dongcheng East Beijing Xinzhongjie Xili 65 1,750
Outside 3rd ring road Fengtai South Beijing Jianmendongli 60 1,300
Outside 5th ring road Chaoyang East Beijing Dingfuzhuang 65 1,200
Outside 5th ring road Changping North Beijing Yunquyuan 65 1,100
Note: Two-bedroom flats in a mediurm rise walk-up blocks only. Search was conducted on 13 April 2005 on the web site, 
http://www.5i5j.com, one of the most popular real estate agent in Beijing
Limits with formal financial opportunities
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Provident Fund (hereafter HPF), which has been the backbone of mainland China’s new 
housing finance system since its inception in Shanghai in 1991. The HPF receives 
monetary contributions from both employers and employees (World Bank 1992: 30-32). 
The HPF account holders are eligible to withdraw their accumulated funds when they 
retire or upon making a down-payment on a new house as a first-time buyer.
The HPF, however, has been subject to some criticisms for bearing a serious equity issue. 
It is very much employer-based, which meant that those in non-regular jobs or out of 
work would likely be excluded. Workers with under-performing employers were also 
unlikely to receive employers’ contributions, thus having their access denied (Rosen and 
Ross 2000). Moreover, because the contribution to the FPF is based on a fixed rate, the 
growing wage gaps in the labour market would lead to a situation in which a higher- 
income earner enjoys a higher contribution from his/her employer (J. Lee 2000).
When it comes to home buying, FIPF account holders, if eligible, would be able to apply 
for HPF housing loans (Rosen and Ross 2000). This has been a completely new 
experience for urban residents in mainland China. To be eligible, an applicant must have a 
stable job and income, and have kept the HPF account for at least preceding twelve 
months. The applicant must have also made contributions into the account consecutively 
during the last six months before making a loan application. Furthermore, before 
submitting a loan application, the applicant must have made a down payment of at least 
20% of the full price of a dwelling (Beijing Ribao 6 March 2003). HPF housing loans thus 
provided are on preferential terms with lower interest rates (about 1% lower in 2002), 
giving advantages over other commercial bank loans. Table 7-12 below shows the loan 
rates and the amount of monthly repayment in accordance with the loan periods when an 
applicant borrows 100,000 yuan.
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Table 7-12: HPF housing loans rates and monthly repayment in Beijing
______________________________________________________________________________ (as of 21 February 2002)
Loan period 
(years)
1
5
HPF housing loans
Annual percentage 
rate (APR)
3.60
1.............. oca..............3.60
Total amount of Monthly repayment
repayment15
(RMB) (RMB)
103,600 one-off repayment
as a proportion of 
average monthly 
household disposable 
income in Beijing25
n.a.
58.5%
as a proportion of 
monthly household 
disposable income for 
bottom 20% of income 
distribution in Beijing25
n.a.
179.6%
10 4.05 121,776 1,015 32.6% 99.9%
15 4.05 133,5% 742 23.8% 73.1%
20 4.05 146,064 609 19.5% 59.9%
25 4.05 159,180 531 17.0% 52.2%
30 4.05 172,908 480 15.4% 47.3%
Note:
1) This is for borrowing RMB 100,000 from the bank, and is based on the repayment conditions at the China Construction Bank.
2) The average monthly disposable household income in Beijing was RMB 3,116 in 2002. For the bottom 20% of income decile, it was RMB 
1015.7 (BMBS, 2003).
From the table above, it appears that HPF housing mortgage would still be too much of a 
burden upon low-income households. It would also be a burden upon average Beijing 
residents if they were to become an owner-occupier by purchasing a new dwelling in and 
around the second ring road where housing prices are far more expensive than elsewhere. 
Reflecting such circumstances, housing mortgage was regarded as an ‘unrealistic’ option 
by the displacees in redevelopment neighbourhoods, as some of the interviewees from 
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood explicitly expressed:
“Who would provide you with mortgage? N o  way to take out a loan... My husband 
doesn’t have a job, and I don’t have one either. It's for sure that they wouldn’t grant 
us any mortgage. I’ve never thought of that. D on ’t you ever say mortgage again!”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-02)
“Bank loan is unrealistic. You don’t have enough money for your living. If you take 
out the loan, then how  will you pay back? I feel I don’t even qualify to go and ask. I 
don’t want it at all. At present, I just live day by day... ” (Interviewee CBX-INT-06)
“Where would I get a loan from? Once you retire, then nobody gives you loan. If I 
have to get a loan, the only way is to depend on my elder son [who has a HPF 
account]. My second son doesn’t have a job, and the third son is laid off. They all 
can’t apply for a loan” (Interviewee CBX-INT-07)
Prospective applicants are required to submit documentary evidences when they apply for 
HPF housing mortgage. This includes the proof of holding a HPF account, an original 
copy of housing purchase contract, proofs of household income usually from their work 
units and so on. Therefore, if a household doesn’t have sufficient income or creditable 
income-generating activities with no HPF account, it would be very unlikely for them to
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have access to formal loans or housing mortgage from the banks that would favour those 
with proven credit records. All these are new and stressful realities that discourage 
residents in such conditions from considering housing mortgage from the start.
Summary
This section has discussed major constraints that would face residents upon their 
displacement when redevelopment takes place. These constraints are closely associated 
with on-going reforms and the resulting changes in the way in which urban housing is 
produced and consumed. In Beijing, such constraints were: (1) the polarised tenure 
structure that increasingly favours owner occupation and reduces traditional public rental 
sector; (2) the redevelopment compensation that has changed from in-kind re-housing to 
full monetarisation, applicable only to those registered Beijing households; (3) the 
affordability problems that are prevalent in both commercial and affordable housing 
sector, especially with regard to those new dwellings provided in inner city districts; (4) the 
under-development of the private rental sector which requires excessively high rents for 
low-income public housing tenants; and (5) the difficulties in accessing employer-based 
formal housing finance system.
7.3 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the major institutional and structural constraints that were 
faced by residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods upon their displacement and 
relocation. These constraints stemmed from the way in which place-specific housing 
provision system is structured in Seoul and Beijing, and from their local regulations for 
promoting and controlling neighbourhood redevelopment. The constraints discussed in 
this chapter are summarised in Table 7-13 below.
In the case of housing tenure systems, the majority of municipal households in Seoul are 
engaged in private rental tenure. The majority of tenant households were in Chonsei 
tenure which required a substantial amount of key money upon signing a contract. The 
rate of owner occupation in Seoul was lower than the urban average. The majority of 
Chonsei tenants lived in individual houses, but new housing production in general 
favoured high-rise flat construction. Such situation would place heavy pressure on 
displacees from redevelopment neighbourhoods, as they are left with no choice but to 
seek for an affordable private renting in the individual housing sector, which itself is
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shrinking.
Table 7-13: Summary of constrains upon residents’ decisioi-to-move in Seoul and Beijing
S ou l
---------------------------------------------------
Beijing
Housing market 
and tenure
Domination of Chonsei rental tenure
Owner occupation rate, lower than the urban 
average
Chonsei tenure concentration in detached housing 
New housing construction in favour of high-rise flats 
Higher rates of price increase in apartment housing
Tenire polarisation between owner occupation and 
pubic renting
Expansion of owner occupation through privatisation 
and new housing sales
Under-development of private renting
Public rental 
housing
Limited supply of public rental housing
Stock available for only 5,4% of municipal tenant 
households
Shriiking public housing sector
Privatisation and redevelopment of dilapidated 
neighbourhoods
Affordability High sale prices of redevelopm ent flats
PIR (Price-to-income ratio) 11.8 ~ 23.0 to 1 for the 
bottom 20% of income decile distribution
Acuta affordability problems in inner city districts
Highly priced commercial flats (including redeveloped 
flats)
Highly priced affordable housing fiats in inner city 
districts
Redevelopment
compensation
From non-compensation to  in-kind and cash 
compensation
Eligibility based on the minimum length of residence 
in redevelopment neighbourhoods 
Eligible tenan ts
In-kind compensation: access to public rental flats 
provided in redevelopment neighbourhoods
Cash compensation: 36 ~  110% of annual household 
disposable income for the bottom 20% of income 
decile distribution
Ineligible tenan ts
No compensation. Only a token fee to help their 
house-moving expenses
Chatge from re-housing to  full m onetarisation
Redevelopment compensation on the basis of 
residents' household registration status 
Eligible tenan ts
Cash-based compensation since 1998 that could be 
more than 10 years' accumulation of average Beijing 
household disposable income
Compensation for formal dwelling space only
Ineligible tenants
No provision at all for ineligible tenants
Housing finance National Housing Fund Housing Loan Programme
Less than 1% of tenants receive the benefits
Short-term repayment period. Terms of redemption 
against tenants' preference
Excludes public housing tenants
Hou<ing Provident Fund
Employment-based housing finance system that 
excludes those in unstable jobs or unemployment
Loans repayment beyond the capacity of most low- 
income residents
In Beijing, in contrast with the situation in Seoul, privcte renting is still marginal in its 
tenure structure. The reform measures during the last two decades have largely promoted 
homeownership through new housing sales and privatisation of public housing stock. The 
pre-reform dominance of public rental tenure has shifted towards a polarised system of 
owner occupation and public rental tenure, though iitense inner city redevelopment 
would further shrink the public housing sector. As for residents displaced from 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, their chance of remaining as public housing tenants is 
very slim, and their available option is to become either ywner-occupiers by purchasing a 
commercial or affordable housing unit, or private sector tenants.
With regard to the public housing sector, Seoul has been traditionally less focused on
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implementing extensive public rental housing schemes. It has very limited supply of 
public rental housing stocks, enough to benefit only 5.4% of municipal tenant households. 
In Beijing, its socialist tradition led to the dominance of public rental housing, but the 
privatisation of existing public rental dwellings in the course of implementing housing 
reform led to a substantial shrinkage of public rental sector. Urban redevelopment in 
Beijing is expected to further reduce public rental dwellings. Such situations in Seoul and 
Beijing indicate that displacees in both cities would have less chance of accessing public 
rental sector upon their displacement.
In both Seoul and Beijing, affordability problems are acute. In Seoul, each property-owner 
in redevelopment neighbourhoods is given a right to purchase a redeveloped flat, and thus 
remain as an owner-occupier upon project completion. The high sale prices of 
redevelopment flats, however, discourages most low-income owner-occupiers from this, 
and eventually leads them to sell their properties to off-site buyers. In Beijing, affordability 
problems are also prevalent in both commercial and affordable housing sector. The sale 
prices of new dwellings progressively decrease as one moves further out to outer 
suburban districts, thus encouraging displacees’ move out of inner city districts upon 
redevelopment.
As for the redevelopment compensation, both cities have a clear distinction regarding 
residents’ eligibility for compensation, which are based on residents’ residence status. In 
Seoul, tenants are eligible for in-kind (an access to a public rental flat provided in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods) and cash compensation (equivalent to three months of 
average monthly expenditure for wage- and salary-earning urban households). The 
amount of cash compensation amounts to 36—110% of annual household disposable 
income for the bottom 20% of income decile distribution. In Beijing, the amount of cash 
compensation is much larger than in Seoul, reaching more than ten years’ accumulation of 
average Beijing household’s annual disposable income. Beijing displacees are expected to 
use the compensation to look for an accommodation on their own, and in most cases, this 
would mean a transfer to owner occupation by finding a flat in suburban neighbourhoods.
Seoul and Beijing both provide housing finance schemes. Whereas the housing finance 
scheme in Seoul targets all municipal tenants with no regard to their employment status, 
the housing finance scheme to help residents in Beijing is employment-based. This leads 
to the exclusion of those Beijing residents who are in unstable jobs or unemployment.
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Even if they manage to apply for housing loans, the affordability gap is too large to be 
filled by housing loans within the repayment capacity of low-income residents. In Seoul, 
the existing housing loan scheme to help tenants with paying their rental deposit benefits 
only a fraction of municipal tenant households, and the terms of redemption is not in 
tenants’ favour.
Having examined the various constraints in this chapter, the next chapter will discuss the 
changes in actual housing outcome experienced by the residents in redevelopment 
neighbourhoods upon their displacement, and compare their pre- and post-displacement 
housing conditions.
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Chapter 8 
Redevelopment and residents: 
Housing experiences upon displacement
Housing outcomes upon redevelopment: the case of Seoul 
Dwelling space
Dwelling forms and physical living conditions 
Housing tenure
Financing post-displacement rental dwellings
‘Forced consumption’: increases in household expenditure
Summary
Housing outcomes upon redevelopment: the case of Beijing 
Dwelling space
Dwelling forms and physical conditions 
Housing tenure 
Financing homeownership
‘Forced consumption’: increases in household expenditure 
Summary
Conclusion
This chapter forms the second of three chapters on residents. Based on the identification 
of institutional and structural constraints in the previous chapter, this chapter examines 
the experiences of Seoul and Beijing residents upon their displacement and re-housing 
due to the redevelopment of their neighbourhoods. The findings are based on the analysis 
of my field research data. The discussion of the housing experiences of Seoul residents 
further benefits from the acquisition of raw survey data from a local welfare centre (see 
Section 3.3 in Chapter 3 for more details).
The key question to address in this chapter is: whether displaced residents were able to 
gain access to existing housing market and improve, or at least maintain, their pre­
displacement housing conditions within their existing financial resources. For this, each 
section is devoted to the discussion of residents’ housing experiences in each city Five 
main aspects of housing experiences are examined: (1) dwelling space; (2) dwelling forms 
and physical conditions; (3) housing tenure; (4) housing finance; and (5) household 
expenditure. The final section pulls together the findings
8.1 Housing outcomes upon redevelopment: the case  of Seoul 
Dwelling space
Increase in dwelling space upon displacement
The reviews of neighbourhood physical conditions in Chapter 4 showed that residents in 
Nangok neighbourhood had enjoyed dwelling floor space much lower than the urban 
average of 48.3 m2 per household (NSO Korea 2001d: 333). In the late 1980s, Nangok 
residents’ dwelling floor space turned out to be only about 22 m2 per household (Lee 
1989:13).
As shown in Table 8-1 below, residents’ dwelling floor space before displacement from 
Nangok turned out to be 37.8 m2 on average, which was higher than the 1980s’ finding. 
This could be because the total number of households decreased substantially during the 
1990s, and as a result, less residents came to occupy existing dwellings. The results in the 
table below indicate that the displaced households as a whole have enjoyed a statistically 
significant increase in household dwelling space upon displacement.
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Table 8-1: Changes in housing space upon residents’ displacement from Nangok
unit: m2
Total 113 37.8 15.20 43.8 20.10 -2.928 0.004**
Private renting before displacem ent 18.50 -2.43836.5 14.57 41.7 0.017=
Moved to non-KNHC dwellings 26.5537.4 17.70 43.3 -1.451 0.154
eligible tenant 
ineligible tenants
36.6 14.73 42.6 25.31 -1.294 0.205
40.0 25.86 45.6 31.55 -0.627 0.546
Owner occupation before displacem ent 42.3 16.83 50.6 24.04 ■1.603 0.121
KNHC tenants after displacement 
(eligible tenants) 35.6 11.03iplfllt'lijffe
40.3 2.76 -2.640
Valid
responses
Pre-displacem ent
..  StandardMean , . „ _________ deviation
Post-displacem ent
Mean Standarddeviation
Recipients of NBLS1* benefits 13.70 i 316  17.87 I -0.185 I 0.855
economically better-off households were more likely to have enjoyed an increase in 
housing space upon displacement.
Per capita floor space after displacement
There were a substantial proportion of tenants who chose cash compensation and moved 
to non-KNHC dwellings in the private sector. To some extent, their action was in contrast 
with the historical demand in the 1980s and 1990s by tenants’ movement that argued for 
the provision of public rental flats to guarantee tenants’ housing rights (Bae 1997; Ha 
2001b; Jang 1998b; S.-H. Kim 1996). If the eligible tenants’ move to public rental flats 
increased their dwelling floor space, why did some tenants choose cash compensation and 
remain in the private rental sector?
One of the clues is provided by the comparison of per capita floor space as shown in 
Table 8-2 below. The post-displacement per capita floor space for the displaced 
households as a whole turned out to be 14.2 m2, which was only three quarters of the 
national average in 2000 (NSO Korea 2001d). In particular, the per capita floor space for 
the KNHC tenants was estimated to be 12.6 m2, much less than 15.3 m2 for those tenants 
who moved to non-KNHC dwellings. On the other hand, the recipients of NBLS benefits 
enjoyed a larger per capita floor space than the non-recipients of such benefits, but this 
probably owed to the fact that their average household size was much smaller.
Table 8-2: Post-displacement floor space per capita for former Nangok residents
unit: m2
Valid
responses
..-............— ...—— -— ..... -.... ............
Mean value Per capita 
dwelling spacePost-displacement 
dwellinq space
Number of household 
members per household
Total 113 43.8 3.08 14.2
Owner occupation before displacement 26 50.6 3.27 15.5
Private renting before displacement 87 41.7 3.02 13.8
KNHC tenants after displacement 
(eligible tenants)
45 ,0 .3 3.20 12.6
Moved to non-KNHC dwellings
eligible tenants 
ineligible tenants
42
32
10
43.3
42.6
45.6
2.83
2.84
2.80
15.3
15.0
16.3
Recipients of NBLS benefits 29 33.6 2.21 15.2
Non-recipients of NBLS benefits 58 45.8 3.43 13.3
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
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Degree of conformity to the National Minimum Housing Standards
In June 2004, the Ministry of Construction 
and Transportation (hereafter MoCT) in 
South Korea produced, for the first time, an 
official policy guidance that defined the 
National Minimum Housing Standards 
(MoCT Korea 2004). The main two factors 
considered in the MoCT criteria were the 
number of bedrooms and per capita floor 
space for co-habiting household members 
(see Table 8-3). Individual households are to 
have exclusive access to housing facilities such
Table 8-3: National Minimum Housing 
Standards in South Korea 
(MoCT Korea 2004)
Number of  
household  
members
Number of 
bedrooms
Floor space  
(m 2)
1 1 12
2 t1 20
3 2 29
4 3 37
5 3 41
6
. . .
4 49
Note: All households are required to have exclusive access 
to kitchen, toilet and washroom.
As one of the interviewees explains below, budget constraints appear to be the main 
constraint for families with a larger household size:
“I started my family in 1986, and have two children, a 15-year-old son and a 13-year- 
old daughter... When we were living in Nangok, the house originally had one 
bedroom, and we subdivided it into two. We used one room as a storage space, and 
four of us all lived in one bedroom... The condition of the previous house was so 
appalling, and it was very small. It didn’t even have a toilet, so we had to use our 
neighbours... We now live in a multi-dwelling house, and there are four other 
families there. Ours is located in the semi-basement. Houses were all too expensive 
when we were looking for one to move out of Nangok, all at least 40 or 50 million 
Korean Won. So, we decided to look for a place within our budget... It has two 
bedrooms. Our children all want a room of their own, but we let our son use one 
room, and our daughter shares the room with my husband and me... ”
(Interviewee KSS7-INT-18)
Table 8-5 below summarises the degree of conformity to the minimum housing standards 
in the case of those respondents to the Sillim Welfare Centre survey. The table suggests 
that a significantly large proportion of displaced residents faced overcrowded conditions. 
One third of all the respondents were experiencing either a lack of bedrooms or 
inadequate dwelling space. In particular, overcrowded conditions were more prevalent 
among the KNHC tenants (40.3%). This partly explains the lack of willingness among 
eligible tenants to move to the KNHGprovided public rental flats upon their 
displacement.
Table 8-5: Sillim Welfare Centre survey respondents’ conformity 
to the National Minimum Housing Standards
Category Conformity to the 
National Minimum Housing Standards
Valid responses (%)
Residents as a whole Conforms 
Not conforms 
Unknown
Total
79 57.2%  
46 33.3%  
13 9.4%
138 100.0%
KNHC tenants Conforms 
Not conforms 
Unknown 
Sub-total
37 59.7%
25 & LZ &
0 0.0% 
62 100.0%
Non-KNHC tenants Conforms 
Not conforms 
Unknown 
Sub-total
42 55.3% 
21 27.6%
13 17.1% 
76 100.0%
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
The overcrowded condition in public rental flats was also confirmed by the Seoul 
Development Institute in its study of a sample of 1,021 tenant households from public
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rental flats, which found that close to half of public housing tenants were experiencing 
overcrowded living conditions that did not conform to the MoCTs minimum housing 
standards (The Hankyoreh 13 February 2004).
Dwelling forms and physical living conditions
In terms of the built form of post-displacement dwellings, less than half of all the 
displaced households between September 2000 and Mach 2002 moved to the KNHG 
provided high-rise rental flats. As shown in Table 8-6 below, among those households 
who moved to non-KNHC dwellings, the most common dwelling form was semi­
basement or basement units, located within individual or multi-dwelling houses (see 
Figure 7-1 in Chapter 7 for the explanation of these dwelling types). High-rise flats were 
rarely displacees’ final destination unless they became KNHC tenants.
Table 8-6: Dwelling forms occupied by displaced residents from Nangok
P ost-displacem ent dwelling forms
KNHC- 
provided 
rental flats
Non-KNHC
flats
Individual houses 
(dandog jutaeg)
Ground floor or 
above
Multi-dwelling
houses
Ground floor or 
above
(Semi-) 
Basement in 
individual or 
multi-dwelling 
houses
Others
Total
Total 62 2 11 23 35 3 136
45.6% 1.5% 8.1% 16.9% 25.7% 2.2% 100.0%
Pre-displacem ent tenure status
Owner occupation 15 1 0 9 5 0 30
Private renting: Chonsei 43 1 11 11 24 3 93
Private renting: Monthly rents 4 0 0 2 5 0 11
Others 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Legal com pensation eligibility
Owner occupation 15 1 0 9 5 0 30
Eligible tenants 47 0 10 9 24 2 92
Ineligible tenants 0 1 1 5 6 1 14
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
With regard to other facilities in post-displacement dwellings (e.g. drainage and sewage 
facilities, kitchen and bathroom, and heating facility ,^ most displacees from Nangok 
appeared to be, in general, content with the improved physical structure and indoor 
facilities (see Table 8-7 below). This largely owed to the fact that those pre-displacement 
dwellings they used to live in Nangok were in severe deterioration. The KNHC tenants 
were also overwhelmingly in approval of the improved physical structure and indoor 
facilities that the public rental flats provided (see Table 8-7).
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Table 8-7: Post-displacement improvement of housing physical conditions and facilities
Post-displacement housing
Physical structure Dampness and Lighting Drainage and sewage
Worsened Not
changed
Improved Worsened Not
changed
Improved Worsened Not
changed
Improved
KNHC-provided rental Responses 1 1 60 0 0 62 0 0 62
flats % 1.6 1.6 96.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Non-KNHC dwellings 11 8 56 21 14 40 8 24 44
% 14.7 10.7 74.7 28.0 18.7 53.3 10.5 31.6 57.9
Basement or Responses 6 5 25 15 7 13 6 12 18
semi-basement units % 16.7 13.9 69.4 42.9 20.0 37.1 16.7 33.3 50.0
1....81........1........1 .11  S i Kitchen Bathroom Heating
Post-relocation housing Worsened Not Improved Worsened Not Improved Worsened Not Improved
changed changed changed
KNHC-provided rental Responses 0 0 62 1 0 61 0 0 61
flats % 0.0 0.0 100.0 1.6 0.0 98.4 0.0 0.0 100.0
Non-KNHC dwellings Responses 10 17 49 8 15 53 5 15 54
% 13.2 22.4 64.5 10.5 19.7 69.7 6.8 20.3 73.0
Basement or Responses 8 7 21 5 8 23 2 8 26
fjfj semi-basement units % 22.2 19.4 58.3 13.9 22.2 63.9 5.6 22.2 72.2
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Housing tenure
Post-displacement tenure change
As was the case with many other tenants in Seoul, Chonsei tenure had been the major 
tenure form among Nangok residents. The Sillim Welfare Centre survey data show that 
69.4% of all valid respondents (or 89.4% of tenants) were in Chonsei tenure (see Table 
8-8 below). The post-displacement tenure status, however, indicates that more than half 
of the respondents in Chonsei tenure before displacement transferred to deposit-based 
monthly rental tenure despite their earlier preference for Chonsei. The majority of them 
did so by becoming KNHC tenants as they were eligible for redevelopment compensation. 
Very few eligible tenants became KNHC tenants with Chonsei contract. About two fifths 
of the former Chonsei tenants remained in the same tenure after displacement.
Table 8-8: Pre- and post-displacement tenure status
Pre-displacement Post-displacement tenure status
tenure status Owner
occupation
Chonsei Deposit-based monthly rent
TOTAL
Public Private Public Private
(KNHC) renting (KNHC) rentinq
Owner occupation 9 15 9 6 6 6 0 30 (22.4%)
Chonsei rental 6 39 4 35 48 39 9 93 (69.4%)
Eligible tenants 4
,  * ^
4 29 44 39 5 " 81
Ineligible tenants 2 6 0 6 4 0 4 12
Deposit-based 
monthly rental 0 0 0 0 11 4 7 11 ( 8.2%)
Flinible tenants 0 n ___ _Q _____ n in 4 6 m
Table 8-9: Nangok Chonsei tenants and their post-displacement tenure and dwelling forms
Post-displacement dwelling forms Post-displacement tenure status TOTAL
Owner occupation Chonsei Deposit-based 
monthly rent
TOTAL Responses 6 39 48 93
6.5% 41.9% 51.6% 100.0%
KNHC tenants (eligible tenants) Sub-total 0 4 39 43
Moved to Non-KNHC dwellings Sub-total 6 35 9 50
Eligible tenants 4 29 5 38
High-rise flats 0 0 0 0
Individual houses (dandog jutaeg) 2 5 1 8
Multi-dwelling houses 1 5 2 8
(Semi-) basement units 1 18 1 20
Others 0 1 1 2
Ineligible tenants 2 6 4 12
High-rise flats 1 0 0
. . . .  ^
Individual houses (dandog jutaeg) 0 2 1 3
Multi-dwelling houses 1 2 0 3
(Semi-) basement units 0 2 2 4
Others 0 0 1 1
Source: Sillim Welfare Center survey data
It was pointed out earlier that the most common dwelling form among households who 
moved to non-KNHC dwellings was semi-basement or basement units. From Table 8-9 
above, it appears that such a move to a much less favoured dwelling type could be part of 
tenants’ attempt to remain in the same Chonsei tenure upon displacement. Given the 
residents’ hesitance to live below ground level, this indicates that there has been a trade­
off between tenure and dwelling conditions.
In the case of those survey respondents who were owner-occupiers in Nangok, two thirds 
of them became tenants after displacement, but this might be from the fact that many of 
them were temporarily relocated until the project completion. The total number of survey 
respondents, who were ineligible for redevelopment compensation, was too few to 
determine any definite trend of tenure change due to their displacement.
Post-displacement tenure and NBLS beneficiaries
Another interesting aspect of residents’ post-displacement tenure status concerns the 
recipients of NBLS benefits. If the survey responses are broken down by respondents’ 
eligibility for the NBLS benefits, it appears that the non-recipients of the NBLS benefits 
were more likely to become KNHC tenants. The recipients of the NBLS benefits, who 
were economically worse off, tended to remain in Chonsei tenure in the private rental 
sector upon displacement (see Table 8-10).
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Table 8-10: Post-displacement tenure and dwelling forms as per displacees' eligibility for NBLS benefits
Post-displacement dwelling forms Post-displacement tenure status TOTAL
Owner occupation Chonsei Deposit-based 
monthly rent
TOTAL Responses 6 39 48 93
6.5% 41.9% 51.6% 100.0%
Recipients o f NBLS benefits Sub total 0 23 11 34
KNHC-provided rental flats 0 0 8 8
Individual houses (dandog jutaeg) 0 7 0 7
Multi-dwelling houses 0 3 1 4
(Semi-) basement units 0 12 1 13
Others 0 1 1 2
Non-recipients o f NBLS benefits Sub-total 6 16 37 59
KNHC-provided rental flats 0 4 31 35
Non-KNHC high-rise flats 1 0 0 1
Individual houses (dandog jutaeg) 2 0 2 4
Multi-dwelling houses 2 4 1 7
(Semi-) basement units 1 8 2 11
Others 0 0 1 1
Source: Sillim Welfare Center survey data
What pushed the recipients of the NBLS benefits away from the KNHGprovided public 
rental flats? The main explanation for this concerns the pressure of paying monthly rents. 
The KNHGprovided public rental flats required monthly rent payment. The NBLS 
beneficiaries were less capable of making monthly rent payment due to their income 
constraints. KNHC tenants could renew their 2-year rental contracts, enjoy a dwelling 
floor space of 39.0 m2, and pay rent deposit and monthly rent, which were KRW
13,319,000 and KRW 161,200 respectively.47 Upon signing a rental contract, tenants could 
decide to increase their monthly rents if they wished to reduce the amount of rent deposit, 
and vice versa. If a full amount of deposit (about KRW 33,000,000) was paid in, then rent 
payment was to be waived. In the case of KNHC tenants with a monthly rental contract 
(39 respondents in Table 8-9; also see Table 8-10), their average amount of rent deposits 
and monthly rents turned out to be KRW 14,040,000 and 166,700 respectively. When the 
tenants in receipt of the NBLS benefits were eligible for redevelopment compensation, 
they tended to choose cash compensation instead of a KNHGprovided rental flat in fear 
of being underpressure of paying monthly rents:
“(Living in the KNHC rental flat) means being a tenant for 50 years, paying monthly 
rents. Well, I have no intention to live in a place that requires monthly rent payment.
I ’d rather use the money instead to find a basement unit, and live there on Chonsei 
where I don’t get stressed about [paying rent every month]... ”
47 The rental conditions for the KNHGprovided flats were taken from the Guidance on New Tenants, 
attached to the KNHC’s internal circulation document; ‘Seoul (Dojeong) 7322-10571’ dated 9 October 2000.
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(Interviewee KSS7-INT-02)
Despite the advantage of long-term tenure security and superior dwelling conditions in 
terms of indoor facilities, a large number of eligible tenants favoured cash compensation, 
which was then used for finding an affordable Chonsei dwelling in an adjacent 
neighbourhood. This behaviour was more common among the recipients of the NBLS 
benefits (see Table 8-11 below). In order to avoid paying monthly rents with their 
constrained income, they seemed to have chosen cash compensation in order to remain in 
Chonsei tenure in the private renting sector after displacement.
Table 8-11: Eligible tenants displaced from Nangok and their redevelopm ent compensation
Category ■——------- —---------------------~t rental residence Total 
(valid N=95)
t to move to KNHC-provided 
rental flats
Cash compensation
TOTAL 5052.6%
45
47.4%
95
Break-down as per NBLS (means-tested social assistance programme) beneficiaries
Recipients of NBLS benefits• : ' ' ' ' '. ■
9
25.0%
27
75.0%
36
Non-recipients of NBLS benefits 4169.5%
18
30.5%
59
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Financing post-displacement rental dwellings
Increase in housing costs upon displacement
The displacement of Nangok tenants led to a significant increase in their housing costs. 
For instance, in the case of those Chonsei tenants who managed to remain in the same 
tenure after displacement, their average amount of Chonsei key money almost trebled 
from KRW 6,706,700 to KRW 20,884,600 (see Case A in Table 8-12 below).48 The 
increased amount of Chonsei key money upon displacement was equivalent to 211.9% of 
the annual household disposable income of the bottom 20% of income decile 
distribution for wage- and salary-earning urban households in 2000. Tenants whose tenure 
changed from Chonsei to deposit-based monthly rental tenure (see Case B) experienced 
less increase in rent deposit, but this came at the expense of paying monthly rents (on 
average, KRW 168,960) for their post-displacement housing. The increase in rent deposit
48 In this table, those former Chonsei tenants who have become owner-occupiers after relocation (six 
households in total) are not included.
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was also evident in the case of those tenants whose tenure status remained in deposit- 
based monthly rental tenure (see Case Q.
Table 8-12: Tenants displaced from Nangok and their changes in rent deposit
Tenure change upon displacem ent Mean (Std. 
deviation)
________________
Unit: KRW 1,000
Deposit as a proportion 
of annual household  
disposable income for 
bottom 20% 1}
Case A Pre-displacement Chonsei Deposit 39 6,706.70 (4,016.28) 68.1%
Post-displacement Chonsei Deposit 39 20,884.60 (10,500.29) 211.9%
Case B Pre-displacement Chonsei Deposit 48 7,260.40 (4,878.29) 7 3 .7 %
Post-displacement Deposit-based Monthly Rent
Deposit 
Monthly Rent
48 12,657.50 (4,821.62)
168.96 (48.21)...................... ....
128.4%
Case C Predisplacement Deposit-based Monthly Rent
Deposit 
Monthly Rent
11 2,727.30
125.50
(1,737.30)
(47.80)
27.7%
Post-displacement Deposit-based Monthly Rent
Deposit 
Monthly Rent
11 9,090.90
140.00
(5,146.90)
(49.00)
92.3%
Note: 1) For salary and wage earning urban households, the annual disposable income for the bottom 20% of income decile distribution 
was KRW 9,854,400 in 2000 (Korea National Statistical Office, 2001b)
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Usefulness of cash compensation
Given that the displaced tenants from Nangok were to undergo a substantial increase in 
housing costs upon displacement, was the redevelopment compensation useful to cover 
the difference for those tenants eligible for it? The comparison of rent deposits for 
different types of post-displacement tenure shown in Table 8-13 suggests that cash 
compensation could have helped eligible tenants pay for their increased rent deposit.
In the case of those eligible tenants who moved to non-KNHC dwellings and remained in 
Chonsei tenure, their Chonsei key money after displacement was on average KRW 
20,431,000. For them, the proportion of cash compensation to their post-displacement 
Chonsei key money turned out to be 28% on average. In the case of those eligible tenants 
who moved to the KNHGprovided public rental flats, the rent deposit was on average 
KRW 14,040,000. This difference was almost eauivalenr to  the rash m mnensarion fo r a
Table 8-13: Post-displacement rent deposit and monthly rents 
(for Nangok tenants who were in Chonsei tenure before displacement)
Unit: KRW 1,000
Post-displacement
tenure
Deposits and 
Monthly rents
Ineligible tenants Eligible tenants
Chonsei 
in non-KNHC dwellings
Chonsei Chonsei Deposit-based 
in non-KNHC dwellings in KNHC dwellings monthly rents
in KNHC dwellings
Respondents 6 29 4 39
Deposit Mean
Standard deviation
15,000.0
7,536.6
20,431.0 33,000.0 14,040.0
10,530.3 0.0 3,624.1
Monthly Mean 
rents
Standard deviation
n.a.
n.a.
n.a. n.a. 166.7 
n.a. n.a. 42.6
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
TnHppH rnn<t rtf thp plicnhlp tpn^nts rA m r\pnciti^n inrl rpm nnp/i in
ay tor their increased Uionsei Key money I Jus, 
ompensation covered the difference between their
compensation helped them a lot to p 
however, does not mean that the cash c
Table 8-14: Number of tenan t households according to  the receip t of NHF housing loan 
or o ther financial institution loans upon displacement from Nangok
Number of households who 
HAVE NOT RECEIVED
NHF housing loan or other financial 
institution loans
Number of households who 
HAVE RECEIVED
NHF housing loan or other financial 
institution loans
Total 
(valid N = 103)
Number of households 
% of total
68
66.0%
35
34.0%
103
100.0%
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
The survey respondents were asked to make multiple responses as to the sources of their 
housing finance, and Table 8-15 below shows the summary of their responses. The result 
also confirms the fact that loans from financial institutions or NHF housing loans were 
the least used sources of financing residents’ increased housing costs upon displacement. 
For those tenants who moved to non-KNHC dwellings, cash compensation was cited as 
the most commonly used source of housing finance. Since the Chonsei key money for 
residents’ pre-displacement dwellings was used to pay for part of the post-displacement 
dwellings’ rent deposits, it could be concluded that displacees’ personal financial assets 
and borrowing from their support network played a major role rather than formal sector 
borrowing.
Table 8-15: Sources of housing finance upon displacem ent from Nangok
Moved to non-KNHC dwellings upon displacement (N=58) Moved to KNHC-provided public rental flats (N=45)
Cash compensation from displacement Own savings
Borrowing from support network
Borrowing from relatives 
Borrowing from neighbours
Loans from financial institutions
NHF Housing loan for low-income households
Own savings
Loans from financial institutions 10
Usurers or moneylenders
Sources of financing ResponsesSources of financing Responses
Borrowing from support network
Borrowing from relatives 
Borrowing from neighbours
have any significant savings before displacement. With regard to the residents’ household 
debts, nearly two fifths of tenants and more than one quarter of owner-occupiers from 
Nangok responded that they experienced an increase in their level of household debts 
upon displacement (see Table 8-16).
Table 8-16: Debts change afte r displacement from Nangok
Pre-displacement tenure status Changes
Decreased
; in DEBTS after displ 
No change
acem ent Total
(Valid responses 
N = 105)
Total
16
15.2%
48
45.7%
41
39.0%
105
100.0%
Owner occupiers
5
20.0%
13
52.0%
7
28.0%
25
100.0%
Tenants
11
13.8%
35
43.8%
34
42.5%
80
100.0%
Moved to KNHC rental flats 6
19.4%
17
54.8%
8
25.8%
w m m m m
100.0%
Moved to non-KNHC dwellings 5
10.2%
18
36.7%
26
53.1%
49
100.0%
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre study in summer 2002
‘Forced consumption49’: increases in household expenditure
Upon displacement, residents experienced an increase in their household expenditure. In 
particular, as shown in Table 8-17 below, 86.8% of the respondents expressed an increase 
in their housing maintenance and monthly rents. Utility bills were the next most frequently 
cited increased expenditure item, followed by debt repayment and interest. In fact, the 
table below indicates that all the expenditures seemed to have increased upon 
displacement.
49 This expression was adopted from the term used by a Chinese journalist, Wang Jun, whom this 
researcher interviewed while conducting field research in Beijing in summer, 2003. The terminology refers 
to the situation in which those displaced residents “are forced to increase their spending on housing, which 
has never been their priority before, and in doing so, they are cutting down on other spending items that 
were more important” (interview by the author).
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Table 8-17: Changes in the level of household expenditure after displacement from Nangok
Housing
maintenanc
e
(inc.monthly
\
Utility bills 
and 
insurance
Debt
repayment
and
interests
Categories of expenses
Transpor- Communi- Medical 
tation cation (inc. expenses 
phone 
bills)
Education Groceries Clothing/
Cultural
activities
Displacees as Valid responses 136 130 125 128 127 132 115 134 127
a whole g Decreased i 6
4.4%
2
1.5%
5
4.0%
2
1.6%
1
0.8%
4
3.0%
7
6.1%
11
8.2% 7.1%
Not changed
%
12
8.8%
54
41.5%
69
55.2%
90
70.3%
93
73.2%
97
73.5%
86
74.8%
102
76.1%
106
83.5%
Increased 1 1 A110
86 8%
74
56.9%
51
40.8%
36
28.1%
33
26.0%
31
23.5%
21
15,7%
B P S
9.4%
Moved to Decreased 6.7% 1.7% 1.8% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 6.7% 10.2%
KNHC-provided Not changed 1.7% 37.3% 69.6% 60.0% 82.8% 86.4% 80.7% 88,3% 84.7%
rental flats Increased 91.7% 61.0% 28.6% 36.7% 17.2% 13.6% 14.0% 5.0% j§ .l%
Moved to non- Decreased 2.6% 1.4% 5.8% 0.0% 1.4% 5.5% 6.9% 9.5% 4.4%
KNHC Not changed 14.5% 45.1% 43.5% 79.4% 65.2% 63.0% 69.0% 66.2% 82.4%
dwellings Increased 82.9% 53.5% 50.7% 20.6% 33.3% 31.5% 24.1% 24.3% 13.2%
Sources: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
While the limits of the data make it difficult to figure out how the residents have been 
managing to finance these increases in overall spending, the table clearly shows that the 
residents were driven towards a greater degree of consumption, forced by the residential 
redevelopment and displacement from their neighbourhood that used to offer affordable 
means of housing. This is what constitutes ‘forced consumption’ of the displacees due to 
the redevelopment.
It was noted earlier that most tenants, who transferred from Chonsei to deposit-based 
monthly rental tenure, were KNHC tenants. Unlike their previous housing conditions, 
these residents came to face the regular payment of monthly rents (about KRW 160,000 
per month), equivalent to 19.6% of the average monthly disposable income of the 
bottom 20% of income decile distribution for salary and wage earning urban households 
in 2000, and 14.7% of that of the bottom 40% (NSO Korea 2001b). If housing 
maintenance fees imposed by the estate management office were included as well as other 
bills paid by tenants (e.g. phone bills or medical insurances), the monthly regular 
expenditure would amount to roughly 40% of the household income.
For many households, such high costs of living in the KNHGprovided rental flats 
hindered them from moving in at the early stage of displacement from Nangok. For those 
who were not aware of such expected increase in household expenditure, life in the public 
rental units has been financially difficult to sustain. One of the KNHC tenants 
interviewed states that she initially applied for a KNHGprovided rental flat, but soon 
gave it up, and now lives in a semi-basement unit in Chonsei tenure because of her fear of
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the high monthly expenditure she would expect:
“I initially thought of moving to the rental flat, but my husband says we would need 
to pay monthly rents, not to mention the management fees, that our life would be 
difficult if we move there... He also didn’t like to live in a high-rise flat where you 
have to stay behind closed doors, saying he’d rather live in the neighbourhood near 
Nangok, mixing together with neighbours. So, I gave up my application. It hurts... 
Afterwards, we looked for a place in this neighbourhood, but all the places were so 
expensive at that time, and we decided to move to a place affordable within our 
budget... My friends who went to those KNHC rental flats all say I have made a 
good decision because the life there is so tough, saying they have to pay rents, 
management fees, and also all those utility bills. They say in winter, more than
300,000 [Korean] Won is spent every month. They all go out to work nowadays as 
both partners have to work to pay for all those bills. . .” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-18)
Another resident quotes his neighbours’ experiences:
“There are many people who are experiencing difficulties with their living, because 
they can’t pay the rents, and their economic conditions are not up to what’s required 
to live here. If they paid a rent deposit of KRW 16,000,000, then they would have 
to pay roughly KRW 160,000 as monthly rents, and if you add the management fee, 
then in each month, you have to spend KRW 340,000. Each month, how can they 
afford this? So, there are so many who are under pressure with lots of 
stress... There was one neighbour I used to know When he first moved into this flat 
here, he said it was like living in heaven... with hot water running from the tap, no 
need to change coals in winter, without having to withstand foul smelL Then, now 
he says his life here is not as good as it used to be in Nangok Why? It’s because he 
can’t afford the rents and all the bills. At the end of each month, he says he can’t go 
to sleep because of all the worries to pay those” (interviewee KSS10-INT-03)
Summary
This section has examined the housing outcome upon residents’ displacement, looking at 
the changes in dwelling space, housing tenure, housing costs and household expenditure. 
In the case of dwelling space, it was found that displaced residents as a whole experienced 
a statistically significant increase in dwelling space upon displacement, and this was 
particularly true of KNHC tenants and non-recipients of means-tested social assistance 
benefits. The post-displacement dwelling spaces for most households, however, were 
below the urban average. Despite the dwelling space increase, one third of the displaced 
residents still experienced overcrowding as defined by the national minimum housing 
standards, and this was more acute among the KNHC tenants (40.3%).
In terms of tenure change, more than half of the former Chonsei tenants transferred to 
deposit-based monthly rental tenure by moving to the KNHGprovided public rental flats.
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The other two fifths favoured cash compensation, and managed to remain in the same 
Chonsei tenure at the expense of poorer living environment, as most of them found 
homes in semi-basement or basement units, which were the least favoured dwelling form 
in South Korea. Residents with income constraints appeared to favour Chonsei tenure 
since they could not afford monthly rents payment, and this was the main reason for some 
eligible tenants to avoid KNHGprovided rental flats.
The displacement of Nangok tenants led to a significant increase in their housing costs, as 
the level of rent deposit after displacement was twice to three times as much as most 
tenants used to pay in Nangok. Cash compensation for eligible tenants was helpful, but 
not sufficient enough to cover the rent deposit difference. The majority of the residents 
did not enjoy formal sector borrowing, and instead relied on personal savings and 
informal borrowing to pay for the increased rent deposits. Upon displacement, most 
residents experienced an increase in the level of their household expenditure. The 
neighbourhood redevelopment and residents’ displacement drove them towards a greater 
degree of household expenditure in all aspects of expenditure items.
8.2 Housing outcomes upon redevelopment: the case  of Beijing
This section examines the housing outcome of Beijing residents upon their displacement 
from redevelopment neighbourhoods based on my in-depth interviews. Following the 
same structure as in the previous section, this section on Beijing residents will discuss 
whether there have been marked changes in terms of dwelling space, housing built form 
and indoor facilities, tenure, housing finance and expenditure upon residents’ 
displacement.
Dwelling space
Earlier in this thesis, it was found that residents living in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
experienced below-average floor space (see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2). As for the 
interviewees, their average dwelling floor space50 per household also turned out to be far
50 The floor space in this context is expressed as sbiyong rrianji in Chinese, referring to the floor space of a 
dwelling inside outer walls. In 2002, Beijing’s per capita floor space was 18.2 m2. The average household size 
was 3.0 persons, and therefore, the average floor space per household in Beijing would be 54.6 m2 (BMBS 
2003a).
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less than the municipal average (54.6 m2 in 2002). If the self-built space (that is, informal 
space that was not subject to a rental contract nor rents payment) was included, the 
average floor space per household reached 28.3 m2 only If the self-built space was 
excluded, it turned out to be 18.7 m2 only.
Improvement of household dwelling space upon displacement to suburban estates
Table 8-18 below shows the interviewees’ changes in dwelling space after their 
displacement from their original neighbourhoods in Dongcheng District. For this 
comparison, only the formal dwelling space was taken, as this was the basis of calculating 
their redevelopment compensation. According to the table, most interviewees experienced 
an increase in their dwelling space upon re-housing or displacement to suburban districts. 
It appears that displacees’ move to suburban districts resulted in larger dwelling spaces per 
household. The interviewees who were re-housed in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood also 
seemed to have had a substantial increase in their dwelling space, but they were part of
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ily As temporarily living in a pingfang dwelling originally occupied by their brother’s fair
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Improved per capita floor space upon displacement
After moving from their original neighbourhoods, most households except for CBK-INT- 
01 and CBD6-INT-01 enjoyed per capita floor space that was larger than the municipal 
average of 18.2 m2 in 2002. This suggests that the supply of newly built spacious flats 
purchased by displaced residents could have contributed to the improvement of average 
housing conditions in the municipality as a whole. This also indicates, however, the 
intensifying problems with the housing poor in the old and dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Their housing conditions were falling far behind the municipal average as the 
redevelopment of dilapidated neighbourhoods progressed, which in turn might have 
provided another reason for the municipal government to proceed with more ODHRP 
projects.
Dwelling forms and physical conditions
Neighbourhood redevelopment is rapidly changing the landscape of Beiiin? s urban soace.
b * ..  .w. i i i c v o i u m -  u i  i i i g i i - i i i L .  i i d w ,  a i n a
v housing market offers to most prospective homebuyers. Such was also 
se interviewees who were displaced from their original neighbourhoods 
pment. As shown in Table 8-19 below, all the displaced or re-housed 
one resided in either walk-up or high-rise flats.
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the case for the 
due to redevelo 
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5-19: Built forms of the dwellings occupied by the interviewees in Beijing Table
Pingfang dwellings Displaceme
Total (N = I
lit StatUS 
■0) with self-built without self-built 
extension extension
Walk-up flats High-rise flats
r-\4- i »-> ft i+-i irr>
redevelopment. All those walk-up or high-rise flats currently occupied by these 
interviewees were self-contained, and fully equipped with indoor facilities and central 
heating. This naturally displayed a stark difference from the physical conditions of 
pingfang dwellings or walk-up flats located in dilapidated neighbourhoods such as 
Xinzhongjie subject to its second phase redevelopment. Figure 8-2 below shows some 
examples of the views of an outer suburban estate, where three interviewee households 
were residing.
While the residents in walk-up or high-rise flats were agreeing that the physical conditions 
were far better than their old pingfang dwellings, they still expressed some complaints 
regarding their current dwellings. Such complaints were mostly related to the poor 
construction quality, which did not meet the expectation of the interviewees, and also to 
the poor management of their estates, as some of the quotes below suggest. As of April 
2001, there were no specific regulations governing the property management practices 
(China Daily 24 April 2001).
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Figure 8-2: Views of outer suburban walk-up flats in Beijing
Exterior view of a walk-up block in Airport Estate 
CKonggang Xincheng') in Yinghuayuan in Shunyi 
district. Three interviewees moved from Xiangheyuan 
neighbourhood in Dongcheng district were living in 
this estate.
Lounge area with double-glazed window
Y inghuayuan
C hangp ing
D istrict
airport
S h u n y i D istrict
Haidian
D istrict
C h aoyan g
D istrict
1. D o n g c h e n g  D istrict 2. C h o n g w en  D istrict
3. X uanw u D istrict 4 . X ich en g  D istrict
Main gate to the estate. On the red placard hanging 
over the gate says, "Don't let SARS enter our 
community", reflecting the city's struggle with the 
epidemic in the year.
Bedroom
Kitchen
Note: Pictures of interior views were taken in the 
residence (total floor space, 70.6 m2) of interviewee 
CBY-INT-02. Photos taken in August 2003, and map 
drawn by the author.
Housing tenure
As discussed earlier in Section 4.2 in Chapter 4, most dwellings in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods were public rental units. Table 8-20 below summarises the current tenure 
status of the interviewees in Beijing. Those displaced and relocated households at the time 
of interviewing also used to be tenants in public rental units, and this was the same for 
those who were yet to be displaced.
Table 8-20: Current tenure status of the interviewees in Beijing
Tenure status of displaced/re-housed interviewees
Pre-redevelopment tenure
Tenure upon displacement/re-housing 1
Owner occupation Rent-free (temporary) Sub.total 
occupancyCommercial housing Affordable housing
Public housing rental tenure 8 2 1 11
Tenure status of interviewees yet to be displaced
Households Owner occupation Municipal bureau housing Rent-free occupancy Sub-total
Subject to displacement 1 7 1 9
Source: Data from interviews conducted by the author in 2003
Most displacees interviewed became owner-occupiers by purchasing a commercial or an 
affordable housing { jin g i s h z y o n g fa r ig  in Chinese) unit. None of the households interviewed 
bought a second-hand flat to become owner-occupiers. Two households who bought 
affordable housing units were those re-housed upon completion of Haiyuncang 
redevelopment, which accompanied the construction of affordable housing instead of 
commercial housing.
In the case of interviewees yet to be displaced, homeownership turned out to be the most 
preferred option, and private renting was considered, if at all, as a short-term alternative 
before their permanent resettlement:
“I don't want to live in a private rental house... Don't live in a private owner's house.
It's too troublesome. The house owner makes decision about whether to allow you 
to live or not. If not allowed, you have to move out the next day”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-01)
“Renting a house is too expensive. I am not capable of renting a place. Our family 
makes altogether about 900 yuan a month [and is receiving benefits from minimum 
living standard security system]... [If to find a place to move in] I can take care of 
these matters temporarily. We can live with my mom, my son's grandmother, at her
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place, "which is also fine. But, in the end, you should allow us to have a practical 
place to live in, a house that belongs to myself. It must be not too far away If it is, I 
am not interested, as my child has to commute to school a long distance.”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-05)
“Even if you rent [for the time being], you need to buy a house someday Renting is 
very expensive. You need to pay the rent every month, and that's not stable. Because 
we are already quite old, soon going to be 50, there's no more future. It's always no 
good to rent. In the end, you place this burden on your children, and it’s not realistic 
either. Still want to have a place of one's own, regardless of the size. Having a place 
to return will make the children feel secure when they come home.”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-06)
Given the pre-reform situation that public rental tenure with minimal rents was 
guaranteed for life among urban residents, the logical option for the tenants upon 
displacement from their public rental units seemed to be homeownership, if their 
circumstances permitted. With the reduced amount of cash compensation from 2001 and 
the difficulties of the low-income residents in obtaining formal financial assistance, 
however, the residents’ expectation to become owner-occupiers upon their future 
displacement seemed doubtful
Financing homeownership
So far, it was shown that those displaced or re-housed households were able to 
successfully transfer to home owners, purchasing modem, redeveloped flats and 
occupying a dwelling of much larger size than their previous pingfang dwellings. The 
question is how did they finance the purchase? To address this question, I will first 
consider the amount of cash compensation these households were entitled to, and then 
examine the extent to which this compensation contributed to the purchase of their new 
dwellings.
Cash compensation as financial gains
As explained in the previous chapter, residents subject to redevelopment have been given 
cash-oriented compensation since 1998. In fact, interviewed households received cash 
compensation upon displacement, which was 5 to 13 times Beijing’s average annual 
disposable household income. Compared to the interviewees’ reported disposable 
household income,51 the cash compensation turned out to be almost equal to their life­
51 Interviewees were asked to provide the actual disposable income of each co-habiting household member.
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time cash savings. For example, the interviewee CBY-INT-02 who was 74 years old and 
retired at the time of interviewing had been living alone on her retirement pension while 
her only son was living separately with his family in a house in one of Beijing’s rural 
counties. She received in total 205,000 yuan as cash compensation for the formal space 
she occupied as a tenant. This included the cash incentive of 25,000 yuan that she 
received from the developer for having moved out before the house-moving deadline. Her 
total cash compensation was equivalent to forty one years of her annual disposable 
income.
Table 8-21: Summary of cash compensation received by 
displaced and re-housed interviewees in Beijing
Interviewee Displaced date Floor space of Reported
ID. interviewees' annual
pre- household
redevelopment income
dwellings
Household
category
Total Compensation received upon 
displacement
'Compensation to 'Compensation to 
interviewee Beijing's average
household income' annual household
CBK-INT-02 01 Jan. 2000 16.0 n.a. 275,000 n.a. 7
Displaced to CBK-INT-03 Early Jan. 2000 21.6 19,800 300,000 15 8
suburban districts CBY-INT-01 Early May 2001 18.0 20,400 280,000 14 7
CBY-INT-02 Early May 2001 15.0 5,040 205,000 41 5
CBY-INT-03 Early May 2001 18.0 17,448 490,000 28 13
Re-housed upon CBH-INT-01 n.a. 20.1 12,960 0 0 0
project completion CBH-INT-02 n.a. 42.0 24,720 0 0 0
CBX-INT-10 Early Jan. 2000 23.0 n.a. 295,000 n.a. 8
CBX-INT-11 Early Jan. 2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Temporary
residence after CBD6-INT-01 Early Dec. 2002 22.3 29,640 296,000 10 8
displacement
Note:
1) RMB 37391.7 was the annual disposable household income by the end of 2002 in Beijing (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2003: 179). 
Note that the annual disposable income of bottom 20% of income decile distribution was RMB 19384.0 in the same year.
2) The interviewee CBD6-INT-01 is displaced from another neighbourhood in Dongcheng District near Xinzhongjie neighbourhood, who
rprpivpri rnm nprra tinn  nnrlpr Hip  R1-70O1 Cnmnpnsatinn Mpasnrp.
On the other hand, those two households CBH-INT-01 and -02, re-housed in Haiyuncang 
upon redevelopment, were subject to a substantial amount of discount for their re­
housing flats instead of receiving cash compensation. The Haiyuncang redevelopment 
was in accordance with a revised ODHRP approach, which was announced in March 2000 
(BMG 2000b). This circular aimed at implementing a pilot programme that gave greater 
emphasis on existing residents’ re-housing upon the completion of neighbourhood 
redevelopment by constructing affordable housing on site (see previous Chapter 5 for 
more details).
Financing homeownership with cash compensation
Given the huge amount of total cash compensation, did the displaced residents find an 
opportunity to join the rank of homeowners upon displacement? The experience of the 
interviewed households indicated that this was possible, but only by moving further away 
from their original neighbourhoods in the inner city district.
Figure 8-3 below compares interviewed households’ redevelopment compensation upon 
their displacement with the actual housing price that they paid to become owner-occupiers. 
The figure suggests two interesting findings. Firstly, it clearly shows that the 
redevelopment compensation helped most interviewed households finance their housing 
purchase. Apart from the case of the interviewee CBX-INT-10, all other interviewed 
households purchased a commercial dwelling in suburban districts more or less within the 
budget of their redevelopment compensation. The housing price paid by the interviewee 
CBX-INT-IO was far greater than the total compensation she received, and this owed to 
the fact that her family was re-housed in an expensive commercial flat built on site upon 
completion of Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment.
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Figure 8-3: Cash compensation versus housing price
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When the total compensation was inadequate to finance the housing purchase, 
interviewed households filled the gap by relying on informal loans and personal savings. 
This was the case with four interviewees, CBK-INT-02, CBK-INT-03, CBY-INT-02 and 
CBX-INT-10. For instance, the interviewee CBK-INT-02 stated that her family used her 
early retirement payment from her former employer to pay the difference (35,000 yuan). 
The interviewee CBK-INT-03 also paid the difference (20,000 yuan) with her own cash 
savings, while CBY-INT-02 borrowed 5,000 yuan from her next of kin. In the case of the 
interviewee CBX-INT-10, the price of her re-housing flat turned out to be nearly twice as 
much as her total cash compensation. She refused to provide the details of how she 
financed the difference, and simply acknowledged briefly that she borrowed some money 
from her friends and relatives. It was evident from her response that the difference was 
hardly financed by formal loans from financial institutions. Such hesitance towards bank 
loans and their tendency to rely on relatives confirms the study on tenure decision 
behaviour in Guangzhou, which found that no families relied upon home mortgage at the 
time of the study (Li 2000: 230). In the case of homeowners in his study, 69% of the 
purchase was funded by personal savings, while the financial help from their relatives and 
parents made up the remaining balance.
As for the interviewees CBY-INT-01 and CBY-INT-03, the housing price was far lower
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than their total cash compensation. Instead of finding a relocation accommodation closer 
to their original place of residence, they chose to move to an outer suburban district (that 
is, Shunyi District). Such decision was made by these elderly displacees so that the 
remaining balance could be given to their children. For instance:
“Our daughter [whose family is also displaced as part of redevelopment and has 
chosen a re-housing option] needs to borrow money She doesn’t have any money 
If we say we don’t give her money she would have to add 200,000 yuan all by 
herself [to buy the re-housing flat]. 163,000 yuan for the flat, and some more for its 
furnishing... So, in this kind of circumstance, we moved to this neighbourhood, and 
gave her 150,000 yuan... ” (Interviewee CBY-INT-03)
The interviewees, CBH-INT-01 and -02, received discounts based on their working years 
and previous dwelling space, but still had to finance the large amount of remaining 
balance on their own. In the case of the household CBH-INT-01 that consisted of a 
retired old lady and her disabled son, their monthly income (RMB 1,080) consisted of 
minimum living allowance and a small amount of subsidy for the son’s disability. The 
interviewee was originally entitled to a three-bedroom flat in accordance with her 
registered household size at the time of redevelopment. Instead of purchasing this flat, 
the family went for a two-bedroom flat by giving up one bedroom and in return received 
RMB 90,000 as cash compensation. Their two-bedroom flat was priced at RMB 170,000 
after discount. To purchase the flat, they used their cash compensation, and received help 
from her youngest son and her nephew.
In the case of an old couple CBH-INT-02, they retired long ago, and had no housing 
provident fund account. Their monthly income, RMB 2,060, only consisted of their 
retirement pension. They were entitled to purchase a two-bedroom flat for their re­
housing, which was priced at RMB 100,000. The price was much less than what CBH- 
INT-01 had to pay, because their combined working years were longer and they used to 
occupy a dwelling which was twice as large as CBH-INT-01’s. The balance was paid out 
of household savings, and hence, they did not require any bank loans.
‘Forced consumption’: increases in household expenditure
While the residents expressed their desire to become homeowners to maintain their 
housing security, the life as owner-occupiers in modem flats would require far more 
increased expenditure. Given the low level of household income and rents while residing 
in dilapidated public rental units, the increased monthly housing costs might turn out to
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be damaging to their future sustenance of homeownership. An interviewee who moved to 
a walk-up flat in an outer suburban district commented:
“At that time [before displacement], we didn’t have to spend much. Our rent was 
just over thirty yuan, and water and electricity bills were cheaper there [in her old 
pingfang dwelling]. Now; things are not well. At the moment, I ’m telling you, I just 
don’t have the three hundred yuan [to pay for the bills]. I just don’t eat nor drink, 
but no three hundred yuan, and that’s embarrassing... ” (Interviewee CBY-INT-01)
In order to examine how much pressure the housing costs might have had upon residents 
after moving from their old neighbourhoods, Table 8-22 below made a summary of 
monthly housing costs incurred by the displaced interviewees in comparison with their 
reported household income. The table only included those households whose housing 
costs and monthly household disposable income were all reported to the author during 
the interviews.
Table 8-22: Monthly housing costs as reported by interviewees in Beijing
Displacement
status
Interviewee
ID.
Monthly 
household 
disposable 
income 
(in RMB)
©
Per capita 
monthly 
disposable 
income 
(in RMB)
Monthly housing costs as reported by interviewees (in RMB)
Rent or Utility bills 
management (electricity, 
fee1) water & 
gas)
© ®
Heating
costs25
©
<5) =
© + ®  + ©
% of monthly 
household 
disposable 
income
© /©
% of average 
monthly household 
disposable income 
in Beijing35
CBX-INT-01 1,070 535 0 56 23 79 7.3% 2.5%
CBX-INT-02 3,430 429 30 200 73 303 8.8% 9.7%
CBX-INT-03 3,310 662 65 350 58 473 14.3% 15.2%
Subject to CBX-INT-04 970 970 0 75 44 119 12.3% 3.8%
displacement
in near future CBX-INT-05 990 330 24 75 15 114 11.5% 3.6%
CBX-I NT-06 1,900 380 48 140 58 246 13.0% 7.9%
CBX-INT-08 1,390 463 26 150 0 176 12.7% 5.7%
Average 1,866 466 28 149 39 216 11.6% 6.9%
CBK-INT-03 1,650 825 51 200 188 45 251 15.2% 8.1%
CBY-INT-01 1,700 850 50 300 129 479 28.2% 15.4%
Moved to sub­
urban districts CBY-INT-02 420 420 52 105 133 290 69.0% 9.3%
CBY-INT-03 1,454 485 52 110 13155 162 11.1% 5.2%
Average 1,306 653 51 179 145 375 28.7% 12.0%
Re-housed CBX-INT-10 n.a. n.a. 375 155 277 807 n.a. 25.9%
(Xinzhongjie
Phase I) CBX-INT-U n.a. n.a. 406 155 300 861 n.a. 27.6%
,__j _,
disposable income in 2002.
As for the households relocated to suburban districts (that is, CBK-INT-01, CBY-INT-01, 
-02 and -03), they experienced a significant increase in housing costs. The total housing 
costs of those four interviewee households constituted on average 28.7% of their 
monthly household income. The proportion of housing costs to Beijing’s average monthly 
household disposable income was highest in the case of those two households re-housed 
in the Sun City Estate (that is, CBX-INT-10 and -11). As was mentioned earlier, these 
households re-housed in the Sun City could be assumed to be the wealthiest among the 
residents displaced as part of Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment. However, even for 
them, the monthly housing costs in redeveloped flats were beyond their expectation, and 
this was reported to be the main reason behind re-housed households moving out in 
order to gain rent by letting their Sun City flats. Apparently, among the twenty odd 
households who were re-housed upon completion of the Sun City project in January 2002, 
only six households were remaining at the time of interviewing in August 2003.
Summary
This section has examined the housing outcome of the residents who were displaced or 
re-housed due to neighbourhood redevelopment in Beijing. In relation to dwelling space, 
all the interviewed households reported an increase in their dwelling space upon 
displacement and re-housing. All of them also reported increased per capita floor space. It 
appears that displacees’ move to suburban districts resulted in larger dwelling spaces, 
unless residents were rich enough to purchase luxurious commercial flats in inner city 
districts and be re-housed upon project completion. The physical conditions and indoor 
facilities of the dwellings occupied by the displaced or re-housed households were much 
superior to the pingfang dwellings they lived in before redevelopment.
The residents’ displacement and re-housing led to their tenure conversion from the public 
sector tenants to owner-occupiers, as they all purchased a flat. The cash compensation 
that the residents were entitled to was 5 to 13 times Beijing’s average annual household 
disposable income and equivalent to life-time savings for those displacees. "When short of 
money to finance their housing purchase, they relied mostly on their personal savings and 
informal borrowing rather than on formal loans from financial institutions. The transfer 
to owner occupation in modem flats, however, seemed to have incurred much higher 
housing costs than the interviewees used to pay before redevelopment. Such high costs
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were too burdensome for Xinzhongjie residents who were re-housed in Sun City so they 
had to move elsewhere and seek rental income instead.
8.3 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the housing outcome of the residents from dilapidated 
neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing upon their displacement due to neighbourhood 
redevelopment. Five main aspects were examined: dwelling space; dwelling forms and 
physical conditions; housing tenure; housing finance; and household expenditure. The 
summaiy of the findings are presented in Table 8-23.
Existing studies on displacement in market economies tend to find displacement as having 
negative impacts upon residents as it involved substantially higher rents and housing costs 
for more crowded and inferior dwellings (Hartman 1979; LeGates and Hartman 1986). 
The redevelopment of dilapidated neighbourhoods in Seoul partly supports such 
a rg u m en t. The displacement of residents from Nangok certainly led to substantial 
increases in housing costs, and most displacees reported increased household expenditure 
on most spending items. The dwellings in dilapidated neighbourhoods suited low-income 
residents’ financial needs, but their destruction and the subsequent displacement of 
residents seemed to have increased debts and aggravated their financial situations. Due to 
the appalling physical conditions in Nangok before redevelopment, however, the 
displacement of residents did not necessarily involve moving to a worse living 
environment. Residents who moved to semi-basement or basement units were discontent 
about the lack of natural lighting and damp conditions, but such dwellings’ other indoor 
facilities were still superior to what could be found in dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Despite the improved dwelling conditions and increased dwelling space, however, 
overcrowding was still prevalent among displaced residents, as they had to find 
accommodations within their budget constraints.
In Beijing, the physical living conditions were substantially improved in the case of 
displaced or re-housed residents. Such improvement was also accompanied by their tenure 
conversion from public housing tenants to owner-occupiers. Residents disfavoured private 
renting that would not provide housing security as solid as what it used to be within the 
traditional public rental sector. However, relocation to or re-housing in a modem flat 
within or outside the inner city districts would incur a substantial increase in housing
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expenditure after displacement, which could be detrimental to residents’ monthly 
expenditure capacity, given the low-income status and unstable employment characteristics 
of many households.
Table 8-23: Summary of Seoul and Beijing residents’ housing experiences upon displacement
■ Seoul Beijing
Dwelling space Increased dwelling space but overcrowding 
persists
Overall dwelling space increase, especially when 
moving to public rental flats. Economically better off 
families more likely to experience space increase
Per capita floor space of the displaced, mostly below 
urban average
One third of the displaced households, failing to 
meet the national minimum housing standards. More 
likely to experience overcrowded conditions in public 
rental flats
Increased dwelling space
Substantial increase in dwelling space when 
displaced and purchased a flat in suburban districts 
or re-housed in redevelopment neighbourhoods
Most interviewed residents experiencing larger per 
capita floor space upon displacement than the 
municipal average
Increased dwelling space applicable only to those 
who became owner occupiers upon displacement
Dwelling forms and 
physical conditions
Overall improvement of physical conditions, though 
some concerns raised for (semi-)basement units
(Semi-)basement units are the least favoured 
dwelling form in South Korea, but found to be the 
second most frequently cited dwelling form after the 
KNHC-provided public rental flats
Displaced residents hardly moved to high-rise flats 
unless they became KNHC tenants
Improved physical conditions of post-displacement 
flats
Physical conditions of post-displacement flats 
superior to those in dilapidated neighbourhoods
Some concerns regarding poor construction and 
management practices
Housing tenure Trade-off between tenure preference and dwelling 
form, constrained by household income
Tenure conversion from Chonsei to deposit-based 
monthly rental when moving to public rental flats
Residents remaining in Chonsei tenure upon 
displacement likely to live in (semi-)basement units
Lower income residents more likely to remain in 
Chonsei tenure in fear of paying monthly rents with 
limited income
Homeownership orientation
Displaced residents in search for homeownership
Those residents subject to displacement in future 
also expressing a strong preference for owner
nrrt inatinn
Housing finance Cash compensation helpful, but not sufficient
Eligible tenants in receipt of cash compensation 
found it helpful to finance their post-displacement 
rent deposits
Cash compensation still not enough to fill in the 
difference between pre- and post-displacement rent 
deposits
Most frequently cited financing methods being 
personal savings and informal borrowing, leading to 
increased debts upon displacement
Ineligible tenants more likely to find a post­
displacement dwelling that requires less rent deposits
Homeownership mostly determined by cash 
compensation
Cash compensation as financial gains: 5~13 times 
Beijing's average annual household disposable 
income
The amount of cash compensation determining 
where to buy a flat
If in shortage of funds, mostly relying on personal 
means or informal borrowing
Household
expenditure
Increase household expenditure
Most expenditure items experiencing increased
Increased household expenditure
Monthly spending on housing maintenance and
When neighbourhood redevelopment and residents’ displacement take place, it is argued 
that the actual outcome and consequences of displacement would depend on the 
relocation (and compensation) policies implemented (Cameron 2003). The redevelopment 
compensation policies in Seoul and Beijing very much support this argument. In Seoul, 
the provision of public rental flats as in-kind compensation seemed to have attracted a 
certain proportion of eligible tenants in spite of the fact that their tenure transfer from 
Chonsei in the private sector to monthly rental tenure in the public sector would incur 
much higher monthly expenditure on rents and management fees. For the tenants eligible 
for such redevelopment compensation, redevelopment meant a ‘fast-track’ access to the 
public rental sector, which only benefits a small proportion of tenant households in Seoul 
due to limited supply The high housing costs incurred in the public rental sector, however, 
pushed away a substantial number of eligible tenants who chose cash compensation in 
order to remain in their favoured Chonsei tenure. The majority of such tenants had to 
make a trade-off between the long-term tenure security provided by the public rental 
sector and the poorer dwelling conditions, as such move led to their setdement in the least 
favoured dwelling form (that is, semi-basement or basement units in individual and multi­
dwelling houses). Such trade-off was more prevalent among the recipients of means- 
tested social assistance programmes, as they tried to avoid paying monthly rents due to 
limited regular income.
As for the ineligible tenants in Seoul, the absence of any kind of redevelopment 
compensation meant that they would struggle hard to keep their head above water in the 
private rental sector that neither guarantees long-term tenure security nor provides 
adequate formal financial support for them to finance housing costs. When the ineligible 
tenants were displaced, their housing consumption behaviour tended to be similar to that 
of eligible tenants, but the rent deposit of their post-displacement dwellings appeared to 
be much less than what eligible tenants paid.
In Beijing, the changes in compensation policies from re-housing to full monetarisation 
led to the displaced residents’ tenure conversion from rental tenure in the public sector to 
owner occupation in the private sector. In this respect, redevelopment policies are in line 
with the government policies of promoting homeownership during the reform period. 
This, however, also means that public sector tenants have no other choice but to exercise 
their housing choice only within the private sector with no further access to welfare 
housing. Moreover, the cash compensation policies adopted in 1998 came to favour those
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with larger dwelling space before displacement, and excluded those who were relying 
heavily on informal self-built dwelling space to meet their housing needs. It is doubtful, 
however, that such tenure conversion would continue to take place as the municipal and 
central governments have revised their compensation policies in 2001 leading to the 
substantial reduction of cash compensation. In this study, it was not possible to contact 
those Beijing tenants ineligible for redevelopment compensation. Such tenants would 
usually consist of migrant workers or families who do not have permanent Beijing hukou, 
not having lived long-term in dilapidated neighbourhoods. They do not have access to 
Beijing’s public rental housing, and may largely reside in employer-provided compounds 
or private dwellings in and around suburban districts and counties (see Section 2.1 in 
Chapter 2 for more details on urban migrants in Beijing). If any such families are found to 
live in redevelopment neighbourhoods as private renters, they are not qualified for any 
redevelopment compensation by regulations, and will have to seek alternative dwellings 
with their personal means.
Having examined residents’ housing experiences upon displacement, such diverse 
experiences among the existing residents in redevelopment districts in Seoul and Beijing 
would result in differing degrees of frustration. How the residents participate in and 
respond to the redevelopment of their neighbourhoods is going to be the main topic for 
the following chapter.
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Chapter 9 
Residents and participation: limited opportunities
9.1 Seoul: charade of community participation
Basis of community participation: voluntary association of property- 
owners
Fallacy of community participation
Owner-occupiers and their limited access to development gains
Tenants and their collective actions
Summary
9.2 Beijing: lack of opportunities for residents’ participation
No provision for residents’ participation until displacement
Barriers to participation
Residents’ discontent and its sources
Limited individual actions
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Summary
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This chapter forms the third of the three chapters on residents. This chapter examines the 
degree of residents’ participation in order to identify if there are any opportunities for 
residents in Seoul and Beijing to intervene in the processes of neighbourhood 
redevelopment.
In western literatures, the rise of the regeneration partnership has led to an increasing 
attention on the issue of community participation. In the UK, for instance, community 
involvement has been considered central to partnership approach especially since the rise 
of the New Labour government (Imrie and Raco 2003). Increased community 
participation in urban regeneration partnership is treated as an end in itself. Critics 
focused on the need of empowering local communities and disadvantaged residents 
(Baeten 2000; McArthur 1995; Power 1996), and the evaluation of the degree of 
community participation and empowerment in regeneration partnership (Hart et al. 1996; 
Hastings and McArthur 1995; Smith and Beazley 2000). It is often criticised, however, that 
limited resources and bargaining power constrain communities from actively partaking in 
decision-making, implementation or evaluation processes (Atkinson 2003; Crawford 2003; 
Morrison 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2003).
In South Korea and mainland China, community participation in urban renewal has rarely 
received attention in academic literatures in spite of the extensive operation of recent 
neighbourhood redevelopment projects. In South Korea, the issue of people’s 
participation has often been discussed in the context of democratisation and resistance to 
authoritative state (e.g. Hart-Landsberg 1993; Kim 1980) or rural community development 
and nation-building (e.g. Dore et al. 1981; Whang 1981). In the context of urban renewal, 
criticisms were mounted mainly against the forced eviction of tenants and the protection 
of their housing rights (ACHR 1989a, 1989b; Q IR 1988; Kim 1998; Kim 1991). Recently, 
there has been a call for a more community-based redevelopment approach (Ha 2001a), 
and there is a need to closely examine the local contexts within which residents’ 
participation is constrained and discouraged.
In mainland China, literatures on community participation emerge mainly in the context 
of rural development (e.g. Plummer and Taylor 2004), social welfare (e.g. Leung and 
Wong 1999; Liu 2004; Wang et al. 2005) and urban service delivery (Xu and Chow 2006). 
Recently some critical literatures have begun to emerge and address the limits of 
community participation in policy-making and implementation (Cai 2004; Chu 2004) and
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the changing nature of urban governance that re-invents urban communities to create a 
“governable society'’ (Wu 2002a). Community participation, however, has been rarely 
discussed in the context of urban renewal, and we are yet to have a more concrete 
understanding of how community participation has been promoted or discouraged.
In this respect, this chapter attempts to be both exploratory and explanatory in its 
approach, and addresses the following key questions: did residents have means to 
intervene and participate within the existing redevelopment framework; to what extent did 
residents approve or dissent neighbourhood redevelopment; moreover, did they remain 
passive throughout the redevelopment process?
9.1 Seoul: charade of community participation
In this section on Seoul, I will start by addressing the legal basis of local community 
participation within the Joint Redevelopment Programme (JRP). It shows that community 
participation in the JRP largely refers to the participation of propertyowners, and 
excludes tenants. I will then discuss how local community participation was hampered by 
taking the case study of Nangok neighbourhood redevelopment. The third and fourth 
subsections discuss the collective actions taken by the remaining owner-occupiers and 
tenants in Nangok.
Basis of community participation: voluntary association of propertv-owners
Legal provision for property-owners’ participation
In Seoul, the implementation of the JRP is based on the voluntary association of 
propertyowners. Propertyowners in a redevelopment neighbourhood come together at 
the outset to establish a representative body called ‘redevelopment steering committee’ 
(see Figure 9-1). The committee is there to facilitate the redevelopment processes 
including the designation of their neighbourhood as a redevelopment district if the 
designation is not made by the local authority. When in need of a collective decision, the 
committee calls for a general assembly where propertyowners cast a vote.
There are two major moments when propertyowners are required by law to make a 
collective decision (Kim et al. 1996: 108-109). The first moment is when the 
redevelopment steering committee transforms into a legal body called a ‘redevelopment
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association,’ and becomes the official project implemented At least two thirds of the 
property-owners should give consent to the establishment of the redevelopment 
association. It is initially comprised of property-owners only, but as soon as professional 
developers are selected, they also join the redevelopment association.
Figure 9-1: Property-owners’ action at each stage of a JRP project 
(MoCT Korea 2000)
Project preparation 
(area designation)
Project implementation 
plan
(if area designation is
not completed) i-------------------------------------- steering o
Selection of a neighbourhood and 
preparation of a project outline (if area designation 
is completed)
1
Designation of a neighbourhood as a 
redevelopment district
Consent from tw o thirds of
i f
Establishment of 'redevelopment 
association'
Selection of a developer, which then 
joins the association as a co-member
Preparation of a 'project 
implementation plan'
Preparation and submission of a 
'project implementation plan'
Consent from tw o thirds of 
property owners
Review and approval of the project 
implementation plan
Management disposal plan Application for a redevelopment flat
|
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Project implementation 
(demolition and construction)
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The second occasion takes place just before submitting a project implementation plan for 
government approval. The delegates of a redevelopment association, chosen through a 
general assembly of property-owners at the time of its inauguration, work together with 
professional developers, and produce a project implementation plan that contains 
information on what are to be built on site. Before its submission to the local authority, 
the plan needs to be approved by at least two thirds of the property-owners.
Law enforcement against non-consenting owner-occupiers
Not all the owner-occupiers would be satisfied with the demolition and redevelopment of 
their neighbourhoods, and some may resist and raise objection and complaints. They may 
also refrain from accepting the collective decision made in a general assembly Some of 
them may also change their mind after initially consenting to the neighbourhood 
redevelopment, and refuse to vacate dwellings. This often splits property-owners sharply 
into two opposing groups. The head of the Housing Bureau at the Gwanak district 
government explained:
“The legal consent rate is very contradictory... Those who consent are acting 
according to their conviction that it [redevelopment] would bring profits. People 
who dissent... are forced to follow despite their unwillingness... So, the dispute can 
be sometimes fierce... ”
(Head of the Housing Bureau, Gwanak district government)
The Urban Redevelopment Act defines that when such disputes occur, a negotiation is to 
take place between disagreeing owners and the redevelopment association. "When there is 
no prospect of obtaining disagreeing owners’ consent, the redevelopment association can 
apply to the court to enforce land acquisition as per the Land Acquisition Act. This is 
deemed necessary to safeguard the interests of the majority group at the expense of 
restricting the right of the minority to dispose of their own properties. This is regarded as 
inevitable in order to complete a project. In this process, the local authority itself does not 
have the jurisdiction to intervene, and the action has to come from the property-owners:
under the present system, it’s a serious problem to mediate such disputes... But, 
the government doesn’t have the means to do this. For instance, if 90% of the 
residents give consent and submit their applications for government permission, the 
permission has to be given. Then, there’s no guarantee that the remaining 10% 
would understand and yield to the majority In such a situation... residents have to 
resolve the situation on their own. We encourage them to meet, talk and understand 
each other, but there’s no legal measure we can resort to in order to solve the 
minority problem... ” (Head of the Housing Bureau, Gwanak district government)
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No provision for tenants' participation
The principle of voluntary association and residents’ participation applied stricdy to the 
property-owners in a redevelopment neighbourhood. As for tenants, there were no 
provisions made in the Urban Redevelopment Act for their participation in the decision­
making process. Since the underlying basis of property-owners’ participation was their 
financial contribution to the total costs of redevelopment, tenants were only granted 
redevelopment compensation if eligible. In most cases, the legal requirement to provide 
public rental flats for eligible tenants who wished to choose the in-kind compensation 
option was regarded by property-owners and developers as detrimental to the profit 
maximisation of redevelopment projects.
Fallacy of community participation
Domination of absentee landlords
In a JRP project, as soon as professional developers are selected and the project enters 
into the stage of preparing a project implementation plan, project uncertainties are lifted 
and speculation becomes rampant. Owner-occupiers increasingly sell their properties to 
off-site investors and speculators who join the redevelopment association as absentee 
landlords. Under such circumstances, collective decisions by the redevelopment 
association increasingly becomes in favour of the absentee landlords (or speculators as 
they are commonly referred to). In time, these absentee landlords come to dominate the 
redevelopment association, and act as individual gentrifiers, constituting one of the three 
major gentrifying agents (the other two being professional developers and landlords) 
(Smith 1992:112).
In Nangok neighbourhood, this process was also clearly witnessed. As its redevelopment 
project preparation progressed, an increasing number of properties possessed by owner- 
occupiers changed hands. A former owner-occupier who sold her dwelling and moved to 
Chonsei tenure confirmed the prevalence of absentee landlords, stating that:
“By the time the general assembly was held in May 2000 [to approve the KNHC’s 
participation], there were only about 450 [owner occupying] households [about 18% 
of total propertyowners]... All others were from elsewhere”
(Interviewee KSS3-INT-01)
The speculators’ take-over caused the fluctuation of dwelling prices in Nangok. 
According to some interviewees’ recollection, the peak price of a 26 m2 dwelling (that is,
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the most commonly found dwelling size in Nangok) reached KRW 65 million in 1996 
when private developers signed an agreement to participate. When the developers 
withdrew in May 1998 due to its financial instability, the prospect of neighbourhood 
redevelopment was endangered, and the dwelling prices fell sharply to KRW 25 million. It 
never recovered the pre-1998 prices afterwards, as the project’s profitability decreased 
substantially.
Nearly two years after the withdrawal of the private developers, the property-owners were 
summoned to hold a general assembly in May 2000 to collectively decide the participation 
of the KNHG By this time, the speculators must have been deeply frustrated, as the 
prices of dwellings were only half what they were before the withdrawal of the private 
developers.
“Some estimates say it [the proportion of speculators] could be as many as 90% [of 
property-owners]. These people paid between KRW 50—100 million to buy a 
dwelling, and they have a very high stake. This might cause conflicts when the 
management disposal plan [to determine the sale price of redeveloped flats] is 
executed” (Official consultant to the property-owners’ representative bodj^
Misleading information that undermines owner-occupiers’ decision-making
The domination of off-site speculators threatened the position of owner-occupiers as an 
official partner of a redevelopment project. The remaining owner-occupiers’ decision­
making was further undermined as they were often presented with misleading information 
by the redevelopment steering committee and professional developers. A good example 
was the case of a general assembly held on 20 May 2000, which was to approve the 
participation of the KNHC as the professional developer. The general assembly was co­
hosted by the then redevelopment steering committee and the KNHG
It was required to obtain consent from at least half of the neighbourhood’s property- 
owners to approve the KNHCs participation. More than 50% of property-owners were 
present at the general assembly, and unanimously approved the company’s participation. 
Some interviewees, however, suggested that the event was very much flawed, and that they 
were deceived by the rosy pictures presented in the meeting:
“If we talk about the percentage, I think there would be only about 30% of 
remaining owner-occupiers who would agree with the redevelopment... When I 
attended the meeting, I just couldn’t think of disapproving it... What they said was 
so sweet and attractive... ” (Interviewee KSS10-INT-03)
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“Without any explanation, they called us to a general assembly... The mayor of the 
district government, members of the local district assembly and the head of the 
redevelopment steering committee were all there. They asked us to bring our seaL 
We went there to listen to how the redevelopment would proceed. If it were for us 
to decide whether or not we agreed with it, I wouldn’t have gone there. When I 
arrived, they told us to stamp my seal on a piece of paper next to my name and 
address before entering the venue. There was no explanation on why we had to 
stamp our seaL There was no other process of giving consent. They used our seal- 
stamping as a proof of giving our consent to the redevelopment... During the event 
they told us about what was to happen, and that owner-occupiers were to move to 
Sillim 10-dong [where public rental flats were provided by the KNHC for their 
temporary relocation]. We were told we’d come back here when the construction 
was over. People who knew nothing simply thought apartment flats of the same 
kind as in Sillim 10-dong would be built here, and we would just move back... ”
(Interviewee KSS3-INT-01)
The presentation of exaggerated redevelopment pictures appeared to be an attempt to 
prevent any potential failure of winning the required number of votes in the meeting. An 
official at the local district government fully understood this problem and stated:
“For many local residents, they wouldn’t agree if they are not presented with 
somewhat speculative blueprint, which says their asset would increase by two fold.
So, at the beginning, because the project is not yet concrete, a rather hopeful, 
exaggerated plan is shown [by developers] to the residents in order to bring them 
together. . .” (Head of the Housing Bureau, Gwanak district government)
Weaker association of existing property-owners with the KNHCs participation
The Urban Redevelopment Act defined that a public agency like the KNHC participated 
in a redevelopment project upon the request of more than half of all the property-owners, 
and that it was to become the sole implementer of the redevelopment. This meant that 
the property-owners could not become joint implementers of the redevelopment, and no 
longer had a legal status equal to the developer. In this context, the redevelopment 
steering committee of Nangok was dissolved after holding the aforementioned general 
assembly in May 2000, and a consultation body was formed instead in July 2000, 
consisting of 17 delegates of property-owners. The body was called the ‘council for 
residents’ representatives.’ Its role was to collect the opinions of property-owners, hold 
meetings with the developer on a regular basis in relation to any issues on which the 
developer wished to consult the property-owners, and publicise the project progress as 
well as the contents of discussions between the council and the KNHC (Council for the 
Residents' Representatives for Sillim District 1 Redevelopment 2000).
The implication of this was that the KNHC had no obligation to obtain property-owners’
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consent regarding the submission of the project implementation plan. The only occasion 
to hold a property-owners’ general assembly was when a management disposal plan was 
prepared and ready for submission to the local authority. In this case, at least a half of the 
property-owners were required to attend, and any decision in the general assembly should 
be made by majority in accordance with the Ordinance on Urban Redevelopment in Seoul 
(Article 15). Therefore, the council existed to function only as a channel of information 
between the developer and property-owners, and to facilitate the information sharing 
among them rather than as a decision-making body
Owner-occupiers and their limited access to development gains
Owner-occupiers and loss of opportunities to acquire development gains
For owner-occupiers in dilapidated neighbourhoods, the redevelopment presented a good 
opportunity to increase their asset by taking advantage of the rent gap in their 
neighbourhood (see Chapter 5). The purchase of redeveloped flats could also lead to asset 
increases as the Korean housing market had been experiencing a general price increase 
especially in the high-rise apartment sector (Kookmin Bank 2005). Furthermore, the price 
of redeveloped flats sold to the property-owners was about one-fifth cheaper than the 
price of redeveloped flats set aside for general sales in the new housing market.52 The 
majority of owner-occupiers were, however, stripped of the opportunity of acquiring full 
development gains as they were replaced by off-site speculators. The high prices for the 
purchase of public lands and redeveloped flats discouraged them from staying, and 
became the main source of owner-occupiers’ frustration.
As mentioned earlier, in Nangok, more than 90% of the lands were public. By the time 
the redevelopment steering committee was organised in the neighbourhood in 1995, there 
was a wide gap between the prices of public lands in the neighbourhood and those of 
private lands in the vicinity (see Figure 9-2 below).
52 The redevelopment of Sillim 2-1 District, an area located close to Nangok neighbourhood, was also 
carried out by the KNHC, completed in 2001. The final management disposal report (finalised in August 
2001) that I was able to obtain from the KNHC showed that the price of redeveloped flats was between 
KRW 90,248,194 (for a flat with a construction floor space of 101.0 m2) and KRW 191,291,336 (for a 195.5 
m2 flat), which was 17 —18% cheaper than the price of redeveloped flats set aside for general sales.
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Figure 9-2: Comparison of official land prices in and around Nangok, 1991 - 2005
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Gap © is the price difference between the public land in Nangok neighbourhood and the private land in the vicinity at the time 
of establishing Nangok neighbourhood's redevelopment steering committee. Gap © is the increase in the official land price in 
Nangok neighbourhood by the time the land preparation was completed.
Sources: Ministry of Construction (1991 to 1994) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan 
Yeoncha Bogoseo); Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1995 to 2002) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In 
Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha Bogoseo); Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1999 to 2002) Official Land 
Prices: Seoul Vol.II-1; Seoul Land Information Service web site (http://lmis.seoul.go.kr/sis/index.html)
The official price of public lands in Nangok was as low as one quarter of the price of 
private lands in the vicinity. As the project went ahead with the participation of the 
KNHC, the official land price of the public lands in Nangok substantially increased, 
eventually surpassing the price of private lands in the vicinity. This represented the 
development opportunities envisaged by the property-owners and developers at the outset 
of the redevelopment project.
By law, the dwelling owners occupying public lands were to purchase the lands to secure 
full ^;//reproperty-ownership. This purchase was carried out between 2000 and 2001. Ten 
per cent of the total land price was paid as down payment upon purchase, and the 
remaining balance could be paid in instalment over 20 years with an interest rate of 4%. 
All information on cost items including the land price remained undisclosed, and it was 
not possible to obtain the land price information from official sources. An owner- 
occupier in an interview, however, suggested that the land price of public lands reached 
about KRW 620,000 per m2, which was roughly a mid-point between the price of public 
lands in the neighbourhood and the price of private land in the vicinity shown in previous 
Figure 9-2:
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“The land I occupied was evaluated to  be 39 pyeong [that is, 129 m2 in metric 
terms]... I have to pay KRW 80,000,000 in total, and so far, paid KRW 8,000,000.1 
have this table that shows how  much I need to pay over 20 years. Next year, I have 
to payback one-twentieth [of the total land price]... ” (Interviewee KSS10-INT-05)
Given that the land price could be paid in instalment over 20 years, the actual amount that 
an owner-occupier needed to pay at the time of re-housing would be equal to the sales 
price of a redeveloped flat minus the total land price. By taking the examples of two 
owner-occupiers, Table 9-1 below shows an estimation of the total payment to the 
developer expected to be incurred upon project completion. I took the average annual 
household disposable income for wage- and salary-earning urban households in 2001 to 
see the affordability of the total payment (NSO Korea 2002a).
Table 9-1: Estimated prices of redeveloped flats and land in Nangok
Interviewee ID (owner occupiers in Nangok neighbourhood) KSS10-INT-05 KSS7-INT-10
Redeveloped flat 
(based on a 6th floor
Size of the redevelopment flat 
the interviewee applied for
145.5 m2 
(44 pyeong)
79.3 m2 
(24 pyeong)
flat) © Housing price0 KRW 218,250,000 KRW 118,950,000
Price-to-annual income ratio 
(average income) 7.8 : 1 4.3 : 1
Price-to-annual income ratio 
(bottom 20% of income decile) 20.3 : 1 11.1 : 1
Occupied land
Land price 
®  (KRW 620,000 per m2) KRW 79,918,000 KRW 16,368,000
Land area occupied (m2) 128.9 26.4
Total payment to the 
developer upon 
project completion
© -  © KRW 138,332,000 KRW 102,582,000
Price-to-annual income ratio 
(average income)
::: •/ " p v - :  ■
5.0 : 1 3 .7 :1
Price-to-annual income ratio 
(bottom 20% of income decile) 12.9 : 1 9.6 : 1
Note: 1) The housing price in this table is based on the preliminary estimate provided by the vice-chairperson of the council for residents' 
representatives, which was an official association of property owners in Nangok neighbourhood. The estimation turned out to be fairly close to 
the official prices of redevelopment flats announced in 2004 (see Table 7-4 in Chapter 7).
The table above reveals three interesting aspects to the situation. Firstly, the price of 
redeveloped flats appeared to be relatively affordable (price-to-annual income ratio of 
4.3—7.8 to 1) for average wage- and salary-earning urban households. Secondly, the 
redevelopment framework was inevitably in favour of those few owner-occupiers in the 
neighbourhood who already owned their lands, since they only had to pay for the 
difference between the prices of the land and the redeveloped flat. Thirdly, the total 
payment to the developer upon project completion was still much less affordable for low- 
income households. Since most owner-occupiers had to pay for the lands as well, securing 
bank loans for the payment of housing price would put an additional pressure upon the 
household economy. As an owner-occupier explained:
“Even the mayor of the district government told us to sell our properties so that we 
could at least get some money to pay for rent deposit elsewhere. He said there was a 
limit on what he could do because this project had been already decided to go ahead. 
That meant, if you didn’t have the capacity then you should simply sell your 
rights. . .” (Interviewee KSS3-INT- 01)
Remaining owner-occupiers and their collective actions
As the financial pressure was heavily felt by the remaining owner-occupiers, disputes 
emerged among them. Some of the remaining owner-occupiers became increasingly 
unhappy about the inefficiency and incompetent management of the council for 
residents’ representatives, and established a separate organisation early in 2001, which they 
named the ‘emergency committee.’ The interviewees who led this movement explained:
“At the beginning, the council for residents’ representatives consisted of twenty 
delegates. The council represented absentee landlords’ interest only and some of 
the poor owner-occupiers felt so endangered that they formed an emergency 
committee to launch a struggle... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INW01)
“I was originally one of the twenty delegates in that council... There were a lot of 
disputes at that time. I always raised objection, and had a lot of bickering. Nobody 
could understand me, so I couldn’t bear it any more and quit. When the emergency 
committee was organised, I was chosen as the chairperson through a general 
assembly in order to establish the legitimacy7’ (Interviewee KSS7-INT-10)
The actions by the emergency committee were, in fact, directed towards the local and 
central governments. The major demand staged was regarding the public lands within the 
neighbourhood that were used for accommodating public facilities such as the local 
administrative office and thoroughfares. Article 56 of the Urban Redevelopment Act 
stated that any public facilities within a redevelopment district would be transferred free 
of charge to the implementers of neighbourhood redevelopment. In Nangok, the Korea 
Forest Service was the largest landlord, and initially denied the free transfer of lands used 
as thoroughfares. The logic was that the thoroughfares were not officially designated roads, 
and were illegally created and used by the residents.
“After establishing the emergency committee, we went to the municipal government 
and the Korea Forest Office, demanding the free transfer of those lands. They 
didn’t accept it. This transfer was actually a very contradictory issue. Say for example 
a piece of public land is [designated as] forestry [according to the municipal land use 
planning]. Its land use designation will change to ‘land for housing’ when the project 
implementation plan is finally approved. Then, we have to pay for the purchase of 
lands based on the modified land use. In the case of thoroughfares in our 
neighbourhood, they were saying these were not [officially recognised] roads and 
that we had to pay as well... So, we fought. If you have no knowledge, you simply
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get deceived.” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-10)
The land transfer was an important issue for the owner-occupiers, as this would 
considerably reduce the overall redevelopment costs, which would then reduce the 
amount of contribution each owner-occupier had to make in order to be re-housed. 
About twenty owner-occupiers were actively participating in the emergency council, and 
“staged demonstrations, attended by around 150 residents” (Interviewee KSS7-INW04). 
In the end, their request was accepted:
When we went to the municipal government office and the Korea Forest Service, 
the official in charge was telling me not to raise my voice. So I told him, ‘people 
keep quiet because they are not aware of such regulations.’ In the end, we won.
What happened was that, say here is a house. If an alley was a cul-de-sac, it wasn’t 
counted as a thoroughfare, but if it wasn’t and you could keep on going, then it was 
recognised as a thoroughfare... It saved a lot of project costs”
(Interviewee KSS7-INT-10)
Upon the approval of the project implementation plan, the total land size that became 
subject to the free transfer turned out to be 27,324 m2 (GDG 2001b). This was about 
16% of the total project area. The project costs saved by this free transfer were known to 
be around KRW 50 billion. According to one of the ex-members of the emergency 
committee (Interviewee KSS7-INW04), this could be as much as ten per cent of the total 
project costs estimated by the KNHG Upon resolving this issue, the emergency 
committee dissolved, and six of its delegates joined the council for residents’ 
representatives, who were then able to check collectively the decisions of those existing 
council delegates.
Tenants and their collective actions
When the KNHC finally decided its participation and signed an agreement at the end of 
February 2000, several local community-based organisations organised three occasions of 
public hearing to help tenants understand the redevelopment progress and what 
compensation measures existed for them. These took place in May June and August 2000. 
The formal relocation of owner-occupiers and eligible tenants who chose in-kind 
compensation took place in October 2000. Until then, there was no concrete movement 
among the tenants to organise themselves. The approval of the project implementation 
plan in September 2001 (GDG 2001b) must have triggered a sense of urgency among the 
remaining tenants, as they began to take organised actions in the following month.
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Figure 9-3: Approval of the project implementation plan and its signposting in Nangok
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(Interviewee KSS7-INT-01)
Another ineligible tenant also pointed out in an interview that Nangok offered the most 
affordable means of accommodation for his family when they first migrated to Seoul:
“When I first came here to live, I initially borrowed some money KRW 5,000,000 
from the bank to find a Chonsei house, and because it was beyond my means to 
repay the loan [after the bankruptcy of his company and subsequent 
unemployment], all my savings accounts were closed- So, we moved our house 
within Nangok.. to another Chonsei with cheaper deposit, KRW 1,500,000, so that 
we could spend the difference on living. The house was cheap because the landlord 
wanted to have anyone living there until redevelopment. The house would have 
collapsed due to negligence if remained vacant... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-03)
As the largest supplier of public rental flats in the country, the KNHC apparendy made 
an advertisement in September 2001 before the commencement of residents* formal 
relocation, encouraging both eligible and ineligible tenants to apply for public rental flats. 
More than 70 ineligible households responded to this, but were not offered any flats in the 
end. This provoked the remaining tenants’ stronger frustration and distrust in the 
developer.
Weak socio-economic status of tenants
As examined in Chapter 4, Nangok residents experienced a high incidence of non-regular 
jobs and unemployment. This placed them in unfavourable situations when it came to 
formal sector borrowing, driving them towards greater dependence on personal means 
and informal borrowing.
For instance, residents’ poor credit rating would deter them from gaining full advantage 
of the National Housing Fund (hereafter NHF) Housing Loan Programme. The 
programme has been implemented to make it the most accessible housing finance 
programme for poor households. To be beneficiaries, applicants should first make an 
application to the local government, which then recommends eligible applicants to 
financial institutions (see Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 for more detailed discussions on the 
programme). Experiences showed that around 30 -40% of the eligible applicants failed to 
pass the screening of the financial institutions (Kim et al. 2004: 123). Because applicants 
should have signed a Chonsei contract and pre-paid 10% of the Chonsei deposit before 
making an application, poor residents are often discouraged from making a loan 
application in fear of failed application.
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In particular, the NHF housing loan was not applicable to those on the credit delinquency 
blacklist managed by the Korea Federation of Banks. Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997, the number of credit delinquents rapidly increased to 3.76 million by January 2004 
(Kim 2004). These credit defaulters experienced various forms of restrictions with regard 
to their financial transactions. To maintain the sound collection of loans paid out, the 
NHF housing loan programme excluded these credit defaulters. Many of the ineligible 
tenants, who had moved to Nangok after the outbreak of 1997’s Asian Financial Crisis, 
faced double constraints upon displacement: they were ineligible to receive any legal 
compensation; and also ineligible to apply for the NHF housing loan programme to 
subsidise their rental housing costs.
“Because I am on the credit delinquency blacklist, I haven’t dreamt of any loans 
from financial institutions, though I’d wish I could... I am in the worst situation. I 
am not eligible [for relocation compensation], and I am also a credit defaulter.
Because of these conditions, I can’t even apply for the [NHF] housing loan... The 
loan is for low-income households, but only for those who do not have a bad credit 
history..” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01)
“We wanted to move to a Chonsei, but the conditions didn’t allow us. In our case, 
we can’t even take out the housing loan, because my husband is on the blacklist as a 
credit defaulter. That’s why we borrowed the money... from our previous 
neighbour... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-15)
Establishment of ‘Tenants’ Committee for Countermeasures for Housing*
The remaining tenants in Nangok organised a committee and held an inaugural assembly 
meeting on 13 October 2001, naming their organisation the ‘Tenants’ Committee for 
Housing Countermeasures’ (hereafter Tenants’ Committee). Its establishment was 
substantially aided by the local community-based organisations that had been operating 
for many years, but it was the residents themselves who took the final decision to step 
forward to start the committee activities. One of the tenants, working as a deputy 
chairperson of the committee, explained:
“This committee was not established solely by the residents. There was no one who 
could do the job on one’s own initiative. I don’t have the strength either. I felt the 
needs, but I was tied up with things to earn my living. Meetings first began with the 
local community-based organisations, and the participating residents came forward 
to start this. Without their help, it [the committee] couldn’t have proceeded like this. 
Residents don’t know much. We don’t know how to fight and what to do, so we take 
advices... ” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02)
The establishment of the Tenants’ Committee was triggered by the approval of the
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project implementation plan, as this provided legal justification to proceed with the 
demolition and land preparation works. The remaining tenants were arguing that there 
were still about 700 households who were residing in the neighbourhood, and that any 
demolition works without consultation with them would constitute safety threats. As soon 
as the Tenants’ Committee was organised, they launched their first demonstration in front 
of the municipal government office on 12 November 2001. They demanded additional 
measures for those who were in financial difficulties and for the postponement of any 
demolition attempts until appropriate relocation measures were taken for remaining 
tenants (Tenants’ News Vol.2 in November 2001).
Figure 9-4: Tenants' Committee and the view of its general assembly in Nangok
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“They [that is, the property-owners] received the public lands free of charge, and I 
hear the total amount [they could save] would be about KRW 50 billion ... They 
received it free of charge, because they were property owners. On the contrary 
tenants’ request for small loans was not accepted. This is a serious matter, because it 
simply means those who already possessed something get more, while those with no 
possession at all are being more squeezed out. I don’t know about law and I don’t 
know why they [property owners] received it, but it doesn’t seem nice. When I think 
of us [tenants], I feel miserable” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02)
The property-owners were conscious about reducing the total project costs so that their 
financial contributions could be reduced as much as possible. Any demands from tenants 
such as additional cash compensation would lead to the increase in property-owners’ 
financial contributions. In this respect, the conflict between property-owners and tenants 
were bound to occur due to the way in which the JRP framework was designed and 
implemented. The head of the Housing Redevelonment Bureau in the munidnal
Table 9-3: Remaining Nangok tenants' relocation preferences
Unit: households
Chonsei tenure 
in private 
residence
Public rental 
flats
Welfare
facilities
Temporary 
accommodation  
during the 
project period
Land allocation  
elsew here for 
self-help  
construction
No response or 
about to move 
out
Total
■
93 60 2 7 6 46 214
43.5% 28.0% 0.9% 3.3% 2.8% 21.5% 100.0%
Source: Survey by the Tenants' Committee in Nangok neighbourhood, November 2001
As shown in Table 9-3, remaining tenants showed a strong preference for Chonsei tenure 
in private residence, while the second preference was an access to public rental flats. 
Although the relocation of eligible tenants to the KNHGprovided rental flats began in 
October 2000, many eligible tenants still remained in the neighbourhood, unsure about 
which compensation option to take. The Tenants’ Committee also found out from the
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Box 9-1: Demands of the Tenants' Committee in Nangok
. Access to the public rental flats for the ineligible tenants;
. Housing loan to be paid back in instalment over 10 years after 5 years of grace period in order to help 
residents move to Chonsei tenure in private dwellings;
. Temporary accommodation built near the neighbourhood for those who couldn't afford to move at all so  
that they could accumulate enough savings in time to find an alternative accommodation in either 
private or public rental dwellings;
. Provision of permanent rental flats for the beneficiaries of the means-tested National Basic Livelihood 
System (hereafter NBLS) programme;
. Provision of appropriate measures including the provision of permanent rental flats for those elderly 
single-person households who have no dependents to rely on;
. No attempts to be made for forced eviction and demolition.
Final resolutions
Despite the comprehensive demands by the Tenants’ Committee, the resolution agreed in 
the multi-party roundtable by March 2002 was rather modest. The KNHC agreed to 
provide additional 59 public rental flats regardless of tenants’ eligibility for redevelopment 
compensation. The district government also agreed to do their best to consider the fast- 
track offer of permanent ( y e o n g g u )  rental flats in favour of tenant households who were 
subject to the means-tested social assistance programme. With regard to the long-term 
housing loans, the Tenants’ Committee failed to achieve this, but they were able to 
persuade the district government to shorten the process of assessing applicants’ eligibility 
for the loan applications. In return, the Tenants’ Committee agreed with the KNHC for 
the company to proceed with the demolition of vacant dwellings in areas where few 
dwellings remained occupied.
Figure 9-6: View of demolition works in Nangok
© Hyun Shin, 2002
Demolition work in action in Nangok neighbourhood
© Hyun Shin, 2002
View of a section of Nangok neighbourhood after demolition 
works. The house on the left was not demolished as the 
tenants did not evacuate yet.
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It still took more than half a year to reach the final resolution for the last remaining 
tenants. In November 2002, the Tenants’ Committee, the KNHC and the property- 
owners agreed to provide additional cash payment for the households who were 
remaining. As for the eligible households, they received cash compensation 20% more 
than they were legally entitled to. Ineligible tenants also received cash compensation, 
equivalent to 90% of what an eligible household would have received by law. Once this 
arrangement was carried out, the Tenants’ Committee was dissolved at the end of 
November 2002. Table 9-4 lists the events that took place from the inaugural meeting of 
the Tenants’ Committee to the displacement of last remaining tenants in the 
neighbourhood.
Summary
This section has shown that the JRP implementation on the principle of property-owners’ 
voluntary association has not been able to ensure owner-occupiers’ active participation 
throughout the redevelopment processes. This was due to the domination of absentee 
landlords who largely consisted of off-site speculators. Misleading information also 
confused the remaining owner-occupiers’ decision-making. The participation of the public 
agency as the professional developer made it more difficult for owner-occupiers to 
participate as they lost their status as legal implementers. Collective responses largely came 
from the tenants who organised themselves to start negotiation with the developer and 
the local authority This action was concerned more with demands for appropriate 
relocation measures for remaining tenants on compassionate grounds rather than with 
preserving their neighbourhood.
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Table 9-4: Chronology of Nangok tenants' collective actions
Date M eetings Dem onstration held Remarks
29 Oct. 2001 Inaugural meeting to establish the Tenants’ 
Committee for Housing Countermeasures
02 NOV. 2001 Leaders of the committee, delivering their demands 
to the district government, the KNHC and the 
property owners’ representatives' council
05 Nov. 2001 Tenants' demands also sent to the municipal 
government
12 Nov. 2001 Demonstration at the Seoul City 
Hall (attendees: 150 residents)
15 Nov. 2001 Meeting with the Head of Municipal Housing Bureau
27 Nov. 2001 Demolition sub-contractors first 
attempt to send in equipment 
resisted by residents
28 Nov. 2001 Meeting with officials (municipal and district housing 
bureaux) and the KNHC
07 Dec. 2001 Demonstration at the KNHC 
Sillim Office to protest previous 
demolition attempt
11 Dec. 2001 Visit to the Seoul Head Office of the KNHC
12 Dec. 2001 Visit to the Housing Bureau at Gwanak District 
Government
13 Dec. 2001 Demolition sub-contractor’s 
second attempt at 7 am to send 
in equipment failed again. An 
apology was made by the KNHC.
22 Dec. 2001 Tenants meet with the mayor of the district 
government. An agreement was made to establish a 
multi-party committee in which the district 
government, the KNHC, property owners and tenants 
all participated
H H h H H h b h H H H H I
21 Feb. 2002 Demolition sub-contractor’s third 
attempt at dawn to send in crew 
and equipment into the 
neighbourhood
25 Feb. 2002
Mj B B MB
Demonstrated at the District 
Government Office in protest of 
the third demolition attempt by 
the KNHCs sub-contractor
Mar. 2002 Initial resolution made in the multi-party talk
Apr. 2002 59 tenant households (both eligible and ineligible) 
granted access to KNHC-provided public rental flats v : ^
Nov. 2002 Cash payment arranged for the final remaining 
tenants
30 Nov. 2002 Dissolution of the Tenants' Committee HHHHHN 1 ' ; H U
Mar. 2003 Last remaining 14 households moved out
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9.2 Beijing: lack of opportunities for residents’ participation
In this section on Beijing, I will start by addressing the absence of the legal basis for local 
community participation within the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment 
Programme (ODHRP). It shows that residents are only able to intervene at the stage of 
their displacement. I will then discuss further barriers to their participation, and then 
identify residents’ discontent and its sources by referring to the case study of the second 
phase redevelopment of Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. The final two subsections examine 
the limited actions by individual residents facing redevelopment and displacement, and try 
to identify if there are any signs of collective responses.
No provision for residents’ participation until displacement
In the case of Beijing’s ODHRP, it is the responsibility of the Old and Dilapidated 
Housing Redevelopment Office in each district government to conduct feasibility studies 
and designate a neighbourhood as an ODHRP district (see Figure 2-6 in Chapter 2 for the 
ODHRP implementation process). In practice, however, neighbourhoods are first chosen 
by developers. Government offices conduct feasibility studies afterwards to make sure the 
proportion of dilapidated dwellings in the neighbourhoods chosen by developers exceeds 
the municipal criteria for ODHRP implementation. Studies found that permissions were 
often granted even if the proportion of dilapidated dwellings did not meet the 
requirement (Fang 1999: 61-62; Planning and Construction Committee of Dongcheng 
District Government 1998:17).
When professional developers acquires permission to proceed with an ODHRP project, 
they draw a plan for demolition and relocation of local residents, and submit it to the 
district government (Article 10 in BMG 1998a). Upon the approval of the application, the 
district government is required to make a public announcement that includes the names 
of the developers, the demolition area, the demolition schedule and the compensation 
details (Article 14 in BMG 1998a). This is also the moment that the local authority and 
developers together proceed with publicity works to inform the residents. The local 
authority also orders relevant departments to freeze any changes in household registration, 
tenure and dwelling structure within the ODHRP neighbourhood.
Unlike the implementation process of Seoul’s JRP that largely depends on property- 
owners’ voluntary association, the ODHRP does not allow individual homeowners or
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tenants’ intervention. There appears to be no legal obligation for the government offices 
to obtain residents’ consent before a redevelopment project takes place. This is on the 
extension of the lack of participation by the general public in urban planning processes in 
mainland China, which has been noted as one of the main deficits of a centralised 
planning system (Yeh and Wu 1999). The situation place Beijing residents in a much 
weaker position when it comes to negotiation with developers or local authorities upon 
their displacement.
Barriers to participation
Complaints procedure in favour of developers
The implementation of an ODHRP project includes procedures for residents to make 
complaints when they disagree with the compensation presented to them, but these 
procedures are largely in favour of developers.
The national regulation on the management of demolition and relocation processes first 
appeared in March 1991 (State Council of China 1991). Its major revision was made in 
2001 (C Wang 2001). In Beijing, there were two major announcements of related 
regulations: once in 1998 to adopt cash-based compensation, and again in 2001 to reflect 
the 2001 revision (BMG 1998a, 2001c). The demolition procedure including the 
negotiation with residents over compensation, however, remained largely unchanged 
throughout the years.
When a demolition notice is officially announced by the district government, residents 
enter into negotiation with developers to come to an agreement on compensation (Article 
16 in BMG 1998a). As soon as an agreement is reached, demolition squads visit residents’ 
dwellings and make holes in the wall and on the roof to brand them as being subject to 
demolition.
“[The demolition schedule is] all written on the notice. [It says] when you need to 
move, that the house is to be demolished completely You speak with the demolition 
company [regarding compensation]. After the talk, they come with two people, 
holding an axe and a spade, and make holes on your house... ”
(Interviewee CBK-INT-Ol)
If no agreement is reached, both parties refer the matter to arbitration by the district
government which initially granted permission to the developers to proceed with the
ODHRP (Article 18 in BMG 1998a). Figure 9-7 below shows the process of negotiation
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and arbitration. If the residents do not accept the arbitration decision by the local 
government, they are entitled to take the matter to the people s court (Article 20 in BMG 
1998a).
Figure 9-7: Beijing's ODHRP and the process of negotiation over compensation
(BMG 1998a, 2001c)
Developer makes application for 
demolition and relocation
District government examines and 
approves the application
District government makes a 
public announcement of the 
demolition
(If not agreed)
appeal to the local authority 
approved the demolition
developers and 
over compensation
(If agreed)
Authentication by a public notary
Government actions in place to 
freeze changes in household 
registration, tenure and dwelling 
structure
Local authority's airbitration decision -
(If not agreed)
f
Residents' appeal t(
_________ __
3 the people's court
(If agreed)
(If relocation dwellings 
are ready)
Developers hold the right to 
proceed with demolition before final 
court decision is made
Vacation of dwellings by residents
Demolition
Final court decision Construction
The fact that the local government, which granted permission to developers to implement 
ODHRP projects, also makes arbitration decisions implies that it would be less likely for 
the government to come to a decision that would delay approved projects. If residents 
refrain from vacating their dwellings without legitimate reasons, local authorities also hold 
the right to instruct relevant bureaux to proceed with forced eviction of occupying 
residents, or obtain court orders to do so (Article 21 in BMG 1998a). Developers and 
demolition companies possess the right to proceed with demolition if they can prove that
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they have fulfilled their legal responsibilities of providing residents with cash 
compensation or relocation dwellings. In such a case, the residents’ further appeal to the 
people’s court would not make any difference in terms of preventing developers from 
demolishing their homes. Moreover, it has been reported that residents rarely win against 
developers in court proceedings (Fang 1999).
Hasty displacement
Residents in ODHRP neighbourhoods also have difficulties in appealing against 
demolition and relocation compensation due to tight schedules of demolition and eviction. 
The interviewees displaced due to the first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment testified that 
they were given only twenty days to evacuate. The formal notice for neighbourhood 
demolition was publicly announced on 19 December 1999, and the deadline for dwelling 
vacation was 8 January 2000 (Interviewees CBK-INT-Ol to -03).
“[We were] given twenty days [to move out]... The notice was pasted on the wall on 
19 December in the evening, and the deadline [to move out] was 8 January75
(Interviewee CBK-ENT-01)
Within this period, they had to reach an agreement on their compensation, and also find a 
dwelling to move to. For interviewee CBH-INT-01 from Haiyuncang neighbourhood, 
there were only two weeks from the date of formal demolition notice to the date of 
house evacuation. Interviewees CBY-INT-01 to -03 were also given only twenty days to 
reach an agreement and move out of their homes.
“The demolition squad [commissioned by developers] is a temporary unit. They just 
work here for a few days, and then simply go away They don’t tell you when they 
are going to do the demolition, very secretive. For example, if they are to start the 
demolition in October, they tell you how much you will be given and explain the 
compensation method in September. Afterwards, you are to move out within a 
month” (Interviewee CBX-INT-07)
The interviewees who were already displaced and re-housed at the time of interviewing 
had lived over 30 years on average in their old neighbourhoods before displacement. Even 
if their displacement did not involve any kind of violence, the tight schedule of 
displacement and demolition with no definite prospect of re-housing would place 
residents under a lot of stress and pressure. An interviewee who was displaced moved to 
an outer suburban neighbourhood described her experience of displacement:
“People received the [redevelopment compensation] offer, pulled in cars for viewing.
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Just took that offer, how  much per square metre. At that time, our displacement was 
really bustling... Everyday, got in a car, went to see houses. In the end, we came to 
see this place. At that time, our house-moving was really in a hurry From 16 April 
to 6 May Twenty days to find a house and move out. My goodness... ”
(Interviewee CBY-INT-01)
Paying incentives to encourage timely displacement
In order to encourage residents’ house-moving, the period of residents’ absence from 
work due to moving is to be treated as ‘paid leave’ (Article 23 in BMG 1998a). Residents 
were also given an incentive if they moved out before the house-moving deadline set by 
the developers (Article 45 in BMG 1998a).
“They [developers and demolition squads] usually give you one month. If you move 
out within one month, you would receive ten thousand or twenty thousand yuan, 
because you don’t hinder their demolition progress. . . ” (Interviewee CBX-INT- 07)
Incentive payment was also given when residents moved to outer suburban districts: for 
instance, if a household’s original place of residence was between the second and third 
ring roads, they were entitled to receive 20,000 yuan as an incentive payment for moving
residents were largely in favour of it, pointing out the fact that their pre-redevelopment 
dwellings were dilapidated, and that the redevelopment provided them with an 
opportunity to change their housing conditions.
“[When we first saw the demolition notice] we were delighted, [because] it was to 
build [new] flats. Those cramped, worn-out pingfang should be demolished... At 
that time (when living in pingfang), we used to go and see our two daughters’ flats, 
which looked better at a glance. We just wondered when we were to live in such flats.
In my opinion, I think demolition and redevelopment is a good thing. If not, one 
would always live in a cramped, dilapidated pingfang... ” (Interviewee CBH-INT-02)
Their favourable comment on Beijing’s ODHRP might have also owed to their tenure 
conversion to owner occupation, which was largely made possible by the receipt of 
redevelopment cash compensation. In contrast, the interviewees from Xinzhongjie who 
were subject to its second phase redevelopment expressed frustration and discontent 
towards redevelopment.
Full monetarisation of redevelopment compensation and residents’ reduced gains
The in-kind allocation of relocation dwellings in the 1990s inevitably incurred a large 
amount of relocation costs upon developers (Leaf 1995). The BJ-1998 Compensation 
Measure allowed them to implement cash-based compensation instead of more time- 
consuming and costly relocation. In May 2001, the municipal government made a further 
revision to its compensation criteria (hereafter BJ-2001 Compensation Measure), which 
stipulated that the estimation of redevelopment compensation should be based solely on 
two factors: (1) the construction space of one’s formal dwelling, and (2) the market- 
appraisal value of the occupied land (BMG 2001b, 2001c).
“The purpose of this [that is, BJ-2001 Compensation Measure] is to follow the 
principle of market appraisal value. In other words, the housing space of an original 
house and the market appraisal value determine how much one gets. Basically there 
is an evaluation company that completes the appraisal and submits a report to the 
Displacement and Relocation Department of the Housing Management Bureau.
One copy is also given to the displacee... ”
(Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department,
Dongcheng district government)
The BJ-2001 Compensation Measure would lighten the burden of developers by reducing 
the total costs on residents’ displacement and relocation. Table 9-6 shows the amount of 
cash compensation expected under the BJ-2001 Compensation Measure. It suggests that 
the application of the BJ-2001 Compensation Measure would result in as much as 36%
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reduction of the total compensation in comparison with the BJ-1998 Compensation 
Measure.
Table 9-6: Comparison of the amount of cash compensation as per BJ-2001 Compensation Measure
(BMG 2001b, 2001c)
Policy
Doc.
Calculation method Non self-contained dwelling for a 3-person household with 
a construction space of
20 m2 30 m2 40 m2
BJ-2001 Cash compensation = © x ( ©  + ®xK)  + ©
© : Dwelling construction space 
(T) : Base dwelling price in yuan per m2 
© : Base land price in yuan per m2 
© : Building replacement value 
K : Plot ratio adjustment co-efficient
Compensation^ 181,955 272,933 
= (5,600 x 1.3 + 1,000) x © +
(24,255/29.66 x ©)
363,910
Rate of reduction (BJ-1998 vs. BJ-2001) 36% 21% 11%
Note:
(1) The values for ©, ®, ® and K were taken from the compensation contract provided by the interviewee, CBD6-INT-01, who was 
displaced at the end of 2002. In the case of building replacement value (©), I assumed for the sake of simplicity that the building 
replacement value was in linear proportion to the dwelling space. The building replacement value of the 29.66 m2 dwelling occupied by the 
interviewee CBD6-INT-01 before displacement was 24,255 yuan.
The table above also shows clearly that the rate of reduction would be greater for those in 
smaller dwellings. For instance, a household residing in a dwelling with a construction 
space of 20 m2, would experience 36% reduction in their total compensation, while a 
household in a 40 m2 dwelling would experience 11% reduction only.
Future displacees’ frustration regarding com pensation
The interviewees from Xinzhongjies second phase redevelopment area were largely 
frustrated over the compensation policies. One source of this frustration was its frequent 
changes in recent years. The residents facing displacement in Xinzhongjie remained 
uncertain as to which policies were to be applied in the future and how much they would 
eventually receive upon displacement.
“[In the old days] if a house gets demolished, we would move to a new flat, but the 
method of demolition and compensation is changing step by step, and now there is 
a new demolition and compensation method. Let’s wait. We don’t know which 
method is going to be used in the end.” (Interviewee CBX-INT-04)
“At present, policies are changing day after day... At the moment, the state policies 
regarding this [compensation] are changing. I am not saying the state is bad. The 
Communist party is still good. Otherwise, we wouldn’t have joined the party The 
state leaders are still good, but when it comes down to the bottom, it’s not always 
like that... ” (Interviewee CBX-INT-07)
While the changing policies presented uncertainties among the future displacees, they
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were fully aware of the lack of opportunities to be re-housed in their neighbourhood if its 
redevelopment was to go ahead. The Xinzhongjie residents, subject to the second phase 
redevelopment, closely witnessed the fate of their old neighbours who were displaced at 
the end of 1999 as part of the neighbourhood’s first phase redevelopment. Very few 
residents were able to come back due to the high prices of redeveloped flats. Although 
the interviewees preferred to stay in their old neighbourhood, all of them were pessimistic 
about re-housing, knowing that it would not be possible under current policies. For 
instance:
“I don't think of that [re-housing after redevelopment]. It’s not possible to come 
back, really impossible. Why? Good heavens! Do you know how many were able to 
come back in that place [Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment area] after 
displacement? Particularly families like us who live on minimum living allowances 
are really impossible to be re-housed... ” (Interviewee CBX-INT-02)
The other major source of frustration was the significantly reduced redevelopment 
compensation that was implemented with the announcement of the BJ-2001 
Compensation Measure. The residents subject to the second phase redevelopment in 
Xinzhongjie expected to have much less chance of following in the footsteps of their 
previous neighbours who had become homeowners upon displacement. Despite their 
approval of the redevelopment itself, the current compensation policy was subject to 
heavy criticism:
“What I mean is this. Housing redevelopment itself is not wrong... Everyone wants 
it to be carried out according to the previous policy If the previous policy is applied, 
then everyone will go obediently If there’s a big difference [in the amount of 
compensation], then people cannot leave... We ordinary people should have been 
provided with a house. This is the most important key point. Premier Zhu Rongqi 
also called for the improvement of residents’ living conditions. Has it been 
improved in Beijing? According to our current policies, it's not possible to improve, 
is it? This demolition and relocation method has a problem... Support the 
government? We, ordinary people all feel we need to be genuinely convinced... ”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-03)
This was a problematic issue, and was recognised as such by the Xinzhongjie 
neighbourhood committee leader, who was herself to be displaced when the 
neighbourhood’s second phase redevelopment was to take place.
“They are essentially incapable of buying a house. From what used to be more than 
200,000 yuan [as compensation], you can only obtain 100,000 odd yuan [under the 
new compensation policy]. With such a big difference, people are definitely going to 
experience difficulties... In the case of a three-person family living in an eleven
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square metre dwelling [in terms of use space; this would equal to about 14.6 m2 of 
construction space], given the average land appraisal value of 8,300 yuan in 
Dongcheng district, the relocation compensation will not exceed 130,000 yuan at 
all... ” (Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader)
In order to see if the residents’ frustration regarding reduced compensation could be 
justified, each interviewee’s cash compensation was calculated on the basis of the BJ-1998 
and BJ-2001 Compensation Measures, shown in Table 9-7 below (for the method of 
calculation, see Table 7-9 in Chapter 7 for the BJ-1998 Compensation Measures, and 
previous Table 9-6 for the BJ-2001 Compensation Measures).
Table 9-7: Impact of changing compensation policies upon 
Xinzhongjie residents subject to displacement
(BMG 1998a, 1998b, 2001b, 2001c)
Interviewee
ID.
Number of co­
habiting 
household
Construction
Spacew
Per capita 
dwelling 
space
Estimation of cash compensation on the basis of Rate of 
reduction
BJ-1998(2> BJ-2001
members
©
Possibility of household 
split to get more © i - © / ©
CBX-INT-01 2 0.0 0.0 n.a. No n.a. n.a.
CBX-I NT-02 8 35.6 4.5 382000 + a Yes 324000 15.2%
CBX-INT-03 5 20.7 4.1 288000 + a Yes 188000 34.7%
CBX-I NT-04 2 48.3 24.2 462000 No 439000 5.0%
CBX-INT-05 3 15.2 5.1 253000 No 138000 45.5%
CBX-INT-06 5 27.6 5.5 331000 + a Yes 251000 24.2%
CBX-INT-07 5 54.6 10.9 501000 + a Yes 497000 0.8%
CBX-I NT-08 3 21.7 7.2 294000 No 197000 33.0%
CBX-I NT-09 3 17.4 5.8 267000 No 158000 40.8%
Note:
(1) This is based on the dwelling space as acknowledged by each household's official rental contract, and doesn't include informal or self-built space
(2)'+ a' indicates that these households might be able to claim more compensation by splitting their household. Those households with three or 
more generations co-habiting one dwelling are included in this category.
The table justifies residents’ frustration. Some residents such as the interviewee CBX- 
INT-05 would experience as much as 46% reduction in their total cash compensation if 
the BJ-2001 Compensation Measures were applied. As was shown earlier in Table 9-6, the 
interviewees with larger dwelling spaces experienced less reduction. For instance, the 
interviewee CBX-INT-07 would hardly experience any reduction, and this owed largely to 
the interviewee’s large dwelling space.
Weak socio-economic status of residents
When the revised approach to Haiyuncang neighbourhood was applied to redevelop the 
area, the residents’ access to housing mortgages was crucial for their re-housing. In order 
to do this, at least a member of a household must have been an account holder of the 
Housing Provident Fund (hereafter HPF). On this basis, it could be argued that the 
reduced compensation could be supplemented by relying on housing mortgage loans if
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future displacees were to buy a flat in their preferred location. In reality, housing mortgage 
was not considered as an option by most interviewees due to their inability to make 
repayment and, most of all, due to the absence of account holders in their families.
As summarised in Table 9-8 below, many interviewee households in Xinzhongjie who 
were subject to the second phase redevelopment: did not have regular employees among 
their co-habiting household members; were dependent on the means-tested Minimum 
Livelihood Security System (hereafter MLSS) benefits; and did not have HPF account 
holders within the household either.
Table 9-8: Xinzhongjie household circumstances regarding their opportunities to access formal loans
Interview ee
Household
ID.
Regular em ployee(s) 
among co-habiting 
household members?
Minimum Livelihood 
Security System  
beneficiaries?
Housing Provident Fund 
account holder(s) 
within co-habiting  
household members?
Expectation for formal 
housing loan
CBX-INT-001 No Beneficiaries None No expectation
CBX-INT-002 Yes Beneficiaries None No expectation
CBX-INT-003 Yes Non-beneficiaries Yes No expectation
CBX-INT-004 No Beneficiaries None n.a.
CBX-INT-005 No Beneficiaries None No expectation
CBX-INT-006 Yes Beneficiaries Yes No expectation
CBX-INT-007 Yes Non-beneficiaries Yes No expectation
CBX-INT-008 No Beneficiaries None No expectation
CBX-INT-009 No Non-beneficiaries None No expectation
Yes 4 6 3
No 5 3 6 8
n.a. 0 0 0 1
Source: Household interviews by the author in Beijing in 2003
The interviewees’ hesitance and negative views towards bank loans and mortgage could 
have resulted from the fact that only few of the interviewed household members were 
classified as regular employees. As shown in Table 9-9 below, most household members 
were either in temporary and informal employment or out of work. It would be unlikely
fr\r lTip»m tr* liovp -an Amrd/'YiTpr-K-acprl T-TPT* -^rrrmrit- \Y/itVi nr* rr^rlit-aKI/a
Table 9-9: Employment status of all interviewee household members in Beijing
Regular
employee
Temporary
employee
Informaliiuui t Laid-off
or
unemployed
Retired and 
beyond 
working age
Working age but 
no employment
Not
working
age
Not
known
Sub­
total
Daily Unpaid 
worker family 
worker
Disabled Schooling
Subject to 
displacement 7 1 5 2 3 6 6 2 4 5 0 36
Displaced or re­
housed 3 1 0 . 1 10 1 2 1
.
26
Temporary 
residence 
after displacement
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Sub-total 10
15.4%
3
4.6%
7
10.8%
3 4 8
12.3%
16
24.6%
3 6 
4.6% 9.2%
6
9.2% 9.2%
65
100.0%
Source: Household interviews by the author in Beijing in 2003
These conditions would limit access HPF housing loans for these Xinzhongjie interviewee 
households. The reduced cash compensation under the revised regulation in 2001 was 
going to make it more difficult for these residents to envisage any tenure conversion even 
if they moved to suburban districts. All these conditions were experienced by the 
Xinzhongjie future displacees while their actual household income level was not much 
different from that of previously displaced households (see Figure 9-8 below). For these 
reasons, Therefore, there were unanimously negative responses from these interviewees 
when they were asked about whether they had any expectation of getting formal housing 
loans to become owner-occupiers.
Figure 9-8: Beijing interviewee households’ per capita monthly disposable income
(BMBS 2003a)
Interviewee households in Xinzhongjie, subject to future displacement 
Interviewee households, relocated (CBK- and CBY-) or re-housed (CBH-) at the time 
of interview
Bottom 40% of income decile: 745.1 yuan/month
Bottom 20% of income decile: 
504.8 yuan/month___________
INT-01 INT-02 DMT-03 INT-04 DMT-05 DMT-06 DMT-08 IIMT-09 INT-03 INT-01 INT-02 DMT-03 INT-01 INT-02
Future displacees’ compensation preferences
Under the circumstance of reduced compensation under the BJ-2001 Compensation 
Measures, the interviewees had a straightforward request regarding their future
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displacement: a relocation dwelling in an area not too far from their original place of 
residence. If not, they all expressed explicitly that the cash compensation should be 
enough to finance their homeownership. For instance:
“Give us a house, and if you ask us to move, then give us enough money to buy a 
house. Without a house, do you think it’s okay? If you give us money only enough 
to buy a house outside the fifth ring road, then what if something happens to this 
88 year old man? He will be dead while waiting for an ambulance to arrive... ”
(Interviewee GBX-INT-09)
The Haiyuncang model of providing affordable housing to increase the re-housing rate 
seemed to have appealed to some residents who wished to stay in the neighbourhood 
without moving to other districts. For example, the interviewee CBX-INT-05 expressed 
she was in favour of the Haiyuncang model despite her inability to apply for bank loans, 
stating that she might be able to rely on her relatives to borrow some money:
“I hope for the renewal [as was done in Haiyuncang]. But, this area is not subject to 
such approach. If this approach takes place, one only needs to contribute 100,000 
odd yuan. Then, other people would help me. My relatives would give me some 
money and I can borrow some from others, and if I try hard, I would repay some 
gradually In this way I still have some hope of staying here... If they can't do in this 
way then just find a place nearby and give it to us. I am not asking for a new house.
Just something big enough, something comparable to the floor space of this 
house... ” (Interviewee CBX-INT-05)
Limited individual actions
Information constraints and individual efforts to make enquiries
It was noted earlier that residents subject to the Xinzhongjie second phase redevelopment 
were uncertain about which policies were to be applied and how much they would 
eventually be given upon their future displacement. In addition, the residents were left in 
the dark with regard to the actual commencement date of the redevelopment. From the 
recollection of some of the interviewees, it appeared that the household survey by the 
local authority and developers had already begun early 2003. The survey was to investigate 
tenure, dwelling conditions and household size so that the developers would have all the 
information necessary for estimating the total compensation. Even at this stage, residents 
were not provided with any piece of information that would have helped them prepare in 
advance.
“[The demolition company] already came here. They came in March [2003]. It was
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the company that is going to demolish this house, and the same one that 
demolished that chunk of street [that is, the neighbourhood’s first phase 
redevelopment area]. I don't know what they are called. They recorded the number 
of houses, and the number of people. All these were recorded. Having completed 
this, they would come back only to carry out demolition... [Rather than informing 
the details or matters concerning the demolition] they just came into the house and 
took the survey” (Interviewee CBX-INT-07)
Under such circumstances, did the residents try to make individual efforts to collect as 
much information as possible in preparation of their neighbourhood’s redevelopment? 
Table 9-10 below suggests that the interviewees actively sought information from their 
talks with neighbours, and that most interviewees asked their neighbourhood committee 
leaders to find out more information.
Table 9-10: Efforts by Xinzhongjie interviewees to find out redevelopment-related information
Have you asked the local Have you asked the
authority? neighbourhood com m ittee
leader?
Have you discussed with your 
neighbours?
CBX-INT-001 No n.a. Yes
CBX-INT-002 No Yes Yes
CBX-INT-003 Yes Yes Yes
CBX-INT-004 No No No
CBX-INT-005 n.a. Yes n.a.
CBX-INT-006 No Yes Yes
CBX-INT-007 Yes Yes Yes
CBX-INT-008 ■■HH1 Yes Yes
CBX-INT-009 No Yes Yes
Yes
No
n.a.
2
5
2 1
Source: Household interviews by the author in Beijing in 2003
The neighbourhood committee leaders were the first point of contact for the residents, as 
these leaders were supposed to mediate the relationship between the local residents and 
the local authority. The neighbourhood committee leaders often took a visible role when it 
came to neighbourhood redevelopment, as they usually accompanied developers when the 
household survey was carried out. This was because they were in principle best acquainted 
with the lives of local residents. However, as the lowest in the administrative hierarchy, the 
neighbourhood committee leaders in Xinzhongjie also lacked detailed information. Their 
limits were also acknowledged by the interviewees:
“Regarding the current policy of demolition and relocation, I always ask her [the
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neighbourhood committee leader], but she doesn’t know either. She is also worried, 
as she also lives here, and is also confronted with demolition”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-03)
“The neighbourhood committee says the [Dongzhimen] Street Office doesn’t say a 
word [about redevelopment]. Just this neighbourhood committee leader, she says the 
Street Office doesn’t tell the neighbourhood committee”
(Interviewee CBX-INT-09)
Table 9-10 above also shows that the interviewees were reluctant to ask the local authority. 
Only one interviewee out of nine mentioned that she had gone to the municipal housing 
bureau to find out more information about the new compensation policy Other 
interviewees did not consider making a direct enquiry to the local authority, in particular, 
the Street Office that was responsible for the administration of the Xinzhongjie 
redevelopment. The interviewees’ responses (shown below) suggested that this was 
because of their distrust in the local authority The heavy criticisms were explicitly 
pronounced during the interviews when this researcher was not accompanied by the 
neighbourhood committee leader.
“I haven't asked them [that is, the housing bureau]. Even if I go and ask them, they 
wouldn’t have any documents. Also, you don’t have the right to ask them. They 
wouldn’t talk to you” (Interviewee CBX-INT-06)
“Ask who? The demolition squad doesn’t explain that to you. The Street Office just 
says it’s going to be the end of the year. The Street Office doesn’t tell the true story 
to us ordinary people... The Street Office should have told us about whether or not 
the demolition would take place. Take a note of this clearly At the moment, 
everyone has a lot of complaints on this matter... Previously the Street Office was 
the poorest work unit. Now it’s become the richest” (Interviewee CBX-INT-07)
“This Street Office, what a despicable being it is. If you don’t believe this, then do a 
survey and everyone will swear at the Street Office. I’ll tell you about them. They 
think of taking advantage of residents... Talking about the Street Office, [they are] 
just wicked... It always thinks of making money... those dregs of society caring for 
the people? Who would believe that? (Interviewee CBX-INT-09)
Individual negotiation with developers and refusal to move if not satisfied
Residents’ direct engagement with developers only takes place after the official demolition 
notice is delivered to the neighbourhood. Although the municipal and district 
governments are involved in every stage of a redevelopment project, they do not come in 
direct contact with residents when developers embark on actual demolition works. The 
local authority such as the Dongzhimen Street Office would only act as an official
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mediator when unresolved disputes between developers and residents over compensation 
are brought to them for their arbitration decision. In fact, the local authority appears to 
maintain a ‘non-interventionist" policy as explained below:
“[Under the BJ-2001 Compensation Measures] there’s no room for any negotiation 
[over compensation]... Under such circumstances, it’s for sure that there’s no way 
they could buy a house. Their living conditions would be worse after 
demolition... They might refrain from moving out. Then, the demolition company 
just has to get in touch with the family and resolve the situation... In the end, the 
only way is for them to negotiate with the demolition company to see if there’s 
any other way of supplementing compensation. But, from the viewpoint of the 
government, we cannot speak out, because we have to guarantee impartiality of our 
policy implementation. It has to be equal for everyone... ”
(Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department, 
Dongcheng district government; Emphasis added by the author)
As the news of reduced cash compensation under the BJ-2001 Compensation Measure 
was shared among the residents in Xinzhongjie, all the interviewees unanimously 
proclaimed that they would not move out if the compensation was not up to their 
expectation. For instance:
“At the moment, all of us don’t want to move out. All are frankly saying that you 
needn’t do demolition... Everyone thinks in this way [If you] demolish ten odd 
square metres, then give us ten odd square metres [in return in the new building].
Don’t push us to move out... We will simply go to the municipal planning 
committee... ” (Interviewee CBX-INT-03)
Judging from some of the negotiation cases reported by the interviewees, it seemed that 
negotiations were not uncommon, providing even greater motivation for the residents to 
insist on staying put when their expectation was not met. An interviewee who was 
displaced as part of Xinzhongjie "s first phase redevelopment recollected that many of her 
neighbours were able to claim more money by postponing their house-moving:
“Those who moved out to this place, I am telling you the truth, are all law-abiding 
people. As soon as we were told to move out, we moved out right away Those 
people who didn’t move out received more money They were formidable. They 
didn’t obey and made all the noise, then took the money... [Such people] were not 
few” (Interviewee CBK-INT-01)
Another interviewee, CBH-INT-01, recollected that she was able to receive another
90,000 yuan by making a pledge to the developer via her neighbourhood committee leader. 
The interviewee was displaced before the implementation of the BJ-2001 Compensation 
Measure, and she was able to take advantage of the old compensation policy that took the
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household factor into consideration.
“I didn’t discuss with them [that is, the developer in charge of demolition]. I just 
went to the neighbourhood committee, and the neighbourhood committee leader 
gave them a call, explaining my situation... I said I couldn’t move out, and would 
have to stay here, that I had no money They said we were four-person household, 
and I said that’s not alright... I said we are equivalent to five-person household.
[When it was done] we were counted as five-person household, and took another 
90,000 yuan... ” (Interviewee CBH-INT-01)
The experience of another interviewee (CBD6-INT-01) also exemplified that displacees 
would make use of personal connections in order to gain as much money as possible. 
When the interviewee’s family was displaced and compensated in accordance with the new 
BJ-2001 Compensation Measure, the size of their dwelling, which served as the basis for 
estimating the total compensation, was increased to provide the family with more 
compensation. The construction space of their original dwelling before displacement was 
21 m2, but according to their compensation agreement with the developer, it was recorded 
as 29.66 m2.
Are there any signs of collective response?
The Xinzhongjie residents were clearly unhappy about the reduced compensation that 
they were entitled to upon their future displacement. They also explicitly expressed that 
they would refrain from house-moving. When the demolition work was being carried out 
as part of Haiyuncang redevelopment, the district government web site reported that 18% 
of the residents had failed to move out before the imposed house-moving deadline. 
Whether or not this frustration would lead to organised action as in Seoul, however, could 
not be identified.
Some of the news reports on displacees’ protests in recent years indicated that individual 
protests were not unheard of, and were in fact on the increase. The government figure on 
the number of protests revealed that “there were some 74,000 protests” in 2004, “up 
from 10,000 in 1994 and 58,000 in 2003” (The Economist 29 September 2005). Given the 
exercise of censorship and political control, the number of protests was likely to be 
underestimated. Most protests were isolated and contained, though occasional violent 
incidents alarmed the nation. For instance, a nation-wide shock was received in August 
2003 when a man died after setting fire to himself in protest at his home’s forced 
demolition in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province (China Daily 17 September 2003). His family was
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one of the 10 out of 1,000 families in his neighbourhood, who refused to move out. Less 
than a month later, another similar incident occurred, this time, in the heart of Beijing, the 
Tiananmen Square. A peasant set fire to himself in the morning of 15 September, 
suffering serious bum (Jiangnan Shibao 18 September 2003). He was also protesting 
against his home’s forced demolition and poor compensation. The Ministry of 
Construction also revealed that between January and July 2002, the residents’ protests 
against demolition resulted in twenty six deaths (China Daily 17 September 2003), clearly 
indicating the seriousness of violence and resistance against demolition. The protests and 
violent clashes seemed to be on the increase especially in rural areas where many lands 
were taken for urban expansion and the provision of infrastructure services (The 
Economist 23 June 2005). These sporadic cases of organised protests and petitions were 
found to take place across the cities, but most cases were eventually unsuccessful and 
isolated (Human Rights Watch 2004:26-31).
With the reform of legal systems, law suits filed by displacees and residents in 
redevelopment districts against developers seemed to gain popularity gradually. The case 
of a law suit filed against the municipal housing corporation by a group of Haiyuncang 
residents (as explained earlier in Chapter 6) could be one of the examples of organised 
action against a developer. Ian Johnson, a Will Street Journal correspondent, reports the 
case of two pioneering citizens in Beijing who made a series of failed law suits against the 
municipal government for making huge profits at the expense of demolishing their homes 
in central Beijing in the mid-1990s Qohnson 2004). Recently in Chaoyang District, a near 
suburban district next to Dongcheng District, more than one hundred households 
collectively filed a law suit against a demolition company, claiming that its certificate of 
demolition issued by the Chaoyang Bureau of Land and Resources was not legitimate, and 
that it should be cancelled in order to stop their dwellings’ forced demolition (Jinghua 
Shibao 17 October 2004). In many of these cases, it was reported that residents rarely 
won against developers or governments (Fang 1999). Often, the myriad of bureaucratic 
processes acted as obstacles to the residents’ petition and legal proceedings (Beijing 
Review 2005). So was the use of implicit and explicit forces that pushed people away from 
resorting to judicial solutions (Human Rights Watch 2004; Johnson 2004).
Alarmed by a series of protests in relation to demolition and land confiscation, the 
municipal government began to issue some supplementary regulations that provided 
limited opportunities to guarantee the housing rights of local residents in redevelopment
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districts. One of the recent regulations included a municipal guidance in April 2004, which 
stipulated that a consultation meeting should be held when more than 40% of the 
residents in a redevelopment neighbourhood could not come to an agreement over 
compensation with developers/demolition companies. All the parties concerned in a 
demolition process were required to attend the consultation meeting, including the 
neighbourhood committee leaders, the Street Office, and residents (finghua Shibao 17 
October 2004). These measures, however, would do little to engage the residents from an 
early stage of redevelopment.
Summary
This section has explained the lack of government provision for residents’ participation. 
There were also further barriers to their participation, which included the complaints’ 
procedure in favour of developers, hasty schedule and incentive payment to encourage 
residents’ timely displacement and cooperation. The changes in redevelopment 
compensation policies in recent years led to growing frustration on the residents’ side, 
fuelled by the fact that their weak socio-economic status made it difficult for them to 
finance their preferred homeownership upon displacement. The field research in Beijing 
was unable to find explicit collective responses, though there were signs of resistance and 
attempts for individual negotiations with developers.
9.3 Conclusion
This chapter has shown contrasts in the way in which residents participated in and 
responded to neighbourhood redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. Although the 
redevelopment framework of the JRP and ODHRP both place emphasis on residents’ 
participation and cooperation, the design of the JRP was more inclusive of owner- 
occupiers as they were considered to be legal implementers through the formation of 
redevelopment association. In this way, owner-occupiers were entitled to participation 
throughout the whole process of project design, implementation and evaluation. The 
property-based nature of the JRP meant, however, that there was no room for tenants to 
intervene at any stage of the redevelopment process. Despite the relatively extensive 
opportunities for owner-occupiers in Seoul to participate in redevelopment, their 
participation was very limited due to the speculative nature of redevelopment and their 
replacement by off-site investors and speculators who join the property-owners’
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association as absentee landlords. All these undermined owner-occupiers’ decision-making 
power, which was usually exercised by casting individual votes in a general assembly to 
reach a collective decision. The predominance of absentee landlords meant that any 
decision-making process would be heavily influenced by their own profit-oriented 
interests. When a public agency participates, the status of owner-occupiers is downgraded 
as they lose the position of legal implementers and become subject to consultation only.
In the case of the ODHRP, no provision was identified for residents to participate in the 
planning or implementation processes of neighbourhood redevelopment. The only 
occasion they were able to express their views was when they entered into negotiation to 
agree upon redevelopment compensation, but this process was severely in favour of 
developers. In short, the residents’ cooperation in neighbourhood redevelopment was 
their cooperation to evacuate in timely manner not to delay the redevelopment schedule, 
and if financially capable, to purchase highly priced redeveloped flats upon project 
completion.
As for the tenants in Seoul, they were in a similar position to the residents in Beijing as 
they had no room for intervention, and were able to respond only at the stage of their 
displacement. Unlike the residents in Beijing, the tenants in Seoul were more pro-active in 
making a collective response through the establishment of their own organisation to enter 
into negotiation with developers and the local authority. To some extent, the tenants’ 
collective action in Nangok was inherited from other organised actions that took place 
elsewhere in previous decades (ACHR 1989a; Q IR 1988; Kim 1998; Kim 1991). Since 
delays to the project schedule were against the interests of property-owners and 
developers, the tenants’ organised actions to prevent demolition and refusal to evacuate 
gave them some bargaining power with which to negotiate. The tenants’ demands were 
largely focused on additional provisions for relocation and compensation as they were 
only able to intervene at the very last stage of redevelopment preparation.
In Beijing, this research was not able to identify collective actions, though there are signs 
of the rise of residents’ resistance in the form of lawsuits, protests and petitions across 
cities in mainland China. Individual resistance in the form of refusing to evacuate in order 
to gain more compensation could be identified from residents’ recollection of indirect 
experiences, and the future displacees also showed their intention to follow the same 
strategy. Their frustration was fuelled by the reduction in their redevelopment
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compensation expected upon their displacement in future, but, in the absence of their 
own organisations, most residents interviewed did not go as far as making direct enquiries 
to the local authority. To some extent, this was not surprising as most individual and 
collective actions in mainland China were isolated and short-lived, if not managed by the 
state (Beijing Review 2005; Cai 2004; Johnson 2004; The Economist 23 June 2005, 29 
September 2005). Moreover, the most problematic issue for the residents engaging in legal 
proceedings such as lawsuits and petitions was that even if the outcome was in the 
residents’ favour, legal proceedings would do little to stop the demolition. As a Beijing- 
based lawyer commented, “the house is gone anyway7’ even if the verdict turned out to 
support residents (quoted in China Daily 17 September 2003).
This chapter, therefore, reveals an interesting picture for our understanding of the 
neighbourhood redevelopment programmes in Seoul and Beijing. The redevelopment 
experiences in both cities testify to the local residents’ participation significantly 
constrained under profit-oriented, developer-led redevelopment. Even if the local 
residents were legally permitted to participate from the outset of a project as in Seoul, 
their strength was considerably reduced due to the gentrification of local residents. Local 
authorities, professional and individual developers share the goal of maximisation of 
development gains, and the community participation is minimised in the midst of realising 
this goal. Since the residents’ involvement comes only at the time of displacement and 
demolition, the intervention only concerns residents’ demands for appropriate relocation 
measures and compensation for remaining residents on compassionate grounds rather 
than with preserving their neighbourhood.
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This thesis examined urban redevelopment experiences in two East Asian cities, Seoul in 
South Korea and Beijing in mainland China, from a comparative perspective. The thesis 
aimed at understanding how developer-led partnership for neighbourhood redevelopment 
emerged in different urban contexts, what contributions were made by participating actors, 
and whether or not neighbourhood redevelopment brought benefits to local residents.
To conclude this thesis, I will pull together research findings from previous chapters to 
discuss three issues: (1) developer-led partnership disadvantaging local residents; (2) 
residents and redevelopment benefits; and (3) beneficiaries and losers in Seoul and 
Beijing’s neighbourhood redevelopment. Then I will draw lessons learnt from this 
research and identify future research agendas.
10.1 Myth of partnership: disadvantaging local residents
Despite the difference in the formation of their dilapidated neighbourhoods, Seoul and 
Beijing shared difficulties in ensuring cost-recovery and replicability of government- or 
community led neighbourhood renewal programmes. In response to these problems, both 
cities came up with partnership-based redevelopment programmes that relied heavily on 
developers’ contributions. These programmes were known as the Joint Redevelopment 
Programme (JRP) in Seoul, and the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment 
Programme (ODHRP) in Beijing. Both programmes were developer-led in that the 
success of these programmes depended heavily on the participation of professional 
developers who provided financial resources and managerial expertise. As the UN-Habitat 
asserts, the most attractive aspect of a multi-sectoral partnership arrangement would be 
the idea of exploiting the comparative advantages of various sectors (UN-Habitat 1993). 
As argued in the following discussion, the redevelopment programmes in Seoul and 
Beijing, however, disadvantaged local residents.
Residents’ weak position in partnership
In implementation, a partnership approach faces conflicts among different actors, which 
may occur at every stage of planning and management (Devas and Rakodi 1993). This is 
because each actor has vested interests, which conflict with those of other partners. Each 
actor forms different views on the desired outcomes. How to resolve the conflicts 
depends on the power dynamics in a partnership arrangement. Each actor has a different
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level of resources at his/her disposal, and local communities have the least financial 
resources to contribute, even though they possess the best knowledge of their 
neighbourhoods and surroundings and share the highest stake in the outcome. In a 
market economy, the ability to contribute financially often determines the degree of 
influence over decision-making processes. Therefore, the basic partnership principle, that 
is the contribution of each sector’s strengths and capabilities on a ‘complementary and 
mutually-supportive’ basis, is endangered from the beginning (UN-Habitat 1993).
In Seoul’s JRP, owner-occupiers’ inability to make significant financial resources led to 
their demise. Most owner-occupiers were replaced by off-site speculators and individual 
investors who were alien to redevelopment neighbourhoods but who could afford 
redeveloped flats. The owner-occupiers’ decision to sell their property rights ultimately 
came from themselves, but for most of them, this was not a proactive decision to acquire 
development gains. It was a passive response to the infiltration of real estate capital and 
gentrifiers into their neighbourhood. In this process, the majority of owner-occupiers 
were effectively displaced, but the principle of JRP partnership framework, that is, a 
contractual bonding of property owners and professional developers, remained 
unaffected.
In the case of tenants in Seoul or all residents in Beijing, there was no channel for them to 
intervene in the planning or implementation processes until a project reached its critical 
stage of commencing residents’ displacement and relocation. In financial terms, they had 
little to contribute, and therefore, were to remain ‘mute’ throughout the project. Beijing’s 
public sector tenants were excluded from enjoying the benefits of housing privatisation 
due to severe dilapidation of their dwellings. Upon displacement, their compensation 
agreement included contracts for the purchase of their dwellings, which meant that the 
dwelling ownership was transferred to the sitting tenants before their compensation was 
paid out. Only then were they able to secure financial means to make any contribution, 
but this cash compensation was far less than was needed even for the subsidised purchase 
of redeveloped flats.
Divided community, more vulnerable to exploitation
Many partnership approaches advocate co-operation with local communities, but as noted 
by Devas and Rakodi, “Except in popular mythology there is no such thing as ‘the people’. 
There are individuals, classes, groups, communities, and popular organisations, each of
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which may have different and competing interests and ideas” (Devas and Rakodi 1993:50- 
51). This accords with the statement by the UN-Habitat that “slum dwellers arc not a 
homogeneous population” (UN-Habitat 2003b: 28). Local residents in renewal 
neighbourhoods have a diverse income spectrum, and not all residents are the poorest 
(Yap 1995). The differentiation and stratification among residents would give rise to 
different attitudes towards neighbourhood changes, and have differing impacts upon the 
patterns of housing consumption and investment (Miah and 'Weber 1991). This was clear 
in the case studies presented in this thesis.
In Seoul, local residents were divided into several groups depending on their tenure, 
compensation eligibility and employment/income status. In terms of tenure, local 
residents were divided into owner-occupiers, Chonsei tenants and monthly rental tenants. 
Owner-occupiers were the least worse off, as they were implementers and in principle 
financial contributors, therefore in a much superior position than tenants in terms of 
negotiation and access to information. The experience of Nangok neighbourhood 
showed, however, that their voice could be weakened considerably as their numbers grew 
smaller. In terms of compensation eligibility, tenants were further split into two groups: 
eligible and ineligible tenants. Ineligible tenants were in the most difficult position as they 
received no in-kind nor cash support for their displacement. Both eligible and ineligible 
tenants were also further divided in accordance with their financial capacity to move to 
post-displacement dwellings that required increased Chonsei key money or higher 
monthly rents and maintenance costs.
In Beijing, the residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods were more homogeneous in 
terms of tenure distribution than those in Seoul: most residents were public sector tenants, 
and very few were in owner occupation. It is possible that redevelopment projects would 
face more diverse residents as the number of private sector tenants and non-permanent 
Beijing residents increased. For the time being, government attention has been more 
focused on owner-occupiers and public sector tenants in dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Among the public housing tenants, however, we could still identify some elements of 
stratification on household income, employment status and eligibility to access housing 
finance system, which led to residents’ differing capacity to finance post-displacement 
dwellings. Moreover, the residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods had dwellings of 
different size, which would lead to different amount of cash compensation. Many studies 
pointed out that the in-kind housing allocation before the reform led to unequal
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distribution of welfare housing, largely influenced by the hierarchy of work places as well 
as the hierarchy of employees within a work place (Gu and Colwell 1997; Huang 2002; J. 
Lee 2000; Logan et al. 1999; Wing 2000). The monetarisation of redevelopment 
compensation since 1998 thus led to the visible emergence of unequal housing 
distribution during the planned economy period.
Partnership or a  growth coalition of property-related interests?
From this research, it was evident that most local residents had little means to contribute 
to and influence redevelopment partnership in their favour, and that the community itself 
was stratified, vulnerable to the exploitation of the property related interests. These 
property related interests included professional developers, property owners as individual 
developers and local authorities as collectors of property related taxes and land sales/lease 
revenues. Even though the implementation of redevelopment projects in Seoul and 
Beijing was partnership-based, the way in which the partnership proceeded was by and 
large to promote the growth of locality and transform dilapidated neighbourhoods into a 
higher and better use. Most local residents were excluded from decision-making processes. 
Nor were they able to continue living in redeveloped neighbourhoods upon project 
completion. In this respect, the operation of redevelopment partnership in the interest of 
local communities was a myth at the best.
The way in which the redevelopment partnership worked was analogous to the operation 
of growth machine or the formation of growth coalition (Logan and Molotch 1987; 
Molotch 1976). In the growth coalition thesis, the city is perceived as “a growth machine, 
one that can increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in the right position 
to benefit” (Logan and Molotch 1987: 50). The growth coalition thesis explains that local 
economic development and urban renewal are driven by the territorial coalition of land- 
based elites that include local officials, business elites, local media, and sometimes, trade 
unions and corporate capitalists in search for regional basis (Logan and Molotch 1987). 
For the land-based elites, “the agenda... is to secure the preconditions of growth” in order 
to “increase the value of land and revenue streams” (Jonas and Wilson 1999: 5-6). In spite 
of their potential conflicting individual interests, land-based elites have a consensus of 
achieving the growth agenda. Inter-city or inter-regional competition becomes inevitable 
in order to attract mobile capital and central government funds for local growth. Although 
land-based elites try to promote “community ‘we feeling’” (Molotch 1976: 314) so that 
local residents become receptive to the growth ideology, local communities are often
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threatened and become subject to dismantlement as “the preconditions for economic 
growth” require “changes in the built environment” (Jonas and Wilson 1999:7).
There are differences in the way in which land-based elites in American cities interact and 
influence each other in comparison to those in Seoul and Beijing. The implementation of 
developer-led partnership as discussed in this thesis, however, suggests that the essence of 
growth coalition has also penetrated the dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment in 
Seoul and Beijing. The property-related interests (professional developers, property- 
owners including absentee landlords, and local authorities) in both cases worked in 
coalition to accomplish the neighbourhood transformation and realise development 
potential at the expense of local residents and long-standing neighbourhoods.
Seoul: Urban growth coalition in consolidation
The implementation of partnership-based redevelopment programmes in Seoul took 
place at the time of the central government exercising development-oriented policies. The 
South Korean economy in the second half of the twentieth century was often interpreted 
as being under strong state leadership. The South Korean government had been 
intervening actively in economic planning and resource allocation in order to overcome 
constraints in the process of late industrialisation (Amsden 1989). In times of its 
economic take-off between 1963 and 1982, public sector investment was often found to 
exceed public sector saving, and involved heavy borrowing of foreign loans for 
investment in key industries and infrastructure provision (ibid, pp.88-92). This involved, 
however, little spending on social services (Jacobs 2000; White and Goodman 1998), 
indicating that the “welfare arrangements have been shaped to fit the strategic priority of 
rapid industrialisation” (White and Goodman 1998: 14). The developmental priorities 
characterised by export orientation governed the shaping of social policies, which largely 
focused on mobilising human resources and enhancing labour productivity (Deyo 1992: 
304-305). In return, the role of non-state agencies such as communities, firms and 
families were given a major welfare role in both financing and providing welfare services 
(Jacobs 2000; Jones 1990; White and Goodman 1998). Unlike Hong Kong and Singapore 
where the provision of public housing has been thoroughly implemented as part of 
welfare arrangements (Castells 1992), the South Korean government distanced itself from 
direct provision, and relied on private-led initiatives. The implementation of JRP projects 
was a continuation of prior strategies as it tried to resolve the problems of dilapidated 
neighbourhoods by means of mobilising private capital and the private sector
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participation with less direct intervention by the public sector.
Based on the contractual relationship, professional developers and property owners (as 
individual developers) worked together to acquire development gains. The public sector 
was also an active participant: it signed contracts for public land transfer, contributed 
public funds (e.g. land sales revenue and National Housing Funds) and facilitated 
redevelopment through planning regulations. As we have seen in the case of the Nangok 
neighbourhood redevelopment, the involvement of the Korea National Housing 
Corporation (KNHQ could also be interpreted as a way of using a public agency to close 
the rent gap in the neighbourhood, and meet the needs of property-owners who were 
desperate to salvage their projects. From the tenants or poor owner- occupiers ’ point of 
view, the implementation of the rolling redevelopment did not make too much difference 
in terms of displacement. The efforts made by property-owners, district assembly 
members and government officials indicated how closely they could work together to 
promote growth in times of difficulties. These efforts were made in the name of helping 
local communities, but the local communities remained abstract, and in reality, were 
replaced by off-site investors and speculators.
Beijing: Urban growth coalition in the making
In Beijing, the ODHRP was based on a formal relationship between local authorities and 
professional developers. Local residents were expected to cooperate by making timely 
displacement to facilitate land preparation or purchasing redeveloped flats for re-housing. 
China’s constitution stipulates that urban lands are owned by the state. It is in this context 
that local authorities entered a contractual relationship for the redevelopment of 
dilapidated neighbourhoods based on the transfer of the use right of the state-owned 
lands. The case of the Xinzhongjie redevelopment was typical of ODFIRP projects, 
oriented towards commercial housing redevelopment in inner city districts. The 
participation of an overseas joint venture highlighted the attractiveness of property- 
oriented redevelopment that the ODHRP promoted. The case of the Haiyuncang 
redevelopment was illusionary in that the project accomplished a very high re-housing rate, 
helping residents to remain in the neighbourhood, but closer examination indicated that 
such a resident-friendly approach came together with stronger government intervention to 
promote property development. By shifting residents into a smaller, densely redeveloped 
neighbourhood, the local authority was able to free up some of the neighbourhood lands 
and sell the use rights to business elites in search for office building sites.
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In this respect, ODHRP projects could be identified as facilitating ‘urban growth 
coalition’ between local government officials and developers, and this thesis agrees with 
other researchers who have recently interpreted urban (re-) development in the growth 
coalition context (Fang and Zhang 2003; He and Wu 2005; Zhang 2002; Zhang and Fang 
2003; Zhu 1999). The formation of urban growth coalition has been facilitated in the 
decentralised environment of resource control and revenue generation. Local 
governments were provided with greater decision-making power and more incentives 
through fiscal reform to manage and proceed with local investment to meet their regional 
needs and achieve local economic growth (Li and Lian 1999; Wei 1996; Wu 2001). The 
sale of land use right by the municipal government was an effective means to secure extra- 
budgetary revenues to invest in urban built environment such as motorways, metro 
connection, electricity and water supply, all of which required immediate public 
intervention for the growing population and economy.
The developers, who are mainly former state-owned enterprises, have relied on their 
personal and institutional links to exploit the new speculative environment of land and 
housing development. In the 1990s, all the major developers in cities were former state 
enterprises, which were nevertheless under strong influence from the central and local 
governments. These developers were in close partnership with the local officials who 
administered the lease of public lands. For example, in the early 1990s when ODHR 
began, it was reported that there were more than “200 property development companies 
registered in Beijing, nearly all of which are owned or controlled by one or another level 
of government,” and it was these companies that undertook the majority of ODHRP 
projects (Leaf 1995:152-153).
Furthermore, the development goals and policies at municipal level are still set and 
implemented in line with the national guidelines put forward by the central government. 
As for Beijing, this characteristic is strengthened by the presence of the central 
government institutions and high-ranking state work units, all imposing certain limits to 
the way the municipal government carries out the policy recommendations from the 
central government. The city promotion of Beijing results in municipal pride, but also 
results in national pride as was witnessed at the time of Beijing’s successful bid for 2008 
Olympic Games.
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10.2 Residents and redevelopment benefits
The fundamental question in this thesis was: does the developer-led partnership benefit 
local residents? The findings indicate that redevelopment projects involved the 
displacement of most residents, and that whilst there were short-term gains for some 
residents, the long-term sustainability of these gains was doubtful.
Scale of iocal residents* displacement
From the viewpoint of residents’ displacement, Seoul’s JRP and Beijing’s ODHRP did not 
bring benefits for most local residents as these programmes led to their large-scale 
displacement and the dismantlement of long-standing communities. JRP and ODHRP 
projects accompanied gentrification of dilapidated neighbourhoods, and redeveloped flats 
were largely consumed by middle- or higher-income households.
In Seoul, owner-occupiers in JRP projects did not enjoy the benefit of re-housing even 
though they were in principle the official implementers of neighbourhood redevelopment. 
Eligible tenants had the choice of re-housing in redevelopment neighbourhoods as JRP 
projects required the provision of public rental flats on site by regulations. This allowed a 
certain proportion of eligible tenants to be re-housed, avoiding permanent displacement 
As for ineligible tenants, they faced displacement with no compensation at all
In Beijing, ODHRP projects accompanied the production of commercial flats, which 
were increasingly purchased by middle- or higher-income individual homebuyers. Local 
residents were displaced from their inner city neighbourhoods, many of them moving to 
near and outer suburban estates. Even if residents were entitled to purchase redeveloped 
flats at reduced prices, these prices were still unaffordable for most residents. The case of 
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood’s first phase redevelopment showed that less than 5% of 
original residents were re-housed, and eighteen months after purchase, the majority of the 
re-housed residents had moved out due to unaffordable monthly housing costs.
When the revised JRP and ODHRP approaches were implemented, they led to interesting 
results. In Seoul, the implementation of rolling redevelopment programme did not change 
the fate of owner-occupiers or ineligible tenants, but made a significant difference for 
eligible tenants. The rolling redevelopment called for the provision of public rental flats 
for eligible tenants before the commencement of residents’ displacement. This increased
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eligible tenants’ housing security as they did not have to go through long-term temporary 
relocation during the project, but in return led to eligible tenants’ permanent displacement 
since these public rental flats were provided elsewhere. In Beijing, the revised ODHRP 
approach since 2000 (that is, the Haiyuncang model) led to a much higher re-housing rate 
(70%). In this respect, as far as displacement was concerned, Beijing’s latest Haiyuncang 
model brought benefits to the majority of local residents.
Redevelopment and financial aains
In Seoul, redevelopment allows owner-occupiers to legalise their tenure, and tap into the 
development gains. In Nangok, most original owner-occupiers, however, sold their 
property rights to off-site speculators, and few managed to stay for re-housing. As we 
have seen in the rise and fall of Nangok’s first phase redevelopment, the risk and 
uncertainties involved in redevelopment projects caused dwelling prices to fluctuate 
during project preparation. Based on the most common dwelling size (26m2), the sale 
price of a dwelling in Nangok neighbourhood between 1996 and 2002 fluctuated between 
KRW 25 million and KRW 65 million (see Section 9.1 in Chapter 9). Given that the key 
money to enter the KNHGprovided public rental flats as Chonsei tenants reached KRW 
33 million, owner-occupiers were likely to convert into private rental tenure if the sale 
price of their property rights was their only finance for their post-displacement housing. 
The biggest loss for such owner-occupiers would be the loss of opportunities to reap 
more redevelopment benefits by purchasing redeveloped flats. These opportunities were 
taken by off-site investors and speculators. As for the eligible tenants, they were entitled to 
cash compensation, which was equivalent to three months’ household expenditure for 
average urban wage- and salary-earning households, weighted by the number of 
household members. This could be considered a financial gain, but not enough to cover 
the increase in housing rents upon displacement. Ineligible tenants were not entitled to 
any compensation, and therefore, had no financial gains at all.
In Beijing, redevelopment compensation has been monetarised since 1998, and residents 
were entided to cash compensation that could be more than their life-time savings (see 
‘Redevelopment Compensation’ in Section 7.2, Chapter 7 and also ‘Financing 
homeownership’ in Section 8.2, Chapter 8). The compensation contract for public tenants 
included the purchase of their rental dwellings, which gave them an equal footing to 
owner-occupiers in terms of making financial gains. According to the manager who used 
to work for the developer involved in Xinzhongjie redevelopment, the cost of residents’
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displacement and relocation usually constitutes one third of the total redevelopment 
project costs. This indicates that residents’ compensation is hugely subsidised by 
redevelopment costs. Displaced residents could make a decision on how to use their new 
financial assets, including their move to suburban estates to become owner-occupiers. 
Given that the residents in dilapidated neighbourhoods were previously excluded to take 
part in the privatisation process under China’s housing reform policies, neighbourhood 
redevelopment provided a platform for residents to accumulate assets and overcome their 
marginal position in the city. In 2001, however, the compensation regulation changed to 
reduce the total compensation by 11 -36% (see ‘Residents’ discontent and its sources’ in 
Section 9.2, Chapter 9). Given the average housing prices in inner city and suburban 
districts, residents facing displacement after 2001 would find it more difficult to become 
owner-occupiers.
Redevelopment and loss of affordable dwellings for poor residents
In Seoul, the implementation of JRP projects since the mid-1980s has reduced the 
number of dilapidated neighbourhoods which had similar characteristics to Nangok. 
Dwellings in these neighbourhoods were dilapidated but most were affordable for poor 
residents. In Gwanak district where Nangok was located, there were still some dilapidated 
neighbourhoods, but they were already designated for or in the process of redevelopment. 
Given that displacees showed a high tendency for ‘intra-district mobility* (that is, house- 
moving within Gwanak district) most likely for the reasons of employment, existing social 
network and children’s education, they had no choice but to move to the dwellings of 
higher standard and rents available in the proximity The loss of affordable dwellings due 
to redevelopment also pushed up the rents of dwellings in adjacent neighbourhoods.
In Beijing, the situation was similar in that neighbourhood redevelopment reduced the 
number of dilapidated neighbourhoods in the city, but this might not have resulted in 
fewer choices for displaced residents. It was unlikely for them to move to other 
dilapidated neighbourhoods since these neighbourhoods largely consisted of public rental 
dwellings, which were already occupied. Individual access to these public rental dwellings 
was unlikely unless displacees had informal connections (for example, interviewee CBD6- 
INT-01 who was able to move temporarily to their father’s vacant dwelling). It is likely 
that intense redevelopment of inner city districts in Beijing contributed to the increase in 
rents and sale prices in the private housing sector, but part of this increase could also have 
come from Beijing’s booming real estate sector in the municipal preparation for the 2008
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Olympic Games.
Redevelopment and housing conditions
In Seoul, the physical standard of post-displacement dwellings was much superior to that 
of pre-displacement dwellings but, as mentioned earlier, this was inevitable as residents 
had no choice but to move to higher standard dwellings. Residents’ displacement also led 
to higher rents (that is, higher Chonsei key money or monthly rents) as well as tenure 
conversion from the preferred Chonsei tenure to less favoured monthly rental tenure. For 
instance, most eligible tenants who moved to the private rental dwellings were able to stay 
in Chonsei tenure, but this required a substantial increase in Chonsei key money. For them, 
cash compensation was helpful, but still fell short of fully financing the rent increase. 
Eligible tenants who moved to the public rental flats could be said to have received some 
benefits (that is, long-term tenure security and improved physical conditions), but their 
move involved tenure conversion to less favoured monthly rental tenure, which might not 
be affordable for those with unstable and/or low incomes. The important thing is that for 
most displaced tenants, their displacement went against their initial reason for living in 
Nangok neighbourhood: to minimise expenditure on housing. In this regard, their 
displacement might have detrimental impacts on how they allocated household resources 
to meet their various needs in future, which could not be verified in the short term.
In Beijing, the physical standard of residents’ post-redevelopment dwellings was also 
much superior to their pre-redevelopment dwellings. This was also accompanied by their 
tenure conversion from public rental tenure into homeownership, which was made 
possible by heavy subsidies to displacees in the form of redevelopment compensation. 
Similar to the experiences of the privatisation of public housing in Britain (Forrest and 
Murie 1988), most public rental dwellings in good condition in urban China had seen 
heavily subsidised privatisation by the late 1990s. This provided a natural desire for the 
displacees to become owner-occupiers, which seemed to have been within their reach 
given the large amount of cash compensation under the 1998 Compensation Measures. 
The legacy of welfare housing provision seemed to have dominated people’s minds, and 
private renting was hardly considered as it did not provide long-term tenure security. In 
Beijing, the likelihood of enjoying larger cash compensation (and hence obtaining more 
assets for further investment) depended on larger dwelling size and longer working history. 
As mentioned earlier, the 2001 Compensation Measure has substantially reduced the total 
compensation, and future displacees would be less optimistic regarding their prospect of
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becoming homeowners in new dwellings. It is also yet to be seen whether or not the 
increased monthly housing costs (maintenance and management costs) would have any 
negative impacts on household economy in the long term.
10.3 Who benefited and who lost in neighbourhood redevelopment
In urban renewal and gentrification debates, ‘who benefits’ has been the most central issue 
(Cameron 1 9 9 2 ) . This is particularly important as urban renewal objectives proposed by 
central and local governments are often unclear and ambiguous. Two contesting 
perspectives exist regarding the nature of urban renewal policies (Bailey and Robertson 
1 9 9 7 : 5 6 2 ) .  On the one hand, there is a perspective that views urban renewal policies as 
promoting economic growth and inviting higher-income groups. In this perspective, 
gentrification is a positive outcome, as urban renewal is expected to provide new jobs and 
generate increased demands for local services, thus trickling down renewal benefits. On 
the other hand, there is another perspective, which argues that urban renewal policies 
should aim at ‘‘redistribution of opportunities or resources to low-income or ‘deprived’ 
groups directly7’ (ibid). In this perspective, gentrification is considered negative, as local 
residents are displaced with less chance of enjoying the direct benefits. Therefore, the 
discussion of benefits and costs could easily be biased depending on whose perspective is 
taken. In this section, I attempt to address the costs and benefits for all the participating 
actors in neighbourhood redevelopment, and conclude that most benefits accrued to the 
property related interests, supporting the a r g u m e n t in Section 1 0 .1  that the developer-led 
partnership in Seoul and Beijing has been a growth coalition in practice (see Table 1 0 -1  at 
the end of this section for the summary).
Beneficiaries
In the case of Seoul, the principal beneficiaries were professional developers, local 
authorities and property-owners. Here, property owners consisted of dwelling owners (or 
owner-occupiers) and landlords. Landlords included both absentee landlords, and the 
central and local governments who owned public lands in dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Professional developers benefited as redevelopment projects presented them with access 
to lands and hence valuable opportunities for real estate development in a city like Seoul 
where vacant lands had become scarce after decades of rapid urban growth. Local 
authorities were able to transform dilapidated neighbourhoods into modem estates, thus
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increasing their property tax basis, collecting land sales revenues and achieving city 
‘beautification’ in their terms. The redevelopment of dilapidated neighbourhoods also 
enabled the upgrading of urban services and infrastructure provision in these 
neighbourhoods by means of relying on private investment and little public spending. As 
for owner-occupiers, they were, in principle, given opportunities to gain from 
redevelopment projects by purchasing redeveloped flats at discounted prices, but it was 
mostly absentee landlords who had the financial means to do so. The provision of new 
high-rise flats also benefited middle- and higher-income households in and around the city 
who were looking for new dwellings. People running local stores and businesses around 
the redevelopment neighbourhood might also enjoy increased demands for local services 
from the new incomers. Tenants who moved to public rental flats as part of 
redevelopment compensation could be considered beneficiaries at first glance, since the 
redevelopment provided fast-track access to public rental housing, which occupied only a 
marginal position in SeouL For the municipality as a whole, the provision of public rental 
flats in redevelopment neighbourhoods contributed to the expansion of the public rental 
sector, which was under-developed in SeouL
In the case of Beijing, professional developers and local authorities have certainly 
benefited from redevelopment projects. Professional developers were given access to 
valuable inner city lands to transform them into high-rise modem residential estates. As 
was the case in Haiyuncang redevelopment, higher density residential redevelopments also 
helped release lands for commercial and business uses. As for the local authorities, their 
monopolistic control over urban lands allowed them to gain extra-budgetary revenues (in 
the form of land use premiums) by land leasing. As Fulong Wu noted, “The policy of 
land leasing enabled the local government to extract landed benefits from developers and 
reinvest in urban development” (Wu, 2001: 283). For local authorities, the neighbourhood 
transformation could also be considered as representing administrative achievement in 
their inter-governmental competition. The transformation of dilapidated neighbourhoods 
into modem, high-rise flats could also be regarded as improving urban landscape 
especially in times of preparing for international events such as the 2008 Olympic Games. 
The provision of modem flats in the inner city districts of Beijing also benefited higher- 
income Beijing residents, foreigners or migrants in well-paid professional employment, 
who sought homes within proximate distance from their work and leisure places. 
Incomers would generate more demands for local services and new employment such as 
housekeepers and cleaners, although these job vacancies would likely be filled by poorly-
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paid migrant workers from other provinces. As for the local residents who used to live in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods, they found an opportunity to catch up with other former 
public sector tenants, and become homeowners by using relatively affluent cash 
compensation (if displaced) or taking advantage of subsidised sale of redeveloped flats (if 
re-housed). The latter choice turned out to be particularly beneficial when affordable 
housing construction parameters were applied as in Haiyuncang redevelopment.
Losers
The neighbourhood redevelopment did not come without costs. In Seoul, dilapidated 
neighbourhoods provided affordable dwellings for the poorest population within the city 
As one of the residents expressed in an interview (KSS7-INT-10), there was a circulation 
of people, moving in when they were in difficulties and moving out when they gained 
strength and saved enough money to live elsewhere. The demolition of such 
neighbourhoods as Nangok gave no regard to this positive role, and effectively reduced 
affordable dwellings for poor people in and around the city. Most local residents could 
also be considered as having lost as a result of neighbourhood redevelopment. They had 
to spend much more upon displacement in order to finance increased housing costs. 
Large-scale redevelopment and residents’ displacement raised rent levels in adjacent 
neighbourhoods, making it more difficult for the displacees to find affordable dwellings. 
Even the tenants who moved to the public rental housing sector as part of redevelopment 
compensation could be considered as losers, since the tenure transfer from private 
Chonsei tenure to public monthly rental tenure placed heavy pressure on their monthly 
household expenditure, and for most households, their living conditions in the public 
rental sector still did not meet the national minimum living standard.
In Beijing, the residents were compensated with relatively large cash compensation, and 
could use it to become owner-occupiers in new suburban dwellings within their budget 
limit. Since the changes in compensation regulation in 2001, it appears less likely for 
displacees to do so if their pre-displacement dwelling space is relatively small. Unlike in 
Seoul, the demolition of dilapidated dwellings in Beijing might have less city wide impact 
in terms of reducing affordable dwellings for general population. This was because most 
dwellings in dilapidated neighbourhoods in inner city districts of Beijing belonged to the 
public rental sector, to which free access was restricted. The demolition of these dwellings, 
however, could be a loss to the local authorities as the number of public rental dwellings 
in their disposal has been substantially reduced in times of privatisation. It is also a loss to
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the city as the historic heritage such as the courtyard housing is demolished in the name 
of modernisation while pursuing neighbourhood redevelopment. In Beijing, the 
demolition of cultural relics has been criticised on numerous occasions (e.g. Beijing Today 
9 July 2004; China Daily 13 August 2003, 20 August 2003), but the logic of modernisation 
seems to override the need for cultural preservation.
Table 10-1: Summary of beneficiaries and losers in Seoul and Beijing’s neighbourhood redevelopment
_____ Beneficiaries
Professional developers
Access to lands and opportunities for real estate development 
Development profits
Release of lands for commercial and business uses (as was in 
the Haiyuncang model in Beijing)
Local authorities
Higher quality housing 
Expansion of public rental stock (in Seoul)
Losers
Local;
Loss of cheap housing supply 
Loss of public rental stock (in Beijing)
comparatively small, investments” (Smith and LeFaivre 1984: 54). The finding also 
confirms our earlier discussion that the developer-led partnership has been closer to the 
operation of a growth coalition. Beijing residents received more benefits in terms of 
increased asset, but as discussed in Chapter 9, this could be interpreted as the attempts by 
the developers and local authorities to minimise their resistance and make them more 
receptive to the redevelopment and displacement.
10.4 What lessons can  we learn?
Several important lessons could be drawn from this research on the experiences of 
neighbourhood redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. Four questions are discussed in this 
section: (1) is it a good or bad thing to involve developers in neighbourhood 
redevelopment; (2) is there a role for the government to play; (3) how do we protea 
disadvantaged residents; (4) how can residents participate as equal partners in 
neighbourhood redevelopment?
Is it a  good or bad thing to involve developers?
Despite the negative consequences such as residents’ displacement, the importance of 
developers’ participation still needs to be acknowledged. It was evident that resource- 
constrained governments and owner-occupiers in fast growing cities like Seoul and Beijing 
were not able to cope with all the redevelopment needs. Professional developers possess 
the expertise and human/financial resources to achieve neighbourhood transformation 
and redevelopment in an efficient way.
The participation of developers, however, still left some room for concern. The success 
of the neighbourhood redevelopment depended largely on recovering development costs 
and profits through the sales of redeveloped flats, and also on the financial capacity of 
professional developers. They needed to be financially capable of handling large-scale 
housing projects, having adequate assets and access to financial institutions for project 
financing. In Seoul, for instance, the average number of redeveloped flats in 251 JRP 
project areas (completed or in progress by the end of December 2004) reached 990 flats, 
equivalent to roughly ten twelve-storey high-rise apartment blocks. The largest project in 
Seoul, implemented in Bongcheon 3 District between 1994 and 1997, demolished 1,954 
dwellings and produced 5,387 flats (Housing Bureau of SMG 2005). Under these
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circumstances, developers’ financial instability could easily jeopardise neighbourhood 
redevelopment as we have seen in the example of the failed first phase Nangok 
redevelopment in Seoul, caused by the withdrawal of professional developers in the 
aftermath of the 1997’s Asian Financial Crisis. The first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment 
in Beijing could not have been possible without the participation of the overseas partner 
that responded to the call of a local developer.
The success of developer-led redevelopment also depended on the extent to which 
redeveloped flats could be consumed in the housing market. As one of the real estate 
developers interviewed in Beijing commented, “because residential projects are built for 
sale, there is a natural exit for the investment.’’ In Seoul, redeveloped flats were largely for 
consumption by middle- or higher-income households. The housing shortage and the 
prevalence of real estate speculation (W-J. Kim 1996: 106-134) allowed developers to 
proceed with high density redevelopment to extract as many profits as possible. In Beijing, 
redeveloped flats supplied in the 1990s were largely unaffordable for average households, 
and the immature development of housing finance system aggravated the situation. It was 
the overseas investors, state enterprises and institutions who played important roles in 
consuming commercial flats supplied in the 1990s (Wu 1996), and in turn, sustaining the 
production of highly priced redevelopment flats in inner city areas.
Is there a  role for the government to play?
The central and local governments play an important role in setting the preconditions of 
neighbourhood redevelopment. As the UN-Habitat proposed, a partnership approach 
pre-supposes a stronger but effective government to establish a legal and regulatory 
framework to achieve dual purposes: (1) the facilitation of the private sector’s 
participation that would bring experienced and efficient human and capital resources; and 
(2) the protection of people who would otherwise be exposed to profit-driven private 
sector (UN-Habitat 1993). Partnership with profit-driven private sector has a risk of 
running counter to the interests of the poor population, but this can be avoided by 
employing appropriate regulations by the “public interests (since the private sector is non- 
accountable politically). This means that there will be a large area of decision making 
(with regard to minimum standards, zoning and so on) which will need to be retained by 
government” (UN-Habitat 1993: Chapter 2A).
This research has shown that the central and local governments made both direct and
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indirect intervention in neighbourhood redevelopment programmes, though the results of 
the intervention were largely in favour of property-related interests. There were, however, 
some elements of positive intervention, which we need to focus on and exploit. In Seoul, 
the provision of public rental flats in redeveloped neighbourhoods was something that 
was not available in Beijing. This measure helped expand the available housing choices for 
tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation. The measure also helped the 
municipality to expand its public rental housing sector, which was substantially 
underdeveloped in Seoul. The application of rolling redevelopment also helped eligible 
tenants to avoid temporary relocation by providing public rental flats before displacement. 
The rolling redevelopment could have had more positive implications if they were 
adopted from the early stage of municipal redevelopment history. The financial support 
for tenants in difficulties (e.g. National Housing Fund housing loans for Chonsei tenants) 
also helped tenants to pay for their increased housing costs, but as requested by displaced 
tenants in their organised action in Nangok, the financial support scheme needs to be 
implemented with a longer redemption period so that poor tenants with unstable or low 
income could have more time to save enough money for repayment.
From Beijing’s experiences, we could also learn that redeveloped dwellings could be 
supplied at a much lower sales price when neighbourhood redevelopment took place on 
public lands. Public intervention of this kind was not exercised in Seoul even though the 
majority of JRP neighbourhood lands belonged to the central and local governments. The 
long-term mortgage provided for those residents with Housing Provident Fund account 
encouraged residents to purchase redeveloped flats upon their re-housing, but there need 
to be provisions to protect residents who fall victim to the on-going economic 
restructuring and labour market reform. In this respect, the municipal policy of 
promoting privatisation and the rapid contraction of the pubic housing sector need to be 
reconsidered.
Protection of disadvantaged residents
When a redevelopment takes place in dilapidated neighbourhoods where poorer sections 
of the municipal population largely reside, particular attention needs to be paid to the 
more disadvantaged residents who are vulnerable in both the housing and labour markets. 
At this point, the tradition of social housing in Europe would be a useful point of 
consideration. Despite the decline of the social housing sector and the decay of public 
housing estates, we learnt that there remained a role for the state to play by providing
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affordable dwellings for the socially excluded population (Power 1993). The lack of public 
housing stock in Seoul, and the rapid decline of the public housing sector in Beijing under 
reform policies need to be reconsidered. In the case of housing finance, families with 
irregular and insufficient income are not able to benefit from existing financial 
arrangements. This is something the market cannot provide on its own, and this goes back 
to the enhanced role of the state. As was shown from the interviews with tenants in Seoul, 
they were still willing to make contributions and repay any loans as long as the terms of 
repayment could be arranged by taking their household situation into consideration.
One good example would come from the experiences of housing restructuring policies in 
the Netherlands, which aimed at promoting neighbourhood redifferentiation and diversity 
by means of physical intervention (demolition and upgrading) of post-war social rented 
housing (Kleinhans 2003). As most project areas largely accommodated low-income 
households, demolition or upgrading of housing stocks led to their forced relocation. 
Tracing the relocation experiences of residents displaced from two restructured 
neighbourhoods, Reinout Kleinhans (2003) found out that many displacees actually 
improved their housing situation if they had taken advantage of ‘priority rights’ and ‘rent 
subsidy for displacees’ in the housing market. In the Netherlands, social rented housing 
units were allocated through ‘advert model’ (or the ‘Delft model’): rental units were 
advertised in a weekly newspaper and on a designated web site, specifying eligibility 
criteria and housing characteristics. Eligible households were required to send in a reply 
coupon to the relevant housing association, ranked in accordance with the selection 
criteria. Those with longest residency or waiting period were given priority in the 
allocation process. As for displacees from restructured neighbourhoods, they also had to 
make an application in the same manner, but they were provided with a ‘certificate of 
urgency if they apply for a dwelling unit with a standard comparable with their current 
residence, which then gave displacees with selection priority over other regular applicants 
(Kleinhans 2003: 477).53 If the displacees were the recipients of means-tested rent 
subsidy, they were entitled to this rent subsidy even if they moved to a rental unit that 
commands higher rents than what was allowed for their initial qualification for rent 
subsidy Such an arrangement allowed those households receiving rent subsidy to move to
53 If the displacees are applying for a dwelling unit of a better standard than their current residence, then 
the length of residency in current residence is the main eligibility criterion. They are also given priority if 
they apply for a dwelling unit in a new housing project delivered by a local housing association, provided 
that they meet the eligibility criteria of the project (Kleinhans 2003: 478).
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a better rental unit (Kleinhans 2003: 478). From this Dutch case, it is evident that 
neighbourhood restructuring policies that provide forced displacees with preferential 
treatment, allowing them to make a head-start over other households in housing markets, 
have positive effects on the housing experiences of the displacees.
Encouraging residents’ participation
In order to ensure equal footing for developers and residents, local authorities need to 
make more coherent partnership frameworks within which residents can make their voices 
heard from the early stage of a redevelopment project. Here, the residents should also 
include tenants as they have also made contributions to the neighbourhood.
From the viewpoint of local communities and the third sector in the developing world, 
the potential for sectoral empowerment and increased participation in decision-making 
process indicates that the residents in dilapidated neighbourhoods could be ‘enabled’ to 
take an initiative in a ‘bottom-up’ approach (Awotona 1999; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 
1989). In developed world, advocates of residents* empowerment also argue that the 
decline of inner city neighbourhoods and their ‘dissertification’ could be remedied with 
more innovative measures that rely on residents’ own initiatives (Mumford and Power 
2002; Power and Mumford 1999).
The implementation of the JRP in Seoul had potential for residents’ empowerment. It was 
designed to promote the partnership between professional developers and property- 
owners including owner-occupiers in redevelopment neighbourhoods. Owner-occupiers 
were invited to intervene in each project milestone. In its actual progress, however, the 
owner-occupiers’ initiatives were largely undermined due to the high degree of 
inaffordability and developers’ profit-maximisation approaches. Most owner-occupiers in 
redevelopment districts in Seoul found it difficult to afford the redeveloped flats, and sold 
their rights to off-site speculators. Such sales took place well before the commencement 
of a project. This process effectively reduced the proportion of owner-occupiers among 
the property-owners, which meant that the owner occupying local residents’ decision­
making power was significantly undermined.
As for the tenants in Seoul, there was no provision at all to listen to their views and to 
encourage their contribution. They were subject to displacement at the early stage of the 
JRP. In the 1990s, there were some measures to allow them to be re-housed in public
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rental flats built on site, but their exclusion from taking a share in the partnership 
framework continued. This led to their resistance when the actual displacement was to 
take place. As shown in the case of Nangok redevelopment in Seoul, such resistance and 
tenants’ negotiation with developers might allow them to extract a little bit more 
concession from property-owners and developers.
In Beijing, there was no provision for tenants’ participation throughout the whole process 
of a redevelopment project. The only moment they could voice out was when the time 
came for making negotiation with developers and demolition companies over 
compensation. In Beijing’s ODHRP, residents were considered to be important actors in 
the sense that they were to transfer their land use rights and dwellings to developers, and 
in principle, make financial contribution by means of purchasing a redeveloped flat. In 
reality, they were subjected to displacement and relocation to make way for more 
profitable redevelopment that targeted off-site buyers who could afford to pay.
In order to off-set this and encourage the decision-making power, it would be necessary 
for the local authority to establish a framework that guarantees residents’ intervention 
from the early stage. Furthermore, in order to prevent residents from making an early 
departure from their neighbourhood, a set of financial assistance would be necessary 
particularly for those groups of residents who would not have established credit history to 
access existing financial arrangement.
10.5 What this research adds: contributions of this research
This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge in a number of ways. Firsdy, 
this is empirical research that closely examines neighbourhood redevelopment experiences 
in Seoul and Beijing, which have been understudied despite relatively long-term 
implementation. This research allows us to gain an insight into the process of 
neighbourhood transformation, revealing how it was possible for municipal governments 
to execute a common strategy of developer-led partnership in different urban contexts. 
This research is a timely academic intervention especially because the urban landscape in 
mainland China has been undergoing dramatic changes in recent years, involving mass 
clearance of urban dwellings and displacement of local residents. In order to understand 
these changes, a number of literatures on issues such as China’s urbanisation, urban spatial 
restructuring, land reform and real estate development have appeared. There are some
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pioneering works on urban redevelopment, but a more empirical research as presented in 
this thesis was in demand to gain a thorough understanding of what has been going on in 
local neighbourhood contexts.
Secondly, this research enhances the understanding of urban redevelopment at 
neighbourhood level by placing local residents at the centre of its attention. The main 
strength of this research is that it was an area-based study in redevelopment 
neighbourhoods, conducting in-depth interviews with local residents who were subject to 
urban redevelopment and displacement as well as interviewing other participants from the 
public and private sectors. In this way, it was possible to collect the views and deliver the 
voices of participating actors and residents. This research approach was particularly rare in 
the study of urban redevelopment in mainland China, where few studies conducted in- 
depth enquiries into residents’ experiences. The few studies that could be identified 
included Tan (1997, 1998) on Beijing and Wu (2004) on Shanghai, but these studies 
focused on quantitative analysis of residents’ housing outcome. The studies by Tan (1997, 
1998) do not tell us much about the changes since 1998 when the compensation was fully 
monetarised.
Thirdly, the in-depth enquiry into residents’ post-displacement housing experiences also 
allows this research to go beyond the discussion of the scale of displacement. Researchers 
studying residents’ displacement have been largely inferring the scale of displacement by 
means of using census data rather than taking a direct measurement due to difficulties in 
tracking displacees (Atkinson 2002:9). Moreover, Bailey and Robertson (1997) argued that 
“the concern over displacement is quite narrow, focusing on whether particular 
households in a renewal area (the ‘community’) are able to continue living there after the 
buildings have been substantially upgraded” (Bailey and Robertson 1997). This research 
successfully overcame such difficulties and limits of studying residents’ displacement by 
recruiting displacees as subjects of this study
Fourthly, this research contributes to the theoretical understanding of urban 
redevelopment and neighbourhood gentrification by revealing the fact that surprisingly 
similar property-oriented approaches were undertaken by the cities in mainland China and 
South Korea. Such approaches were not confined to the cities of the developed world. It 
was found in this thesis that developer-led partnership was an important strategy for 
dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment, bringing together property-related interests in
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search for profits and resulting in local residents’ displacement in most cases.
Finally, this research showed that the experiences of Seoul and Beijing were highly visible 
in comparison with other cities in developing world due to a strong government emphasis 
on redevelopment. In most developing countries, the absence of efficient, effective policy 
making and strong government has made it difficult to develop a systematic approach to 
concerted urban redevelopment (UN-Habitat 1996,2003). In this respect, a multi-sectoral 
partnership was strongly advocated to supplement the weaknesses of each sector in 
developing countries. This research on Seoul and Beijing showed that such a partnership 
was already in place in these cities, having driven urban changes for many years. This 
research also tells us that most benefits of the partnership-based urban redevelopment 
accrue to property-related interests, and that caution needs to be taken in order to protect 
the disadvantaged local population.
10.6 An ag en d a  for further research
The findings of this research have enhanced our understanding about the nature of 
neighbourhood redevelopment in fast growing cities like Seoul and Beijing, providing 
insights into the role of different actors behind the neighbourhood transformation and 
what impacts the transformation had upon local residents. This research, however, opens 
up more opportunities for further research.
Redevelopment compensation and ineligibility
The municipal governments in Seoul and Beijing all made a clear distinction regarding 
who was to be eligible for redevelopment compensation. The residence status and the 
duration of residence were the key criteria for deciding residents’ eligibility for 
compensation. In Beijing, one important additional requirement was that residents were to 
hold permanent Beijing hukou if not owner-occupiers (BMG 1998a, 2000b, 2001c).
Since Beijing is still in the process of completing housing reform measures, more 
attention needs to be paid to the expansion of the private rental sector. With the 
development of the housing market in Beijing, the number of private rental tenants is 
expected to grow in the near future. This will also be facilitated as the restrictions on inter­
city migration become less severe, inviting more migrant population into the private rental
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sector. The latest compensation regulation, 2001 Compensation Measure (BMG 2001c), 
stipulates that private rental tenants do not receive cash compensation. When 
redevelopment takes place, they are to terminate their rental contract with landlords, or if 
not agreed, renew their contracts with the original landlords in relocation dwellings 
provided by developers. At first glance, these conditions appear to give tenants more 
choices and prevent their forced eviction. In its actual implementation, however, it is 
doubtful if the provision of relocation dwellings would proceed as promised due to two 
reasons. Firstly, the monetarisation of redevelopment compensation was to avoid 
excessive costs on providing relocation dwellings for original residents. The regulation 
above would only work if the number of private sector tenants was small enough not to 
bear financial pressure on developers. Secondly, the compensation regulation is obscure 
about how to solve any conflicts when the private sector tenants refuse to relocate. It is 
very likely that such conflicts are going to be more prevalent as the reform policies 
continue and the private sector expands.
In Seoul, when formal dwellings are reconstructed, the private rental tenants do not enjoy 
any compensation. In South Korea, a rental contract lasts not more than two years, and 
landlords hold the right to renew or terminate a rental contract. Unlike JRP projects, the 
reconstruction of private dwellings is entirely considered to be at the discretion of 
property-owners, and there is no legal provision to guarantee compensation for tenants.
In this respect, under what circumstances could compensation be socially just? This 
question is closely linked to the issue of establishing a property rights concept in 
connection with development gains in property development. In market economies, to 
what extent could property-owners claim the land increments (increase in land value) due 
to redevelopment and subsequent public investment that goes into the redevelopment 
neighbourhoods? Wfould it be possible to assign some notions of property rights to 
tenants and allow them to claim a certain portion of development gains for having made 
substantial (human and physical) investment into the neighbourhood in proportion to 
their duration of residence?
Long-term effects of redevelopment and asset inequality
One of the strengths of this research was the investigation of post-displacement impacts 
on displacees’ housing experience. It was, however, difficult to see in this research what 
impacts residents’ displacement might have upon their future accumulation of human and
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financial capital.
In Seoul, one of the findings presented in this research was that tenants had to pay for 
increased rents (either increased Chonsei key money or increased monthly rents) upon 
displacement. The increase in housing costs meant that their displacement incurred forced 
spending on housing-related expenditure, which could have been used to meet non­
housing related household needs if they were not displaced in the first place. For example, 
displaced residents would have preferred minimal spending on housing (by staying in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods such as Nangok where rents are extremely cheap), and save as 
much as possible to pay off their existing debts (as some interviewees explicitly 
mentioned) or spend more on children’s higher education to build upon human capital 
Most tenants also relied on external formal or informal loans to finance increased Chonsei 
key money, and we are yet to find out what negative or positive impacts this might have 
upon household economy in future.
In Beijing,.the large cash compensation for displacees led to the substantial increase in 
their financial assets in their disposal Unlike displacees in Seoul those in Beijing therefore 
had more choices in terms of how to spend their new assets to meet various household 
needs. Like in other market economies where homeownership has long been associated 
with family wealth (Forrest and Murie 1995), Beijing’s displaces were presented with 
opportunities to be active participants in housing markets. Their financial assets in the 
form of compensation would also give rise to a number of different investment strategies 
at household level. For many interviewees quoted in this thesis, the priority was to secure 
homeownership, but as the private rental sector and second-hand housing market mature 
in time, it would be possible for them to consider splitting their financial assets for 
different uses. For instance, some of the financial assets could be invested in children’s 
education, or saved to meet any medical needs in future. This might prove to be beneficial 
for families with low income and insecure jobs since the state provision of welfare has 
been diminishing under the reform policies, and welfare provision has been tied more 
closely with beneficiaries’ income and employment status.
In this regard, it would be interesting to find out long-term impacts of residents’ 
displacement and compensation upon wealth distribution and asset inequality among 
displacees as well as between displacees and other urban residents in the city. As for the 
residents in Beijing’s dilapidated neighbourhoods, they were marginalised in the process of
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privatisation, and their relatively poor household circumstances would suggest that they 
might face the fate similar to that of powerless, marginal groups in the UK who suffered 
the most in the process of privatising council housing (Forrest and Murie 1988). In this 
respect, it would be interesting to further investigate if neighbourhood redevelopment 
contributes to the residents’ asset accumulation or further marginalisation. With the 
monetarisation of redevelopment compensation, the size of cash compensation has 
become directly proportionate to the size of one’s dwelling under the new compensation 
regulation. This indicates that those residents who received larger dwellings during the 
period of the planned economy and welfare housing allocation would receive larger 
compensation, giving them a head start over other displacees in terms of accumulating 
financial assets in the new market economy. This could be an important source of income 
and wealth disparities in mainland China, closely associated with wealth accumulation 
through homeownership (Forrest 2003:9-13). In this sense, the compensation is never fair.
10.7 Concluding comments
This thesis aimed to disclose the momentum behind Seoul and Beijing’s neighbourhood 
redevelopment, and examine the redevelopment impacts on local residents. This was to 
examine what roles were undertaken by participating developers, local authorities and 
local residents, and ultimately to find out if developer-led redevelopment partnership was 
beneficial to local residents. In doing so, this research disclosed the downside of 
seemingly successful urban transformation in Seoul and Beijing. In the process of city 
promotion in the globalising world, urban policies led to the exploitation of development 
opportunities in dilapidated neighbourhoods, which disappeared one after another to 
accommodate the growing demand for modem flats, office spaces and/or commercial 
buildings. The search for profits led property-related interests to form a developer-led 
partnership, demolishing affordable homes, dismantling long-standing neighbourhoods 
and displacing poor residents.
It is thus essential to recognise the profit-oriented nature of residential redevelopment 
projects in these cities, and devise renewal approaches that are placed in a wider social 
context on the basis of the needs of urban poor residents. Such approaches need to 
acknowledge the various constraints that are faced by residents in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods. Profit-oriented developer-led partnership brings the urban growth that 
suits the interests of policy-makers, developers or more affluent sections of the urban
336
population. The problem is how to make the government more accountable to local 
residents, and make its policies more balanced between property-oriented redevelopment 
and protection of local residents. Governments need to weigh up much more carefully the 
costs and benefits of neighbourhood redevelopment to different parties or actors, find 
ways to recover excessive profits made by developers and absentee landlords at the 
expense of local residents, and help residents build their assets to survive in market 
economies.
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Appendix Al A sample of interview schedule for residents
1 Personal Details
1.1 Age
1.2 Employment Status
1.3 Educational Background
1.4 No. of years having lived at the current address
2 Family Relations and Income Status
2.1 Married status
2.2 Details about Co-habitants
- No. of Co-habitants
- Relationship with the co-habitants
- Co-habitants* age /  educational background /  employment status
2.3 Income Status
- Monthly income of co-habitants with job
- Income from jobs or any subsidies from the government
2.4 If you have a child (children), how much do you spend on your children?
3 Housing History
3.1 House-moving History
- No. of years living in current residence
- When did you move to the current residence? Did anyone introduce you to this 
area?
- Does any of your relatives or friends live near this area?
- Who is the landlord of your current residence?
- How often did you move your residence?
- Where did you live before moving to this area? Who was the landlord of your 
previous residence?
- What was the main reason for moving from previous residence?
How long did you originally plan to live in this residence when you first 
decided to move in? If you have been living more than your first thought, what 
was the main reason for prolonged stay?
3.2 House Condition
Type of residence before and after house-moving
i. No. of rooms and size of each room
ii. Is there toilet and kitchen for your sole use? Do you have to share them 
with other families?
iii. Type of heating system, if any.
Have you ever done major maintenance and/or repair work of your current 
residence? 'Who paid for the repair and/or maintenance?
- Does any of your family members share the room?
3.3 Housing Expenditure
- Deposit/Monthly Rent
- Amount of bills 
Current savings
- Did you receive any help to pay your deposit or rent when you moved to 
current residence?
- Have you ever applied to financial institutions for loan? What was the 
outcome?
- Amount of current debt, and who did you borrow from?
4 Life in the neighbourhood
4.1 Do you like your neighbourhood? What are the good and bad aspects that you would
list?
4.2 Do you think there are enough facilities in your neighbourhood? What are the facilities
that you mostly miss?
4.3 How many people in your neighbourhood do you feel close enough to visit occasionally?
4.4 What are the advantages and disadvantages of your neighbourhood in comparison with 
other neighbourhoods nearby?
4.5 How often do you visit local banks or other financial institutions? Do you feel any 
hesitation in visiting these places?
4.6 How often do you use public transport? How convenient are they in terms of frequency 
and access to other parts of the city?
4.7 Have you ever felt insecure about the policing status in your neighbourhood?
4.8 Do you think garbage collection service is satisfying?
4.9 What do you feel toward the local municipal offices?
4.10 Is there any regular meeting with your neighbours? If there is, how often and how many 
persons do you meet during each meeting?
5 Regeneration and Life
5.1 Have you ever experienced eviction or resetdement due to regeneration?
5.2 What was your first feeling when you first heard the news?
5.3 Is your feeling at the moment any different from your initial feeling?
5.4 Have any of your neighbours already moved out of the area? Do you still keep in touch 
with them? Is your relationship or feeling towards them changed after they have moved 
out?
5.5 If you are thinking of moving out, do you have someone to discuss about this? What is 
your relationship with this person?
5.6 Are you qualified to receive compensation? If yes, what kind of compensation can you 
receive from whom?
5.7 What do you think of the compensation and resettlement measurement announced by 
the developer /  local government /  other parties who are responsible for this 
compensation? Is there anything that you feel fair or unfair?
5.8 What do you think regeneration project should consider the most in the process of 
regeneration?
5.9 Do you know any organisations (NGOs for example) or people who are working in your 
neighbourhood for the benefit of the residents?
If yes, have you met any of them? If you have, how often?
If no, what is the reason for not having met them yet?
Appendix A2 A sample of interview questionnaire for Beiiina residents
This questionnaire was used in Beijing to make sure the basic household details (personal 
details, family relations and income status) and housing history were collected correcdy in each 
interview. The questions were based on the interview schedule used in Seoul. Sections 1 to 3 in 
Appendix Al were translated into Chinese, and then further elaborated to meet the local 
circumstances.
(see overleaf)
Da
te:
 
20
03
 
¥
 
E
 
0 
Do
c. 
N
o,
&
K-
M*
i5F
*S
HI>yU'Rr\
Up
41
1m
7<
Si
af-
Si
as
□
H*
UP
M
£1 d+i
mi miSe vh1
□ □ M
IK <n <fei
$  asnff Den
ids ids
□  □
r-
S\
ids m
$  <ela® $
Hfc nz
a  m
g
is
K-
€H
m
m
N-1"
m
g
o&
m
•an
a
# #
to s_
□ IS a ft® «■ u ft®
« B & m
lb nJ lb rtf
m $ m $ •an
□ □ □ □ □
g
fcK
g
g
§
c^ -
1®
<v 3 i? o-
■tt g
1? K- rSm Qffil IdsX ids *
b g g IJS!
o-* lb dS iS *H Up
ids g IS g ids t t
a -H B ids a i?
IS ids 3 a IS a
1 a bK 5S mid
B IS S «
nK Kn
fflK bK
S a
iK H
o»
s<
«
Si
PI
«r
&
s ' -
*  «  
w <
$  N
IdS
Si W 
& g  
^  -H4
i» IS
>* □
Hi? ids ^  
ide ^  n
□ □ □
M.
lb
$
S< 
as iii-
® g
im m «k
ttU
£
mis
lb
m
jp
g
Iff
4K af 
B£ EH; 
tg «i
1 3  m il  m ilis=^ urn ®n
sc m gs? 
«  IS IS
s
SI
Pi
g
§n
K
>co
IS ebU ffiU 
Ids
I© IS IS
g  
£  E
SS B3
□ □
is £  m- 
r  ttf €H
□ □ □
m
§  £  ^  w-
5 *  ut 
g * t f  m
i^ b Q □ □
m
$fJS
&<*
4S Ids
fv*
g {S' BB
m ro
ids idsm fii <- m*L/iwS 1S? ids HI i i# ids &K <wS Si dS
s a 4S «n <n
to o a □mid
............................... |. ... ...—......... ...................  ...............
* m« &us mdS
. .. . ............ .
m
. ■:•■■:; .' . ... ■ '. .': ■ .
 . □ :£?R □ SIR
7c) D ttH itH
□ *  □ » *
.   . ,..r          — *   
□ /Js# □
□ □ *>t-
□ * # e i±
(SfliftA:
tiP
shu
□ □
—
s
$0 s
tip ^
&
iii
£
Ttt
H
3
W
-fir
m
**
Mi
faSfCi }^
□ □ 
nu- $5 
[1J 3i
P
Mt IV
iD
Mm
V*•-J
□  □
□ □ □
K SB es
tiP tip
*S £
SHII SWI
□ □
hd> a*• tip& -n*m tip
Sffll
Mm
*z
IP
Dt
aft
/W
m
is
Mm
sj*
A
HI
-H
Si
Sm
M
B
*
*
a t
msn
*
s
s
»
Date: 
2003 
£ 
0 
D
oc. N
o,
Appendix B1 List of residents interviewed in Seoul and Beiiina
Interviewee identification Residing neighbourhood, age, gender
(a) Residents interviewed in Seoul (20 interviewees in total)
SI. KSS3-INT-01
52. KSS6-INT-01
53. KSS7-INT-01
54. KSS7-INT-02
55. KSS7-INT-03
56. KSS7-INT-04
57. KSS7-INT-05
58. KSS7-INT-06
59. KSS7-INT-07
510. KSS7-INT-10
511. KSS7-INT-11
512. KSS7-INT-12
513. KSS7-INT-13
514. KSS7-INT-14
Sillim 3-dong resident (displaced from Nangok)
48 years old, female
Sillim 6-dong resident (displaced from Nangok)
70 years old, male
Nangok resident (subject to displacement)
32 years old, female
Nangok resident (subject to displacement)
also the vice-chairperson of the Tenants’ Association
in Nangok, 42 years old, female
Nangok resident (subject to displacement)
32 years old, male
Nangok resident (subject to displacement)
59 years old, male
Nangok resident (subject to displacement)
52 year-old female
Nangok resident (subject to displacement)
67 years old, female
Nangok resident (subject to displacement)
48 years old, female
Former Nangok owner occupier;
also Vice-chairman of the Council for the Residents’
Representatives, 65 years old, male
Sillim 7-dong resident (displaced from Nangok)
21 years old, female
Nangok resident (subject to displacement)
70 years old, male
Sillim 7-dong resident (displaced from Nangok)
37 years old, female
Sillim 7-dong resident (displaced from Nangok)
34 years old, female
S15. KSS7-INT-17 Nangok resident (subject to displacement) 
48 years old, female
S16. KSS7-INT-18 Sillim 7-dong resident (displaced from Nangok) 
38 years old, female
SI 7. KSS10-INT-01 Former Nangok resident (relocated to KNHGprovided 
rental flat in Sillim 10-dong), 60 years old, female
S18. KSS10-INT-02 Former Nangok resident (relocated to KNHGprovided 
rental flat in Sillim 10-dong), 62 years old, female
S19. KSS10-INT-03 Former Nangok resident (relocated to KNHGprovided 
rental flat in Sillim 10-dong), 69 years old, male
S20. KSS10-INT-05 Former Nangok resident (relocated to KNHGprovided 
rental flat in Sillim 10-dong), 60 years old, female
Residents interviewed in Beijing (20 interviewees in total)
Bl. CBX-INT-Ol Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 51 years old, female
B2. CBX-INT-02 Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 44 years old, female
B3. CBX-INT-03 Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 54 years old, female
B4. CBX-INT-04 Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 75 years old, female
B5. CBX-INT-05 Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 44 years old, female
B6. CBX-INT-06 Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 43 years old, female
B7. CBX-INT-07 Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 70 year-old male and 64 
year-old female
B8. CBX-INT-08 Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 47 years old, female
B9. CBX-INT-09 Xinzhongjie resident (subject to displacement upon 
second phase redevelopment), 57 years old, female
BIO. CBX-INT-10 Xinzhongjie resident (re-housed in the Sun Gty estate 
after first phase redevelopment) 
age not given (c. mid 50s), female
Bll .  CBX-INT-11
B12. CBK-INT-01
B13. CBK-INT-02
B14. CBK-INT-03
B15. CBH-INT-01 
B16. CBH-INT-02 
B17. CBY-INT-01 
B18. CBY-INT-02 
B19. CBY-INT-03 
B20. CBD6-INT-01
Xinzhongjie resident (rc-housed in the Sun Gty estate 
after first phase redevelopment), age not given 
(c. late 50s), female
Former Xinzhongjie resident (moved to Kangjiegou 
upon first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment)
66 years old, female
Former Xinzhongjie resident (moved to Kangjiegou 
upon first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment)
43 years old, female
Former Xinzhongjie resident (moved to Kangjiegou 
upon first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment)
68 years old, female
Haiyuncang resident (re-housed after redevelopment)
68 years old, female
Haiyuncang resident (re-housed after redevelopment)
78 years old, female
Yinghuayuan resident (moved from Xiangheyuan)
66 years old, female
Yinghuayuan resident (moved from Xiangheyuan)
74 years old, female
Yinghuayuan resident (moved from Xiangheyuan)
64 years old, female
Dongsi 6-tiao resident couple (temporary residence after 
displacement from Dongsi in Dongcheng District)
46 year-old male and female
Appendix B2 List of kev actors interviewed in Seoul and Beiiina
Interviewee identification Place of work, position, gender
(a) Key actors from Seoul
51. KSS7-INT-08
52. KSS7-INT-09
53. KSS7-INT-15
54. KSS7-INT-16
55. KSS7-INT-19
56. KSS7-INW01
57. KSS7-INW-02
58. KSS7-INW-03
59. KSS7-INW-04
510. KSS10-INT-04
511. KSS10-INW-01
512. KS99-INT-01
513. KS99-INT-02
514. KS99-INT-03
515. KS99-INT-04
Head of Sillim 7-dong Office, male
Korea National Housing Corporation
manager in charge of Nangok redevelopment, male
Sillim 7-dong resident working in Nangok 
42 years old, female
Chairperson of the Property Protection Committee for 
Sillim 7 District Redevelopment 
(a redevelopment district adjacent to Nangok), male
Member of the Gwanak District Assembly 
(Sillim 7-dong being his constituency, male
Church minister in Nangok, a respected local 
community leader, male
Head of the Tenants’ Association in Nangok, mid-40s 
male
Urban renewal consulting company working with the 
Council for the Residents’ Representatives, CEO, female
Member of the Council for the Residents’ 
Representatives, mid-40s, male
Head of Sillim 10-dong Office, male
Former Nangok resident (relocated to KNHGprovided 
rental flat in Sillim 10-dong), mid-40s, male
Head of the Housing Bureau 
Gwanak District Government, male
Korea Centre for City and Environment Research 
Senior research fellow, female
Head of the Housing Redevelopment Bureau 
Seoul Municipal Government, male
Assistant head of the Housing Planning Bureau 
Seoul Municipal Government, male
516. KS99-INT-05
517. KS99-INT-06
518. KS99-INT-07
(b) Key actors from Beijing 
Bl. CBX-INT-13 
B2. CBH-INT-03 
B3. CB99-INT-01
B4. CB99-INT-02
B5. CB99-INT-04
B6. CB99-INT-05
B7. CB99-INT-06
B8. CB99-INT-07
B9. CB99-INT-08
BIO. CB99-INT-09 
B ll. CB99-INT-10 
B12. CB99-INT-11
B13. CB99-INT-12
B14. CB99-INW-01
B15. CB99-INW02
Official at the Housing Policy Bureau 
Ministry of Construction and Transportation, male
Official at the Residential Renovation Department 
Ministry of Construction and Transportation, male
Hyundai Engineering and Construction, a leading 
developer in South Korea, manager, male
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader
Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee leader
Professor in Sociology, Tsinghua University, female
Professor in Economics, Beijing University, female
Xiangheyuan neighbourhood committee leader
Estate management company managing director, male
Beixinqiao branch of Dongcheng Housing Management 
Bureau, manager, male
Xinhua News Agency Reporter specialised in urban 
renewal
Foreign-funded housing management company 
manager, male
Real estate agency, general manager, male
Real estate consulting firm, assistant manager, male
Professor in Architecture and Urban Planning 
Tsinghua University, male
Xinzhongjie project-related developer 
former manager at China Homes Limited, male
Urban Construction Department
Dongcheng District Government, section chief, male
Xinzhongjie project-related overseas financier 
former manager, male
List of officials from Dongzhimen Street Office who attended and expressed their 
views in the meeting on 07th August 2003
Head of Dongzhimen Street Office
Section chief of Urban Construction Department, Dongcheng District 
Government
Section chief of Demolition and Relocation Department, Dongcheng District 
Government
Section chief of Low-rent Housing Department, Dongcheng District 
Government
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader 
Xiangheyuan neighbourhood committee leader
Appendix C Explanation of field research data classification
These classification systems are devised to organise field research materials for both 
electronic and non-electronic field research materials.
(a) All field materials excluding photographs
This classification system is for all field materials exdudina DhotoaraDhs.
The identification is composed of four parts: Area -  Data type -  Sequence - Descriptions
Area Country -  City - Administrative District
Country £  for mainland China K for South Korea
City B for Beijing S for Seoul
Admin. District S7 for materials related to Nangok neighbourhood redevelopment 
X for materials related to Xinzhongjie neighbourhood redevelopment 
H for materials related to Haiyuncang neighbourhood redevelopment 
99 for general materials
Data Type Source -  Subcategory
Source N for community-based organisations 
H for developers 
A for residents'organisations 
LG for local authorities 
CG for Central governments
Recorded type VA for verbatim account EH for pamphlets 
MM for researcher's own memos Q I for others
Sequence: 01, 02, 03...
Descriptions: Descriptive title of the field material
(b) Photographs taken during field research visits
This classification system is for all field materials exdudina Dhotoaraphs.
The identification is composed of six parts: Area -  Data type -  Year -  Grouping -  Sequence - Description
Area: Country -  City -  Administrative District
Country C for mainland China K for South Korea
City B for Beijing £  for Seoul
Admin. District S7 for materials related to Nangok neighbourhood redevelopment 
X for materials related to Xinzhongjie neighbourhood redevelopment 
H for materials related to Haiyuncang neighbourhood redevelopment 
99 for general materials
Data Type: Source MM for photographs taken by this researcher
OT for photographs taken by others (including those downloaded from web sites)
Year: 2001, 2002...
Grouping: 01 General
02 Local facilities including nurseries, study centres, etc.
03 Utilities and infrastructure including other support services
04 Building materials
05 Local organisations
06 View of streets and alley ways
07 Social settings
08 Housing conditions
09 Redevelopment in action (e.g. scenes of demolition)
10 Overall impression from various access points
Sequence: 01, 02, 03...
Descriptions: Descriptive title of the photograph
